76mm
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Posts posted by 76mm
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Thanks for that. The world of intelligence and counterintelligence is a murky one...
Yeah, reading about the purges is so grim that I think I pick up more than a few grey hairs very time I read about it. Nonetheless in this case I hoped to get what appear to be the facts out there before people started posting the crazy stuff...
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I've seen it attributed not to Abwehr but to Heydrich and the SD, but such evidence as I have come across is flimsy and speculative.
Robert Conquest's book The Great Terror includes rather detailed information about the German "dossier" implicating Tukhachevsky which was leaked to the Soviets. Apparently the SD lifted Tukhachevsky's signature from an agreement that he had signed with the Germans relating to technical assistance to the Soviet air force, and used this original to forge his signature on a series of letters between Tukhachevsky and senior German generals. This dossier was then "leaked' by the Nazis to President Benes of Czechoslovakia, who informed Stalin of the "plot". A Soviet agent then purchased the dossier for 500k (counterfeit) reichsmarks, and it made its way to Moscow. The purge against Tukhachevsky and his circle soon accelerated.
Despite this apparent success, this dossier cannot be considered a "huge intelligence coup", for several reasons: first, there is some (inconclusive) evidence that the NKVD suggested the whole scheme to the SD. Second, a slow-motion purge against the Soviet officer corps had already started almost a year earlier, with the arrest and torture of some lower-ranking officers to provide some evidence against the more senior officers. Third, the dossier was not used or mentioned in these officers' trials, rather they were convicted of what are generally assumed to be other fictitious charges of plotting coups, etc. Stalin had already decided to purge the army and didn't need the fake dossier to do so--he had already tasked the NKVD to compose their own fake evidence extracted through torture.
So it seems fairly clear that the purge would have happened with or without the German dossier--and indeed had started before the dossier was produced--and that its ultimate impact was probably limited to providing Stalin a pretext to accelerate the purge by a couple weeks/months.
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If somebody can manage to systematically refute the crushing aggregation of evidence Suvorov has so painstakingly assembled over many years, I'd love to see it.
Many Russian historians have systematically refuted Suvorov's "crushing aggregation of evidence". Here's one for starters ("Antisuvorov" by Isaev--in Russian but presumably you know how to work Google Translate:
http://militera.lib.ru/research/isaev_av1/index.html
Isaev addresses most or all of the points you raise, and from what I can see, makes it clear that Suvorov is simply wrong on pretty much everything. Isaev cites several instances where Suvorov takes quotes out of context or only uses partial quotes in a misleading way.
A few responses, mostly from a common sense perspective, but with some reference to Isaev:
The result of this was to put 57 divisions (their artillery preceded them) right up on the border of Germany and Romania, with another 114 close behind and in easy attack position. This was the entire First Strategic Echelon. 170 divisions! And where the First Strategic Echelon had been, the Second Strategic Echelon, whose existence the Germans did not know of, and whose movements and arrival were thoroughly concealed, took the former place of the First Strategic Echelon.
To the extent it is correct (ie, not very much, see Isaev), moving troops closer to the border is fully consistent with preparing for a German invasion.
He's got fully documented account after account from the various senior COs attesting to things like calling up reserves, going "on exercise" out of season and with full war stores, the employment of special orders reserved solely for wartime, rigorously camouflaged encampments already in place in the forests for the arriving units, senior officers running around in much lower rank insignia, same people traveling in (gasp) box cars with their staffs and commo gear, all amid night movement only.
All of this is also fully consistent with preparing for a German invasion.
"But before an offensive, ammunition is stored on mobile transport, which is a very expensive and dangerous thing to do. 'At the small railway station of Kalinovka alone, the South-West Front had 1,500 wagons laden with ammunition.' (Sovetskie Zheleznodorozhniki v Gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny, Izd. AN. SSSRI963, p. 36)"
Sigh...building up stores of arty ammo also fully consistent with preparing for German invasion. Moreover, Kalinovka was 400 km from the border.
Border defenses, right down to barb wire removed? Check?
