Kammak

Just for sh*ts and giggles I had Vista look for audio driver updates, and I am running the latest and greatest available for my sound card. The culprit is the Windows audio system - audiodg.exe - from what I've read, all the sound requests go through that program for DRM purposes, and that is what appears to have the memory leak associated with Tacops playing sounds. Again, a down and dirty fix would be an option to disable all sounds in Tacops - so that it doesn't even try to play any audio. If you can provide this I would be eternally grateful MajorH. Kevin

Thanks for responding Sprocket62. RE: Sound can be disabled through OS - that doesn't address the issue though which is caused by Tacops trying to play audio files - I was asking for a way to disable Tacops from even trying to play them, as that will stop the memory issue. RE: Other processes, viruses - its clearly Tacops - I've played it several times now with the Task Manager process viewer side-by-side, and can watch the memory usage increase with each and every sound Tacops fires. Turning on click sounds slows down the issue, but Tacops still plays several sound files even with click sounds, so its a difference of playing four games instead of three before the system becomes unstable.... RE: Sound drivers - I admit could be the problem, but as I have no issues with anything else, both modern and classic games other than Tacops, I won't be touching the sound drivers anytime soon. I've played Tacops to death in years prior, and mostly reinstalled it for nostalgia.

Are there any command line options or hidden doohickeys that will let me play without any sounds at all? I deleted all the wav files but I'm guessing the game sounds are either in the .exe or some other resource file, right? This issue is pretty bad - play several times consecutively and the system becomes unstable from memory usage and then locks up the sound system. I hate to give up on Tacops, so any option that just disables the game from playing any sound effects would be much appreciated.

MajorH, I used to be active on your mailing list a while back, and played Tacopsv4 nonstop on Win98, NT, and XP without issue. I installed it recently on a Win Vista 32bit machine, and am having some real issues which I think are sound related. For the first time ever, ever, I have had Tacops v4 stop responding and been forced to not only end the process, but then reboot afterwards as there seems to be some nasty memory leak associated with playing the sounds during the game. I've had nothing but excellent performance from Tacops v4 for years, so this was quite a shock. I patched to the latest version right after install, 4.0.6 AH, but have not been able to play more than three battles consecutively without issue. I admit I haven't pin down exactly what is wrong, but the memory usage will usually spike after some sound file is attempted to play, and then the game stops responding, it takes the system a good forty plus seconds to shut it down, but then I have a huge memory usage leftover from the sound system software (I forget the exact process but its obviously related to the sound drivers). Any history of this issue with other folks? If you want specs and whatever I can provide, but wanted to touch base with you first and see if this is a known thing. Thanks in advance, Kevin (Kammak)

Outstanding, thanks 152mmDumbRocket.

What are the icons representing in the status display on a Thor tank? (If I'm using the wrong terms, I mean the pictures left of the green/yellow/red damage indicators.) Is there a reference that tells what they are for each vehicle? For a Thor MBT I'm guessing the top is driver, engine (?), fuel system, main gun, ?, and gunner at the bottom. No idea what the second from the bottom is either. Thanks

Helpful? Not quite. "Read the support guidelines". That is not helpful. I read the tacked posts and most of the previous posts before posting in the first place. The devs said the first thing they would do is ask for the logfile by email - meaning open the issue, they respond, and then the issue carries over to email if necessary. Pretty standard stuff. The error in your attempts to "help" is in assuming I'm a moron. I'm not. Don't bother submitting snide one liners that do no nothing to move forward in settling a serious issue with the software. If you don't know how to get around the error in posting logfile contents, quite wasting bandwidth with extraneous cr#p. I posted here to get official help from the devs or whomever supports this title. You obviously can't provide that support, so kindly stay off the thread. Regards, Kammak

@poesel71 You've got quite the attitude there, don't you? Before posting I went through the previous messages on this board - other folks have successfully posted their log file in a message, when I try, I get the error mentioned in my initial post. Obviously there is a way to post it here that I have not figured out. If you know how, great. If not, please drop the attitude posts and I'll wait for some real tech support from the dev shop. I guess you are trying to be helpful, but your delivery stinks. Regards, Kammak

Well, if you actually read my message you would see I tried to post the logfile and can't...so how about somebody address that first. Is this a real support board or just fellow-player support?

Hello, Ordered, downloaded, and installed Drop Team today. I also installed updated video drivers per the game's startup message. Issue: I have a bizarre background screen while in the "lobby". The text reads fine. Once in game, I have no aiming cursor. The "E" targeting cursor is just a very colorful bizarre shape. Apparently, many of the structures are displaying incorrect textures (black and white lines like a grid over the entire model). However, my units look fine and the ground seems to be normal. I've got a maybe 4:1 run to crash ratio so far. Since upgrading the video drivers, all other games I've checked are displaying correctly. I have messed with the video options in DropTeam but they do not affect the texture issue. Attached below is the logfile from my last session which ended with a CTD: Your help is appreciated, Kevin ======================================== Okay - I've tried to paste the logfile and post, but I keep getting an error message that it doesn't allow parenthesis...I don't see an "attach" option here - am I missing something obvious? How do I send the log contents to you? Kevin

