The_Capt

So if Putin gets the cat, who gets the CD collection? Gotta be the best 80s synth stuff around. And we all know they are keeping keys.

Meow! Someone didn’t get his pistachio pudding today.

This one is nuts. You can see the electrical grid melting down as transformers on power poles start to go (the blue flashes). That probably did more damage than the loss of ammunition.

Well it will definitely be viewed as an escalation, the question is “how much”. I think that Russia having some sort of escalation dominance has been a myth since the beginning of this thing. Repeatedly, Russian escalation has 1) been underwhelming and 2) resulted in a Western escalation that Russia cannot counter. I am less worried about Russia “thinking they can get away with it”because of western inaction at this point - we already have far too much sunk cost in this thing to back off now. NATO is securing the next decades worth of defence spending, industry in the west is ramping up - “war is business and business is f#cking booming baby!” We are talking trillions here and it all needs a scary enemy to point at. Russia was dumb enough to put up its hand up in Europe and we are talking ourselves into China one way or the other. Russia thinking it can get away with WMDs is one helluva leap to make for a below threshold action right now. My concerns are the other way - Russia figuring out that they have nothing left to lose, or simply losing control of the WMDs in the end. The end results we are debating are on opposite sides of a spectrum but have the same result…a lot of bad. So what are we doing…navigating the middle until there is no middle left. Outpacing escalation can actually drive us out of viable escalation room. Say we do start green lighting strikes into Russia…what do we have left? Someone said “strike the Russian Navy and take it out” while an escalation, it is not viable in the current strategic context. In fact it would be WW3 at that point and we would not stop at the Russian Navy. Your concern is valid: are we boiling them or are they boiling us? As this war has unfolded I was more concerned in the early days than I am now. While the West has been restrained, Russia has shown itself full of BS. No massive mobilization - millions of Russian troops pouring over the border were a no show. No carpet bombing of cities, just spiteful lobbing of a mess of a missile campaign which is only demonstrating their weaknesses. No WMDs, just some crappy flooding and maybe some sort of nuclear “whoopsie” that is just as likely to drift into Russia. None of this is the ”shock and awe” everyone was going on about a year ago. As to “silence”, well US Congress made a bilateral statement which in this day and age is a freakin unicorn. I also suspect that red phones are going off all over the place, the greater worry is that someone in Russia is actually picking up. As to war damage to Ukraine, Russia does not need to throw a radiation tantrum, great swaths of Ukraine are a century problem right now with RoW and mines. As I have said repeatedly the Reconstruction will need to be historic or there was no point. We are talking economic sector re-wiring epic, like Japan post WW2. And if Russia wants back into any sort of club and not wind up an Eastern European North Korea it is going to have to foot a portion of the bill. You, and others appear to be pointing out the glass if half empty. I am not saying the glass if half full. I am saying it is a freakin Christmas miracle that the bar is still standing and we are well past worrying about stupid glasses. This war has become a great power shaping and positioning exercise in many dimensions. The stakes got really high, really fast and we are pretty much committed at this point.

That is not really how it works. Anything short of nuclear weapons in Ukraine is not going to give strategic deterrence. Ukraine is waging an epic war right now but no weapons we can give Ukraine are going to deter Russia from the big nasty stuff. What is deterring Russia from the use of nuclear weapons on Kyiv is that it would raise our level of uncertainty about Russia as a rational state to a crisis point - the worse thing any revisionist power can do is get the West to get off the couch. If we are being brutally honest, we in the West would feel very bad about Kyiv on the receiving end of a nuclear device but that is not what would cause the reaction…it would be the uncertainty of nukes in New York or Toronto (well maybe not so much Toronto). That uncertainty would demand a response, and even Russia does not want to see what that would look like. We brought them to their knees in a proxy war with a small power that was supposed to fall in a few days. Do you think that maybe what happens if we really get involved isn’t in the Russian calculus? I argue that the evidence that they have tied themselves into knots to avoid direct escalation with NATO proves that they are very concerned. I do not think Russia has outpaced anything. They are on the freakin defensive right now while managing whatever that freakin thing was a couple weeks ago. No one serious is talking about Russian victory, we are too concerned with Russian full blown collapse. They are barely able to conduct coherent anything right now, let alone a game of escalation dominance. Most of the energy is trying to figure out how to prevent a Russian spiral, up or down because they are a complete hot mess. Syria, Georgia, Chechnya, we talked ourselves into a status quo lie, that much is true. We embraced our certainty to the point that it became a blindfold. Russia’s biggest mistake, and it is one for the history books, was tearing that blindfold off with this war.

