Matthew_Ridgeway

Gracias Buckeye.

VL’s and limited intelligence\fog of war Quick question that may have been answered and discussed in the past (F*#k doing a search )…are friendly opccupied VL's instantly known by the opposing side. Moreover if I occupy a VL on one side of the map and the bad guys are say 2000 meters away, do the bad guys now know that I have possession of the said VL (and troops in the area) by way of the flag turning from neutral to my national flag?

4.5” is an “odd” class relative to US ARMY field artillery. US ARMY WWII artillery was primarily made up of: 75mm 105mm 155mm The 75mm was however somewhat restricted in use to light infantry units and parachute divisions. The 105mm was the US ARMY WWII workhorse, with most US infantry and armored divisions having 2 organic medium battalions of 105mm howitzers. US divisional artillery was typically rounded out with an organic heavy battalion of 155mm’s. Commonwealth Classes: 3.45” (25-pdr) equates to approximately 87mm 4.5” equates to approximately 114mm 5.5” equated to approximately 140mm I think the 25-pdr was sort of the Commonwealth workhorse. I am assuming that the 25-pdr kind of fit the role the US ARMY 105mm was filling. I don’t know what the typical organic layout of artillery for Commonwealth divisions was. Presumably, as with most of the major belligerents, there were two medium battalions and one hvy. battalion. Did the 5.5” fill the role in hvy. artillery battalions…or was that role filled by either the 4.5” or 5.5” depending on equipment availability?

If it's SLA Marshall you know its got to be good. Thanks for the link.

I’m with Dirtweasle. So what if it’s been discussed before. How many books have been written on the Eastern Front and folks are still crankin’ more **** out. Maybe we should go knock on David Glantz’s door before he cranks out yet another book on why the Russian Army Rules! And tell him to go do a “search”. Regarding smoke rounds and the 75mm…FM17-12 (the May 15, 1942 version) does talk about proper uses of smoke shells. So although they may not have had WP for the 75mm at that point in the war, there did seem to be a smoke round available for the Sherman or Grant/Lee. Regarding when a 75mm WP round was introduced … dunno for sure. However, I have read an account of a Sherman Crew deliberately firing WP at Panthers during the Lorraine Campaign…that would put it in service by at least September’ish of 1944. It apparently made the victim Panther crews believe their tank had caught fire. Last one out is a French fry. Belton Copper in “Death Traps” relays a similar tactic being employed by a Sherman Crew against two King Tigers in early 45. The Tiger crews also bailed quick. One advantage WP was supposed to have over other forms of smoke delivery was an almost instantaneous large, dense screen. This was a function of the bursting charge (as already indicated by Olle). No waiting ala. Smoke candles, smoke pots or other more conventional forms of screening smoke. Perhaps, as already indicated, the burn time duration was less.

No doubt your 37mm's will be equipped with it in CM2...but than they will never fire it ala Allied Tungstun ammo in CMBO

another good one **punt**

**punt** the good topics are always worth a little push

The charge in AP-HE ala APCBC is relatively tiny when compared to say 75mm M48 HE or 105mm HE. In addition the fuse in AP-HE in theory is very robust (i.e. it is designed to penetrate a couple inches of hardened steel before activating the HE charge. I wouldn’t expect properly functioning AP-HE to just burst when impacting soft to medium stiff ground, a tree, or personal. As already indicated High velocity spalling from AP-HE penetrating into enclosed spaces (bunkers, building etc) presumably would be potentially dangerous to any personal in that enclosed space. But than I could be wrong

