The_Capt

So this guy is an EW specialist too?

Oh it is not so hidden, but nobody seemed to really care. Other than some nasty terrorist and some screwed up countries that are always screwed up, most westerners were not thinking about conventional warfare at all in the last 30 years. The few times we did get into a conventional fight it was against tethered goats like Iraq and over in days. So western democracies gutted defence spending over time. In fact most of the hubbub over NATO and 2% was less about collective deterrence and more about economic gains in defence industries (“jobs!”). So here we are, again, playing catch-up and scrambling. Problem is now that we are not even sure what we should be scrambling for, governments want to look strong on defence while militaries are trying to figure out what that means. And the news media was absolutely no help. They polarized and really just told target audiences what they want to hear, as opposed to any real analysis of the situation. So people retreated into their echo chambers, and most are still in them. Add to all this the worst pandemic in a century where western society went legally insane for about 3 years and we are here in 2023 trying to figure out a conventional war that has brought us all closer to the brink. Meanwhile in East Palestine Ohio… https://www.factcheck.org/2023/02/multiple-federal-agencies-supporting-east-palestine-contrary-to-partisan-claims/

Well if the past is any indication, the UA will lead with Light Inf and SOF, heavy on unmannned systems support, to do infiltration first, those are huge frontages on that Jomini of the West map and not a lot of RA troops to cover them. Find your opponents quickly, and hit them hit precision artillery. At the same time operational ISR is illuminating in depth and they conduct a deep strike campaign on RA artillery, C4ISR and logistics. Minefield are going to be a challenge but there are ways through them. Have not seen any real discussion on explosive breaching or even mechanical breaching support. The UA is going to be needing assault engineering to break through those belts, but the lighter infantry and SOF will likely find or make gaps first. This may drive back observation and cover fire on those minefields, which makes breaching a lot easier. And then once you get enough forward moment, and corroded the RA - while pinning them down elsewhere, you go for manoeuvre and try for a breakout. Nothing easy about any of this but that is the order of the day to break the back of the RA.

Pearls are just glossed oyster poop. Ah, well perhaps I see the problem then. In military parlance we get into J35 versus J5 space. Step 1 - is likely in the J35 space, while Step 2 - Crimea is in J5. We do both at once, not liking to plan things just before we do them, we push planning out and adjust as required. That, and there are capability/force generation decision that will need to be made now to support Step 2 - so it behooves to have an idea of what one wants that to look like. For example, if the west gets all scope eye on tanks (and we sure as hell did here), they could wind up short-changing the actual capabilities needed for Step 2. We will have mountains of steel and a 10km nightmare corridor without an ability to choke out the peninsula. Of course you need to balance with Step 1, but how can you balance if you have no idea as to Step 2? To my mind Step 1 is pretty much a done deal. If it is not well then we have a much larger problem on our hands. If the UA cannot re-take Melitopol and/or a good chunk of the Northern shore of the Azov then their options space starts to shrink. Ukraine could try broad corrosive warfare along the Donbas, surging and pulling to try to accelerate RA collapse. If we think choking out the Crimea is a tall order, doing it along the entire Donbas, and southern front is even harder. The RA supply lines get shorter with more of them in Russia, which opens up the potentially nasty eventuality of sustained strikes inside Russia itself. I think the odds of this conflict freezing go up, unless the RA fails completely which is not impossible but pretty hard to predict. Frozen conflict will only shaken western resolve as this thing drags on, it kinda plays into Putins gambit, so not optimal. So the UA needs to cut down center. It dislocates the two theatres. It takes away a major strategic objective (the land bridge) and sets the conditions for what happens next. If the UA take Melitopol, they threaten the back end of all the forces still on the south bank of the Dnepr. They will have to turn and fight - and face northern pressure and crossings, or pull back to the Crimean choke point. The UA slugging it out in the Donbas could get very expensive and end up going nowhere. I think we may see diversionary ops in Luhansk but main effort will likely be Melitopol. That is not going to be easy and will have to be a hard going assault, I suspect this entire defensive dance at Bakhmut and surrounding is trying to bleed the RA white to set up for Melitopo, much in the same way Severodonetsk did for Kharkiv. So the UA pulls off another major offensive gain at Melitopol and establishes conditions for the battle of Crimea, or this thing might just stall pretty close to where it is now. We can hope that broad corrosive warfare will continue to collapse in the Donbas and lead somewhere. I think even at Melitopol there will need to be an element of corrosive warfare but how much is anyone's guess - it may be happening already. So Step 1 is already written, or start making "other plans". I mean if anyone else has any ideas shout them out - but we are talking about the road to a UA victory here. RA collapse could happen at anytime, so lets just put that one up on the "hope" COA. The good news is that the RA already looks kinda strung out in the center compared to what is going on further east: (Thank you Jomini of the West) So Step 2 - Crimea or Donbas...pick your poison. To my mind it is Crimea, (and apparently Gen Hodges as well). So start thinking about what that is going to take, and begin to build it now.

