LongLeftFlank
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Posts posted by LongLeftFlank
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Thanks for posting. Warts and all, there's nothing else like this on the market.
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Aww, Broadsword there you go just when things are getting interesting! It's like watching two bull elephant seals getting ready to fight!
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Wow! Do an AAR if you can, with some map panos and level 8 screenies showing the deployments for the key fights. As for the Nazi Gotterdamerung on the city edge, you've got the high ground OPs now. Pour on the arty (and the heavy bombers)!
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Another option would be to have bailed out crews have Scarce levels of ammo in their small arms (how likely are they to be wearing or grab ammo belts when their vehicle is destroyed?) to inhibit their combat power while retaining the player's choice to have them hide, flee or fight. A 1 level Experience (not Morale) drop outside the vehicle might make sense too. Even if they've left their vehicle voluntarily to scout or Spot, they have no business (or incentive) seeking out or staying in major firefights. Self defence or rounding up enemy surrenderees they may stumble across is another matter and there are ample historical accoumts of both.
I definitely don't like the Auto-Rout idea. Why represent them in the game at all if they're merely ciphers? Also, what happens if they've bailed voluntarily or the vehicle isn't destroyed? Can the TacAI distinguish?
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Let me join the ranks of the slack-jawed It took me a moment to realize the first shot wasn't a colourised period photo (the uniform poses of the pixeldoughs made me look again).
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Quite the rolodex there, Broadsword!
@TrailApe, I was referring strictly to recon ops in talking about casualty avoidance. The little recce battle I'm playtesting now really brings home how the Cavalry units were very well-equipped to cover mileage and kill enemy snipers or OPs but totally unequipped to hold ground or do more than withdraw in the face of a dug-in enemy once located. I also need to pick up Balkoski's book on the Cav units.
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And designers can create that (esp in a campaign) by costing you a lot of points for friendly losses. I wish they did more of that, so that one doesn't necessarily have to lose big cos one wants to save one's troops from slaughter. (You'll need em for the next battle.)
I heard that 5% casualties was considered very high. But, am unclear if that would be a figure for the parent formation/corps or just for the combat formation.
Since there were about 10 support guys for every combat soldier, 5% casualties of a parent formation of (say) 5,000 would be a huge % for the approx 500 combat troops who would suffer nearly all the casualties.
Agreed. In the platoon scale recon scenario I'm testing right now, the player must weigh his objectives against force preservation -- in practical terms, even if you've occupied your objectives you aren't likely to hold them long if you've also lost ~15% of your lightly armed force. This also promotes a lot more realistically cautious behaviour by the attacker. Killing enemy is of relatively minor value (albeit not zero value) -- Recon forces simply weren't equipped and manned to hold ground or to do much more fighting than kill snipers or drive off rival patrols.
The teeth to tail ratio varied a lot, and the Germans were especially (though not uniquely) prone to put their cooks and clerks into the line as riflemen in extremis.
My guess is that once an attacking infantry force hits about 8-10% casualties in a planned attack (i.e. every squad has a man down on average, although more likely a few unlucky squads have sustained 30-50% casualties and are essentially broken), forward movement has ground to a halt, especially since the causative agent is most likely copious enemy artillery. I don't think there's a fixed threshold of cumulative unreplaced casualties (i.e. across multiple days of fighting) at which a force becomes totally unable to attack though -- in fact, history suggest there isn't.
Small groups of elite forces engaged in commando raids or coups de main might be more resilient, so long as they've seized their objectives early on and are awaiting relief or reinforcement (at that point, they've become defenders).
For defenders, the "breaking point" is a lot harder to quantify. Defenders typically don't know what's going on beyond the next hole, so casualties alone aren't necessarily going to cause them to flee (leaving your hole could be worse). However, if enemy shooting or shooters are detected on the flank(s) or worse, behind them, I suspect most defenders would take that as a cue to fall back or at minimum, ask command what's happening.
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The legend of the lone hero annihilating numerous opponents predates civilization: think the Iliad, Gilgamesh, the Ramayana, Hiawatha, blah blah blah. There's a reason shooters, not chess or Go-type many-vs-many strategy games, have dominated video games ever since Space Invaders.
I went through my Paul Carrell phase as well, but as I read down into the accounts I realized he was full of crap. The Russians held, then thrashed the Germans head to head using superior strategy, plus equipment, tactics and good old fashioned individual cunning and courage that were every bit as good -- think T34/KV/IS tanks, SU-122, Sturmovik, La-7 and MiG-3 fighters, 76mm AT gun, 120mm mortar, Katyusha, PPSh41. Many of which the Germans themselves copied (yes, the Russians returned the favour).
