OBJ

Sorry, yes, when all other factors were essentially equal, technology, mobility, organization, force to space/troop density is what enabled maneuver on one front and quickly precluded it on the other. I am wondering, wondering, while we speculate on what the future equivalent of 'Blitzkreig' will be, if we also challenge the assumption defensive primacy conditions will be omni-present in future conflicts, start to finish, limited or not. If we assume stalemate where ever we go, whatever we do, start to finish, are we missing out on thinking about preventing stalemate, in addition to breaking stalemate. Breaking stalemate maybe the CM level problem, while preventing stalemate maybe the levels above. As an aside, I have been on the, 'OMG, maneuver is dead, this is the Western front all over again, what are we going to do!' bandwagon, in fact was an early adopter, and am now trying to rethink that. In the limited war that Ukraine is with both Ukraine and apparently Russia presently lacking the means to support strategic maneuver, we're probably stuck, at least or until there's a decisive attritional disparity, either in physical ability or political will.

The western front in WWI was ~765 km, the eastern was 1,300 km, essentially technical parity across all belligerents, just very different force to space ratios. Western front operations started with a maneuver phase. The Eastern front, given lower force to space ratios, was a lot of maneuver. If the Ukrainian front is 800km, I'm spit-balling here, but from Northern Finland to Romania on the Black Sea it's 2,500-3,000 kms, just sayin' lot of room for maneuver, especially initially. I think you are right about the drones, if they can clear the building, without killing more non-combatants than our troops would, let 'em. I'm pretty sure LLF will be along soon with a meme of Robo Cop's ED-209.

Thanks Capt. I share your concern for western casualty sensitivities. They have and remain a major constraint on western operations. I worry politicians and the public in democracies will not adjust their thinking as fast as a successful peer level campaign would require. I am hopeful in this war an eventual combination of new technologies, organization and doctrine will restore battlefield mobility, the ability to successfully execute offensive operations. I do worry it is possible the war could get stuck like Korea before this happens, leaving it to theory until conflict resumes in Ukraine or elsewhere. I also hope none of the western democracies reach a Maginot conclusion. Adopting isolationist policies looks like that to me.

Me too, I am here for the discussion, contrary opinions like yours being most valued as they cause me to ask myself if I am being dogmatic, pedantic or some other bad 'ic' and should be listening more and opinionating less, but I am not quite there yet So casualties, yup, gunna happen, just as we see here on this forum almost everyday when a FPV feed snaps to static then the ISR feed shows smoking, bleeding casualties crawling away, some dying while we watch their buddies try to save them, other smoking, bloody, unmoving bodies scattered in the snow around the impact point. On the other hand we here routinely denigrate Russian 'meat grinder' tactics. To me, we think Russian tactical commanders are needlessly taking casualties when Ukrainian commanders, after attacking last summer, quickly deduced tactical defensive primacy and decided they needed to stay on the defensive. So, Ukrainians, in actual combat, not between the wars staff officer theorizing, in actual combat tactical practice are avoiding needless casualties while the Russians are not. Avoiding needless casualties, NOT, avoiding casualties. Back to urban warfare and other premises of the the MWI Urban Project, world trending is toward more urbanization, militarily weaker opponents recognize the combat effectiveness leveling and technology negating and other domain benefits of urban warfare, and non-combatants will be a major component of future urban warfare. This last puts western tactical commanders constantly doing proportionality assessments, see the now closed thread under SF2 on 'How Hot is Israel Gonna Get' and @The_Capt's led discussions on proportionality. At least early in the city fight, many of these western commander assessments will result in a decision necessitating supported infantry entering and clearing buildings. 'Major,' not exactly sure what, or how many, or the percentage of, that is, but 'Major' casualties may be UNAVOIDABLE, as long as the ROE don't allow friendly forces to just drop the building when they confirm or suspect it is defended, or put a 120mm HE round into every door, window and wall facing the assault direction, or bursts of 25mm HE. Any tactical plan for building entry and clearing needs to reflect the tactical commander's judgement of what will best allow his unit to accomplish his mission and minimize friendly casualties given constraints. I have a hard time imagining mouse holing onto the second floor from an adjacent building with suppressive fire support is just the same as breaching the front door, or windows, or walls, and starting clearing from the ground floor. But that's just me, and combat based tips, techniques and procedures for CQB leaders. If we have someone here, given viable upper entry options, that has made these decisions in combat and witnessed the results we should listen to them.