Mines lifted? Check.
Fortifications in the path of the advance destroyed? Check?
Bridge demo charges removed? Check.
Bridges refurbished to carry the weight of tanks and such? Check.
Transport network built and expanded to accommodate a high speed offensive? Check.
Offensive naval units deployed? Check. Danube flotilla ready to go? Check. Combat aviation forward based to support attack by ground forces? Check. Multiple Airborne Corps, including Zhukov's favorite from Khalkin Gol, brought west, ready to pounce on strategic targets.
Secret mobilizations? Check?
Universal draft? Check.
I've addressed most of these points in a previous post. See Isaev re the "offensive naval units". And given the obvious threat that Germany might invade Russia, mobilization and a universal draft were wholly rational measures for a defensive war.
This is not the combat posture of a defender, who should have actual defenses in place well away from the frontier and be burrowing away like a mole on steroids to make more, better and faster.
The Soviets obviously had a defensive doctrine which did not involve digging in far from the border. Of course it turned out to be a rather poor defensive doctrine, but that doesn't mean the Sovs planned to attack.
In front of that should be a deep security zone, full of military nastiness. Instead, we have no security zone, no mines, no abatis, tank traps or wire entanglements, no bridges ready to blow. No partisans. No stay behind units. No weapon caches or underground bases.
As dsf points out, this was due to redeployment of fortified line from the Stalin line to the Molotov line, with the German invasion falling in the middle of this redeployment. If you were to read histories of the pre-war period, you'd see that most, if not all, Soviet fronts were constructing defenses in their sectors. I am currently reading the memoirs of the chief of staff of the 5th Army (Southwestern Front), and he speaks at length about the fortifications in his sector--the problem was that the troops did not have time to occupy them before being overrun.
The conclusion, based on the information presented, is ineluctable.
Yes, but not in Suvorov's favor.
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I had a copy of Icebreaker in my hands yesterday but decided not to buy it (or read it)--I have too much else on my reading list. If people such as yourself can't give any convincing reasons to believe Suvorov, why should I waste my time reading an entire book on the topic? A few responses:
Chapter 9 in "Icebreaker" talks about the enormous buildup, against all rational military behavior if defending, of the rail and road network at and near the new border.
Well, since much of the new border had been part of Poland, I imagine that the road and rail network was in an abysmal condition, and best case not integrated with Soviet networks, so the area needed to be tied in to the rest of the USSR. No reason to assume it was meant to support an attack.
Rather than preparing bridges for demolition, the charges in the columns were removed, and the bridges were all reinforced. Damaged bridges were repaired, too.
Damaged bridges repaired? Shocker! Bridges probably reinforced because they were rickety structures that couldn't hold a panje wagon, much Russia's 10k tanks. It is well known that even Russia's "defensive" plan called for an offensive in many areas, which would need adequate bridges. And much of the new border area had populations not particularly favorably disposed towards the Russians, so maybe not a good idea to leave lots of explosive charges on bridges throughout the countryside that they could pick up. I would also remove demolitions charges.
Every obstacle to high speed advance into Germany was ruthlessly removed. There was vast track laying right up to the German border, with more planned, as evidenced by gleaming piles of freshly delivered railroad track steel (if it's sat around for any time at all it rusts a bit) and huge stacks of railway ties.
Maybe this had something to do with all of the trains going back and forth with imports/exports under the peace pact, which were important to Russia both for its own uses and to keep Germany happy.
Chapter 10 talks about the Stalin Line, how potent it was, how extraordinary the maskirovka regarding it, and how, in a veritable eye blink, a huge fortification complex running 1500 km and unflankable from land (ran Baltic to Black Sea, I believe) was torn apart and the weapons stored.
OK, please explain why this is rational even if you are planning an offensive? Why not just let it lie there? In fact, I doubt the weapons were stored, but rather incorporated into the many new army units or transferred (or in process of transfer) to the Molotov line.