As opposed to what? Watching war-porn as the UA and RA blast away over shattered lands in the mud? Hand-wringing and pearl clutching at imminent victory/defeat? It is pretty clear that if Ukraine wants to get this going back their way they are going to need to dislocate Russia strategically. Dry humping in the Donbas is a dead end unless the RA collapsed entirely. So we are at a play down the center to cut the theatres and then taking on the Crimea. Between the UA and western supporters they have likely got rooms full of guys working this stuff out.

Crimea is about 3-4 times the size of the Kherson pocket (7000 sq kms to 27,000 sq kms) and most of that accessible coastline. So the problem for the RA is much larger than the 150 odd km frontage they had at Kherson. They will need effective sea control on the Black Sea side, Azov Sea side, air control over the whole thing and will likely concentrate land forces on that bottleneck but will need enough land forces to either post them all along the entire coast or have rapid reaction forces that can quickly counter any landings. This is a very high logistics bill one way or the other. Russia sucks at rapid reaction forces but if they go that way those units will be hard to hide and prime targets for a deep strike campaign. If they go with "conscripts on the beach" their logistics bill goes up dramatically as that kind of real estate will soak up entire divisions to construct defences in any meaningful way. So as to interdiction. Yep a lot of coastline and routes to it but they either really spread out logistic nodes on the landing sites - a logistical nightmare, or concentrate them for scale. So all the boats in the shipping are fair game, but my money is on the landing sites and nodes. The RA operational logistics at this point is highly visible as it comes over the water - this is not like the Donbas where they can hide trucks in back wood trails, boats are really hot and visible. Further they have to employ constructed landing sites (which if anyone has studied amphib ops is not easy) and distribution centers for things like re-packaging because putting something on a boat is not the same as a truck...and these are also very hard to hide. So if the UA is going to do this, based in ranges, we are into ATACMs territory but I am betting planners already know this and might be why we are hearing rumors of training going on. Basically ISR and any sort of long range denial will really hurt the RA logistical effort. Given the scope and scale of RA requirements I think the system may be more vulnerable and fail faster than Kherson so long as the UA can sustain its fires program. Self-loitering long range munitions would be very helpful here...or achieving air superiority but that is a big ask. Is it doable, absolutely. How long will it take...who knows? Given the state of the RA, they are not in the same place they were back at Kherson. Being cut off on a large isolated peninsula is going to do nothing for morale.

We heard the exact same arguments at Kherson...and it went the way it did. Well using civilians as human shields to protect military logistics is a war crime in itself. Further it does leave a lot of room for collateral damage calculations. And of course humanitarian aid is off the hit list, which I am also sure Russia will try and employ etc. In the end however, it takes lot so sustain a large military organization, even 10-20% attrition of supplies can lead to some pretty stark calcs. If the UA can deny access to military platforms and military controlled shipping, they are onto something. In the end, yes there will be human suffering - not sure why we in the west think war is somehow sanitized now. The UA will likely do everything they can to try and keep this pointed at RA military capability but it will be a siege, and those suck...best to get used to the idea now.

