zahl

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Stalin's Organ: Well for starters a DRAFT copy is obviously somethign that is considered - and then NOT adopted - or it wouldn't be DRAFT. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> This document was being prepared in the summer of 1944, but the situation for which it was intended had not yet emerged. Your argument would be valid if they had simply decided not to adopt it. However, the Soviet offensive stalled and the document was rendered useless. Why was it not public? Because that would have collided with their official and public policy. This is not irrelevant. The fact that it indeed was not public supports the notion that it represents their true intentions. It was not just some paper meant to intimidate the Finns before negotiations or to be used as a bargaining tool. Afterall, it was coupled with that infamous public demand of unconditional surrender. When this demand was lifted and the Soviets changed their objectives, the document became irrelevant. In this context there's reason to believe that the document reflects actual Soviet intentions. One link discussing Finnish and Soviet tactics: http://www.winterwar.com/tactics.htm [ 06-05-2001: Message edited by: zahl ]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Stalin's Organ: Err...since when did "draft" copies of anything become the oficial version and public policy?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Nobody claimed this draft represented the public and official policy. It certainly tells us what exactly they had in mind, but did not reveal, when unconditional surrender was demanded. Why did the Soviet Union demand unconditional surrender if their primary objective was not occupation?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper: Shtemenko is the book I dream to put my hands on. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> A brief description and pictures at http://www.collectrussia.com/DISPITEM.HTM?ITEM=3207 <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>As I understand it now, what Meretskov tells in his book was the objectives for the first stage (which was more or less successfully achieved). 1944 operation actually had further goals, which were not achieved.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I think this is a truthful statement, although you should use the word offensive. Based on the quoted sources, it is evident that this offensive consisted of two stages and both stages consisted of several operations. It was clearly not a single "attack" that got blunted and then abandoned. It seems the General Staff had planned and Stavka had accepted the entire offensive way before it commenced, including the decision to cross the new 1940 border. The offensive was then divided into stages and the objectives for stage one were only intermediate objectives. Govorov's and Meretskov's initial orders did not include anything but stage one objectives, apparently to preserve operational integrity. It is noteworthy that at the time when the stage two directive was issued on June 21, the offensive had not yet stalled. Stage one had been a success. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>So, what is the final conclusion about strategic outcome of 1944 fighting? Soviet primary goal in that sector clearly was to take Finland out of war, thus releasing several armies for operations in West and South West directions. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I am not comfortable with that statement. They could have taken Finland out of war simply by accepting the old (pre winter war) borders. This is all Finland wanted. No need to fight for Karelia, losing a pretty significant amount of men and material. More importantly, no need to waste several precious months of time planning this all over at the highest level and then concentrating well over 40 divisions against the Finnish army. These could be used to breach German lines at Pskov. Why all this trouble? The Soviet Union had to have something more in mind. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>That's why peace negotiations took place both in April and in August '44. Ie, right from the start, Stalin was prepared to accept an armistice. This objective was achieved, and it was enough. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> March/April terms were not quite achieved. When Shtemenko writes about the spring negotiations, he says the terms were "as easy as possible" and required (among other things) the internment of German troops in Lapland. But there was a time limit and this condition: "if the Finnish army would prove to be unable to intern the Nazi forces, the Soviet Union would offer help". In September 44 talks both of these terms were abandoned. In the end an acceptable outcome was reached. But had the opportunity presented itself, I don't think the Soviet Union would have refrained from capturing the "centers of political and economic activity" Shtemenko talks about.