He talks about how the partisans and detachments designed to fight in the immense security zone were disbanded.
arming partisans among an unfriendly populace doesn't sound like a great idea to me. Plus the army was being greatly expanded at this time, they could probably better use the bodies in the real army.
He talks about the wholesale lifting of mines, leaving the new border wide open to German attack, but the plan was to go the other direction. He talks about how artillery caponiers, constructed at huge expense and resource use, were blown up, covered over, or simply abandoned, with their weapons being stripped out and stored.
Again, why do any of this (other than removing some of the mines) even if you're planning an attack?
you are perhaps uniquely positioned to check his citations and see how well they stand up.
actually, hundreds, if not thousands, of Russian historians have already done this, and unlike you, I am willing to take them at their word if they say he is full of bunk. So my incentive to spend any more time on this is very low...
At the very worst, the carefully marshaled evidence he adduces would, in my estimation, carry the day in a lawsuit, and people have been put to death over far, far less in criminal proceedings.
er, what criminal proceedings do you have in mind?
Suvorov shows the Russians were planning their armed move against the West as early as 1920.
This is the crux of the matter. Russia's armed forces were clearly built for an offensive strategy. Soviet Russia generally had an offensive geo-political mindset. Germany had invaded the USSR before, and was threatening to do so again. Any rational Russian planner should have assumed that Russia should be prepared to invade Germany, either as a pre-emptive measure or as an opportunistic lunge in case Germany became engaged elsewhere. But none of this means that Russia was planning to attack Germany in 1941. An attack in 1942-1943? Maybe... A potential attack, eventually, at some point in the future, given an opportunity? Probably... But 1941? Don't think so.
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John, unfortunately when I tried to watch the video I got the following error message: "The YouTube account associated with this video has been terminated due to multiple third-party notifications of copyright infringement." So I guess I won't be seeing that one. In any event, I know that Russian troops used just about everything to cross rivers, including planks, bundles of hay, etc. So I guess you'll say that planks and hay bundles are offensive weapons as well?
This whole discussion about amphibious tanks is rather ridiculous. If you want to talk about offensive weapons, talk about the 10k tanks or 5 airborne corps, not a couple thousand pea-shooter amphib tanks.
Regarding Suvorov: While I haven't read his books, I've read quite a bit about him, most of it critical. The problem is that I can read his facts and even if I accept his facts (maps of Germany! German phrase books!) I draw completely different conclusions. But I was at one of Moscow's largest bookstores today and you'll be glad to know that there were two entire shelves groaning under books either by, or about, Suvorov, so I'm sure he'll continue churning out his oeuvre.
But I will throw you a bone: just today I was reading the memoirs of Konstantin Rokossovsky, one of Russia's senior generals by the end of the war. Below I quote directly from his memoirs:
“Having studied the nature of the operations of German troops in operations in Poland and France attentively, I could not make out the plan of action of our troops in the given situation in the event of a German attack.
Judging by concentration of aviation on advanced aerodromes and the disposition of centralized supplies in the forefront of the front’s sector, this resembled preparation for a forward movement, which did not correspond with the disposition of the troops and measures undertaken by the troops. Even when the Germans concentrated their troops on our border, moving them from the West, about which the General Stafff and KOVO command must have known, no changes were made in our unit. An atmosphere of incomprehensible peacefulness continued to reign in KOVO’s units...In an event, if there was some kind of plan, then it clearly did not correspond to the situation arising toward the beginning of the war, which led to the heavy defeat of our troops in the beginning period of the war.”
But even this quote, from a credible source, falls far short of convincing me that the Soviets planned to attack anyone in 1941.
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dsf, thanks for the book titles. I just finished Solonin's book (Июнь 41-ого--яуза-пресс, 2014) (not bad) and just started Vladimirsky's book (На Киевском Направлении--Воениздат, 1989). Vladimirsky's book in particular looks good, his writing style seems better than many other Russian authors.
I've also got Martirosyan's book (22 июня--детальная анатомия предательства), but it seems to be some kind of diatribe (I guess the title should have tipped me off), not clear about what...