Agree, and so my interest in innovative methods to restore battlefield mobility, penetration in depth of prepared defenses to enable operational level breakout, to include use of jetpack infantry, which I do not find either funny or outlandish, which might also support top down building assault. We seem to agree we are witnessing the pendulum swinging back past the equilibrium point in favor of the defense. As it always has, the pendulum will start it's swing back in the other direction, only a question of when and based on what. We also can not forget the front in Ukraine is geographically constrained enough that the combination of modern day technology in combination with forces available to both sides has resulted in statement, at least temporarily. The analogies with the WWI western front all seem appropriate. However there was a WWI eastern front, in which the combination of geographic space and forces available favored maneuver, both fronts in the same war with the same technology available to both sides.

I tend to agree with Holien, much as we wish they were, our enemies in the middle east are neither stupid or incompetent. They do seem to be patient, persistent, capable, and able to leverage local resentment towards 'occupying unbelievers,' certainly enflamed by events in Gaza.

I would think this, some sort of effective IFF. If there was confusion or an inability to distinguish friendly from enemy, whatever IFF was in place clearly wasn't effective. Although tail gunners could work too...

Thanks @Kinophile, hope I am not missing your point here: To me, in the limited and focused part of combined arms tactics that involves small infantry units entering and clearing buildings supported by other infantry, engineers, armor, and other arms, I am not sure some things will change. 1. Grenades will still roll down stairs more easily that up 2. Defenders will still prepare ground floor defenses first 3. Technology will still be degraded in urban environments The ATTP, based on what we know is 20+ years of middle eastern urban combat experience at all levels of intensity, asks the CQB leader to account for a lot of different factors, and make a decision. If above ground floor level entry is possible, assuming eventual success in clearing the building in all cases, which entry level is likely to result in fewer friendly casualties? Also worth pointing out top down does not equate to roof down, re mouse-holing, re Ortana, re any urban environment with buildings adjacent to one another. I read MWI Urban Project case studies, Fallujah II, Mosul, Ortona. Other than Ortona, they did not mention top down. I did not take that to mean top down was never used when judged best, just that it wasn't a significant enough practice to call out, or casualty risk was routinely assessed as no more going in at ground level than above, other than at Ortona. I also found a MWI urban project premise that modern urban warfare has much in common with medieval sieges intriguing, and needing more exploration by me. I agree, the MWI Urban Project is a really good resource for those interested in recent and near future urban warfare. I agree Ukraine points to significant changes to all domains including ground combined arms operations and tactics. I admit, although hadn't thought of it before, my interest in top down maybe a reflection of my maneuver bias. I find avoidable casualties revolting and all combat experience that may preclude them attractive.

Thanks, the expert advice is very much appreciated and soon to be applied.

Don't think I've seen it but now I will

Hey Dave, got a chuckle, not sure about you but for me road was, 'Retired On Active Duty.'

I found discussion above fully informative and answered my question from the manual. So, thanks all. Below from engine 4.0 manual, Brille's explanation removed my confusion on the bolded section. With regard to scout vs infantry spotting ability, "However if they [sic scouts] are embedded in a proper formation they often come with their own, sometimes unique, equipment. In some armies they have specialized low profile vehicles or additional equipment that other formations don´t have or at least not in this extant." From the manual, Spotting, Page 42: "One of the center pieces of the new CMx2 game engine is the concept of “relative spotting”, where a number of game elements - from command & control, to skill levels, to individual unit abilities - all come together. A typical battlefield is full of chaos by its very nature: combatants worldwide call this chaos the “Fog of War”, where no two soldiers “see” the same thing. To simulate this, CMx2 employs complex calculations and a unique spotting concept which only shows the player what his currently selected unit can see. Spotting is computed for each unit individually, and is not only based on actual lines of sight, but includes many other factors such as: what the spotter and target are doing (facing does matter!), the equipment they have available (scopes, binocu- lars etc.), skill levels, visibility based on climatic effects and the time of day, even sounds (units can “hear” nearby enemies!) and so forth."

My experience was like Andrew's, tried it, my units kept moving and never stopped where I thought they'd be hull down doing my own level 1 and line of sight check eyeballing of the terrain, so have shied away from using it. Like Magnum50 I'd be interested to hear if others have used it successfully and what the trick might be.