"Kammak appears to have fallen into the "anything that is avoiding strength can be maneuver warfare" trap himself, when he uses Marines handing out food whilst in a state of peace with warlords in Somalia "a great example of maneuver theory". No it's not. It's a great example of what can be accomplished under peaceful circumstances." Nope. No trap. The mission was "deliver aid to the civilians". The on scene commanders had great leeway in determing how to go about it. The Marines saw the warlords were a definite surface...so instead of attacking them, attriting them, and attempting to destroy (which wasn't the mission at all) they engaged them in the process and succeeded in accomplishing the mission. They went into a disaster area filled with armed gangs and thugs, and had two basic choices - attrite the armed thugs as an enabling action to get food to civilians, or recongnize their power, admit they are a surface, and deal with them accordingly. They got food to the civilians in the most economical, "cheapest" way. No dead Marines, no dead Somali's, just civvies getting food and aid. No trap, just an intelligent analysis of the situation, instead of a "We've got guns, they've got guns, lets shoot more of them before they shoot more of us" solution. It ended a hell of a lot better than the following "strategy" of wiping out the bad guys which turned into a national embarrassment. As I said in my first detailed post, Maneuver Warfare is not revolutionary, just a culmination of basically good ideas from the past several hundred years of warfare. If you need to twist that into something weaker to give you something to argue with, whatever. The whole issue is kind of moot. Maneuver Warfare IS the doctrine used by the US Army, US Navy, and US Marine Corps, and thus usually implemented by the NCA and Joint Chiefs. Deal with it. Calling folks that disagree with you "idiots" just shows you to be very unhappy little men in front of computer screens. I'm outta here anyhoo. Thanks for the nice remarks to those that posted them! Regards, Kevin

One more example - the Phoenix project in Vietnam under the US. Forget about blowing up main force units, selectively target and kill VC insurgents in the villes. That is the closest any program came to the CAP Marines project in the I Corps zone. It went to the root of the insurgency issue, which was security for the peasants. If the vietnamese farmer, who doesn't give a hoot what is going on in Saigon, can work his rice fields, feed his family, and a have a good chew in peace, he won't contribute to the VC effort. However, the US battalion that does a sweep today and is gone by sundown doesn't protect him against the VC squads that come at night, store weapons and ammo in his hooches, and take rice taxes. They will kill him or his family on the spot if he doesn't comply. Whether the US forces killed 20 or 40 bad guys earlier doesn't affect this little situation one bit. But that situation, going on all over the countryside every evening, drives the insurgency. CAP Marines and Phoenix went to the heart of the issue and worked to secure the peasants from the VC, and it worked. It worked big time. It scared the hell out of Ho and Giap. By destroying the insurgency at the local level, the only option the North would have is conventional invasion, and they didn't want that against US regulars. Unfortunately these programs were either scuttled or of such small scale, and against Westmoreland's grand visions of battlefield annihilation, that they never got the attention they deserved or the resources they required for total success. But they are additional examples of an intelligent analysis of the situation resulting in focused efforts to address the unique strategic issue. CAP Marines in every ville, or a ten fold increase in phoenix teams would have been far more beneficial than all the arclight raids put together.

"This is starkly contrary to the actual facts. The older generals were not merely "loitering around Berlin", they also held the CAGs, AG, and most of the army level commands. They continually clashed with the maneuverists, none of whom had more than an army." There's that sarcasm that you fail to comprehend again. Sorry, I'll try to speak in simpler terms. Yes Kluge disagreed with Guderian, he was actually a big enough trog to "challenge" Guderian to a duel. And I'm glad to see you finally agree that Germany was not maneuver-warfare run rampant. As I stated earlier, the bulk of the German army did not embrace maneuverism, which you now agree with. The bulk of the general staff and higher commands were put off by the rampant advances of the panzer forces. Hitler, despite green lighting the formation of the panzer forces, consistently put the brakes on them in operation despite the pleas of the maneuverist commanders to continue. Did he occasionally side with them, yes. Was he committed to a maneuverist-mad drive across Europe, and that is what destroyed him, far from it. The claim that Guderian wanted to drive south instead of continuing on to Moscow is directly addressed and refuted by Guderian himself, so no real value in bring up that point. "Why on earth? Weren't the Russians "exhausted"?" Look at a map. Exhaustion favors the defenders. Internal lines and all that logistical stuff ring any bells? The Germans had been campaigning, the Russians had been falling back. The muddy season works against the advancing force and favors the static defender. Yes the Soviets were exhausted, but its not a zero sum equation. They both were spend, but the Germans still hadn't captured Leningrad or Moscow and were still required to maintain the offensive. Advantage Russia. "In other words, it is true, news to you, and you don't have an answer to it, so you will just sneer at it instead." No, I sincerely mean that it is so weak an argument it doesn't merit rebuttal. Right up there with an astrologer saying we lost because Mars was ascending. It is that silly of an argument. "Horsepucky. It was relevant in the Korean war. Wars between nuclear states do not instantly and automatically escalate to general nuclear exchange. But that does not mean they are never protracted affairs, or decided by logistical and firepower resource depth." Please try reading AND comprehending my posts before setting up false fronts. It would make this much simpler. I never said wars between nuclear states instantly and automatically escalate to nukes. So why would you falsely insert that claim and then argue against it? What is the word for that kind of debater..."s" something....? Attrition warfare based on industrial output and higher exchange ratios has not been the US strategy for any war since WWII except Vietnam under Kennedy/LBJ. Even then it was not industrial warfare, but "lets see how many we can kill and call that a win". The Gulf War was definitely a mixed bag, but to claim it was total attrition-oriented is fallacy. The Marines and JFC were supposed to be the holding force, pinning and drawing in reserves that would be bagged by the sweepers to the west. That the Marines acheived dramatic breakthroughs ahead of schedule is wonderful, but to claim that was the plan all along is just wrong. Compared to the fully mechanized army units, the Marines had limited operational mobility, so they were best suited to the "ordinary" fight. They were far from the main effort, and their results were unexpected, unanticipated, but luckily still capitalized on. However, great attention was paid to maneuver warfare theory in trying to determine Iraq's operational and tactical gaps and surfaces, and attacking those gaps before and during the ground war. CentCom didn't charge into Kuwait with full force intent on destroying every unit they encountered. Many Iraqi units *were* disrupted and did collapse immediately. They weren't destroyed by smart bombs or even dumb bombs, nor by direct fire for the most part. They were destroyed morally. The greatest failures to use maneuver theory in the Gulf War have more to do with issues of sychronization, command push, and heavily centralized execution. The primary drivers behind that are the USAF and to a lesser extent the army high brass. Did it work in Iraq, yes. Is it the best way to prosecute a war, a lot of bright folks don't think so. Despite your opinion that maneuver warfare demands perfection, it actually recognizes and encourages action, even incorrect, as opposed to inaction. That is why mission orders and decentralized execution as pillars of the theory - it recognizes that the lower commands hold the "ground truth" and are better able to react to it than higher commands. Anethema to the air power folks, because they want to win the war by themselves, which requires massing air assets and using them independant of the ground forces. Thus Marine air, designed as an integral component of every USMC fighting command for close air support, gets stripped out and placed under the JFACC to fight the "coordinated" air battle. Not a good solution. But for more examples of attrition-oriented failures, look to Somalia. The initial phase, under the Marines (manuever warfare proponents) went it to fulfill the mission of bringing aid to the civilian population. They looked at the ground truth, saw the warlords were a definite "surface", so they parlayed with them to create a cease fire to accomplish the mission. Aid got to the civilians, there was relative peace in most areas the Marines operated in, and not very Marines got shot. Exit the Marines, enter a new set of commanders, and they scuttle the cease fire, pick one warlord as the big man on campus, then seek out to destroy the others. TF Ranger comes in to hunt down and capture "the bad guys", that months earlier had been assisting the Marines in deliverying aid. A great example of maneuver warfare theory being applied to a non-standard situation. The goal was delivering aid to civilians. The Marines analyzed the unique situation, determined its relative strengths and weaknesses, and executed a plan accordingly. No raging street battles, no captured helo crews, just Somalis downing well need foodstuffs and Marines not getting shot at. A great example of an attrition oriented plan failing - Israel and the Palestinians. Bomb goes off in Haifa, Israel sets out to kill some Palestinians. Rinse and repeat forty, sixty, a thousand times....Killing the enemy ain't working, because Israel isn't addressing any strategic issues, other than attriting the bad guys. Classic failure of a pure attrition strategy. Dien Bein Phu - great possibility for a battle of annihilation...we'll camp out at some place that is of limited strategic value, wait for the bad guys to surround us, then kill em all. Only the French don't have US airpower, so instead of Khe Sanh they get the battle now synonymous with utter failure. No strategic issue involved there other than killing Viet Minh bad guys, and it backfired. But suppose the French did have enough firepower to kill 'em all...what did it accomplish? Were all the radical vietnamese insurgents dead? No. Did all the vietnamese now want to embrace Cosmopolitan France as their true master? No. Would they have ruled indochina with ease, peace and properity now? No. Attrition without consideration for the ultimate strategic issues doesn't work. OK, maybe it does work occasionally...people win the lottery too. But it doesn't make the lottery a sound investment strategy. There are better ways to fight and win wars. Just because you can't always model it in a computer game, doesn't mean it doesn't work in real life. (Deltalogic's "Blackhawk Down" would probably always outsell "Parlay with the Warlords" every time. But it was still a better strategy.)