Thanks for the offers for the pdfs, but I live around the corner from one of Moscow's biggest bookstores (Biblioglobus) and from an Ozon.ru delivery point (for used books), so I typically try to pick up hard copies--let me know if you need anything. I hadn't seen Isaev's book, so will look for it.
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But if France would have deployed it's forces similar to Sovietrussia, then they would have been stationed in a line along the border. They were not. Because France was not preparing to attack Germany, when Germany attacked.
Unfortunately I don't have time to respond to all of your points in detail, but I did want to point out that Soviet troops were hardly "stationed in a line along the border". I'm reading a lot about the South-Western Front now, and its main strike forces were stationed 200-240 km from the border.
In fact, while the initial deployment was not great, the real problem arose when all the Sov units were ordered to attack in the initial days of the war, putting them further into harm's way.
I'm also fascinated by some people's fixation on amphibious tanks (and characterization of DUKWs, amphib jeeps, and schwimmwagens as offensive weapons). And John, citation please for the claim that amphibious jeeps led the way in the "Battle of Berlin" to secure a bridgehead...
I really don't understand why the fact that the Sov military had an offensive mindset is taken as proof that they intended to attack Hitler in 1941??
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Why would you link a Russian-language source on an English language forum to poster who's never claimed to be able to read Russian?
Presumably because all of the most recent and relevant sources on this topic are in Russian? I guess dsf could either have said "take my word for it" or posted whatever cititations are available--I know which approach I prefer.
Besides, people are doing wonders these days with Google translate...
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Thanks for the ideas.
I already have the manpower data for the bottom-level level entities, but I think it would be more trouble to figure out how many of each bottom level units should be in each formation than to do your Option 3, which is what I'm doing know.
I also thought about Option 2, although as inefficient as it is, I think that Option 3 is the quickest way to do it.
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I'm working on a little project that requires the number of men in various CMRT formations.
This information doesn't seem to be available in the scenario or quick battle editor; in fact the only real way I've figured out this info is to load a single formation into the scenario editor, create and play a scenario with only this formation, then finally get the total number of men in the OOB in the AAR screen.
This method is pretty tedious; can anyone recommend anything better?
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If anything, he was simply waiting for germany to either exhaust their resources taking over europe, or to start losing the war against france/britain.
Maybe we're arguing about semantics here, I don't disagree with what you say above, although I would still call its pre-emptive attack.
Far short of the T-34?
So... the BT-7 was outclassing the Germans then?
Because there wasn't all that much between what they had and the T-34 when it comes to tank models.
Let's face it, most of the German tanks in 1941 crap--but my point is that if they were trying to develop tanks to match the Germans, they'd probably have come up with something like the T-70, which presumably was cheaper to build than a T34. I guess they built the T34 simply because it was the best design they came up, regardless of what the Germans were doing.
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The "Icebreaker" argument will make much better sense after you have a chance to watch this man in action. He notices things others don't, and if they did, don't know why it's significant. He does. His argument about Red Air force forward basing is quite telling. In a nutshell, "If you plan to attack, you want your airfields close to the border, where they can have maximum reach as your forces advance into enemy territory. You certainly don't have some 800 meters from the border! Why? If you're attacked, you will suffer terribly. And that happened to...?"
Arguing that Suvorov is a genius because the US military values his work is akin to saying the Bernie Madoff was a brilliant investor because lots of "smart money" invested with him (and they did). The question in both cases is whether that faith turns out to be justified.
I haven't studied Suvorov enough to form a personal opinion about him, but honestly, his "insight" about forward placement of air bases that you describe above is so completely obvious that it is difficult to understand why you consider it the mark of genius? I sincerely hope that this is not the kind of thing that the US military needed his help to figure out?
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The Vulture, YankeeDog
I'd suggest three things:
1. Study how Russia defeated Napoleon. You will recognize that defense in depth is nothing really new.
Especially not for big countries. That brings me to:
Hellas,
I'd suggest two things:
1. Stop acting like an arrogant jerk.
2. Consider that some countries, perhaps Soviet Russia included, might prefer a strategic forward defense to a "defense in depth" which results in your country being overrun and your capital burnt to the ground.