It is a common misconception that having fulfilled their given task, the Red Army halted the offensive, but could have continued if needed. The directives, plans and actions to signify this were carefully suppressed in Soviet political and military history, but not entirely. In the following I quote two sources, both of which were written during the Soviet era by Soviet authors. S. M. Shtemenko was Chief of Operations Directorate of the General Staff at that time. His memoirs, entitled "Generalnyj shtab v gody Vojny" (The Soviet General Staff at War) is a two volume out of print classic that saw limited circulation in the west. The second volume deals with the 1944 summer offensive on Finland and includes an interesting map that shows Leningrad Front's objectives. According to caption, this plan was authorized by Stavka. Leningrad Front would overrun the Karelian Isthmus, capture Viipuri, cross the border that was agreed upon after the Winter War and continue the drive towards Helsinki. Shtemenko wrote about the preparations that were carried out in the spring of 1944: "After the Finnish government had rejected our conditions for peace [April 44], Stavka and the General Staff had to reconsider which forces should be eliminated first - the Finns or the Germans [in Lapland]. [...] In the Finnish section of the front we could swiftly advance within striking distance of the major population centers of Finland as they were closer in that direction. And the Finnish main forces were deployed there. Their defeat would result in the collapse of the entire Finnish defensive system. For this offensive we had at our disposal the Leningrad Front, the Karelian Front, the Baltic Sea Fleet and a great number of aircraft." He then claims that the Finnish defensive preparations were very solid, but that the troops and material available would crack them. Shtemenko writes that the Leningrad front had a decisive manpower and material advantage and gives the following ratios: infantry 2:1, armor 6:1, artillery 6:1, aircraft 3:1. This apparently includes all reinforcements received by both sides during the offensive (Kuhlmey et al). The Leningrad front had 30 divisions in 3 armies, including 5 divisions received as reinforcements at the end of June. The Karelian front had 15 divisions (2 armies) for the offensive. These forces were led by experienced and successful commanders, Govorov, commander of the Leningrad Front, and Meretskov, commander of the Volkhov Front. They had defeated the German forces south of Leningrad, breaching the siege and liberated Novgorod and Luga. Meretskov was assigned to command the Karelian Front after the Volkhov front was disbanded on February 13, 1944. Shtemenko: "Leningrad Front was to strike first at the enemy main forces. The objective was to breach the Finnish resistance in the direction of Viipuri, threatening to advance deep into Finland towards the primary centers of political and economic activity, including Helsinki." After Viipuri was captured, he continues: "The time had arrived for our [Leningrad Front] armies to advance beyond Viipuri, into Finland, and along the western shores of Lake Ladoga, towards north, into the rear of enemy defenses in Karelia." The fact that these attacks were repulsed is basic military history. The Karelian front did not reach their final objective either. Shtemenko clearly states that the objective in Karelia was to break into enemy rear, encircle and eliminate the Finnish forces, but this did not happen. He writes: "The enemy was able to withdraw and parried imminent thrusts. As it turned out, we had not been able to annihilate the enemy forces, but only managed to push them back so that they slipped through our fingers." More serious setbacks were about to emerge, however. Shtemenko reveals what happened to Meretskov's spearhead: "When our units were approaching the border at Kuolismaa, two divisions found themselves to be in a critical situation. In that difficult terrain the Finns had encircled them." In Stavka's report it was said, according to Shtemenko: "it was mainly due to bad leadership that the last operation on the left flank of the Karelian Front did fail. Stavka has likewise noted that the staff of the front is full of inefficient and incapable personnel." This staff, including the commander Meretskov, was the ex-staff of the disbanded Volkhov Front. One final quote from "Bitva za Leningrad": "The repeated offensive attempts by the Soviet Forces failed to gain results. The enemy succeeded in significantly tightening its ranks in this area and repulse all the attacks of our troops. During the offensive operations lasting over three weeks, from June 21 to mid-July, the forces of the right flank of the Leningrad front failed to carry out the tasks assigned to them on the orders of the Supreme Command issued on June 21st." I could continue this, but let me just state the facts. Finland did not capitulate or surrender, although the Soviet Union demanded this during the offensive. Finland was not occupied, unlike all the other countries that were at war with the Soviet Union. The Finnish army was not defeated nor was it disarmed. It withdrew and fought the Red Army to a standstill - holding unbroken lines when the peace treaty was signed. Military wise, the Finnish defensive victories had resulted in a strategic draw, neither side having the strength to resume offensive operations. Politically Finland had to accept harsh conditions since it was obvious that eventually the Soviet Union would concentrate new forces in the northern theater of operations and hammer their will in. However, these conditions were easier than in the spring of 1944.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Treeburst155: I would say your narrow victories are not "brilliant" simply because they were narrow.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Just because a win is narrow doesn't mean it's not brilliant! Agassi would beat Sampras 3-2 and it could very well be game of the year or Agassi's best performance that year. Then you are giving him one point for a narrow victory. Please. If both players have equal chances before the game and both play nearly perfectly, then obviously the result will be a draw or a narrow victory. I think it's ridiculous to suggest that such a win is worth less, in fact several times less, than a total win that was possible only because Champion had a really bad day. You are effectively penalizing hard fought battles between elite players and rewarding inferior games. This is why they don't consider victory levels in NBA, NHL, etc.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Treeburst155: A player would receive 1 point for a minor victory, 2 for a tactical, 3 for a major, and 4 for a total victory. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> There's one inherent problem in systems that take victory level into account. You could score four brilliant, but only narrow wins against state of the art opponent and then commit a major blunder in the fifth game, resulting in a total defeat. Your opponent would have negated all of the wins, all thanks to your horrible mistake in one game.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by redwolf: Turn a few AA guns "inwards" to cover your own setup area and so that they are out of LOS from outside.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> This anti-maneuver tactic renders Hellcats etc. useless. When the Allied player locates a hull down TD and tries to outflank it, suddenly some flak guns protecting the flank and rear areas open up.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Mike the bike: IMO it's an unbalanced force, with far too much heavy equipment and artillery <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> This is getting ridiculous. Beware - if you buy "too much" artillery, you might be gamey. It soon takes a professional system technician to buy forces that are kosher.