The following report by the 3rd Panzer Division, based upon its combat experience in the spring and summer of 1942 touches on a lot of what has been bated about on this forum over the last few weeks regarding Soviet Tank Crews, and Soviet Armour combat practices. For those with longer attention spans; From Jentz, “Panzer Truppen Vol 1” pg 232 – 233. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>In the following report, the commander of the 3-Panzer-Division passed their knowledge on to the other Panzer-Divisions preparing for the major summer offensives: Combat Experience of the 3.Panzer-Division – Summer 1942 The Russian infantry is poor. They won't attack without accompanying tanks. Nothing has changed in regard to how they attack. The attack still always occurs in herds. In spite of attacks being beaten back, the attack will again and again be repeated in the same fashion without achieving any other results. The Russians can no longer withstand a concentrated German Panzer attack. He panics and abandons his position. This very clearly occurred during the battles by Charkow and also on the Kertsch peninsula. However, it should be clearly emphasized, that this only occurs as a result of massive Panzer attacks. During attacks at company strength, after he has recognized the low number of Panzers, he immediately gets back into his hole and stubbornly defends against the following infantry. During successful German breakthroughs, it has continuously proven to be necessary to relentlessly chase the opponent, even at night. He has mastered the concentration of large bodies of troops especially at night, so that when the attack is renewed in the morning a new defensive front must be broken through. The Russians have become very insensitive in the flanks. The Russian tank forces are good. The level of training is also good. A Russian first lieutenant tanker captured near Charkow stated that the Russians feel that they are superior to the Germans in tanks. Use of the German Hohlraummunition (shaped charge shells) was known to the Russian first. However, the Pz-Kpfw.lV with the longer gun (which wasn't used near Charkow) was unknown to the Russians that came from Charkow. The captured officer's description of the organization of the Russian Tank Brigade is the same as other documents available by the Division. Command occurs by radio down to the company commander, within the company by flag signals (yellow flag held up - follow in a row; red flag held up - spread out; red flag swung side to side - enemy tanks, take positions). The Russian tank crews are very sensitive to being fired at, even from weapons that can't harm him. He is almost always turned around and retreats when fired at from the flank by 3.7 cm and 5 cm anti-tank guns or the 5 cm Kw.K. L42 tank guns. In several cases he turned back when hit in the flank by heavy machinegun fire. In all cases, hardly any damage could be found on the tanks that had been fired at. Because of the small amount of radio equipment and the lack of ability to observe to the side, the Russians have not been able to lead a concentrated tank attack. Therefore, at first only four tanks appear, while gradually the others follow by and by. He is a master in recovering tanks. He knows that Germans breakthroughs in depth are conducted with long, large road columns. In many cases, therefore, he has successfully stopped the advance with two or three T34s positioned on a commanding height or even dug in. Well camouflaged, these are first identified after they open fire. The positions are chosen so that they can't be approached from the flanks. In every case, scouting for detours has cost so much time that contact with the opponent was lost. After several experiences, the current commander of the 3-Panzer-Division decided that advances would not be made on the larger roads but that these would be left free at first. New weapons that have appeared are the British Mark II tank and an American tank. The 7.62 cm anti-tank/anti-air-craft gun was widely used. A Russian 12.7 mm anti-tank rifle with a two-man crew has newly appeared. It is recognizable by its very long barrel with a lifting support about 1.5 meters high. The bullet penetrates the sidewalls of our Pz.Kpfw.lll and IV. Ranges at which it can be fired are not known. The gunners have been instructed to fire at the glass blocks in the commander's cupola. Panzer-Regiment 6 lost six Panzer commanders because of this during the last battles. While attacking with infantry it is necessary that coordination between the Panzers and infantry be exactly timed. Either the infantry advance in front to draw enemy fire so that the enemy weapons can be effectively engaged by the Panzers, or the infantry follow at about 300 meters directly behind the Panzers. This interval must be held and may not become longer or it results in fire from the recovering enemy making the advance of the infantry significantly more difficult. In addition it is at least as much the task of the infantry to combat enemy weapons as it is the task of the Panzers. The best experiences have been achieved in combating enemy tanks through cooperation between the