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I'm going to answer these individually.
But let's pose some of the questions that he brought up in the video, just for fun.
IF the russians were not going to attack, and just defend, why did they need to develop amphibious tanks?
If the russians were not going to attack, but just defend, why would they put their airbases so close to the front lines?
If the russians weren't preparing to go to war with germany, why were they up-arming their tank force with tanks to specifically match or beat the germans? The japanese and other soviet border states certainly didn't have tanks that were much better than the T-26 and BT-7.
If they were preparing to only defend, why have tanks that were clearly developed for attack ?
Well, just for fun, these questions are seriously supposed to lead one to conclude that the Sovs were preparing to launch a preemptive attack on Germany??
As has been repeated over and over and over, the Soviets always envisioned a very "offensive" defense which involved large-scale counter-attacks. That by no means proves (or disproves) that they were planning a preemptive attack.
Regarding the tanks, I suspect that they developed the best tanks that they could--if they were only trying to outclass the Germans, they could have stopped far short of the T34...
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Not sure if I'd seen this site before, but in any event thanks for pointing it out. It has the best collection of Soviet situation maps that I've seen.
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Canada Guy,
[bellamy] personally believes Stalin, because of both the lack of sufficient modern weaponry and the urgent need to rebuild the thoroughly purged officer corps, couldn't have attacked Germany until 1942, but Stalin certainly did plan to attack Germany. Bellamy...has some complimentary things to say about Suvorov's argument and evidence, doubtless to the consternation of those here who view him and the whole thing as male bovine excreta and him as insane. Worse for them, having carefully considered the evidence pro and con, rather than rejecting outright the "Stalin planned to attack Germany in 1941, but was beaten to the punch by Hitler" scenario, Bellamy instead says, and I quote, "the jury is still out."
So why would Bellamy saying that the "jury is still out" convince anyone that Stalin was going to attack Hitler in 1941?? I've read alot about this and don't find the evidence about a 1941 Sov attack very convincing, but 1942, maybe...
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I'm having a hard time accepting your arguments and evidence of some kind of prohibition on opening hatches, for a couple of reasons:
1) The text in the link that you cited explicitly allows, if not requires, crews to observe through open hatches under certain circumstances.
First, "Before contact with the enemy is made, observation is to be performed from open hatches." This would cover many instances in CMRT, when Russian tanks are awaiting the approach of the enemy, and thus would spot them.
Second, even during combat, it says that "if the target is lost, it is permissable to carefully observe through an open hatch".
Even if Soviet doctrine favored opening buttoned-up, it seems very clear that there was no prohibition on opening the hatches.
2) What would be the rationale behind a Soviet regulation prohibiting opening of hatches? To prevent needless casualties among tank commanders? haha, yeah, right. While there is some argument that unnecessary exposure of the TC would put the whole tank at risk, as we have seen in game you are also putting the tank at risk if you stay buttoned up...
3) The handful of pictures are not particularly convincing to show that Sov tankers were not allowed to open their hatches, only that for some reason (compliance with general doctrine?), in their staged photos the Sovs often showed tanks buttoned up. A casual google search reveals many photos of Sov tanks with TCs in the hatch, although admittedly many of these (like many of yours) show tanks on the march rather than "in battle."
4) The only book I've read which explicitly addresses this issue is "Panzer Destroyer: Memoirs of a Red Army Tank Commander" (actually SU commander...) by Vasily Krysov. In his account, they often fight with the hatches closed, but are constantly opening and closing hatches, rather as you'd expect. First, it seems that during active combat, they tried to leave the hatches open, because otherwise the fumes from the main gun could be overpowering. But they closed the hatches when they felt they needed to. Here are several quotes:
"On the morning of 7 July, enemy bombers appeared, and in their wake an artillery barrage began. The crewmen were in their positions, the hatch covers were battened down, but sometimes the explosions were so close that we could see nothing but flames through the optical devices – it seemed that the self-propelled gun was on fire! The ensuing terrible drumbeat of rocks and dirt clods falling on the armour from the geysers of earth blown high into the sky by the explosions nearly deafened us. As the dirt and dust settled, they covered the machine with a thick, impenetrable layer of soil, and it was becoming as dark as night in the fighting compartment.