EDIT: Oh, I've downloaded the scenario. Look forward to giving it a spin.
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And I was just about to ask whether anyone else out there except Broadsword is still actively working on "historical" scenarios or campaigns? (i.e. where the maps, forces and situations are reasonably closely matched to historical accounts). Awesome!
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So that got my interest piqued. And sure enough, from Balkoski, "Beyond the Beachhead: the 29th ID in Normandy"
General Bradley was deeply concerned about the situation west of the Vire.... An American intelligence report warned that a major enemy force was preparing to counterattack the west side of the Vire to sever the tie between the two beachheads. Bradley had no troops to spare to block such a counterattack, so the 175th was ordered to send a force to the west side of the Vire on June 12. The mission, officially designated a "reconnaisance in force" was to discover what the Germans were up to and, more important, to seize two key bridges over a [Vire et Taute] canal that the expected German counterattack would have to cross.
Goode wanted the two companies to cross the Vire under cover of darkness. At 0400 on June 12 however... Companies C and E were still far from their assigned crossing sites... the [Company C] CO explained that he hadn't even heard about the mission until after midnight.... the sun had risen by the time the two companies reached the Vire.
... sixteen rubber assault boats - 8 for each company. Each boat could carry ten men. Company E was to cross the river 2-1/2 miles southwest of Isigny, just south of the St Lo-Cherbourg railway bridge. Company C was to cross a mile upstream....
As the 29ers paddled across the river, a few machine guns opened up at long range, but they were aimed too high. The Yanks were actually safer in the river than anywhere else, since both banks were lined with twelve foot dikes.... Cota accompanied Company E across the river. "It [the plan] didn't smell right from the first, and I thought maybe I could help if they got in a jam", Cota remembered.
... The day was hot and several 29ers became ill-tempered.... Cota realized that Montmartin [the rendezvous point] was occupied by the enemy, for Company E took heavy fire as it approached the town from the northeast.
But the bridges -- not the town -- were the mission objectives, so Cota decided to bypass Montmartin on the north. The change of plan could not be passed on to Company C however, since the radios had gotten soaked in the crossing and were not working.
... Cota and Company E marched straight into a trap. 500 yards northwest of Montmartin, the 29ers were filing down a narrow dirt road, bordered on both sides by hedgerows as tall as a man, when a couple of German submachine guns suddenly opened up on the head of the column at pointblank range....
The Germans were on the other side of the hedgerows, pushing their submachine guns over the embankments without even looking and firing long bursts down the road... Only a handful of the enemy had scattered an entire company. Only 30 men remained with Cota. The rest had disappeared into the bocage. "What is this? 'Cota's Last Stand?'" Cota demanded of [Lt] Shea....
Like vultures circling a dying man, they surrounded Cota's party and called upon the Americans to surrender. One 29er answered by blasting an enemy-occupied hedgerow with a full clip from his BAR. "Blow it out your ass!" he shouted.
One of Cota's men peered over the hedgerow and detected an odd-looking cow in an adjacent field. "One of those dumb bastards is trying to hide behind that cow!" the 29er yelled. "Look at those boots!" A fusillade killed the German, and the cow -- but a sergeant scolded the men for wasting ammunition. "You don't have to bury 'em with lead," he said.
For the rest, read the book (I've ordered a copy to atone for my minor copyright infringement -- fair use).
Like I said, you can't make this stuff up!
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As part of my research into my le Carillon opus, I was digging backwards into the chronology of 175th Infantry, 29th ID (the first US outfit to capture, then lose, La Meauffe in June).
And I ran across the following gem, proving that history can provide dramas equal to the imagination of any modern day gamer. This story has it all: ill-conceived and botched plan resulting in small bands of hard-fighting GIs cut off behind enemy lines, counterattacked by panzer forces and calling in battleship guns, dense bocage, cigar-chomping general with tommy gun, desperate relief action personally led by regimental commander (who then went MIA).
Actually, screw CMBN, somebody call Hollywood.
My dance card is full right now with the oh-so-conventional Le Carillon sequence, but someone really should do this one.
Here's the dry high level day by day, from the XIX Corps Chronology
June 7, 1944, D plus 1, the 175th Infantry landed on Omaha Beach
8 June. Fierce fight for Isigny
9 June. Capture of Lison 1800
10 June.Consolidate defensive positions around Lison
11 June. Active patrolling by all units
12 June. At 0645 a task force under Major Miller, 1st Bn XO, crossed the Vire River with their mission of securing crossing of the Vire et Taute canal against use by panzer units moving against our right.