RE:"Chinese civil war, Iran-Iraq war, Afgan war, Eritrea, Vietnamese war (from both sides) Algerian war, Korean war, Tamil Tigers, all involved industrial mobilisation, (both of material and manpower) beyond the existing forces in uniform. Heck, the Japanese economy was kickstarted by the US mobilisation for Korea. I think you will find the USA ended Vietnam with completely different equipment than they started it with." If you want to call limited drafting full mobilization of a nation's economy, then yes you are right. I consider industrial warfare to be its WWII incarnation, with projections about tons of shipping produced per month, number of AFV units per month, etc....which hasn't been a factor in any war since WII. Korea did not involve mobilization of the US economy by any stretch of the imagination, one of the many reasons it is called the Forgotten War. The bulk of the gear used by UN forces was WWII surplus. Vietnam likewise involved no major industrialization on the part of the US, and in fact had little direct impact on the nation...which is why Abrams re-structured the US Army afterwards so it *couldn't* fight without significant reserve call ups in the future. Another factor is that many belligerents are incapable of producing machines of war - so they have no way to "ramp up" production once a war starts. Once the cash runs out for arms purchases, unless they are a client state of a superpower they are left with at-hand forces. That the major powers continue to develop and produce new war machines is not the same as saying they are involved in an industrial war of attrition. There have been steady advances in armor, aircraft, and personal arms throughout peace and war...that doesn't equate to a nation being fully mobilized for attrition warfare. "I thought attrition was the primary strategy of western nations now? Massive firepower to destroy the other side, before you run out of smart bombs. If you can't, don't even start the war in the first place..." Its not the primary strategy of the USMC, USN, or the US Army. I can't speak for other nations. That the USAF continues to hollar about how it can win wars with airpower alone by blowing up stuff from 20,000 feet is a constant embarrassment to the rest of the US military community, but I wouldn't call it the national strategy of the US! "As for attrition loss rates not being acceptable by any population - Afganistan, Vietnam, China, Bangladesh (lost 300,000 in the civil war), Iran. It's amazing how high an attrition rate a population will accept, if they believe it is the route to freedom, or defending something they believe in." Well, in those cases the losses were acceptable to the *Leaders*, but I doubt the followers were as happy about it. So yes, it is a fully valid strategy for despotic regimes where the masses have no political franchise. For western nations, not so much, in my opinion.

