Urban Shocker
-
Posts
162 -
Joined
-
Last visited
Never
Posts posted by Urban Shocker
-
-
Another book I've read is "Panzertaktik." It is pricey and I got it through interlibrary loan but it was fascinating and does have a lot of stuff on tactics for small groups of tanks. It would also somewhat helpful for setting up CMBB scenarios.
-
All of the following were found at:
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/catalog/WWII-Pubs.htm
(Shocker's note: I read the "Small Unit Actions" book and found it full of small scale maps and german unit types involved in combats. It is a bit skimpy on the Russians But I think this book would be great for developing CMBB scenarios. I have not looked at the others.)
German Studies
The following CMH historical studies were previously published as DA Pamphlets. Except as noted, these studies were prepared by senior German commanders based on their personal experience.
MILITARY IMPROVISATIONS DURING THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN (DA Pam 20-201, 1951; CMH ed. 1986; 110 pp.). CMH Pub 104-1, paper, GPO S/N 008-029-00142-0, $5.50.
The massive effort against the Soviet Union forced the German Army and Luftwaffe into tactical and logistical improvisations that would become permanent features of the war in the East.
COMBAT IN RUSSIAN FORESTS AND SWAMPS (DA Pam 20-231, 1951; CMH ed. 1986; 39 pp.). CMH Pub 104-2, paper, GPO S/N 008-029-00143-8, $2.50.
The numerous dense woodlands and swamps that covered the western portions of European Russia presented severe problems for the German invaders and occupation forces.
*NIGHT COMBAT (DA Pam 20-236, 1953; CMH ed. 1986; 49 pp.). CMH Pub 104-3, paper.
Combat operations and movements at night became increasingly prevalent as the war in the East dragged on. Initially untrained for such combat, the German Army developed night combat tactics and techniques out of necessity.
TERRAIN FACTORS IN THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN (DA Pam 200-290, 1951; CMH ed. 1986; 60 pp.). CMH Pub 104-5, paper, GPO S/N 008-029-00144-6, $3.75.
The numerous rivers, swamps, and forests and the endless steppe lands of the Soviet Union confronted the Germans with extensive tactical and logistical problems unanticipated by planners and largely left unsolved during the campaign.
EFFECTS OF CLIMATE ON COMBAT IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA (DA Pam 20-291, 1952; CMH ed. 1986; 80 pp.). CMH Pub 104-6, paper, GPO S/N 008-029-00145-4, $5.00.
Climatic conditions of European Russia varied from bitterly cold, long winters to dry, hot summers, interrupted by wet, rainy springs and falls that virtually halted all ground movement. The German Army was ill prepared or ill equipped for Russian winters and paid a huge price for its negligence.
GERMAN DEFENSE TACTICS AGAINST RUSSIAN BREAK-THROUGHS (DA Pam 20-233, 1951; CMH ed. 1988; 80 pp.). CMH Pub 104-14, paper, GPO S/N 008-029-00183-7, $10.00.
The Germans had to develop tactics to counter Soviet breakthrough operations. The Germans, especially in the war's early years, were often successful in sealing off and destroying Soviet penetrations.
*OPERATIONS OF ENCIRCLED FORCES: GERMAN EXPERIENCES IN RUSSIA (DA Pam 20-234, 1952; CMH ed. 1988; 74 pp.). CMH Pub 104-15, paper.
The Soviet-German war was marked by numerous encirclements, first of Soviet units and, as the war continued, of German units as large as entire armies, such as the 6th Army at Stalingrad. Fighting encircled became a frequent occurrence for German commanders, and their experiences at Klin, Cherkassy, and Kamenets-Podolskiy are related here as well as an analysis of the critical role of air support when fighting encircled.
THE SOVIET PARTISAN MOVEMENT, 1941-1944 (DA PAM 20-244, 1956; CMH ed. 1989; 217 pp.). CMH Pub 104-19, paper, GPO S/N 008-029-00193-4, $17.00.
The great German offensive of the summer of 1941 left large portions of the western Soviet Union in German hands. Scattered partisan bands soon began operations against the German occupiers, quickly growing into a major military force. Prepared by Edgar M. Howell, this study analyzes the Soviet use of partisans both for political purposes and in
strategic operations.