Well the Dnepr was hard enough to get them to give up Kherson. Crimea does have a lot of coast line, the trick will be sustaining the tonnage required to sustain land forces, which can get pretty high. So while a lot of people here have been positively gushing over tanks, the UA likely has an anti-shipping/interdiction requirement right now that is much higher priority. Western ISR will be able to pick up any shipping, but being able to deny this space will get tricky and require different capabilities. Crimea will definitely extend this war deeper into the maritime domain.

Back last year I was also concerned that Crimea could be a Russian “red-line” and the threat of losing it could lead to WMD escalation. That 10km corridor is where it would likely happen. But I am at the point where I think the Russian “red-line” is further back, likely Russian home soil itself. My reasoning is that if Putin had the backing and internal justification for WMD release, he would have done it by now. Russia has not demonstrated a lot of restraint in breaking LOAC so why have we not seen the use of chemical weapons in the attacks in the Donbas? These were sold as make-or-break assaults and if Putin’s back is up against the wall here (and he could get away with it) we likely would have seen WMD use this winter. We did not. So this does not mean Russia will never use them but clearly the calculus has to be far more stark. I also suspect Putin’s is concerned about western escalation and possible Chinese pressure in the event Russia goes this way. The WMD line clearly has a high bar in the Russia thinking. Further if Crimea is choked out and simply folds like Kherson did, WMDs are likely not going to save them but could seriously unite the west further - even the most rabid pro-Russian shills are going to have a tough time of it if Putin’s goes in this direction.

Well I am definitely thinking along the same lines. The “republics” can be boxed up and turned into a sort of buffer zone. Crimea is too strategic and frankly just retaking Sevastopol is a clear indication of how this war went for the Russians, not wiggling out of that one. The good news is Crimea is likely the one which can be taken Kherson style once the UA pushes down the centre to the Azov coast. That bridge will be in range (assuming Ukraine does not get ATACMS) and Crimea can be completely cut off. That 10km corridor to then north is tight but if the UA continually hammers them for a few months, while they are cut off - they may take the hint.

I think the guy might be caught between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea at this point. Radicals on one side you need to keep you in power, and the Russian population outside of Moscow on the other. All balanced on an autocratic framework of plate spinning - isn't this the perennial Russian political dilemma?

Right. Weird signals coming out of their economy. Putin is starting to sound desperate in his narratives. I am thinking he is running out of runway. But I guess we will see.

I know we have to be very careful not to see what we want to see, but there have been some weird sounds coming out of Russia (even by their standards). This whole Chinese play is the latest - weird wishful thinking reports on NATO. I am starting to wonder just who really needs to tie this war off right now. I am starting to think it is Russia, not the West or Ukraine.

I have seen a few of these and frankly they are kinda big celebrations of confirmation biases. There is nothing inherently wrong with the BTG, it lies somewhere between Combat Team and Battlegroup in organizational constructs. I think the theory was that the unit would really heavily on quick response firepower linked directly into the tactical level C2. Add UAS and this sort of unit worked and saw some success when facing mounted manoeuvre units back in 2014. In some ways the BTG has advantages in lower size and profile, and logistics requirements. In the right hands and fully enabled the BTG looks a lot like some sort of ACR/ACS concept. Lighter, faster and carrying a lot of boom-boom. Obviously the BTG runs into problems in infantry heavy fight requirements, but so do ACRs - not designed for it. The RA actually had several BTG types if you look them up and some look more manpower heavy. I think the intent may have been to make the modular but it looks like it did not pan out. Overall the thing looks like a self contained raider unit with a lot of integral firepower. The BTG failed not because it was a bad design, it failed because so many other aspects of the Russian military system failed. A BCT without air superiority and under constant illumination and deep strike PGM is not going to fair well either. The second problem is that a BTG is fine so long as you only ask it to do what a BTG can do. If you ask it to do too much any unit organization will fail. The third problem was what looks like a serious lack of peer-coordination. These sorts of units will need to work together a lot and provide mutual support - this is very MC and self-synchronization stuff, which we have seen that the Russian doctrine on C2 does not support. And finally on support, this organization will work fine if it has a formation over it to C2 all the enablers. And we know that was a serious issue. I mean the BTG didn’t work in the same way that asking an ACR to do a heavy urban assault unsupported, after losing air superiority etc, would not work. Focusing on the organization as the “reason” for Russian failure is missing the much larger issues at play here and frankly highlights some incorrect lessons.