"I look at what they prepared to do when Moscow was approached, and can see it did not lead to command shock" If you don't call Beria sueing for peace and offering large chunks of land to stop the war "Command Shock" then you are in worse denial than already evidenced. That was during Typhoon when the Germans were spent but still threatening Moscow. Had Guderian continued onto Moscow BEFORE the muddy season and before the Asian forces were pulled out and sent west, the situation would have been even worse for the Soviets. Deny it all you want, but Moscow was a critical vulnerability for the Soviets and should have superseded the destruction of forces that could be stalled and reduced later. "Bystanders" (per your term) can either take your opinion, or that of contemporary senior Soviet leaders, contemporary German field commanders (Guderian, Bock, et al), and a good many modern historians and strategists. Hmmm, which one holds more value...? ""most of the great setbacks occurred when operating under direct orders from Hitler" False. The failure of Typhoon was a great setback, and Hitler had not yet taken charge. In fact, the army commanders were mostly busy resigning to avoid responsibility" You are again, wrong. Hitler had direct influence on every campaign regardless of later titles or laws increasing his despotic powers. He rejected Moscow was a primary objective, then compounded his mistake by not at least designating his choice as THE MAIN EFFORT, but instead frittering away time and resources with three thrusts. It was his intervention that drove Guderian south instead of continuing to Moscow. It was his intervention that halted the forces in front of Dunkirk. His influence was omnipresent throughout the war. And invariably his opinions were counter to the manuever-minded commanders. He thus set up a situation where he was armed and equipped for a quick war of manuever, had manuever-minded commanders in many of his higher commands, but continually intervened and countermanded manuever-oriented plans. That there were still many older generals skeptical of manuever loitering around Berlin at the time only helped him to justify his opinions to himself. Thus my line "any plan can fail with poor execution". Germany had great plans for the war, and prepared and advertised for one type of war, but the illogical, and later irrational, input of Hitler hounded its execution throughout. "Is 18 months of strategic initiative supposed to be a *short* period of time? Is losing it in 18 months "rapid" loss of it? " Do you practice being obtuse, or does it come naturally? (I assume since you called me an idiot that personal degradation is hunky-dory with you.) The German initiative was lost once they stopped directing the action and started responding to it - halting the advance on Moscow, investing Leningrad instead of taking it, and re-directing forces to counter a "failed" Soviet thrust is "losing the initiative". By the time the battle of Kiev ended, the Germans were exhausted. The culminating point of the 41 campaign had been reached...the fall brought the muddy season, fresh forces from siberia, and few replacements for the Germans. The initiative was lost. Again, an obvious fact for anyone that has actually studied the war. "Objectives are not locations on maps." They sure can be. If a point on the map has some inherent value to the enemy, you can bet it will be an objective. If that position can unhinge forces, cut off his lines of communication, represents a geographic choke point, has political value, etc...you can bet it can be an objective. Despite your opinions, objectives are unique to the enemy of the day...and not always just the bad guys with guns. "Meanwhile, maneuverism *does* hope to stun the enemy into submission, to panic his command, to bring about a *psychological* collapse following disarticulation of C3I etc" Nope. Maneuverism seeks to achieve victory in the most economical way. IF you are dealing with an enemy that is command-driven, mechanized, and fairly hi-tech, then his C3I may be a vulnerability (a gap). If you can disrupt his C3I you can then destroy his forces with greater ease, or he may collapse all together. What you keep falling back on as a weakness of manuever warfare is actually "information warfare" / fourth gen warfare. That is not synonymous with Maneuver Warfare. Manuever Warfare can be applied without regard for the technical sophistication of the enemy - information warfare presupposes a "wired" foe with the inherent vulnerabilities of electronic C3I. You will have a hard time trying to force your own distorted opinion of what manuever war is, when you have to argue against printed doctrinal manuals from one of the world's foremost manuever warfare proponents and a respected fighting force, that continually contradict you. Regarding your "Watergate lost Vietnam" spiel, I think the weakness of that argument is so obvious it doesn't merit a response. And by the way, Ho was still around when Khe Sanh occurred - thus my line "How did losing several divisions make Ho lose the war?" line. Also, he didn't lose, that was sarcasm. I noted a few places where your remarks displayed an inability to recognize that form of humor. ""Did the US get better strategic value from Third Army's drive through France" Straw man. The breakout was only possible *after* attrition destroyed the German force in Normandy." You again miss the entire point. The question in the original post was whether greater strategic value was gained by the 3rd Army's drive through france, or should they have instead spent that time reducing the surrounded Germans in the atlantic port towns. Had nothing to do with breaking out of the peninsula. "I wonder if the bystanders can understand the sheer silliness of it all. They've got an operation that should be a poster child for the usefulness of offensive maneuver by armor, and they disown it and pretend it was a giant mistake. And why? Because it didn't promise to win the war practically without fighting, but actually passed through the intermediate step "destroy the enemy army". They must paint the Germans of WW II - the actual masters at implimenting offensive maneuver, with greater success and to a greater extent than anyone else before or since - as pikers who do not understand their own, gloriously purified doctrine. It is just plain silly, and should be laughed off the stage" I think the one that should be laughed off the stage is the "piker" (whatever that is) that can't understand my posts and puts words in my mouth (or keyboard)! RE: "they disown it and pretend it was a giant mistake. And why?" Well, I'm not disowning it because I'm not German, didn't fight there, and never owned it in the first place. I believe it was a giant mistake for the same reason Guderian believed it was a giant mistake, as did Halder, Bock, and a few other manuever-oriented commanders - because it stalled the drive on Moscow. And no one here is painting the Germans as "pikers" - I have continually stated that the greatest accomplishments were carried out under the personal direction of the division and corps commanders. The only true, constant, "piker" was Hitler. Just look at his orders through the war, compared to the original op orders or the intent of the field commanders, and you'll see the light. "Swamping the enemy with numbers is the actual strategy that won WW II." And immmediately dropped by every major power after the war ended, because its a piss-poor strategy. Its a strategy by exclusion...meaning you can't come up with anything else, so you fall back on attrition. (There are lots of diseases that fall in the same category - there is no empirical test for them, rather you declare it to be active when no other known disease can be found.) When talking about any conflict involving a nuclear power, industrial warfare is completely irrelevant. Any nuclear power that suffers total destruction (or the threat of total destruction) of its conventional forces will go nuclear to stem off defeat. Its a dead theory because its a bad theory, and because its no longer applicable to any conflict involving a major power. Ironically, industrial warfare demagogues have firepower to blame for their demise, in the form of nuclear devices! Post WWII warfare was, and will continue to be, fought with existing forces without regard for any industrial capacity of the belligerents. Nations must enter a conflict with a strategy that can win with the forces in uniform. Within that subset, Maneuver Warfare is a viable and attractive strategy. That is to say, manuever warfare for real, as presented in previous posts from USMC doctrinal publications, and not maneuver warfare straw man garbage. Attrition as the sole strategy for victory can win, but at loss rates, even for the victor, that can no longer be tolerated by any population. To espouse attrition as the primary strategy for a western nation is about the same as declaring total neutrality - you will never get an administration (or a population) to support a war waged under attritionists themes. Maneuver Warfare, like any theory, has bonehead supporters as well as the occasional genius. Supporters have differing views on the application of manuever theory. You can support maneuver theory but vehemently disagree about what a foes' center of gravity is, or what its critical vulnerability is. But at least those questions are being asked, and lives are being saved, by intelligently analysing the situation and determining its unique values to find the most efficient path to victory. Any bozo claiming the "official" manueverist answer is "x" has no clue what he is talking about. There is no official answer because maneuver theory treats war as a social construct, not a physical one governed by mathematical laws. As I stated before, the only constant in maneuver theory is total orientation on the current enemy. It is a theory that matches the political, economic, and ideological realities of the times. Short of alien invaders showing up one day threatening humanity with extermination or slavery, I don't think attrition will be anyone's preferred strategy. (Other than a few very unhappy war game enthusiasts.) Regards, Kevin

