The_Capt

Not entirely how it works. Resistance/partisans are a bit of a lost art in western warfare. We were pretty good at it in WW2 with the SOE and OSS, and during the Cold War we held onto skill sets but it got pretty messy. In the post-Cold War we got all righteous and uppity “we don’t negotiate with X” which is often very much resistance space. The term being thrown around is “support to resistance” which is really unconventional warfare (itself a subset of irregular warfare). In conventional conflicts partisans do two things really well - 1) intelligence as has been noted and 2) creating uncertainty. They along with SOF are the great “undeciders”. This is a main effort in just about all unconventional warfare campaigns as it can act as a strategic force multiplier for conventional comparing (see Lawrence of Arabia etc). So with respect to the occupied areas in the south, partisans are really good at intel and then symbolic compartmentalized actions that drive Russians crazy in rear areas, to the point that a “rear area” ceases to exist. Every now and again partisans get tagged with some sort of strategic strike, normally when no other options are left. No they can be activated en mass and integrated into a broader conventional campaign a la Normandy and France, but this is extremely tricky. More often than not they risk both sides shooting at them thinking they are enemy hybrid elements. That said, we really do not know what 21st century irregular warfare looks like - could be a version of crowd-sourced warfare we saw back in Phase I. I would not get too excited about it though, at least until it happens. A lot of points of failure in this sort of work, but if the UA can make it work it could be glorious particularly as this is their own country. The reality is that we probably won’t know the full UA irregular warfare details until this thing is over. Just one more thing to unpack after the war.

We have had a lot of debates on the spotting models in CM. No game is perfect but CM’s is pretty solid. A lot of times players get frustrated but this is entirely realistic. Perfect no, and we always get weird instances but having playing both sides a lot the game is not that far off. As to Unhook The Leash - this is the last scenario of the US campaign. You have M1s and Bradley’s versus 2nd ech Soviet troops, that are also kinda beat up. Not sure of player CW experience levels but this scenario is pretty asymmetric for the US player…up to a point (and it has the MGB!). Soviet tanks are not fantastic for spotting but they were not really designed for duelling, they were designed for getting in close and crushing. If you start duelling T72s with M1s you are going to lose badly. Maybe the T80 and T64 but even they have to be careful.

I honestly have no concerns on if a UA offensive will succeed, too many factors working against the RA at this point. The real question is: how much will it succeed? How far can the UA push before the RA can establish a new defensive line? They have to balance that limit with what they can support and sustain. And then there is “how much is enough?” Apparently all that ground taken back last Fall didn’t do it, so how much does the UA need to retake to convince Russia, the West and in some ways themselves, that this thing is not over yet?

Gorram forum buttons.

Density on the Ukrainian side are likely lower than the RA but this is apples to race horses. The UA C4ISR superiority allows it to leave a small trip wire force forward along most of the line because they are pretty much impossible to surprise. The UA has demonstrated a much more highly mobile force with a rapid C2. The UA clearly upguns density in areas under assault but in quiet sectors they can sit back and simply wait because they will see (and hit) any RA concentrations well back being fed western ISR feeds - and by now their own architecture is likely pretty robust. The UA also can move in the backfield better. We know Russian ISR is challenged the deeper into Ukraine held territory one goes and they lack PGM, so the UA likely has greater freedom of movement for c-moves. The RA does not have this advantage, so they have to try to push out more density on the line. So the UA conducting an attack in one area to draw in limited RA resources, forces them to commit, and then attacks in a second area for a break-in/out/through just like they did last fall, makes a lot of sense. The RA could be surprised and dislocated in that scenario, again repositioning challenged by UA deep strike capability linked to likely the best ISR on the planet right now.

It is not the tanks that is going to kill the RA, it is the crews. They likely only had enough crews for about 2000 tanks (ie those in ready service), with some reserves. This crews must have been taking horrendous losses in the first year, and the Russian tanks do not look very survivable when hit. We know some crews got out but a lot of examples of them not. They do not have a lot of time to train replacements, so they go out poorly trained, make mistakes and become more casualties. The “so what” is that the effectiveness of their tank corps overall all is going to drop in a non-linear rate, compared to linear losses. And then we could talk logistics and maintenance of the force in contact.