I gotta be honest here, as much as we would have liked the RA front to crack like an eggshell on the first weekend, it was a bit of a dream. I wanted it too, and frankly given how hard the RA bled over the winter, and the frontages we are talking about, it was not a crazy dream. But the bastards dug in, mined everything and now are going to have to be ground out, hopefully to a breaking point coming to a theatre near you soon. I am not sure what, if anything, the West could have provided that they have not given already. I am not sure anything “new” would have really made a big difference. Even fighters 12 months ago would likely still be denied airspace. ATACMS would be nice but no one is on board with UA striking directly into Russia just yet…except the Ukrainians, which we get. The western failure was more likely failure to stock up and push the basics: ammo and engineer/logistical equipment type stuff - the boring stuff that really does matter. I think we are in a “slow is smooth, smooth is fast…when it happens” type of scenario. Now before we all go doom and gloom we were in the exact same situation last Fall. The Fall offensive went in at end-Aug and lasted until Nov. When the grandkids watch the war documentaries on this one, remember that was a loooong 3 months. This offensive likely started in Jun so we may be talking Sep before we know how it really ends. No point on turning on each other either, just do what we did last time, strap in and ride it out.

Ah so somewhat more complex…now we are getting somewhere. So what you are saying is that western deterrence is at risk of failing as Russia continues to prod along red lines. As we have failed to escalate in the past it shows our hand in not really planning to escalate in the future. Of course it really did not quite happen that way did it? We did escalate in scope, scale and effectiveness of capabilities sent to the UA. Hell you guys got Patriots…only Israel gets Patriots. We know it was viewed as an escalation as Russia came right out and declared it. Now Russia is definitely playing silly buggers at the dam, and may even have a “soft nuclear incident” as they continue to play footsy with the west - it is kinda on brand. And we will reply by finally giving the UA ATACMS and other higher end capabilities. Moreover, I suspect we will get more comfortable with footsy of our own - precise military strikes into Russia itself - will start non-kinetic and go from there. They have already started with SOF and partisan looking stuff (aside: Russia has also shown its cards on this one as these are “technically” direct attacks on the “motherland” but somehow we are also not in WW3 yet). We will (and should) get nervous at all this as if we escalate too far we not only risk “the big one” we also risk driving support in Putin’s direction - which is not what it was about a month ago. As to “narratives”, look I get the sentiment. I am pretty sure that a younger and idealistic kraze did not join Amnesty International or volunteer for the White Helmets when Russia was doing worse in Syria…and now Ukraine is basically Syria. But the good news is that unlike Syria, the West actually did get its act together and decided to “do something”. Of course I am not sure what you and a few others are expecting to gain by shaming or insulting the West writ large, especially on this thread. I mean what is your theory of change here? Do you expect us to riot in the streets? Write our government and advocate…what exactly? Do you not see the risk of alienating your biggest supporters? I get the need to vent, I really do but maybe we aren’t the bad guys here. The situation is all hell and sh#tty but the way out is going to be slow, no getting past that. As to consequences for Russia. Well beyond the obvious daily warcrimes and whatever comes next. Russia did this: https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/preliminary-lessons-russias-unconventional-operations-during-russo-ukrainian-war-february-2022 That is the real dark stuff. Pre-meditated and planned in egregious detail. I think normalization with Russia may be a generation away after this. Which is very good news for Ukraine after this war because it puts you on the “front line of freedom” and that is a good place to be...unlike Syria.

The two of you have two narratives - The Russians are savages who will stop at nothing to destroy Ukraine. And The West is sitting around and do nothing while the first one happens, and will continue to do so no matter what. So if these are true…why hasn’t Russia simply used nuclear/chemical/whatever since day 1? Why is this war even still happening? Is Ukrainian resolve and resistance an effective deterrence to strategic nuclear strikes? If the West is so useless and, clearly ready to let Russia do whatever it wants (and you can come read justifications of this right here on this thread)…why do we even still have this thread? Russias are genocidal savages who are being deterred from escalation…by what exactly? Because we certainly know it is not the bumbling western powers. Of course if this is the case then why are we spending billions to assist Ukraine? Symbolism? Boredom? Look, if you guys want to go bask in narratives that call for bloodbaths and holy crusades/WW3 there is a big ol Internet out there that will tell you exactly what you want to hear. If you want something that resembles a grown up conversation, stick around. But if you are advocating that we all jump on whatever crazy train that seems to float your boat right now: nope. What is it gonna take for the West to directly intervene in this war? You do not want to know. And frankly this thread won’t matter if that happens because a lot of us will already be dead.