"Germany failed in Russia, at least in major part, because she ODed on maneuverism." This is one assertion that requires a hell of a lot of supporting facts. If you have seriously studied World War II and looked at the influence of Hitler directly on the campaigns you can't make that claim. Maneuverism was not embraced en-masse by the German army, and certainly not by the general staff. Hitler supported it on the production/technology side to a point, but consistently fought it in operation. The rare occasions where orders were vague enough (or simply not in existence yet) is when the maneuver proponents, the Division and Corps commanders, really "showed their stuff". That is when most of the phenomenal accomplishments of the German army occurred. Germany was not Maneuver Warfare run amok by any stretch of the imagination. The fact that most of the great setbacks occurred when operating under direct orders from Hitler, against any aspect of Maneuver Warfare theory, would seem to be proof enough for most. But if you have actual examples of where a maneuver-oriented plan, executed per the original plan, resulted in a disadvanteous situation, please share. Starting with Dunkirk, through north Africa, and throughout the eastern front, history shows the division and corps commanders pressing for more freedom for pursuit and exploitation, or defense in depth, but being denied the opportunity by Hitler or the general staff. They consistently curbed advances in favor of a *quicker* reduction of surrounded (and irrevelent) forces, or imposed rigid defense lines (hold to the last man) which robbed the commander of any maneuver option for the defense. The examples are so abundant I don't think I need to list them...but if you actually challenge this claim I can present scores of them. The net effect is a rapid loss of the operational and strategic initiative, as time was wasted attrited forces already rendered irrevelent, while still-relevent forces were allowed to withdraw, strengthen, and reorient. The attrition of surrounded forces is a forgone conclusion, but maneuver theory postpones that task so that the greater objectives can first be realized. Why attrite a division today, when I can come back in two weeks, after I've wiped out his army and group headquarters, destroyed his supply columns, cut him off from any support, and squash him with ease? Examples: Did the US get better strategic value from Third Army's drive through France (maneuver), or should it have spent that same time attriting german forces holed up in the atlantic port cities (attrition)? Did the US get better strategic value from the Tenth Corps in Korea by landing at Inchon (maneuver), or should they have been sent straight into the Pusan perimeter for a good-old-slugfest with the NKPA (attrition)? Was South Vietnam more stable because of battles like Khe Sanh (attrition) or because of CAP Marines and the ink-blot methods of the Marine commanders (maneuver)? Getting back to WWII, the Germans were not practicing Maneuver Warfare in the extreme, not by any stretch of the imagination. To claim otherwise is ignorance of the historical facts. And it certainly no basis upon which to make blanket declarations about the validity of Maneuver Warfare in general. On final note - an aspect of this argument that has slid in but not been addressed directly is the relative animosity between opposing forces. A surrounded unit is far more likely to surrender to a force with "pleasant" POW policies than to maurauders that kill every last man. That psychological aspect can't be ingnored when discussing the merits of encirclement and morale collapse. The Iraqi army that stood up to human wave attacks by the Iranians, and did the same in turn, folded with amazing ease in two wars against the Americans now...in part because of the expectation of treatment of POWs. Had the US summarily executed POWs in the first gulf war, things would have definitely played out differently this time in the desert. What this underscores is the real existence of the psychology element of warfare, which is beyond simple calculations of tank production, exchange ratios, or body counts. Had the nazi regime not totally fouled up the occupation of eastern europe, the war in Russia could have been very different. The will to fight is a real, powerful force to reckon with. A civil occupation policy and civil POW treatment is worth more than several infantry corps when it comes down to a fight-or-flight decision on the part of the front line soldier. Its another one of the "grey" aspects of war that Maneuver Warfare forces us to recognize, and if possible, capitalize on.