Company “E” after suffering heaving casualties, withdrew across the river.
Company “C” with Major Miller and Brigadier General Cota (asst div commander), pushed through the village and occupied the high ground south of Montmartin en Graignes.
At 2200 Colonel Goode, the Regimental Commander, assumed command of Company “G” and crossed the Vire.
13 June. At 1205, 13 June, Company “G” recrossed the River Vire, having run into stiff enemy opposition. Colonel Goode was missing, having been wounded or killed in this action.
Rations and ammunition were dropped to the task force from the air. An enemy Panzer Division was reported to be approaching. The battleship Texas shelled the town with its 16-inch batteries, without hitting the task force.
The morning of 14 June, the Division Commander ordered the task force to with-draw across the River Vire and rejoins the regiment. They fought their way back to the river and returned late that night.
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I don't sink them. I'll take a look at your crater idea though.
Btw, you're covering 320th operations north of St Lo, right? Check this paper out.
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Haven't read the book myself and my knowledge of it is limited to what I've read here. But if you do a Forum search (include the CMx1 forums) using the title and author you'll find that his thesis is .... heavily disputed and far from the last word on the topic.
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Got a workaround for that too. I lay out foxholes and wooden bunkers in various useful spots and then lay bocage on top. That way the deviish Huns have fortifications built right into the bocage, like in the real deal
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All non-paved roads have semi-abstracted ditches.
Especially noticeable on diagonal roads.
I agree that the reported boggings seem excessive, but wanted to make sure folks were aware.
Running a tank into a dry ditch should not bog it.
If it were german tanks bogging more than Allied ones, then I would say it was abstracted mechanical breakdowns.
Just resurrecting this thread to report an anecdote from a playtest of my Le Carillon submap (conditions are Wet). I've made Low Bocage areas crossable by inserting Hedge segments on top of Mud (i.e. crossable by vehicles at risk of bogging).
Results: my first M8 successfully broke 5 of these crossing points without bogging (did sustain some wheel damage). My second M8 (see pic) bogged down while negotiating a diagonal sunken Dirt Road. To keep it narrow, this road only has diagonal road segments on the south side (so vehicles encounter the "roadside ditch" in a strange way - moving from Dirt Road to Grass and back again -- you can see them bumping up and down).
Now I'm delighted that CMBN vehicles Bog frequently in Wet conditions, including on Dirt Roads -- that was a large part of the reason armour was so ineffective and roadbound, and that should be reflected in the game.
But given that my first vehicle never Bogged going overland, it doesn't seem right that Dirt Roads should be worse than Mud for bogging in Wet conditions. I will playtest further.
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Yes, I will definitely get back to Ramadi in 2012.... probably do the Army/IA raid on the Saddam Mosque (a non-Marine scenario for those only owning basic CMSF).
While setting up a recon platoon for playtesting, I took this fun shot, capturing a classic "green troops" deployment error by the light mortar squad (in their defence, it's the map edge and there isn't much alternative parking).
(a) jeeps parked under trees close to the mortar position instead of behind bushes well back. The Luftwaffe ain't much of a threat these days (trigger happy Tactical Air Force fighter jocks are another matter), but Jerry's artillery spotters are sure going to wonder what's going on in and behind that house....
(
parking right next to a bridge on a main road, a very likely spot for a German TRP. -
C'est magnifique!
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Thanks for the offer, gents. I think we can do that soon. Unlike my Ramadi map which I jealously guarded it's my intent to make my maps and submaps available for QBs sooner rather than later. But I would definitely like some experienced players to give me feedback on how the high vegetation density and particularly, those streambeds, work for you tactically, gameplay-wise and PC performance wise, irrespective of the force mix and mission type.
Also, by cutting down most of the High Bocage to Low + more windbreak trees and reducing the number of orchards, these maps can easily be repurposed for non-bocage fights elsewhere in France.
One other note; I find it silly that Low Bocage cannot be crossed (with a delay). Therefore all stretches of Low Bocage have at least one Hedge + Mud tile inserted to allow men and AFVs to cross, at the risk of bogging. I'll be interested in seeing how that works or whether it gives non-Rhino AFVs too easy access to the interior fields.
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And now, 90%.
Tell me this s**t ain't looking pretty photorealistic.
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Spotting is possible, just challenging. About 3/4 done at this point.