Ahhh, Capt we count on you. We here will always call on you. 'They' might not for reasons unknown. Someone in this discussion on the future of urban warfare, made reference to Mosul lessons learned, including use of UAV, both for ISR and attack. Whoever that was might be interested in this- https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project-case-study-2-battle-of-mosul/

An excellent list by @The_Capt. I can only offer a small addition: The first on the Capt's list is part of a large project on past, present and near future urban warfare. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project/ within that, for those interested, a pretty interesting collection of case studies https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project/urban-warfare-project-case-studies/

14 hours ago, OBJ said: 7-149. The disadvantages of upper entry are that the means to enter a building at an upper level may not be present and, even if present, often takes additional time to reach; and the method of entry often increases the exposure risk of the assault force. These disadvantages, combined with the fact that the ground floor is by far the most accessible, mean that the most common method of gaining entry to a building remains by way of the ground floor. As such the dangers of ground floor entry can be successfully mitigated by support, suppression, security and obscuration. Yes, I know, you have repeated my quote of the last section of this part of the US Army ATTP. I deliberately highlighted the latter half of this section as you show above to recognize your position. However, for those just joining us, the section you have quoted is preceded by, emphasis added by me 7-146. The goal is to gain a foothold. While a direct frontal assault can accomplish this, it also can be quite costly. As such, always look for an alternate entry points. If the building is enemy occupied, try to avoid the obvious entry as the enemy will be expecting it and, to various degrees, be ready for it. 7-147. In many instances, it is better to clear a well-defended building, especially a well-defended ground floor, from the top down as this avoids a frontal assault and bypasses the expected ground floor entry points that are often well defended and booby trapped. As I said above, @The_Capt I think there is little doubt of your courage, combat experience, and intellect. Assuming the US Army doctrine is based on actual experience, and as far as I can tell it is, not just some between the wars staff officer theorizing, I will retain my position and leave you to yours. For those interested in doing their own research, I am referencing US Army: ATP 3-21.8 INFANTRY PLATOON AND SQUAD April 2016, which references: ATTP 3-06.11 (FM 3-06.11) Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain Jun 2011 The ATTP reference starts page 7-36 "METHOD FOR ENTERING AND CLEARING BUILDINGS"

@The_Capt I think there is little doubt of your courage, combat experience, and intellect. Assuming the doctrine is based on actual experience, and as far as I can tell it is, not just some between the wars staff officer theorizing, I will retain my position and leave you to yours.

Again, with all respect to those having direct urban combat experience of being ordered as an infantry leader to clear a building(s), we may have to disagree and leave it there. From the references I have cited it appears over the past 70 years to the present day, when infantry in a combined arms setting is given the mission to clear a building(s), top down is preferred for a number of reasons perhaps most importantly to minimize the attacker's casualties. Top down in no way assumes the necessity of heli-lift to drop the attackers or that all other pre-assault measures needed to support top entry will not first be in place. edit: 1. Top down does not assume starting on the roof, most particularly when assaulting adjacent buildings 2. Agree in near future humans preceded by drones or drones alone might be the assaulters 3. I see I am at risk for falling out of sync with responses

With all respect to those with direct urban combat experience of being ordered as an infantry leader to clear a building, not quite sure why clearing a building top down is controversial, peace time thinking or practically infeasible. From recent 2003-2011-2016 direct US combined arms experience, it seems to be the preferred method, and the proven preferred method over the last ~70 years. Indications are this is the first option any CQB leader should consider with a mission involving clearing buildings. @JonS example, Canadians fighting Fallschirmjäger in WWII, emphasis added https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project-case-study-5-battle-of-ortona/ "Finally, the use of the mouse-holing method was another tactic that heavily influenced the battle’s outcome. It enabled the Canadians to avoid having soldiers cut down on the open streets by remaining and moving inside buildings and allowed them to fight from the top down instead of from the bottom up. Although it was not invented by the Canadians—the method was actually already formalized in British doctrine and called “the vertical technique”—mouse-holing was a common-sense tactic to apply to avoid casualties, advance under protective cover, and surprise the Germans by attacking from above. More on Urban warfare in general, a number of case studies and essays on present and near future urban warfare, US perspective, including observations on urban combat experience in Ukraine https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-project/