You gotta love a guy with an opinion about everything he's read! Let's begin: "Yes Guderian wanted to go to Moscow. He was wrong." I love bald statements of right and wrong conferred with no supporting argument. Guderian was wrong because some guy called JasonC on a wargame board says so! OK. Next. "Russia withstood losses of millions of men in the greatest string of military catastrophes in recorded history, in battles that make Cannae look like a walk in the park. They were still fighting like tigers. (Please note that doesn't mean "skillfully". Men with guns defeat tigers regularly)....They didn't *have* a "psychological breaking point". " Which argues very well towards the point that a strategy of attrition wasn't going to win quickly against them. As you point out, killing army upon army of Soviet forces didn't achieve anything at all. I completely agree. From here you went onto a spiel about production and manufacturing or "industrial warfare", and posit that the reason Germany lost was because she failed to mobilize her economy. In essence, by that logic, it doesn't matter what strategy Germany followed - they would have lost because they didn't ramp up production. "They gambled on maneuver supplying multipliers that were unbounded above. They gambled on maneuver making odds irrelevant." Not really. Hitler consistently intervened at critical moments to stall the forces and lose the momentum already achieved. Manuever was consistently denied the opportunity to show its colors by either Hitler or older generals that were unnerved by it. Any plan can be made to fail with poor execution - and no one can argue that Germany's strategic and operational development was consistent or even rational with the frequent intervention and about-face orders from Hitler or the general staff. So it is very troublesome to try to draw *vast* conclusions about maneuver warfare from the experiences of World War II. Falling back on an industrial warfare theory is one step short of admitting you abandon any pretense of strategy, and just plan on swamping the enemy with numbers. "Not Kiev. Killing entire army groups inside of a month is not a mistake. The only way to defeat a state as powerful as Russia is to destroy its army." Its a matter of time - wiping out army groups without first securing the broader strategic objectives IS a mistake, because even a victorious battle COSTS the victor time, men, material, and momentum. It plays into the hand of the opponent with more forces because it robs the other guy of his initiative. Guderian was forced to halt his advance, swing 90 degrees around and drive away from his original objective to wipe out something of little strategic value to the enemy. By your own words killing and capturing hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops didn't phase the Soviets - so why was it the smart thing to do for the Germans? All it did was rob the Germans of time and resources, neither of which they had in abundance, but which the enemy DID. That is a very poor strategic decision. The panzer forces were Germany's "extraordinary forces" per Sun Tzu's analogy, and were strategically wasted any time they forfeited their powers as such and were forced to fight in the "ordinary" role. That was the fight of the infantry corps/army - to surround and reduce enemy forces rendered operationally irrelevent by the advance of the panzer corps. At the strategic level (i.e. winning or losing the WAR) the only real value of the panzer forces was in maneuver. "But you cannot afford to ignore the need to match the enemy in resource mobilization. You cannot afford to be prepared only for a short successful offensive war, while being unprepared for a long, see-saw one including periods of defense. The strategic context of attrition or odds or annihilation battle, focused on armies as the real center of gravity of modern states in war, cannot be ignored without inviting disaster." You can ignore industrial warfare if you can win quickly. Fact. That is why industrial warfare was dropped so quickly following WWII because nations realized a nuclear war would not allow industrialization to matter. Even conventional defense of Europe post WWII did not rely on any industrial output calculations, but on time-space relationships - making every existing unit operationally significant as quickly as possible. The true renaissance of industrial warfare was in the Kennedy cabinet (and later LBJ) and epitomized by the Rand folks of the time - actually computing the exact number of arty shells required for the next war and suggesting the surplus be destroyed ahead of time to save money. Those folks honestly thought they could mathematically compute warfare and turn it into a science of input and outputs...and produced the Vietnam war. Khe Sanh probably epitomizes your example of a great attrition fight in which US firepower is brought to bear and the enemy is utterly destroyed - right? A great tactical success and even operational success - but what strategic value did it have? How did losing several NVA divisions make Ho lose the war? How did arc light raids contribute to the strategic success of US interests in Vietnam? Finally, just a thought on sequencing. I detect an outright enthusiasm in your posts for the destruction of the enemy, preferably as soon as possible. In this way, it is your opinion, that wars are won. You object to maneuver warfare because you see it as hindering the "ultimate" goal of killing the bad guys. Instead of viewing it that way - consider that it just postpones the killing until the conditions are even better. Instead of walking up to my foe and punching him, I wait until he eats, has a few beers, and falls asleep, then I walk over and crush his windpipe with ease. Ultimate goal is the same, victory. Intermediate goal is to win with less expense of resources. In the above example, I took no return blows, suffered no injuries, only spent some time waiting. In that case I am both the ordinary and the extraordinary force. Maneuver Warfare, as pointed out in many quotes in my previous posts, still destroys the enemy, but it seeks to do it in a far more efficient manner.

Is this how you normally discuss things? Because it comes across as a rant, going everywhich way, with no real points, reference to sources, or clear focus. If I read you correctly on one point, you seem to think Hitler was right to go south instead of going to Moscow...which is exactly the opposite of what Guderian wanted. And Guderian wanted Moscow not because it would magically win the war, but because Moscow was a vital comm/transport hub for all of Russia. Seizing Moscow first would have made the drive into the Caucasus much easier the following season. Even Guderian himself notes that Paris was not the same at all as Moscow - "I therefore explained basically and in detail the points that favoured a continuation of the advance on Moscow and that spoke against the Kiev operation....I described to him [Hitler] the geographical significance of Moscow, which was quite different from that of, say, Paris. Moscow was the great Russian road, rail and communication centre: it was the political solar plexus; it was an important industrial area; and its capture would not only have an enormous psychological effect on the Russian people but on the whole of the rest of the world as well." (199 Panzer Leader) Moscow was one of a few critical vulnerabilities of the Soviets that should have been designated a main effort...not attacking the mass of Soviet forces, which was a definite "surface" for the Soviets - massive manpower and resources. Annihilating Soviet armies without regard for the broader strategic picture was a large mistake. The strategic "gap" for both the Soviets and the greater alliance against Germany was Moscow. For the alliance, the fall of a capital would be extremely demoralizing and would change the political landscape of the world. For the Soviets, losing Moscow would have imposed a severe hit on their lines of communication, thus aiding the Germans in subsequent offensives. Attacking something the enemy has in large quantities isn't a good way to win wars. RE: "Note the inaccurate claim that firepower mostly stuns and takes a long time to actually cause outright destruction" You completely miss the scope of the original statement. Nor did it say firepower stuns. I will requote: "The greatest effect of firepower is generally not physical destruction —the cumulative effects of which are felt only slowly—but the disruption it causes." (74 FMFM 1) Please keep in mind the scope here - and note the word stun does not appear anywhere. Yes the immediate effect of firepower is dramatic...no need to state the obvious too much in a doctrinal publication. The statement is that the *cumulative physical effect* on the enemy of unit-by-unit destruction is felt slowly. Example: I wipe out ten soldiers, physically the enemy gets ten more guys on the line, not much overall operational or strategic effect. That kind of attrition *will* eventually have an impact, but it will be graduated with the force of the firepower involved and the scarcity or surplus of manpower available to the enemy. To me, this seems a very reasonable, logical, and historically accurate statement. Now, it seems you are putting words in my mouth regarding body counts. I never claimed you were arguing for body counts, so please re-read my post to clear up that misconception. The portion of my post dealing with body counts was in reference to the popularity of a theory that wasn't obsessed with killing for no reason other than killing. RE: "that the remaining fielded forces of the enemy are rendered irrelevant even though intact" With this statement you seem to imply that the remaining forces are left intact by Maneuver Theory. This is again incorrect. The purpose of disruption and dislocation is to facilitate victory...i.e. its easier to render the forces combat ineffective once they no longer fight as a team but instead as a bunch of drunken brawlers. Here is the enlightening line: "Yes I want to target the enemy army. It is the center of mass." How to put this...umm...WRONG. Was the American military defeated in Vietnam? Did the Vietnamese kill more Americans and allies than they lost? No. Warfare is not science - there is no 2+2=4 in warfare. Its a social construct, not a physical one. The US and allied military forces were no more the center of gravity for the US in Vietnam than the NVA and VC were the center of gravity for Ho. What better example would anyone need to prove the fallacy that the armed opposing force is *always* the enemy's center of gravity than Vietnam? Hell, even Sun Tzu knew that - or is he always wrong too? Finally, you refer a couple of times to "the other doctrine" - who exactly are you talking about? Please give us a quote from a military manual that says "unleash maneuver from any subservience to battle"? I honestly don't know what you are talking about, and therefore assume you are either arguing about the extremes of a theory, or just making up stuff to blast at. I have presented numerous quotes from several doctrinal publications that flatly refute many of your claims about Maneuver Warfare, so now you claim you are arguing against "modern maneuverism"...my question is - Who Cares? You seem to be arguing about a theory that no one uses, or you simply don't understand or refuse to understand what Maneuver Warfare theory really is.