Reboot your system, connect to the net and run Netstat -an to determine your current tcp/ip connections. See which ports are being listened. Are you seeing port 1411 or similar ones on this list?

Don't you mean flight time = distance / velocity. Distance would be the distance between the shooter and the target at the moment of firing? So if the flight time is calculated to be eg. 1.75 seconds, the engine would check the location of the target (and possibly facing, etc.) 1.75 seconds after firing and use this info to determine the end point of the second check? Steve's estimate that it happens maybe once out of a couple hundred shots sounds valid to me. Extreme case yes, but I play a lot and see it every now and then. Easy to overlook for sure.

I still can't see how the engine could possibly know the location or the time of impact WITHOUT tracing the projectile in flight and seeing WHEN and WHERE and HOW exactly does it really hit the target. Philistine's suggestion looks like a solution on the surface, but how can you tell the engine to extract these vital details from the graphical representation we are seeing?

Maybe the predetermined hit could be considered to be "conditional" until it is verified by the second LOS check? The engine should remember the location of the shooter when it fired (it could have moved too) and then run the LOS check between that spot and the graphical hit location. But isn't this the problem, the engine does not know exactly where and when the graphical hit happens? Tom, can you acquire LOS/LOF through the middle of a church?

There is, because reality is always in motion. You can't stop the time, check for possible intersections and have accurate results. This kind of static intersection check would be useless because it could not possibly know that 0.25 seconds after the check some unexpected entity temporarily blocks the trajectory just when the projectile is in that location. Therefore trajectories must be constantly checked (thousands of times per second to accurately track projectiles from high- velocity guns) for each airborne projectile. This is the dynamic method. If the check was made 10000 times per second for each projectile to ensure that it would travel under 10cm between checks and there were 20 shots fired in one game turn and one would be in the air for 1 second on the average and the engine could evaluate 1000 intersection checks per second, it would take minutes to just calculate one minute worth of intersection checks. He said it was a simple static LOS check, so clearly useless for this purpose. I'm sorry if I totally missed your point.

Hello folks, I made the movies M Hofbauer is talking about. Tanaka, I would say that what these movies show can not be explained by a small difference between engine calculations and their graphical representation. A while back somebody argued that his shells were flying through enemy armor without causing damage and that he was using the realistic scale. BTS replied that the graphical representation and in-game calculations do not exactly match - the projectile can be shown flying through a tank when the engine had calculated a near miss. What you see in the third movie is way off-balance. If you haven't seen a projectile tunnel several hundred meters underground and go under buildings, then kill the target, take a look. The most logical explanation is that CM determines hitting and missing at the instant of firing, based on the conditions that applied at that very moment. If it was a kill, whatever the target might be able to do during the following seconds can't save it. It might drive behind a hill, behind buildings or woods, but the shell travels mercilessly through any obstacles and kills the target, because this was predetermined. This is no LOS issue. The shooter needs to have LOS at the moment of firing, but after that it is irrelevant. Apparently projectile collision detection is already implemented since they can unintentionally hit buildings when you are trying to shoot something else. Possibly the only way to fix this would be to calculate trajectories dynamically when the shell is in flight. If I remember, this was suggested before and BTS replied that it would make a difference only in exceedingly rare cases. Like when Tank A is firing at a distant B and some third vehicle intersects the trajectory just at the most inappropriate time. As far as I know, this 'you can't escape death' thing was not mentioned. Too bad cause it's much more common. The most annoying tank loss I've suffered this way was when Blastoise had his Sherman firing at my PzIV. The latter disappeared behind a hill, but alas, about a second later the shell arrived and tunneled through the darned crest, killing my panzer. Subvet's concern with x-ray vision is already explained by BTS. Somebody posted a picture showing LOS through the corners of three buildings and they replied this way: "the underlying LOS grid doesn't match building walls perfectly (it would take too much memory and CPU time to do it more precisely). Sometimes it can be off by a bit, though the picture shown is the most extreme example I've seen. The LOS function allows for a little "play" around corners and such." Neither the shooter nor the target in the above example were anywhere near the buildings. There might be yet another LOS issue that is visible in the picture aka_tom_w posted - if a unit is right behind a building, it can see through the middle.