Fearing that we’d miss the start of the enemy attack, we frequently opened the upper hatch cover briefly to have a better look around and to wipe clean the optical lenses. Once when looking out of the hatch, I saw a terrible scene: three nearby villages were burning, enveloped in thick clouds of black smoke, and just in front of us one could see the infantry positions – there men were frantically trying to dig out comrades who d been buried under piles of dirt and logs, collapsed trench walls and bunkers.
‘Comrade Lieutenant, get back into the machine.’ Fearing for my life, Emelyan Ivanovich was pulling me down by my belt. Through the semi-opened hatch cover, we were hearing the artillery cannonade that had erupted in our rear – hundreds of our guns and mortars had opened return fire at the enemy! Then we heard the buzz of low-flying aircraft and we rejoiced to see squadrons of our Il-2s flying towards the enemy lines in waves."
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"The Germans ferociously returned fire, but kept retreating to prevent being caught in a pocket. They were concealing their combat formations with some powerful smoke device. Glimpsing through the curtain of smoke a silhouette of a tank moving towards us, I ordered the gunlayer: ‘Valeriy! At the tank, continuous aim! Fire!’
While the gunlayer was searching through the smoke for the target, I looked out of the hatch and saw with my naked eye that it was a ... T-34 moving towards us! ‘Belay that order!’ I yelled, and having fired a green recognition flare, I wiped the cold sweat from my brow with my sleeve."
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"There was one assault gun commander from Ivanovo Oblast among us – a former teacher, but a bit of a coward. He came up with a certain peculiar way of acting when in combat: his hatch cover would be raised, yet he’d not be standing in the hatch, but instead crouched behind the armoured superstructure, giving directions to his driver by prodding him with a long stick. If he smacked the driver on the head, that meant ‘stop’; if he poked him in the back – ‘forward’; tapped him on the left shoulder – ‘turn left’; on the right shoulder – ‘turn right’. His surname was Abramov. Of course, not everyone knew about this – when the action starts, who’s going to keep an eye on him? However, those directly around him knew, and guys like him were shunned by the rest."
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"As if to confirm my fears, German infantry began to approach in short rushes, attempting to bypass an area illuminated by the fire of a burning house. The enemy tanks and assault guns intensified their fire – so strongly that it seemed that they were on the verge of attacking! Although shells and bullets were flying overhead, I nevertheless decided to open the hatch in an effort to get a better view of what was going on. I had barely unlatched the hatch cover, when I saw dozens of multi-coloured flares overhead, fading as they fell on the eastern side of the village."
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Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis
Nigel Askey (multi-volume set)
Has anyone seen or read this book.
You can "look inside the book" on Amazon to read a few pages and/or look at the table of contents. Frankly it doesn't look very interesting to me...
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And these kind Western Allies...they burned what supplies we had. In Rheingau, and other places. I have no complaints about the Russians or Eastern Europe. It is the Western Allies that were the most horrible. They had everything, and destroyed what little some people had.
War is hell Otto.
I guess he didn't complain about the Russians doing it because the Germans had done that and much worse in Russia.
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And yet, I've read lots of accounts of east front action (both sides) and don't recall ever reading anything about fuel barrels being targeted, or exploding, other than in air attacks...
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But none of that means I cheerlead for Russians the way Nazi fanboys cheerlead for the Germans. Also, there is no political component in my judgment of their military skills or weaknesses (I have utter contempt for the politics of both regimes). Nazi fanboys can't all say that (without lying, at least) - alas.
Fair enough, although frankly I think that puncturing a few German fanboy bubbles automatically makes you an honorary Sov fanboy, at least in their eyes.