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I agree on the troop side that the boys should hit the dirt and start a Slow/crawl movement AWAY from light mortar point of impact unless inside a fortification/building. No spotting, no taking a knee, just crawling away from strikes, and towards structural cover if possible, until told otherwise by the great commander in the sky.
I would rather lose men doing something proactive and sensible than just waiting for the other shoe to drop... within the same action spot.
Interesting thought, but it seems like that kind of TacAI judgment call would be hard to implement well:
1. the TacAI doesn't presently seem to recognize fortifications as "cover terrain" (they're more like some kind of vehicle). So you might get men leaving their entrenchments to crawl to buildings or forests when the most sensible thing would be to keep your head down.
2. that aside, you could also easily get unintended consequences where troops are crawling into the grazing fire of MGs in their overriding routine that says get out from under the stonk. The calculus of survival is a complex one.
My gut feeling says that it would be better for PixelPBI to get down and stay put under shellfire until they either Panic / Rout or are explicitly ordered to move elsewhere.
In another thread I suggested Charles might induce a simple Hit the Dirt reaction to incoming by modeling each plunging shell (not flat trajectory rounds) as having "2 bursts" instead of one. The first one would be undetectable to the player (you'd still hear the incoming whoosh!) and inflict no actual damage, but induce the TacAI's existing Take Cover reflex in the troops a moment before the "real" burst occurs.
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I'd actually LIKE to see them lay down ("hit the dirt!") proactively, as prone units in the game as it is now are noticeably less vulnerable, especially when entrenched. Even the "whisper" of mortars should give a split second of warning, especially to veterans already Alerted. Problem is, entrenchments and many other terrain types have units not Hiding or Cowering "take a knee" to get better LOS. Same with gun crews. That's fine, except that they just quintuple their vulnerability to shrapnel, then sit there stoically through the stonk like Graebner in his track until they're prompted to Cower or become casualties.
This "take a knee in cover" reflex, btw, is also why you see Spandau LMGs being fired from the shoulder in foxholes, or tripod-mounted MGs have the gunner oddly bolt upright behind it, instead of with the bipod resting on the parapet and the firer prone behind. Some tweaks to unit positioning and cover-seeking are clearly required, although I recognize that the new animations needed will not be a simple matter.
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It seems that BARs still did make an outsize contribution to American squad killing power though, and there are numerous accounts from both WWII theatres and Korea of gutsy BAR men singlehandedly holding off or killing huge numbers of enemy. I can hypothesize several possible reasons for this (1) generally assigned to a reliable squad member; less special training required than for a machine gunner (2) full automatic fire capability, even if inferior to true LMGs, encouraged more aggressive suppression firing, especially in low visibility terrain like bocage (3) unlike the Garand toters, failure to fire would be more obvious to comrades. There may be other reasons as well. A close friend's grandfather was a BAR man in Korea and he liked the weapon much better than the 30 cal.
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Great post. I agree -- OBL and Salafism have far more in common with Che Guevara and his urban guerrilla theories of the 1960s -- romanticized saint/hero figures "fighting the Imperialsts" but essentially ineffective, easily coopted and above all incapable of articulating an attractive alternative vision for economy and society other than to wind back the clock to some fuzzy idealized notion of the Prophet's First Caliphate. Their attempts to establish a base of support in any "developed" area of the Islamic world have been dismal failures -- Chechnya, Bosnia, Algeria, Iraq and now (it seems) Libya have failed simply because the local rulers see them for the naive crackpots they are and generally kill them.
Even worse for them, the only places these folks have been able to last any length of time amidst are failed societies like "Pushtunistan" (AfPak), Sudan or Somalia. The Taliban, a semi-illiterate rural movement whose non-philosophy is akin to that of Pol Pot has made a pretty uncomfortable bedfellows. Even the ailing OBL himself found himself unable to endure their lifestyle and ended up hiding back in civilzation. Typical -- Guevara was also busted once he tried to come out of the jungle, having hit his bourgeois limit on virtuous rural privation.
Absent the continued presence of a foreign force to keep stirring up the natives, these people will eventually either wear out their welcome, intermarry and melt into the tribal pastoral tribes, or retire into either impotent obscurity or police custody.
parking right next to a bridge on a main road, a very likely spot for a German TRP.
Infantry AT in buildings
in Combat Mission Battle for Normandy
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Re the PIAT referenced earlier Louis Hagen's memoir "The Arnhem Lift" relates a duel between a German SP gun and his team, which was firing on it repeatedly from a small attic window. I read this book long ago and details are hazy but ISTR they were engaging the AFV at some distance and launching the PIAT bomb in an arc. They didn't kill it but kept it from advancing.