re Infantry clearing a building, what I could find for a current US Army doctrinal reference is: ATP 3-21.8 INFANTRY PLATOON AND SQUAD April 2016, references ATTP 3-06.11 (FM 3-06.11) Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain Jun 2011, emphasis added below Presumably both are recent enough to reflect Iraq/Afghanistan experience, which to @The_Capt's point, may not be relevant in Ukraine. The principal seems the same though, top down is preferred. Since this is a wargame forum I should mention I think we can simulate many of the planning considerations for a top down infantry assault where buildings are adjacent and occupied by opposing forces. Steve or Charles I imagine would need to weigh in on whether and how CM advantages the attacker going from top down. The ATTP reference starts page 7-36 "METHOD FOR ENTERING AND CLEARING BUILDINGS 7-146. The goal is to gain a foothold. While a direct frontal assault can accomplish this, it also can be quite costly. As such, always look for an alternate entry points. If the building is enemy occupied, try to avoid the obvious entry as the enemy will be expecting it and, to various degrees, be ready for it. 7-147. In many instances, it is better to clear a well-defended building, especially a well-defended ground floor, from the top down as this avoids a frontal assault and bypasses the expected ground floor entry points that are often well defended and booby trapped. However, entering a building from any level other than the ground floor may be difficult, Security and speed are critical to a successful above ground entry. The exposure of Soldiers when entering a higher level must be mitigated. Use various methods to gain above ground floor access, to include ladders, drainpipes, vines, Soldier assistance, armored vehicles, adjacent roofs, windows, or walls. Additionally, consider using helicopters to gain access to the roof. Urban Combat Skills 10 June 2011 ATTP 3-06.11 7-37 7-148. The advantages are that a unit’s momentum is greater clearing down than up; grenades are easier to throw down a stairwell than up; fewer personnel are needed to secure the upper floors and roof as opposed to securing the ground floor. Also, consider that an enemy who is forced to the top of a building may be cornered and subsequently fight desperately or escape over the roof. An enemy who is forced down to ground level may elect to withdraw from the building, thus exposing himself to friendly fires from friendly forces outside. 7-149. The disadvantages of upper entry are that the means to enter a building at an upper level may not be present and, even if present, often takes additional time to reach; and the method of entry often increases the exposure risk of the assault force. These disadvantages, combined with the fact that the ground floor is by far the most accessible, mean that the most common method of gaining entry to a building remains by way of the ground floor. As such the dangers of ground floor entry can be successfully mitigated by support, suppression, security and obscuration.

No argument it is much easier and less risky to just blow the building. But, if, for whatever reason, the mission is to 'clear the building' top down seems to be the preferred method. If you take a look at fm-7-8-6.3, there are a number of qualifiers to the top down approach. From my limited view of this war, no one seems too interested in clearing buildings, simply clearing resistance.

Re attacking buildings from the top down. Please see para 6.3 sub para d. https://550cord.com/infantry-rifle-platoon-squad-fm-7-8/fm-7-8-chapter-6-urban-operations/ "Entry at the top and fighting downward is the preferred method of clearing a building (Figure 6-5) . This forces the defenders down and out of the building where the support element can engage them. This method is only feasible, however, when access to an upper floor or rooftop can be gained from the windows or roofs of adjoining, secured buildings. Rooftops are treated as danger areas when surrounded by higher buildings from which enemy forces could engage the assault element. Helicopters should land only on those buildings that have a roof structure that can support their weight. If the structure cannot support the helicopter, soldiers can dismount as the helicopter hovers a few feet above the roof. Troops then breach the roof or common walls to gain entrance into the building. (If using explosives on the rooftop, ensure cover is available to the soldiers.) They may use ropes or other means to enter the lower floors through the holes created."

Reads like a NATO exercise scenario, but it's being presented as a leaked top secret Bundeswehr war plan. This probably belongs with Polish and Swedish Military Chief war warnings, growing Western military leadership impatience with stuck politicians. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/01/15/7437227/ Source: Bild with reference to a secret Bundeswehr document Details: Bild noted that, according to the document, escalation between NATO and Russia may take place as early as February 2024. In a classified document (Top Secret – For Official Use Only), the German Federal Ministry of Defence outlines a potential "Path to Conflict" between Russia and NATO is detailed. The actions of Russia and the West are described month by month, culminating in the deployment of hundreds of thousands of NATO troops and the inevitable onset of war in the summer of 2025.

Thanks @Haiduk appreciate the quick response, also your unique and consistent information sharing to this forum. Apologies if I caused a repeat. I was perhaps incorrectly connecting dots between significantly lesser shoot downs and what I thought was some Russian success in attrition of most capable Ukrainian air defense systems. With the stalemate on the ground it would certainly seem to be important for the West to support and supply a very capable Ukrainian air defense along with keeping Ukraine strong in all the other domains. https://abcnews.go.com/International/ukraine-failed-shoot-down-33-russian-missiles-deadly-attack/story?id=106193589#:~:text=The success rate -- 35,reports from Ukraine's air force. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-air-defense-missiles-95cf7f351d05c0c4b704d9fe8a0c5f39 https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/06/world/europe/ukraine-patriots-us.html https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-missiles-crimea-cyberattack-d44099272ac424081df3a81c3a042087

Just me or number of missiles being shot down is way down?