But they just laid down and died…except for the Reavers.

Even with x2 (add mobilized and tossed on frontline), these are very low densities. Take Zap-Blue. Double the density to 214 per km. So chop a third for logistics/support, so 140-150 actual frontline troops (which is generous). That is a healthy company with no one behind it, nor an ability to rotate out and off the line. Based on what we have seen troop rotations are likely happening horizontally from loud to quiet sectors, not from front to rear. This is the Russian problem. A lot of people are handwringing about “frozen front lines” and Russian defensive belts but that is an enormous frontage to try and defend and nowhere enough troops to do it with. Russian LOCs are interdict-able - I would be saving a lot of deep strike for that, so as the UA assaults the RA are going to be challenged to c-move (which will be highly visible). The RA is simply spread too thin and likely does not have the logistics, ISR or C2 to be able to cover those sorts of ranges. I think that once the UA drops the hammer that whole thing is going to crack like an eggshell. The RA counter-moves are going to get hit while trying to re-position. RA targeting cycles are too slow and its logistics are fragile. This has all the hallmarks of the setup for an operational collapse.

Still painting it.

I live in the New Eden where I can buy pot in a store and smoke it behind a military mess. Not that it is really doing that much for recruiting.

The other big problem is that power hungry leaders on both extremes are creating a doctrine of absolutism. There can be no middle ground when one’s identity is tied to uncompromising rigid belief systems that must stand even in the face of directly contradictory facts - simply choose to believe “alternative facts”. To the players this is just a game to push support into their camps, but it is so dangerous. Once you polarize enough and demonize the other side(s) to the point that there is no compromise…well that is how democracies die. We see it here. We get drive bys by posters who are completely unsupported by facts and have constructed frameworks of how the world works to simply shore up the position that they are “better than them”. Ignore an illegal war that is murdering thousands…they other guys are supporting it, it must be wrong. And frankly the odd trolls that spin through here are pretty tame if one starts looking around. Now I have to believe these are nothing more that vocal minorities; however, I am not entirely sure. I am not sure where the middle went. The moderates and compromise. I am sure it is still there but some days it feels like it has already left the process.

Well pot smoking is on the menu now, at least for some of us.

Now, now this gentleman has presented a very coherent strategy on how to decisively lose the next Cold War/strategic competition. This will guarantee a US hard power contraction, which means soft power will be right behind it - I mean why invest in the US on many levels if they refuse to actually “get involved”? What value is US diplomacy if security means America only? This is right up the alley of a certain political figure that it could be ripped from one of his speeches. And into these vacuums other powers are going to quickly pivot - they already have. With their increased influence investment in the US will start to dry up - deals will be cut to ensure it, as will supply chains and consumption. In a few years the US dollar will no longer be the global reserve currency. This will pretty much set up the West for fracture as Europe will figure out pretty quick that it has been largely abandoned to its own devices. A whole lotta nations in the Indo-Pac are going to also bail. I mean the logical extension of Step 1 is China can invade Taiwan, North Korea into South Korea, India and Pakistan can totally blow up. Screw Ukraine. Russia can pretty much do whatever it wants. US out of NATO - because that entire thing rides on allied intervention, so Europe is on its own. 5 EYES is gone. Forget global cooperation on trans-regional crime and terrorism because unless it happens in the US - “not our problem”. In fact this is so monumentally stupid that of course people who are looking for easy answers in a very complex and frightening world are gravitating towards it. I mean the entire deal that keeps the US on top is built in global stability backed not only by the US dollar but also carrier groups - so it is entirely logical that if you pull those groups back and let them float only 200 miles off the US coastline that US global influence will remain extant. The US can probably drastically reduce defence spending and focus on building walls though. Here is a crazy idea: if the US does not step up and in to keep some sort of order on this planet, someone else will. The US does not get to withdraw into fortress North America (while choking out immigration with a declining birth rate) and remain a global economic superpower. Hard power backs soft- that US dollar as much as whatever the US is selling (or more importantly, buying). At least 3 generations of Americans had that one figured out, but now for some reason people have totally forgotten. Regardless, thankfully these complete amateurs are not running the show, yet.