Panzers and the Flak. Especially noteworthy is the fact that when Flak engage ground targets the 8.8 cm Flak guns present a very large and immobile target. It is in our interest to especially pay attention to the local defense of these Flak guns from enemy tank attacks. This one is particularly interesting The rumors that the Russian armor quality has become poorer are emphatically denied. But it is admitted that the penetration ability of armor-piercing shells is better in the warm part of the year than in the cold. According to the opinion of the experts, this is exclusively due to the differences in temperature. It is strongly emphasized that every Panzer attack must absolutely follow prelaid plans, with the exception of the pursuit of retreating enemy. Artillery preparations are necessary, with Stukas joining in. Of vast importance for the Panzer- Regiment is medium-range frequency radio contact with the rear elements. It is a useful suggestion that the infantry and the Panzer on the same assignment use the same medium-range frequency so that they can hear the other's battle reports. Panzer-Regiment 6 proposes that the turret numbers of the commander's Panzers be redone in a more subdued form. With the numbers as presently displayed, the regiment has lost many commanders. The first and second uniform of the commander was shot up; also the third uniform already has a considerable number of holes. The Russians understand and demonstrate great skill in seeking out and knocking out the commander's Panzers. Especially the Pz.Bef.Wg. which is identified by the frame antenna on the rear, is presently the target of his concentrated fire. Because of this the commander of Panzer-Regiment 6 transferred to a normal Pz.Kpfw.lll. Further, the regiment believes it more suitable that the commander and adjutant ride in one Panzer, instead of the commander and signals officer. The commander gains so much time for directing the battle and observation. His intentions are given to the adjutant in catchwords who converts them into radio language and transmits them. The signals officer rides in a second Panzer and monitors the radio traffic or follows further behind the commander's Panzer to maintain contact with the division on medium frequency or with aircraft on radios sets on their frequency. Henceforth, Panzer-Regiment 6 is supplying its Pz-Kpfw.II with 2 cm Sprenggranaten. With this they possess a weapon that is very effective in combating enemy infantry. Their armor-piercing ammunition is no longer effective because of the increased thickness of the enemy armor. In battles against enemy tanks, it has been shown time after time that calmly waiting and letting the opponent come into close range is better than a showy attack. Besides a large number of knocked-out enemy tanks, no large number of our own are lost. A showy attack results in large losses to ourselves in addition to its possibility of success. This becomes very evident if the successes of the 3. and 23.Panzer-Divisions are compared. Slowly feeling out the front and flanks with the main force on the flanks, sector by sector, is most suitable. When possible, scout on foot and guide the Panzers on foot into selected positions, especially those for the Pz-Kpfw.lV with the long 7.5 cm Kw.K.40 tank gun.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Armornut said: “The Tank in Ridgeways story was a KV 2 belive it or not” There is a photo of a destroyed KV2 at the tail end of the write-up in “Small Unit Actions During The German Campaign in Russia”. The Photo's caption is unclear as to weather it is the same vehicle described in the above tale…it simply reads “Soviet KV tank demolished by the Germans, July 1941”. The action actually took place on the 23 and 24 of June 1941. It certainly seems possible that it could have been a KV-2. The study does go on to suggest that there was a fair amount of variability in Soviet Tank Crew quality and Soviet abilities at both tactical and operational levels of armour combat during 41-42. Some of the accounts suggest a fair amount of brilliance in Soviet crews was seen at times. Other units were very much armed mobs…little training, poor leadership, and scant understanding of the equipment they were operating. Heinz 25th PzReg Said: "For the second half of 1941, only a little more than half of the planned output of tanks was managed, the total production for 1941 beeing 6521 machines(2996 of the T-34)" Agreed…a handful seems an extreme under exaggeration of production figures. Steven Zaloga in “Red Army Handbook” indicates the following figures for 41 and 42: T34 production in 1941 was 3,014 machines T34 production in 1942 was 12,553 machines KV1 and KV2 production in 1941 was 1,353 machines KV1 and KV1S production in 1942 was 2,533 machines Total KV and T34 Production 41 – 42 was 19,433 machines Production of Lighter tank Models by the Soviets in 41 – 42: Combined T40 + T50 + T60 production in 1941 was 1,907 machines Combined T40 + T50 + T60 + T70 production in 1942 was 9,553 machines Total Light Tank (T40 through T70) Production for 41 – 42 was 11,460 machines [ 04-20-2001: Message edited by: Matthew_Ridgeway ]