Latest article I can find on the subject points to a generalized shortage. High concentrations are more likely the locality phenomenon if this is the case. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2023/04/05/when-will-ammunition-shortage-silence-russias-artillery/?sh=3d8071c36d95 UA is also struggling with ammunition however they need far less because they have a much greater ISR advantage (estimates seem to show that the UA is firing about 20-25% as much artillery and achieving better effects with it).

So if Russia is ramping up military industrial production, why is there a shortage of artillery ammunition? Further if Russia’s high tech/electronics is the main focus then why are they also not improving ISR or PGM? Attrition is not about “stuff”, it is about power. Power is: Will, Capability, Relationships and Opportunity/Options - so let’s play “how is Russia doing” through that lens.

Mine strike with an ATGM follow up would be my guess. Left track is blown off.

Helluva lot of credibility to blow up on this war, but he found a way. His wiki page read like "a next gen maverick too real for mainstream military service", followed by his whole government work. Turns out the guy is so extreme a pro-Russian mouthpiece that most in intelligence would likely suspect he has been compromised. He has no credibility left in my industry, at least not in the "real world" circles.

Assuming that these are legit and not recycled strikes with a Ka-52 gun camera aesthetic overlayed - this would average out to about 3-4 strikes per day along an +800 km frontage.

Who are you and what have you done with the real LLF? It brings up the central challenge the RA faces, density. They have got an extremely long frontage to try and cover with not enough troops. The UA is poking and probing to 1) draw out RA reserves and support, 2) gauge just how effective RA systems are right now (e,g, logistics, air support, ISR and logistics) and 3) to get inside the heads of Russian leadership - classic shaping. All this adds up to continual stress on the RA which will either hold or break. If they hold we are into a different endgame. If they break options open up for the UA. Considering that Russia appears to be a complete psycho-f#ck family right now given the events of the last couple weeks, my money is on “break”.

The end of every war is the start of an interregnum - any strategy that does not recognize this is doomed for failure. Unless we are talking complete extermination of the Russian people to make the region “safe” but that is a non-starter so no point even exploring it as an option.

I never bought that entire line on the end of WW2 in the Pacific to be honest. It is a little too nicely tied up in a neat little line to resonate. I firmly believe that nothing happened at the end of WW2 that was not in context of the conflict all sides knew was coming post-WW2. I am convinced that the atomic bomb was as much about demonstrating power to the Soviets as it was about finishing off the business with Japan. It was awful coincidental that after Japan tried to surrender to the Soviets that the bomb was dropped. The US could not accept a loss of influence on that side of the Pacific - and Korea proved them correct. I suspect the end of this war is also more about what follows than the outcome of the war itself by this point.

No single weapon system is going to end this war suddenly. The more complicated the system the longer the lead time to get it into battle and the greater the risk of mistakes being made on unfamiliar equipment. People were howling for tanks and as we have seen western tanks are not magic, they are operating under the same limitations as Russian based stuff. HIMARs did change the game as they became a substitute for AirPower especially when plugged in as the last mile of the entire C4ISR architecture. However, while HIMARs had a significant impact they were not going to win the war on their own. ATACMs will give extra range; however, the RA will pull support infra into Russia proper. This is not small as it will force lengthening of support lines etc. However, this will put us on a slippery slope for conducting missile strikes into Russia proper, which is very likely what the hesitance on ATACMs was in the first place. Storm Shadow seems to have gone well and been restrained in it employment so I think the ground work has been laid. Short of serious escalation or spiral risks, we are kinda stuck with a slow grinding affair until something gives. I would also prioritize AD, the sustainment of air denial is pretty critical.