*SMALL UNIT ACTIONS DURING THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA (DA Pam 20-269, 1953; CMH ed. 1987; 289 pp.). CMH Pub 104-22, paper.
Case studies of German infantry, armor, and engineer units from company to battalion level in offensive and defensive actions that also include small unit operations in the Arctic, forests, river crossings, and antipartisan warfare.
*WARFARE IN THE FAR NORTH (DA Pam 20-292, 1951; CMH ed. 1987; 24 pp.). CMH Pub 104-24, paper.
From June 1941 through September 1944, German forces fought the Soviets in the Arctic and sub-Arctic as allies of the Finns. This work compares German, Finnish, and Soviet tactics, equipment, and organization and discusses the unique terrain features.
To get the small scales that are required you need to look for these military publications rather than the division to army scale descriptions found in the books listed the above posts (e.g., Glantz).
[ July 25, 2002, 05:57 PM: Message edited by: Urban Shocker ]
-
The real question is: Could a mosquito fly from Italy to the United States, pick up a copy of CMBB, then fly back to Italy?
-
-
-
I 2nd Cincinnati!
-
I was thinking with decreased ability to spot and increased pinning power of MG's that scenarios would have to be longer. My reasoning is that to preserve your force (especially if you are planning multiple actions with them) you would have to do more precise probing or recon which is going to take extra time.
Does anyone else think this will be the case?
Are any of the scenarios that have been designed longer than there CMBO counterparts of the same unit size?
Are people who have planned scenarios in anticpation of CMBB thought about this?
-
On the other hand, if they recoded and sold CMBO with the upgrades for a nominal charge I would buy it to have a fully functional Western Front.
-
I just moved to Lexington, KY. Are there other CMBO'ers around the state? Maybe we should get a CMBO state tournament going?
-
I saw your post on locking these types of threads down. I certainly did not want to waste your time or make you madder than you already seem to be.
Anybody in the Central Kentucky area?
-
can see the excitement has not abated over CMBB. I got worked up again just reading over some older posts. Wouldn't want to play poker with the BFC fellows as they appear very tightlipped about its release.
Maybe this could help. BFC, please put a number next to each of the following dates. This number represents the chance of release by the written date(e.g., 10 = 10%)
July 15 _____
August 15 _____
September 15 _____
October 15 ______
After Oct. 15 ______
I also just moved to Central Kentucky. Anybody close by?
[ July 06, 2002, 06:43 PM: Message edited by: Urban Shocker ]
-
I just saw it here a couple of days ago but now can't seem to locate it. Thanks in advance...
-
Bamse,
If those are divisions in your image the scale is too big. I would think a battalion is as big as most people want to play. On a 4 sq. km map, too many units will bog down the computer. A "stacking limit" of a battalion of infantry + armor + arty, etc. is probably a good starting point.
The "hex sizes and thus, map sizes can be adjusted to this fact. I read that a WWII American battalion could be expected to hold between 1-5 km of frontage depending on the situation.
Does this seem appropriate?
What about people who have or are running campaigns "manually" do you have any guidance for Bamse?
[ February 27, 2002, 12:53 PM: Message edited by: Urban Shocker ]
-
Bamse,
The answers to many of your questions could probably be found here.
http://www.combatmission.com/CMMC/Academy/academy.htm
Since the CMMC guys have thought about all of these issues. Some of them might even be downright helpful. No sense in reinventing the wheel, as the saying goes.
-
Another realistic feature would be to set a % casualty figure. If an objectiive is important then this could be higher than if it were low. Players would think twice before sacrificing anything as it would negatively affect their casualty rate. This seems as realistic as being given a time-based limit.
I know that casualties affect the final score and force morale but this feature would simulate having to fight and live for another day rather than having the last man (men) standing.
-
I invited a friend to sit down and try a mission and he did themad dash and mopped up. He then decided that the game sucked. Later, he realized that there was more depth to it but his opinion was colored by that first encounter.
-
How much is BTS paying you CMMC guys to try and side track us campaigneros from getting what we want? How much?!?
We will not be sidetracked! Long live the revolution! Viva la revolucion!
-
A note to BTS:
We campaigneros love Combat Mission and play it to the detriment of our personal health, family values, community service, and national pride (except the Finns). We thank you again for this beacon of tactical military simulation light in a black coal night of simulations universe.