“Villers-Boccage Through The Lens” by Daniel Taylor...fairly definitive. Great quality photos as well. Even Whittmann’s own report following the battle never mentioned the quantity of destruction being alluded to here. Still one can not take anything away from the shear audacity of this guys attack at Villers…be his final count 15 tanks KO’d or 115 tanks KO’d. Following the battle Nazi propaganda succeeded in building the encounter up to proper Wagnerian proportion.

My favorite 1941 Russian tank combat story…The Tale of “Ivan Whittmann”. How a single tank threw a monkey wrench into the workings of the mighty Panzerwaffe. From: “Small Unit Actions During the German Campaign in Russia”, Dept. of the US Army, July 1953. II. The Armored Roadblock (June 1941 ) When Germany launched her attack against Russia on the morning of 22 June 1941, Army Group North jumped off from positions along the border separating East Prussia from Lithuania. On D plus I the 6th Panzer Division, which was part of Army Group North, was ordered to occupy the Lithuanian town of Rossienie and thence to seize the two vehicular bridges across the Dubysa River north- east of the town (map 17). After Rossienie was taken the division was split into Combat Teams R and S, which were to establish two bridgeheads, Combat Team R being assigned the bridge nearest Lydavenai, a village situated almost due north of Rossienie. By early afternoon both columns had crossed the river and contact was established between the two bridgeheads. Mopping-up operations around its bridgehead netted Combat Team R a number of prisoners, about 20 of whom, including a first lieuten- ant, were loaded onto a truck for evacuation to Rossienie. One Ger- man sergeant was placed in charge of the group. About half-way to Rossienie the truck driver suddenly noticed a Russian tank astride the road. As the truck slowed to a halt/the prisoners pounced upon the driver and the sergeant, and the Russian lieutenant lunged for the sergeant's machine pistol. In the struggle that ensued, the powerful German sergeant freed his right arm and struck the lieutenant such a hard blow that he and several other Rus- sians were knocked down by the impact. Before the prisoners could close in again, the sergeant freed his other arm and fired the machine pistol into the midst of the group. The effect of the fire was devas- tating. Only the lieutenant and a few others escaped; the rest were killed. The sergeant and the driver returned to the bridgehead with the empty truck and informed their commanding officer that the only supply route to the bridgehead was blocked by a heavy tank of the KV type. The Russian tank crew had meanwhile severed telephone communication between the bridgehead and the division command post. The Russian plan was not clear. In estimating the situation, the bridgehead commander felt that because of the encounter with the tank an attack against the rear of the bridgehead was to be expected; accordingly, he organized his force immediately for all-around de- fense. An antitank battery was moved to high ground near the command post, one of the howitzer batteries reversed its field of fire so as to face southwestward, and the engineer company prepared to mine the road and the area in front of the defense position. The tank battalion, which was deployed in a forest southeast of the bridgehead, prepared for a counterattack. During the rest of the day the tank did not move. The next morn- ing, 24 June, the division tried to send 12 supply trucks from Rossienie to the bridgehead. All 12 were destroyed by the Russian tank. A German reconnaissance patrol sent out around noon could find no evidence that a general Russian attack was impending. The Germans could not evacuate their wounded from the bridge- head. . Every attempt to bypass the tank failed because any vehicle that drove off the road got stuck in the mud and fell prey to Russians hiding in the surrounding forest. On the same day, an antitank battery with 50-mm. guns was ordered to work its way forward and destroy the tank. The battery confidently accepted this mission. As the first guns approached to within 1,000 yards of the KV, it remained in place, apparently unaware of the German movement. Within the next 30 minutes the entire battery, well camouflaged, had worked its way to within firing range. Still the tank did not move. It was such a perfect target that the battery commander felt that it must have been damaged and aban- doned, but he nevertheless decided to fire. The first round, from about 600 yards, was a direct hit. A second and a third round followed. The troops assembled on the hill near the combat team's command post cheered like spectators at a shooting match. Still the tank did not move. By the time that the eighth hit was scored, the Russian tank crew had discovered the position of the firing battery. Taking careful aim, they silenced the entire battery with a few 76-mm. shells, which destroyed two guns and damaged the others. Having suffered heavy casualties, the gun crews were withdrawn to avoid further losses. Not until after dark could the damaged guns be recovered. Since the 50-mm. antitank guns had failed to pierce the 3-inch armor, it was decided that only the 88-mm. flak gun with its armor- piercing shells would be effective. That same afternoon an 88-mm. flak gun was pulled out of its position near Rossienie and cautiously moved up in the direction of the tank, which was then facing the bridgehead. Well camouflaged with branches and concealed by the burned-out German trucks lining the road, the gun safely reached the edge of the forest and stopped 900 yards from the tank. Just as the German crew was maneuvering the gun into position, the tank swung its turret and fired, blasting the flak gun into a ditch. Every round scored a direct hit, and the gun crew suffered heavy casualties. Machinegun fire from the tank made it impossible to retrieve the gun or the bodies of the German dead. The Russians had allowed the gun to approach undisturbed, knowing that it was no threat while in motion and that the nearer it came the more certain was its destruction. Meanwhile, the bridgehead's supplies were running so low that the troops had to eat their canned emergency rations. A staff meeting was therefore called to discuss further ways and means of dealing with the tank. It was decided that an engineer detachment should attempt to blow it up in a night operation. When the engineer company commander asked for 12 volunteers, the men were so anxious to succeed where others had failed that the entire company of 120 volunteered. He ordered the company to count off and chose every tenth man. The detachment was told about its mission, given detailed instructions, and issued explosives and other essential equipment. Under cover of darkness the detachment moved out, led by the company commander. The route followed was a little-used sandy path which led past Hill 400 and into the woods that surrounded the loca- tion of the tank. As the engineers approached the tank, they