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wadepm - it is metaphysically possible, but at least outside of Putin's Russia I think the set is empty.
Strange response...I would think that anyone who knows as much as you do about the eastern front would have immense respect for what the Red Army accomplished during the war-I know that I do.
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If not even the most basic military question about op. Citadel can be answered, but instead obvious cover ups with bad style of discussion are practized then a discussion is moot.
Ha ha, great stuff. Several people have attempted answers to your rather cryptic question, but you allege a "cover up".
Why don't you tell us what you think rather than having every guess what your brilliant insights into the battle might be? And then maybe we can have a better style of discussion...
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Michael, my concern with an approach like what you're describing is that while it would certainly ease admin burdens, it would also almost inevitably result in players under-allocating casualties to favorite (presumably experienced units) and over-allocating them to cannon-fodder units, which would result in an unrealistic proliferation of uber-experienced units. Therefore, I think it is important to drill down to the squad/vehicle level to understand exactly what casualties were suffered.
The database I'm working on would ease the admin burden to some degree in that it would be easier to deal with than a spreadsheet, although it would certainly still be a pain to input all of the casualty figures, especially if the forces involved are large. But the good news is that you wouldn't have to mess around with any units in CM until they were involved in a battle, at which time you'd have to conform them to their state in the database, which could change outside of battles because of replacements, resupply, etc.
Was the USSR set to attack Germany before Operation Barbarossa??
in Combat Mission Red Thunder
Posted
Here is a lengthy quote from the account of Vladimirsky, the deputy head of the operations section of the 5th Army, responsible for defending the Vladimir-Volynsk sector (published in 1989).
Vladimirsky notes that for some fortified zones the fortifications along the border were only intended as the "security zone" for the main defenses, which were intended to be 20-40 km from the border but on which work had only just begun by the time the war started (ie, site selection, etc.). In other fortified regions, the main defensive fortifications were directly on the border, and were only partially complete. Generally, important parts of the fortifications, including anti-tank obstacles, etc. were incomplete (25%).
I've provided the Russian text for those that which to avail themselves of Google translate, but in summary he says that the fortifications were far from complete, and were marked by several significant defects, but that they would have been of some assistance for defensive operations had the troops had time to occupy them before the war (which generally, they did not).
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Приграничные укрепленные районы
В полосе 5-й армии вдоль государственной границы весны 1940 г. силами войск и двух военно-строительных отрядов осуществлялось строительство укрепленных [38] районов: Ковельского УРа № 9 — на участке (иск.) Влода-ва, Городло (7 км сев.-зап. Устилуга); Владимир-Волынского УРа № 2 — на участке (иск.) Городло, Скоморохи (5 км сев. Сокаля) и два северных узла обороны Струмиловского УРа № 4 — на участке (иск.) Скоморохи, Крыстынополь{26}.
Состояние и готовность указанных УРов к началу войны были следующими: в Ковельском УРе была основательно оборудована только полоса обеспечения (предполье), проходившая вдоль государственной границы и состоявшая из 14 батальонных районов и одного отдельного ротного опорного пункта{27}; к строительству долговременных сооружений главной полосы обороны этого УРа, намеченной по линии Дубечно, Крымно, Нудыжа, Згораны, Любомль, Пузув (20—40 км от границы), планировалось приступить в 1941 г., но до начала войны были проведены только рекогносцировка и определение мест установки дотов. Постоянный гарнизон Ковельского УРа состоял из двух пулеметных батальонов.
Во Владимир-Волынском УРе также была оборудована полоса обеспечения глубиной от 1 до 4 км, включавшая в себя десять батальонных районов полевого типа, построенных вдоль правого берега Буга. Готовность — 80—90 процентов.
Главная полоса обороны УРа была оборудована долговременными сооружениями только на 30 процентов. Из намеченных к строительству 7 узлов обороны с общим количеством 25 опорных пунктов к началу войны построили, и то не полностью, только 4 правофланговых узла обороны, в которых из 13 запланированных опорных пунктов было построено 8 опорных пунктов с общим количеством 97 долговременных сооружений, но были вооружены [39] и заняты гарнизонами только 61 дот{28}. Постоянный гарнизон Владимир-Волынского УРа состоял из четырех пулеметных батальонов и одного артиллерийского дивизиона капонирной артиллерии, которые с 5 июня 1941 г. занимали четыре правофланговых узла обороны.