Having gone through your last 2 posts now, let me say you are all over the place - what exactly are you arguing about? You make a bunch of statements, counterstatements, and then say one is right and the other wrong, with no justification for why one is "the official" maneuver answer and the other "the official" xxx answer, where xxx is the name of the theory you believe is always right. Manuever Warfare is not the same as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), Fourth Gen warfare, and information warfare. They are certainly related and are at the forefront of discussion co-incidentally, but they are not all the same thing. You consistently make the assumption that maneuver warfare = center of gravity = soft target = avoid fighting. That is incorrect. A fundamental step in maneuver application is correctly determing the enemy center of gravity/critical vulnerability. They vary at each level of warfare. And they can change with time. RE: Your example about breakouts...I'm guessing you are trying to address the concept of surfaces and gaps, but being far too literal. A good description of surfaces and gaps: "Gaps may in fact be physical gaps in the enemy’s dispositions, but they may also be any weakness in time, space, or capability: a moment in time when the enemy is overexposed and vulnerable, a seam in an air defense umbrella, an infantry unit caught unprepared in open terrain, or a boundary between two units. Similarly, a surface may be an actual strongpoint, or it may be any enemy strength: a moment when the enemy has just replenished and consolidated a position or a technological superiority of a particular weapons system or capability." (92 FMFM 1 Warfighting) Don't read gap as "where the bad guy ain't" - it isn't that simple. RE: JDAMs and the Air Forces..etc...The US Air Force has, since its inception, been trying to come up with an institutional "strategy" that would actually work in a war. They have always been firepower advocates because they have nothing else to offer - so no surprise they continue to push attrition and firepower as that is the only way they can win funding. They have no real air-to-air threat anymore so they must focus on their contribution to the ground battle, and that contribution is in the form of firepower. There is no real historical or strategical backing behind it, its an institutional survival plan with no bearing on the merits of Maneuver Warfare theory.