That is a movie/HBO series script right there.

Ouch, that is a strategic level C4ISR asset, Russians may be down to balloons before this is over.

Ya not sure where this is coming from and why. I mean the UA is holding on while the RA breaks itself (again), so it is logical that like last time they will follow up with an offensive - this cycle can repeat a few more times at least. So I do not know where the crisis is in all this that would signal that Ukraine needs to sue for peace. I am far more willing to believe that Russia is running to China for a solution as things on their end are more likely approaching breaking points. NATO nations suddenly knocking knees does not track - sounds more like Russian wishful thinking to be honest.

So why not just picket and bypass a hard point in a forest? Cut it off and hammer with arty? Why go through the very expensive action of clearing? And if you are, why do a frontal? Assaults are normally conducted on long defensive lines (I.e, break in battle) based on these graphics the RA is planning to conduct these everywhere? Biggest problem isn’t C2, it is Visibility. UA defenders are going to be able to see whatever this is from space, along with its logistics train. 12 flamethrowers going off are going to look like the Pink Floyd show on thermals. With this sort of visibility, attacking where the enemy “is”, is not a good idea unless you have completely isolated them from their own support. I mean this would work if it were plugged into a massive deep strike architecture - mass beats isolation. I mean “ok”, a little frontal and attritional for my tastes - really light on armour, which is interesting. But my first question was “where is the rest of it?” To make this thing one is going to need a lot of formation level support and last I checked the Russkies were a little light on that. Decentralization of guns is also kinda weird, but makes sense in a Russian context I guess? I mean how do they swing indirect fire support? It really looks like straight up firepower-centric warfare, which makes sense from a Russian point of view. Biggest question of all “is it actually working”, and considering that we are still talking about the imminent fall of Bakhmut, I am betting “not enough”?

Easy now, do not attach my ownership to this one. It is one scenario out of many that I have no doubt some western politicians will push for. I personally do not see anything good about Russia gaining a single acre from pre 23 Feb 22 lines. They must not gain from this war - a post 2014 status quo may have to be what we live with, it ain’t great but see my other post as the other outcomes can get pretty stark. All war is negotiation. Oh, and for the record I also do not think the UA is spent yet. I am not sure why we think we are at the “need to negotiate” point (we heard this before). The UA needs to be given at least one more major operational level offensive.