1. Depends on the mine. A bounding frag mine is basically like having a mortar go off next to you but we have pretty good frag protection. A basic HE mine does damage through blast, which will go through protective frag armour - we saw this in Afghanistan where troops body armor was not penetrated but the bast shattered them all to hell inside. No EFPs are really AP yet but if people start running around in power armor it is going to happen. 2. Not much at all. Some AP mines have only a few pounds pressure to set off. Trip wires need even less. AT mines need a lot more weight, normally, gets into 100 pound range if I recall.

Good lord, the whole navigation Roosevelt had to do prior to Pearl Harbor is a case study in political tightrope walking. We all remember the happy ending but he was threading needles like a mad tailor in the lead up. I suspect Ukraine is the same thing in many ways.

I am not sure this was a failure in assessing Russian Great power as much as it was a failure in assessing Ukraine's power to resist and deny Russia strategic victory. We were not about to throw a bunch of expensive (and proprietary) very expensive hardware into a country whose chances to continue existing were low. Why these assessments were wrong we as much about mis-reading "Russia Sux" as they were about "War is fundamentally changing". All of the metrics we used to measure military strength and it ability to create decision were the problem, not necessarily metrics of national power.

There we go...write that in a FP article.

Ya I got that part, it was weak reframing which does not really help beyond those who already agree with the position...hell I agree with the position and thought it off key. There is no way we can park policy on "the is no such thing as Great Powers" - it is right up there with that Chatham House piece from yesterday. Of course there are Great Powers, they would be the ones who deter, coerce and compel us be it above or below the waterline. The questions are - how do we expand/sustain our option spaces while compressing theirs? Quickly followed by "setting conditions to negotiate from positions of strength". Russia, China and/or Mole People, that is the central issue. What seems to break a lot of these policy types is the fact that we may need to renegotiate the RBIO in the process as the status quo appears to have fun off and joined the circus. Back to Russia the issue to my mind is how do we defeat a Great Power without making things worse? Carefully, it would appear. Edit - to follow up, now the concept of Medium Power (one my nation seems to think is a thing) might be the idea worth tossing out. I am beginning to think a state is either Great or Small, Medium really doesn't seem to mean anything beyond a collectivism dream that is starting to fray on the edges.

Peace on the requirement for forward thinking...so lets see it. It has been a brutally long time since I have read anything from these IR/FP types that got the blood pumping - of course that may be me, as the lights in the eyes go out in this line of work.

I was actually thinking more about R - to the point that their system fails to a level where A is viable. OS are very hard to the point of being impossible so one had to erode the entire thing for a length of time. The you are not breaching as much as pushing safe lanes in order to chase after a fleeing opponent.

Yeesh, I do not even know where to start. I hate it when "insiders" play the nomenclature game. "It isn't Hybrid Warfare, its Grey Zone." "It isn't Grey Zone it is 'Below the Threshold'". "It isn't Great Power, it is 'Full Spectrum Power'". Half of this is just trying to new label for the same thing but now you can claim re-branding rights - original thought is not any part of the discussion. So a Great Power is now defined by "full spectrum" appears to be DIME+P (and no mention of C - culture), with a focus on capital M and everything to make that happen. If this is the case there is a pretty strong argument that the US is not a Great Power, nor a Full Spectrum Power either because it is lacking in Political unity and will to actually employ all them pointy bits and accept sacrifice on the same level as China. Further this completely misses the boat as to why Russia failed. There is a level of facade, no doubt about that; however, as we have discussed numerous times here the entry cost of a war like this is so high that if the US and a coalition were fighting an enemy empowered and enabled like Ukraine we likely would not even start it in the first place. Can you imagine 100k US soldiers dying in 16 months? Last time that happened was WW2, not some sideshow intervention. What is missing from this entire discussion is Opportunity. Great/Full Spectrum (whatever) Power only counts if one has Opportunity to use it, or better yet create Opportunity to use it. Further a more fulsome treatment of the subject has to look at the power to Deny opportunity. We are democratizing both energy/kinetic and information based power at a terrifying rate - now small powers like North Korea can achieve a sort of relative power superiority within niches. So is Russia a "Great Power"?...well considering that we are not going all Iraq/Saddam on its a$$, I would say "yes" it is still in the club of nations that can deter the entire western world to a degree. Further, Russia has (and likely will) go back to employing subversive power as a primary mode of making trouble, as going overt did not work out so well. Or are we going to convince our selves that "no Russia is not a Great Power, so we can do all sorts of things as policy"? Are we going to start treating Russia like we would Panama?