could distinguish its contours in the pale starlight. After removing their boots, they crawled to the edge of the road to observe the tank more closely and to decide how to approach their task. Suddenly there was a noise from the opposite side of the road, and the movement of several dark figures could be discerned. The Ger- mans thought that the tank crew had dismounted. A moment later, however, the sound of tapping against the side of the tank was heard and the turret was slowly raised. The figures handed something to the tank crew, and the sound of clinking dishes could be heard. The Germans concluded that these were partisans bringing food to the tank crew. The temptation to overpower them was great, and ,it probably would have been a simple matter. Such an action, however, would have alerted the tank crew and perhaps have wrecked the entire scheme. After about an hour the partisans withdrew, and the tank turret was closed. It was about 0100 before the engineers could finally get to work. They attached one explosive charge to the track and the side of the tank and withdrew after lighting the fuse. A violent explosion ripped the air. The last echoes of the roar had hardly faded away when the tank's machineguns began to sweep the area with fire. The tank did not move. Its tracks appeared to be damaged, but no close exam- ination could be made in the face of the intense machinegun fire. Doubtful of success, the engineer detachment returned to the bridge- head and made its report. One of the twelve men was listed as missing. Shortly before daylight a second explosion was heard from the vicinity of the tank, again followed by the sound of machinegun fire; then, after some time had passed, silence reigned once more. Later that same morning, as the personnel around the command post of Combat Team R were resuming their normal duties, they noticed a barefoot soldier with a pair of boots under his arm crossing the bivouac area. When the commanding officer halted the lone wanderer, all eyes turned to watch. The colonel was heard asking the soldier for an explanation of his unmilitary appearance. Soon the sound of their voices became inaudible as the two principals in this little drama engaged in earnest conversation. As they talked, the colonel's face brightened, and after a few minutes he offered the soldier a cigarette, which the latter accepted, visibly embarrasssed. Finally, the colonel patted the soldier on the back, shook his hand, and the two parted, the soldier still carrying his boots. The curiosity of the onlookers was not satisfied until the order of the day was published, together with the following extract from the barefoot soldier's report: I was detailed as an observer for the detachment that was sent to blow up the Russian tank. After all preparations had been made, the company commander and I attached a charge of about double the normal size to the tank track, and I returned to the ditch which was my observation post. The ditch was deep enough to offer protection against splinters, and I waited there to observe the effect of the explosion. The tank, however, covered the area with sporadic machinegun fire following the explosion. After about an honr, when everything had quieted down, I crept to the tank and examined the place where I had attached the charge. Hardly half of the track was destroyed, and I could find no other damage to the tank. I returned to the assembly point only to find that the detachment had departed. While looking for my boots I found that another demo- I lition charge had been left behind. I took it, returned to the tank, climbed onto it, and fastened the charge to the gun barrel in the hope of destroying at least that part of the tank, the charge not being large enough to do any greater damage. I crept under the tank and detonated the charge. The tank immediately covered the edge of the forest with machinegun fire which did not cease until dawn, when I was finally able to crawl out from under the tank. When I inspected the effect of the demolition, I saw, to my regret, that the charge I had used was too weak. The gun was only slightly damaged. Upon returning to the assembly point, I found a pair of boots, which I tried to put on, but they were too small. Someone had apparently taken my boots by mistake. That is why I returned barefoot and late to my company. Here was the explanation of the missing man, the morning ei- plosion, and the second burst of machinegun fire. Three German attempts had failed. The tank still blocked the road and could fire at will. Plan 4, calling for an attack on the tank by dive bombers, had to be canceled when it was learned that no such aircraft could be made available. Whether the dive bombers could have succeeded in scoring a direct hit on the tank is ques- tionable, but it is certain that anything short of that would not have eliminated it. Plan 5 involved a calculated risk and called for deceiving the tank crew. It was hoped that in this way German losses would be kept to a minimum. A feint frontal attack was to be executed by a tank formation approaching from various points in the forest east of the road while another 88-mm. gun was to be brought up from Rossienie to destroy the tank. The terrain was quite suitable for this operation; the forest was lightly wooded and presented no obstacle to tank maneuver. The German armor deployed and attacked the Russian tank from three sides. The Russian crew, clearly excited, swung the gun tur- ret around and around in an effort to hit the German tank kept up a continuous fire from the woods. Meanwhile, the 88-mm. gun took up a position to the rear of the tank. The very first round was a direct hit and, as the crew tried to turn the gun to the rear, a second and a third shell struck home. Mortally wounded, the tank remained motionless, but did not burn. Four more 88-mm. armor-piercing shells hit their mark. Then, fol- lowing the last hit, the tank gun rose straight up as if, even now, to defy its attackers. The Germans closest to the tank dismounted and moved in on their victim. To their great surprise they found that but two of the 88-mm. shells had pierced the tank armor, the five others having made only deep dents. Eight blue marks, made by direct hits of the 50-mm. antitank guns, were found. The results of the engineer attack had amounted to only a damaged track and a slight dent in the gun bar- rel. No trace of the fire from the German tanks could be found. Driven by curiosity, the Germans climbed onto the tank and tried to open the turret, but to no avail. Suddenly, the gun barrel started to move again and most of the Germans scattered. Quickly, two engineers dropped hand grenades through the hole made by the hit on the lower part of the turret. A dull explosion followed, and the turret cover blew off. Inside were the mutilated bodies of the crew. The Germans had come off poorly in their first encounter with a KV at this point of the front, one single tank having succeeded in blocking the supply route of a strong German force for 48 hours,