I read the long piece on the Time site, gotta say I do not really agree with it in its entirety. Now before anyone jumps on that, I absolutely think Ukraine needs to be supported in this war and more so after it, but the laying down maximalist lines in the sand within the article really glosses over some important issues, many of which we have discussed here: - Russia has already lost this war. Even if they somehow managed to retake all of Ukraine and made it a proxy, the damage is done. NATO is going to be funded, united and basically hauling in all takers (eg Sweden and Finland). Russia’s strategic position is much weaker and is not likely to recover soon. The odds of Russia actually retaking Ukraine are about zero, but even if they did the costs far outstrip any gains they may have made within their near abroad - even the most ardent Russian nationalist will be able to do the math in a few years, and then the Russian power regime has got a new set of problems. - Driving Russia from Ukraine - even pre- 2014 lines, will not stop Russia from lining back up on this and trying a round 2. Nor will it stop both kinetic and subversive attacks in Ukraine itself. There are only really two ways to secure Ukraine indefinitely by this point, the complete defeat of Russia within Russia itself - so regime change and very possibly civil war, which is very bad. Or a deterrence guarantor that creates a line Russia will not cross. Right now that can come from two sources: NATO or China, and I do not trust China. So until Ukraine has Ch 5 in it pocket, the actual stop lines on the ground do not matter so much. - We have been around the horn on this, but guys let’s be up front and admit the ugly truth - there are a lot of people in Donbas and Crimea who are not onside “standing with Ukraine” and likely will not simply say “okydoky, new guys in charge”. Insurgencies have been sparked up for less. Ukraine will need to somehow integrate and enfranchise entire populations, many of whom took up arms against them. As our Ukrainian posters have pointed out, this is a very complex space and opinion’s definitely vary, but nothing could derail Ukraine’s entry into those security guarantees in point #2 faster than a dirty counterinsurgency blowing up all over the internet - and take it for one who knows, every counterinsurgency is dirty. So as we get back to 23 Feb 22 lines - an absolute must because Russia cannot gain one inch from this illegal war, there is going to have to be some careful consideration of just where the line actually is, or is not. Is this war worth extending another 2-3 years to retake territory whose people hate your guts? How do you plan to address them and this, because hoping they simply are going to stay home is pretty weak given just how many took up arms with the RA (granted many against their own wills). Militarily I can see a path where Ukraine takes back both Crimea and Donbas, but it is long and bloody unless the RA suffered strategic collapse. So we definitely should be doing and supporting that as hard as possible, however, as to longer objectives I think there is still a lot of TBD out there. Finally I disagree with the authors statement that “Russia not winning does not equate to Ukraine winning”. Sure it does, it is called “strategic denial” and it has a pretty long history - Mao wrote an entire doctrine that pivots off the idea. Especially if Russia exhausts itself in the process.

Sure, the Marine Corps of 2023 should absolutely be tied down by an act from 1947 - that is how to win nations wars in the 21st century. But ok, let's play Forum Lawyer because it is Saturday. The document you want to look at is the United State Code - Title 10 to be more specific. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscode/2021/ Within that is the up to date "compositions and functions of the USMC". So the deal actually is that the US President can assign additional duties - which is a wonderful catch-all. The only caveat is that the USMC must still be able to do its primary jobs of: - seizure/defence of advanced naval bases (you did get that one) - for conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. (oh my that is wide open to interpretation) - Security detachments for protection...etc So the USMC is basically the US Navy's land force to project ashore. If the USMC Commandant can sell his vision to the US Navy (and these things do not make nice glossies without being sold) then between them they can pretty much define the mission however they like within "essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign". Further the President can task the USMC with missions such as NEOs and rapid projection so long as they "do not detract". I am pretty sure if the President orders it the answer will never be "but Mr President that may detract from our base seizing duties". The use of the USMC to project US military power around the globe, from sea to shore, has a long history and sending a force to Taiwan is not going to get held up by the freaking 1947 NS Act if the political calculus lands on it as an escalatory solution. Although this sort of sentiment fits right into my "really constipated and conservative military culture" point very well.

Ya the race to the automated bottom. A lot do this is centred on an Amazon style delivery of effects - you pick the X and the system will figure out deliveries. This gets the lawyers in a tizzy but I have zero doubt that less humans will make for a better system because we are very prone to error. Half of friction in warfare is caused by simply being human. Mirrors a lot of police systems as well. The difference is none of these systems were built to create organized mass. In fact police need to change command systems to create mass. But as we are seeing in this war, mass in the future may mean different things. If I need mass built on unmanned systems then I will likely be highly DC because machines are not their yet with interpretation of intent - might never need them to be.