В двух северных узлах обороны Струмиловского УРа, входивших в полосу 5-й армии, из девяти запланированных к постройке в них опорных пунктов было закончено строительство только пяти.
Постоянный гарнизон этих двух узлов обороны состоял из двух пулеметных батальонов, усиленных капонирной артиллерией.
Главная (долговременная) полоса обороны Владимир-Волынского и Струмиловского УРов создавалась на удалении 1—3 км от границы, а на отдельных участках примыкала к пей (в районе Михале, 4 км сев. Крылува, и на участке Потужицка Вулька, Крыстынополь), сливаясь с полосой обеспечения.
Основными недочетами в системе долговременной обороны приграничных УРов являлись: малая глубина обороны, включавшая в себя только одну полосу при отсутствии подготовленных рубежей в тылу; равномерное расположение оборонительных сооружений вдоль фронта без уплотнения их на наиболее важных направлениях; малочисленность постоянного гарнизона УРов, изолированность оборонительных сооружений, не связанных между собою ходами сообщения, что не обеспечивало взаимодействия и маневра подразделений в ходе боя; слабое развитие связи. План строительства наземных линий связи был выполнен всего на 32 процента, а подземных линий— только лишь на 13 процентов{29}; неудовлетворительная маскировка сооружений; слабое оборудование УРов в противотанковом отношении: план устройства противотанковых заграждений был выполнен на 25 процентов. Этот недостаток относился и к полосе обеспечения; между узлами обороны оставались широкие промежутки, не заполненные дотами и не занятые войсками.
Вследствие этих недочетов долговременные сооружения приграничных УРов вместе с их гарнизонами могли рассматриваться лишь как некоторое дополнение и усиление системы полевой обороны. [40]
В целом же вся система приграничных оборонительных сооружений, включая оборудованную на 80—90 процентов полосу обеспечения и недостроенную главную полосу УРов, несмотря на все недостатки, представляла собою довольно развитую инженерную основу для ведения упорной обороны войсками дивизий первого эшелона армии, но при условии своевременного занятия ими подготовленных сооружений.
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In addition to Vladimirsky's account, Isaev's Antisuvorov has an entire chapter on the topic of border fortifications. He points out (as I have already done), that there was no need to dismantle fortifications in the event of an attack, and indeed the fortifications were not dismantled (as detailed in post-Barbarossa German reports).
It is difficult to argue that the Soviet forces on the frontier were well deployed, but it is relevant to note that
(i) generally the positions right on the border were occupied by border guards, not the army--and where else should border guards be but on the border?
(ii) part of the reason for the fortifications following "every bend and twist" of the border was that many of them were constructed on twisty-turny rivers constituting the border;
(iii) As to the lack of mines, camouflage, obstacles, etc., the fortifcations were work in progress and these steps had not yet been completed;
(iv) at least in the Kiev Military District, the main defensive line was to be built 20-40 km from the border.
I had hoped to track down the context of this quote, but unfortunately don't have the time to do so. I will note, however, that Kulik might have been the biggest buffoon in the pre-war Soviet Army (no mean feat!), and that many of this other pronouncements about tanks, etc. are so off-base that they are laugh-out-loud funny. In one example, in a Kremlin meeting after the wargames in January 1941 (ahem, after two German blitzkrieg campaigns), Kulik still argued that deploying tanks was a mistake, and that the future was with horse-drawn guns. So it is difficult to accept him as a credible source about anything.
I'm not sure why you find it so hard to accept that that failure to create "strong, combat stable defenses" is not the same thing as planning to launch a pre-emptive offensive? Since the French and Polish also failed to establish "strong, combat stable defenses" I guess they were planning to attack Germany as well?