We campaigneros also love the (not much) bigger picture where regiments and divisions fight. We really are just matchmakers looking for the true love of the tactical beauty you've created. We feel that true love is the handsome strategic layer where we can make ourselves strong in one place (attack!) while becoming weak in another and hope that our supply lines are not cut!
We campaigneros also know that you have a million and one things going on in your head of which we are not aware of at present. We respect that but will continue to ask in appropriate and inappropriate ways for a strategic layer for CM. All I can offer is the promise that I will plunk the requisite greenbacks to buy aforementioned product. I think other campaigneros would do the same.
We campaigneros say there is more! The campaigneros could
(1) make suggestions as to the elements of this strategic layer in the spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding. Get the ball rolling!
(2) volunteer our skilled and unskilled services in a way that develops and improves this product and maintains BTS as healthy capitalistic operation.
(3) provide for an endowment that would buy coffee or Coca-Cola for all those late night sessions.
The Campaigneros will not be forgotten! Hi'yah!!
-
An interesting debate...that will never be solved. Human subjects lie for various reasons. If you are a soldier you probably risk the wrath of many of your comrades and superiors if you answer the question "Did you fire your weapon during the battle?" with a "negative." Also, relying on second-hand information is never going to give you the truth, especially in battle.
Consider these questions when dealing with the fire effectiveness of a soldier:
(1) Did the soldier fire his weapon?
(2) Did the soldier fire his weapon in the general direction of the enemy?
(3) Did the soldier fire his weapon directly at an enemy?
(4) Did the soldier hit the enemy?
Keeping those 4 questions in mind consider our desired response of the enemy. We would like to
(a) suppress (make an individual unable to fire due to his behavior, i.e., taking cover or "hitting the dirt" as the bullets whiz by or strike the nearby area
(
incapacitate by wounding© incapacitate by killing
or even, (d) cause retreat which is probably a sum or product of a, b, and c.
Asking soldiers question 1 reveals nothing about a, b, or c unless your willing to make the assumptions that the answer to 2,3, and 4 are yes!
Even answering question 2 with a "yes" is probably only relevant at close distances. Why? At close range, the noise of a weapon firing probably influences the enemy's judgement on the strength of he opposing force. Question 1 is relevant at close range as well. At longer range, "firing your weapon" only wastes ammo and "looks good."
Only data pertaining to questions 3 and 4 are directly relevant to fire effectiveness. How do you measure question 3 effectively? I don't know. Question 4 is usually found out after the battle as a body count.
I am not supporting or opposing Marshall's idea. My point is that the proper evidence must be collected to draw the correct conclusions. I think Marshall is on the right track (e.g., if you don't fire you can't effect the enemy's behavior) with his questions.
-
someone at this e-mail would help test it
-
Here is an AAR written by Marshall. It is quite easy to understand how "fog of war" and "friction of war" can be important for battle, as well as morale.
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/documents/wwii/lafiere/325-LaF.htm
-
Read Rommel's book "Attack" for ideas on how to use MG's on offense and defense. The book is about his WWI experiences but the lessons are applicable to WWII.
-
Does the state of weariness affect the morale of the troops in CMBO/CMBB? It seems like this is an important part of battles in that weary troops tend to rout faster or attack/defend at lower effectiveness. Off the top of my head, I recall the manual saying that weariness increases the time necessary to get the troops moving into their next action.
Which brings up another question" Does weariness delay or reduce firing at enemy units?
The effects of weariness might be hard to accurately model but if you've read enough "war stories" you realize that it plays a significant part. Of course, I'm talking about tactical weariness and not operational weariness (marching 25 miles and immediately being put into battle!).
-
Vader's Jester,
I thought the same thing as you regarding crunching metal, screaming men, and exploding ammo. The problem is (and I haven't tested this) if I fire at a target 2 klicks away (admittedly a big map) and potentially get the same message. That seems a little unrealistic.
It's no big deal but it does make a difference for a turn or two. If I don't know if the gun has been blown then I probably have everyone sit tight while I send a few guys up to "sneak a peek." If I don't have to recon the site I can proceed with my plans 1-2 minutes earlier. That is a 3-7% time savings in a 30 minute battle!
[ February 08, 2002, 09:41 AM: Message edited by: Urban Shocker ]
incapacitate by wounding
Eastern Front book recommendations
in Combat Mission Archive #4 (2002)
Posted