Short answer to a very good question - nothing viable. To shorten this war dramatically - like in a month, NATO would need to establish air supremacy (and sea control of the Black Sea but let’s stay focused). If the Ukrainian had that then I believe that land power mass would work again. This would include an epic history making SEAD campaign linked to a C-ISR campaign, again of historic scope and scale. It would include strikes into Russia at air and C4ISR infrastructure, followed by massive strikes on Russian logistics and strategic capacity. Without that, this war will continue to unfold at its current speed…until it can go fast. And we all know that is not going to happen unless there is a major strategic shift. The West could supply the UA with 1000 tanks but they would need a lot of logistical support and literally years to train up crews/units/formations at that scale. Essentially I strongly suspect that we are pumping about as much into Ukraine as they can realistically absorb and support. We could definitely up the scales in some areas like deep strike but I suspect there is a logic for that one too. People do not want to believe just how hard and how long it takes to build a fighting formation that can do a deliberate assault. This is near the high water mark of land warfare - maybe only amphib or heavy airborne is a higher bar. So the penny packets we are seeing being pushed in are not like there are 500 trained crews waiting for western tanks and we are only sending 100. There are likely only enough crews for the tanks we are sending and the force generation pipeline is only so wide. So this is going to take time and a lot of effort, and sacrifice. No shortcuts, no magic US bullets (we have spent a lot of these already). But my money is still on a UA breakthrough and breakout in the spring/summer. There will likely be another Russian operational collapse, or two. And then we will have to see what Phase VI brings. I get everyone being edgy but I cannot stress how much of warfare is exactly this, sitting around waiting while listening to artillery. You gotta breathe through it and be patient cause it will get exciting enough, soon enough.

Man that really highlights the issue at play here. The US is more than a nation of 360-odd million. It is an idea. An idea that despite it flaws, contradictions and even occasional hypocrisy that the western world signed up for because it resonated. We all took the idea and made it our own. It was bigger than a political system. It spoke to themes of liberty, representation, security, justice and equality. We built a global order to oppose Communism around this big idea. That is what this war is really about - the defence of that idea. Supporting Ukraine is simply the right thing to do. It is about pushing back a genocidal bully and declaring to any and all that would think about trying this “Hey, this is our idea and we are going to defend it. You are not attacking Ukraine, you are attacking our idea”.

I think a lot of this springs from a sort of ignorant entitlement mentality. The world is just supposed to keep the US on top because it is the US. This completely misses the sacrifices and decades of work it took to position it on top - and frankly everyone in the western world should be happy it worked out that way. But no, the US should be able to simply “Let it be” and somehow the world will keep spinning the way it has - this is beyond ignorant and is heading to dumb. Here is a crazy thought for all the Russian apologists, isolationist, Cro-Magnon-adventists who try and frame this war as anything than it is: Some wars are worth fighting, and this is one of them. ”Oh if we had only…[insert upside down theory]”. Well we did not. Russia invaded a nation that was minding its own business and is killing innocent people in a naked power grab. I do not care if Russia wigged out because NATO - so freakin what? We use our words not poorly aimed cruise missiles. This entire war is not the result of anyone’s foreign policy other than Russia and Putin. Every nation that joined NATO did so of its own free will - you know, the thing we are supposed to be protecting? Anyone who suggests that we should live in a world where we let regional dictators pull of nonsense like this war - “to avoid war” is deluded. Or, as I suspect is in this case, is that kid in the class who is just clever enough to be contrary and get attention but has no real solutions to offer.