“This means that the delay for artillery falling SHOULDNT be much more than any other country.” I think you are WRONG in this assessment. This isn’t a matter of TIME of flight. It is a question of communication between FO and FDC. WITHOUT wireless this communication would be restricted to runners FIELD TELEPHONES or wig-wagging (if that was employed by the Red Army).

Agreed…see my previous post regarding mortars and the Red Army. My only hair on a gnats ass nit-pick would be dates for massed artillery concentrations. Uranus was heralded by massed concentration of artillery fire (late 42). However, modeling massed artillery barrage…drum fire barrages...on helpless Rumanian and Italian positions prior to Uranus would most likely be a bit of a bore for the Italian player. The critical point here is the lack of significant radio\wireless sets severally cuts into an Armies ability to adjust and fire in real time. Thus the Soviet affinity for large caliber assault guns…SU-122 and 152. Direct fire artillery support. Requiring players to pre-plan barrages I think would have a certain appeal. Such a thing would forces players to plan prior to hitting the start button for their respective scenarios.

MrSpkr: I am not attempting to flame or begin a flame war. Perhaps I came off more terse than I intended. I’m simply interested in weather there is some sort of precedence here. If there is a consistent trend for this sort of thing occurring based upon historical examples, than maybe there should be some attempt to model it into a historical simulation. If the extent of our evidence is based upon one account this is perhaps a waste of time trying to code such a thing into an Eastern front wargame. That was my only point.