With respect to the RA, that is a pretty accurate assessment to be honest. They employ their command system for a lot of reasons - history, training systems, political constraints/restraints. What they brought to this war was old school tactical Soviet DC, without any of the operational MC that system was known for. Further they were not built for next gen DC, the lack of control they demonstrated points to a much more effective MC command style as a better option for them but like so much in this war, they went in upside down. Built for one type of war while trying to execute another. Then when that failed they tried to turn this war into one they were built for but the UA refused to play by those rules. To really fry brains there are concepts on hyper-MC out there that in a completely integrated system may actually work very well. Here we are talking about the UA early on, self-synchronization. Here higher command is basically there to send support as tactical elements self- organize and synchronize. This is really an emergent non-linear warfare strategy and it does work in stuff like guerrilla warfare but the UA took it into the conventional space. This is the line between positive and negative capability - if you really want to go down the rabbit hole. Beyond this you get into inverted command and slaving systems, the idea that systems self-select who is in command at a given time and all support is slaved for the window a unit is in charge. That command authority is dynamic and shifts with the flow of battle. This sort of thinking melts policy makers brains as none of our legal frameworks are set up for this sort of thing. So one really has two poles of C2 systems, but a lot of spectrum in between. The reality appears that advantage goes to the side that can best fit the C2 system to the problem and means to solve it. Further adaptive C2 which is much harder to do, also appears to offer significant advantage - like being ambidextrous in a sword fight. So yes, continuum and transition but there are arguments for both school extremes.

As compared to a force that is already built for DC? No. To use Steve’s analogy we are basically talking about taking a very well trained jazz musician and sticking them into an orchestra. In many ways it is easier to take a totally untrained guitarist because they do not need to unlearn years worth of muscle memory. It is incredibly hard to unlearn something especially after it has been beaten in with a hammer - they saw this with UAS drivers, pilots actually are harder to train. Now taking a DC-centric force and turning it into a ballet dancing manoeuvre outfit is no easy task either. In fact “which on is easier” to do really does not lead anywhere in overall force generation as we are talking major retooling one way or the other. Comparative force generation advantage, which is what we are really talking about, has a lot more factors at play than which command system a force leans towards. Now if you want the force to be capable of both extremes at the same time, we are into SOF space.

Sorry but that does not track. The high water point of DC was during the late 18th early 19th centuries - everyone points to WW1 but it was a monument to the failure of DC. The forces in the War of 1812 did not lack for investments in “culture”. Nor was training troops to parade manoeuvre and stand in a straight line while someone shot cannon balls at them “easier” by any stretch. Your guitar analogy is a bit off kilter. It is not a question of the sophistication of the playing, command systems are about how C2 is exercised in the playing. So in your analogy MC is a guitar player free-running or jamming with an overall intent of what the composer want to convey…”gimme something angry teenage Steve, because no one understand you!”. DC is being given a sheet of music and told to stick to it until a conductor directs otherwise. Guitar Hero is sort of the ultimate DC for playing that instrument. As to sophistication, well large philharmonic orchestras are commanded using DC and I do not think anyone could call them unsophisticated or “easy”. Both systems have advantages and disadvantages - for example, DC is a lot more efficient, a bunch of MC empowered units driving all over the countryside burns a lot more gas than tight controls. But DC can be a lot more constipated when it come to exploiting opportunities. MC shoots for opportunity but can become chaos pretty quick. Neither system is inherently “easier” in my experience. And swinging from one system to the other is probably one of the hardest things to do. If you have built an MC-centric organization, asking them to stand still is really hard - high agency outfits do not simply forget that agency easily. For DC you have largely beaten the initiative out of them, so do not expect it to flip like a light switch. The only organizations that can really do the extremes are SOF. In a direct action role they are under extreme DC. In other roles such as irregular warfare they are so far into MC that they become a negative capability. It can be done, but right now it cannot be massed produced. Finally, there is not proof I have seen that SOF from DC-centric militaries perform MC better or worse than we do - so the ability for a human do to it regardless of cultural backgrounds is likely inherent. In nature we are built for MC, it is where we started as monkeys in the tree. All tribal warfare going back to pre-history is MC-centric. It is likely our natural inclination is for MC. DC is a modern invention, something we had to engineer to create effective mass. The Mongols are probably the best example of creating a hybrid system, and they conquered pretty much the known world with it.