Fallacy - Maneuver Warfare seeks only to win without fighting, denies the importance of firepower, and focuses solely on physical movement. That is the typical beginning that most "critics" start from, them start a long winded diatribe about how stupid it is,etc... Maneuver Warfare as it is commonly used by the USMC and is written about by Leonhard, Lindh and others is much more than physical movement. It is a distallation of basically "good ideas" that have emerged from 500-600 years of military history. Maneuver Warfare doesn't suggest that you drive up behind the bad guy, yell boo, and win the war. It is a mostly operational and somewhat strategic thought process with very little application at the tactical level. The USMC, one of the foremost supporters of Maneuver Warfare, still spends the bulk of FMFM 3 Tactics talking about combined arms, use of terrain, and the effective use of fires to destroy the enemy. Move up the ladder to FMFM 6 Ground Combat Operations and of course FMFM 1 Warfighting, and you enter the real realm of Maneuver Warfare. Even there, you still have full appreciation of firepower and violence: "At all levels of the GCE, regardless of location on the battlefield, violence of action in the face of the enemy is required. Violence of action is an integral component of maneuver warfare. Violence against the enemy during the conduct of maneuver warfare is no different than that experienced in past wars and is not to be solely associated with an "attrition" style of warfare."" (1-17 FMFM 6) "Maneuver that does not include violent action against the enemy will not be decisive." (1-10 FMFM 6) "Firepower and attrition are essential elements of warfare by maneuver. In fact, at the critical point, where strength has been focused against enemy vulnerability, attrition may be extreme and may involve the outright annihilation of enemy elements." (38 FMFM 1) What Maneuver Warfare does dictate is that the use of firepower be directly tied to the overall purpose of the campaign, and not used just because it can: "Rather than wearing down an enemy’s defenses, maneuver warfare attempts to bypass these defenses in order to penetrate the enemy system and tear it apart. The aim is to render the enemy incapable of resisting effectively by shattering his moral, mental, and physical cohesion—his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole" (73 FMFM 1) "This is not to imply that firepower is unimportant. On the contrary, firepower is central to maneuver warfare. Nor do we mean to imply that we will pass up the opportunity to physically destroy the enemy. We will concentrate fires and forces at decisive points to destroy enemy elements when the opportunity presents itself and when it fits our larger purposes. Engaged in combat, we can rarely go wrong if we aggressively pursue the destruction of enemy forces. In fact, maneuver warfare often involves extremely high attrition of selected enemy forces where we have focused combat power against critical enemy weakness." (74 FMFM 1) "The greatest effect of firepower is generally not physical destruction —the cumulative effects of which are felt only slowly—but the disruption it causes." (74 FMFM 1) "Inherent in maneuver warfare is the need for speed to seize the initiative, dictate the terms of action, and keep the enemy off balance, thereby increasing his friction. Also inherent is the need to focus our efforts in order to maximize effect. In combat this includes violence and shock effect..." (74 FMFM 1) But even in FMFM 3 Tactics - pretty far down the chain, we have the following lines: "Therefore, the Marine Corps has embraced a more flexible, imaginative, and effective way to wage war: maneuver warfare. This does not mean, however, that combat should be viewed as a bloodless ballet of movement. Combat, especially at the tactical level of war, will be characterized by tough, brutal, and desperate engagements." (16 MCDP 1-3) "The application of Marine Corps tactics does not mean that we expect to win effortlessly or bloodlessly or that we expect the enemy to collapse just because we outmaneuver him. It means we look for and make the most of every advantage and apply the decisive stroke when the opportunity presents itself." (101 MCDP 1-3) "It is not enough merely to gain advantage. The enemy will not surrender simply because he is placed at a disadvantage." (101 MCDP 1-3) Maneuver Warfare is generally defined by several characteristics including strong emphasis on Mission Orders, Recon Pull vice Command Push, designation of a Main Effort, identifying and attacking the enemy Center of Gravity/Critical Vulnerability, and Tempo. Tempo of course applying to the entire range of warfare, from vehicle speed to CinC decision-making. IF the enemy's center of gravity is his armed forces, Maneuver Warfare dictates you destroy his armed forces. How they are destroyed is another question, and depends solely on the situation. What Maneuver Warfare supporters want to get away from is a de-facto assumption that the only course to victory is through destruction, by firepower, of the entire enemy force. It doesn't take a genius to see the origins of support for this theory of warfare growing out of junior officers' experience in Vietnam, where the only strategy coming down from on high was attrition as measured by body counts. While given enough time and resources that strategy may actual win, there are far better, quicker, and economical paths to victory in that same scenario that were never supported or in some cases never even implemented. Maneuver Warfare has no absolutes other than total orientation on the ENEMY - what will bring about the collapse of my current enemy at this time. If its means destroying his armed forces, go for it. If it means decapitating his senior leadership, go for it. Just don't charge in with guns blazing, fixated on killing and blowing up stuff, and call that a "strategy". RE: Your last post with bits about France and Russia, I honestly didn't follow it to closely. It seemed to have nothing do to with Maneuver Warfare theory as it is applied by military professionals. If you are instead interested in arguing about the hypothetical extremes of manuever warfare vs. attrition warfare, I have no interest in that. At the extremes, any theory is stupid. Thats why no one actually uses any theory at the extreme end of its range. If your initial chess parody was ridiculing some Maneuver Warfare supporter pushing the extreme edge of the theory, then I retract my remarks as you were dead on. I however read it as an attack on Maneuver Warfare in its generally accepted form, and included the USMC and authers by name in my response. As you did not deny you were attacking those views, I can only assume you have a distorted and inaccurate understanding of the theory as it is used today by the USMC, and layed out above. Regards, Kevin

The only thing you are displaying with these posts is a massive failure to understand "manuever warfare" as it applies to the Marine Corps and other entities. Both supporters and detractors make the same mistake of losing sight of the scope of the theory...and then having a hey day with straw man arguments. Perhaps a little more learning and less pompous diatribes are in order? Just a suggestion.

Wow. A more blatant display of hubris I have not witnessed in some time. I'm sure Leonhard, Lindh, the USMC, and countless others really appreciate you putting them in their place as "fish" in the military history and theory realm. As a mere "fish" as well, I won't bother to argue with the grand master about theory...he already knows I'm wrong. I guess that saves you a lot of time, huh? Sheesh.

Just to reiterate - AFAIK the artillery is modelled as coming from a friendly border - as determined by the scenario designer. I made a mission with US airborne attacking from the West to the East, with only the southern border friendly. Then all the arty fire was parallel to my troops lines (arty coming from the south) and ranged across the length of the German lines. Another good reason to flank instead of head-on assault - no short rounds on the friendlies!

Perhaps you are right about the Germans and Brits having inferior comm gear, I wouldn't know. But the USMC created JASCO teams in WWII, which later became ANGLICO during Korea (and are still present today). ANGLICO = Air Naval Gunfire Liason Company They also controlled artillery despite not being in the acronym. Usually the teams were attached at the battalion level and would go with the forward company to provide fire support in the assault. The large radio was hand-cranked, and the backpack radio used large batteries that were very finicky in cold weather (like in the mountains of North Korea). As far as signal loss or freq drift, that is not a problem I recall hearing about...usually the biggest complaint was humping spare batteries and having them take forever to warm up in the cold weather. Or having to hump the large set (4-5 Marines) when there were no roads for the jeep mounted unit. All JASCO/ANGLICO fire was immediate fire too - they called in strikes with a TOT of five minutes ago . I can't imagine that Army artillery was that much less responsive but perhaps it was. I just don't see anything in CMBO that would require a 15 or 20 year time warp to be do-able.

The backpack radio (no idea what the actual ID was) was also used for terminal control of air support once the a/c was within LOS of the FAC. The controller on the ground would talk the pilot straight onto the target (if the pilot was Navy or Marine Corps) or direct him a couple hills over if Air Force/Army Air Corps (to reduce fratricide)! Again, this is during both WWII and Korea.