von Lucke said: I believe the issue of prepatory bombardment (in relation to CMBO) was discussed quite heavily, with the end result being Steve stating that Prep Fire was considered an operational event that would have occured outside the scope of battle depicted in CM. I don't really see BTS changing this for CM2. I have to agree with von Lucke or Steve, or who ever originally said the above. Soviet Indirect artillery fire can best be described as an operational tool simply because of the limited communications available (read lack of wireless sets). But I would be more inclined toward incorporating Soviet indirect fire capability via pre-planning as suggested above. The planning stage may be conducted at regimental, or division levels but the impacts of pre-planned artillery fire are certainly tactical, and thus its incorporation is certainly appropriate to a tactical level game Soviet artillery employment at the level of CM would typically consist of Soviet self-propelled guns firing in a direct support mode…ala the SU152, JSU (or ISU) 152, etc. Soviet “crash-booms” 76.2mm field guns also were employed a great deal in a direct fire mode. Mortars were also heavily relied upon for tactical level or battlefield level “indirect artillery” fire. However CM’s present modeling of mortar fire would make it difficult to portray actual Soviet battlefield employment of the 82mm and 120mm mortars (read BTS needs to take another look at mortar fire and how it is being modeled in Combat Mission). In the case of an established defensive position I think we can safely assume that Red Army units would have established a fairly elaborate system of field telephones…with a fair amount of redundancy in telephone lines. I would contend that in this situation Soviet Artillery was employed in an “adjust and fire” mode in real time similar to what is being portrayed with Allied and German FO’s in CMBO. This of course assumes Soviet Artillery observers remain in their initially established position at the start of a scenario…i.e. they hang out where the telephone is. Perhaps an intrinsic probability that at some point in the game phone lines may become severed…poof no more fire and adjust capability. In addition, it is evident from various works on late war Soviet Army doctrine that the Red Army was employing forward air controllers in limited numbers. These fellows apparently accompanied armoured spearheads and were in communication via wireless sets with Red Air force ground support elements. So in limited cases Red Army units should be able – at a battlefield level (read tactical level) – to call in air strikes on positions established by ground elements. In game terms that means an FO unit with a radio designates a target…5 or 10 minutes latter dedicated Sturmaviks attack that target. IMHO air liaison officers should be available in CMBO in limited numbers…subjected to realistic rarity constraints. But that is for a different thread.

**punt**

Is this thread about unarmed Soviet Conscript or atrocities against Soviet POW’s? I’m curious how many people here can quote specific sources and the passages therein to give us a feel for just how prevalent unarmed Soviet Infantry squads were. I know of only one such example disscussed in Paul Carell’s “Hitler Moves East” regarding a Soviet Infantry attack around Leningrad.

Thanks Enoch.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>JuJu: Guys, this has been literally discussed to death, and then some... I think BTS is well aware of your (our) hopes in this.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> So what if it's been discussed to death before Does that mean we can't talk about it some more. Perhaps we need to leave more room on this board for the PENG thread or some such thing. I didn't participate in the past discussions...so why can't I talk about it now? If you don't wish to participate in this present incarnation of an old discussion than don't. A year from now if it resurfaces...well…perhaps I won't participate in it than. Have you been elected CM forum playground monitor now? It's a good topic, otherwise it wouldn't keep resurfacing. My two cents.

Great Post TSS…now we're talking! Any thoughts on interaction between Soviet FO’s and Soviet Fire Direction Centers. Did the Soviets even employ a system of FO’s and FDC’s? Were the Soviets capable of delivering quick fire missions during say a meeting type engagement? Any recommended references on Soviet WWII arty (in English)?

Exactly! This issue of game engine calc’s vs. visual representation has reared its head before. A recent topic by Marcus Hofbaur revealed another such quirk in which vehicles were being shot at and hit when graphically they appeared to be a large building intervening between the firing unit and target. The images on that thread also told a thousands words. Relative to the images you posted, it is impossible to see how graphical scaling can be the predicament here. The Churchill (at least graphically ) is literally over the slopes crestline, and thus should be presenting the entire tanks cross-section as a target to the schreak team. Hard to figure how the image you presented could be a hull-down situation.

Who cares if more realism can or can’t be implemented in the game. The topic is still interesting. There is a great deal of base knowledge on this forum about “all things WWII”. These topics that we banter on about, don’t have to be associated with their effect on CM. I would still like to hear someone knowledgeable on WWII Red Army Artillery protocol throw in his or her three cents worth. I know Soviet Artillery has never been kicked around on this forum in any serious threads. Come-on jasoncawley@ameritech.net…I know you were once a red-leg. Surely you can crank out a few paragraphs on anything you learned about Soviet Arty while in the ARMY. [This message has been edited by Matthew_Ridgeway (edited 04-05-2001).]

"...a tank crew always loses to brave soldiers defending their city streets. It's not a matter of brute force; it's a pure tactical issue. A tank crew can't see soldiers waiting for tanks to blunder below, setting up a perfect top-down shot from a window with a handheld anti-tank rocket. The blind tank is more vulnerable than the nimble rebel who waits to ambush from tunnels and alleys." Unfortunately for use mouse wielding generals the above is almost impossible to recreate in wargaming. One unit sees for all units in wargames. How often have you set up an ambush in a Tactical game such as CM only to have it foiled by the instantaneous reaction of all enemy units suddenly seeing the ambusher and opening fire on it. Someone wood-be game designer really needs to site down and think about line of sight and reaction times for units.