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Eddy

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Posts posted by Eddy

  1. Article in The Economist backing up what has been said here about the cultural conflict within the AFU between the Soviet-style rigid, sequential, top down thinking and the 'mission command' thinking (I think it's free to read) 

    Ukraine’s army must shed its Soviet legacy, says a military expert | The Economist

    Interestingly, the author states that in some cases modern technology is hindering, rather than enabling the mission command conducting of operations as the higher ups use the battle information to micro manage the lower echelons. Also states that some junior officers have started to ignore orders from above.    

  2. 15 minutes ago, kevinkin said:

    However, this could be defeated by strategic depth

    Good point. I hadn't even considered the strategic level as I don't think the RA will be able to do the learning at the operational level. Not necessarily because 'Russia sux' but because it is so difficult to do, especially while fighting a war. 

    I recently re-read Dr Aimee Fox's Learning to Fight about how the British & Dominion armies went about learning in the FWW and the complexities of it - vertical vs horizontal, formal vs informal, Western front vs other fronts, exercise vs pamphlet etc. They had to try to overcome pre-war prejudices, snobbery between fronts (Western Front thought they had nothing to learn from other fronts), snobbery from British towards Canadian and Australian, traditional vs modern, learning the wrong lessons etc. They just about managed it but it took four years. And despite what can be garnered from Blackadder, those armies were open-minded, keen to learn organisations (well most of them). 

    The long and short of it, I got from that book that learning on the job in a war is bloody difficult and complex. 

  3. A response from Mick Ryan regarding the reports of the Russians modifying their assault tactics

    Basically, he's comparing it to the German Stormtroopers of 1918 and positing that without changes to the operational level it won't make that much of a big picture difference. If there is no capability to exploit, then 'chopping a hole' as Ludendorff called it will lead to nothing. And he doubts that RA will be able to create the capability as it's not just equipment that would be needed, but training, changes to doctrine etc, etc. which is difficult at the best of times, let alone in a war. And of course the Ukrainian have a say as well.

  4. 6 minutes ago, dan/california said:

    The ISW presentation billindc just put up went over this in GREAT detail. still going by the way. Hopefully the recording will be available, it is solid gold.

    It's also available on YT here if that's more convenient:

    I'm about half way through but so far it is well worth the watch

  5. To add to the discussion on Russia's economy:

    Starts with a short discussion of the Chinese FM visit to Moscow and Putin being forced to use the 'small table'! Then goes on to the Russian economy, before the war, during and what's to come.

    Worth watching it all I think but the interesting points for me are:

    • Around about May and June Russia was raking it in because the energy shock pushed prices so high but this has now stopped.
    • Russian exports of oil now have a price ceiling and the buyers have no incentive whatsoever to pay more than that ceiling.
    • Russia is not making any money i.e. it's not covering it's costs and the price of a barrel of Ural oil is 35% down on a barrel of Brent. And it's not selling hardly any gas to Europe anymore so that income stream has dried up. So in effect there is no income and Russia is relying on it's savings account i.e. the National Wealth Fund.
    • So Russia is tapping into it's national wealth fund. This has fallen since the start of the year from 12% of Russian GDP to 7%
    • If that carries on Russia Govt. completely runs out of money in 3.5 years (I don't follow his maths here. To me it's sooner than that)
    • But that's only if the events are linear, could burn through the fund faster )or slower I guess)

    Like I say, don't understand how he got to 3.5 years before that fund runs out.

  6. 2 minutes ago, sburke said:

    okay name one moving in the right direction...just one.  It is too easy to say yes things will change, this could be the moment.  However, if you have no plausible alternative... at all.  then how likely is that what if? Blockchain and crypto baby, that is gonna change the world.. except it is just a ponzi scheme.

    Correct. The only currency that could possibly rival the dollar as the reserve currency in the near future (like years away) is the Euro and for a number of reasons that's not going to happen. As for the Yuan, it's not traded enough, CCP have this big sovereignty control thing over their currency and there are trust issues.

    As for crypto, it's an asset class similar to gold not a currency.

  7. Just listened to the often excellent Ukraine: the Latest podcast. They are quoting a Western defence official (probably British but that's just my guess) stating that the casualty figures are at least 100K Ukrainians, 200k Russian. Those figures are comprised of killed, missing, wounded and taken prisoner. 

    An important bit is the mortality rate. The official stated (according to them) that the mortality rate for Ukrainian is between 1 in 10 and 1 in 20, whereas the Russian mortality rate is 1 in 3.

    So according to the quote that would be between 5k and 10K Ukrainian dead versus approx. 66K Russian. 

    Must admit I'm taking the 1 in 20 with a pinch of salt but what do I know?

    Can be found here (I've copied at the time they're talking about this so you don't have to wade through an hour!) :

    First reporter fluffs his numbers at first btw

  8. 3 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:

    Could also be general tactical training.  One of the weakest areas of Soviet based airforces is their lack of training and coordination with other assets

    Yep, this from a retired Air Marshal, Edward Stringer 

    On Sky News he'd stated previously that just giving F16s without all the Awacs, EW, refuelling etc. (i.e. the whole package) wouldn't be much more of an improvement on what they've got now. 

     

  9. 20 minutes ago, Huba said:

    In case of UK, fighter pilots training means Eurofighters ( several, IIRC up to 50 Tranche1 are in storage in the UK and were recently approved for sale) or perhaps the Tornado GR4, assuming these are still in flyable condition and not scrapped.

    That's what I thought but according to this Senior Research fella at RUSI: 

    So not aircraft type specific from what he's saying.

  10. 58 minutes ago, The_Capt said:

    On a lot of this: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-update-february-5-2023

    Very interesting analysis/assessment and speaks to a dictator that is either very risk adverse after making a big gamble and losing, or is much more politically hemmed in than many think.

    Good link thanks.

    However, the article argues, and I think this is important, that Putin did not know he was making a big gamble and in fact he 'saw Russia’s invasion as a limited and acceptable risk' (from the article).  My understanding of the point the article is making is that Putin at all times has been risk-averse if the risk is large, as he perceives that risk. Given this the article ends with 'Putin’s reluctance to take risks directly related to his conventional war in Ukraine indicates that he remains highly unlikely to pursue nuclear escalation or war with NATO.' (their bold)

    To paraphrase the article, in Putin's mind he has taken no big risks either invading or mobilising or whatever and that he will continue to not take any big risks in the future, because he is not a risk taker.

    Obviously, I think I'm right in saying a lot of the people here thought invading Ukraine was a massive, ginormous risk.

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