Ok to summarize: - Ukrainian economy - Russian Support kicking in (namely from China) - Western support running out - materially, and glancing off of will. Ergo - west is not providing enough support, should accelerate/double down in order to end this war before Ukraine runs out of time. I think I got it all but jump in if I missed something. Well first off it fails to recognize Russian trajectories, which are not pretty either militarily or economically. Ukraine is not seeing shipments of M60s and Leo 1s, but Russia is shipping T62s. This is evidence that as it relates to material Russia is running out of runway while there is no evidence the Western cupboard is bare. We do know there are production concerns as western inventories of forward edge munitions are starting to strain. However, let’s keep a level head here on this. I had a chance to virtually attend a RUSI conference last week on air power and let me say that military industry has seen the wind and is really leaning into it. It is in their interests to accentuate production shortfalls and issues as in this environment they will equate directly to deep long term investment in their industry. So the “truth” is likely somewhere in between. We are seeing shortfalls in some areas because we were set up for short wars, but we also have some pretty deep war stocks. I have seen no evidence that we are really anywhere near the bottom of the barrel, we will need to accept risk but welcome to warfare. Ukrainian economy - well by this logic (ie saving the Ukrainian economy) then Ukraine should have likely sued for peace last Nov. The economic return on the land they take back from here is not likely to pay for the costs of taking it back at this point. Frankly if the West does not follow up this war with the largest reconstruction effort since the Second World War then we may as well pull out now - and the grown ups know this. So listing this one as a forcing function doesn’t really line up because we are talking decades of investment if this thing ended today regardless. So we are really down to western Will on one side. Russian Will and Material on the other. Russian Material is a significant problem for them. China would have to seriously invest, likely more than the entire western effort for Ukraine right now, to stop the current RA trajectory. Will China go that far? We do not know, but we are not seeing evidence that China is preparing to jump into this thing with both feet. It is a single powerful nation with a lot of regional defence and security bills to pay, hemorrhaging that into Russia is a questionable strategy but we will see. Russian Will appears startlingly robust, at least on the surface the signs of strain are there. But I am betting it is also not infinite. Time = Western Will, there is your forcing function.

Another weird thing is that whole vehicle park/bivouac on the bottom. Pretty administrative for being in a warzone. This picture must be well back from the front. If that were a logistics node it is a prime target.

Some oddities there. My guess is they are only about half built. The white bundles everywhere are likely field defence stores, so the trenches have been dug but not revetted or sandbagged. That takes a lot of manpower. Weird stuff going on with sighting. The long stretch facing the lake looks like they are worried about an amphib. Then there are this small sections, looks like they are incomplete but also a bit strange. No sign of minefields or obstacles. The lack of vehicle tracks suggests that these are not manned yet. Biggest thing, and a problem for a defender, is just how visible these are.

You doing that thing again where you dance on the edge of the argument that this war was somehow a discretionary strategic diversion that we could have avoided. Further glancing off the idea that this war is also somehow the West/US fault because it got involved in containing an obvious genocidal dictator. It is the part where you conflate isolationist foreign policy advocates with the whole US, as though support of US involvement in the broader planet - one which is largely engineered the global order thereof - and pays for their lifestyles, is itself "Anti-American".

That first one is the rub for Russia. The troop density they need to sustain for a defence in depth is far too low for the frontage they have bitten off. The UA has done it through ISR coverage backed up by fires and likely rapidly mobile counter move forces. The RA has not demonstrated any of this capability, in fact the capability they had has demonstrated erosion, not growth, so they can only offset with manpower…which is also a shrinking pool thanks to baffling wastages in the Winter offensives. So Russia has a really big frontage to try and freeze the conflict while the UA only has to find the weak spots to exploit - and keep exploiting. As to mobilization, I am not sold that the west is at the bottom of the barrel yet. In fact I know we are not even close. Now political will is the one thing that may start to run low but materially we have a long way to go before we are totally Winchester. Now dipping into stocks will make us uncomfortable but those stocks are there. For example Canada still has about 70 Leo 2 (and we all love those guys - The Capt said sarcastically) we could ship another dozen or more with parts etc. Would we be happy, nope. Would we be in trouble if China invades Taiwan?…trust me 12-24 Canadian Leo2s are not going to make a difference in Taiwan. But could we do it if we had too, yes. And there are a lot of nations in NATO with war stocks etc with a lot of depth. So again, Russia is not on the winning end of that calculus either. What we do not need is a Ukrainian military disaster which would result in a lot of western political testicular retreats into abdomens.

The anti-US/NATO types should be coming out shortly to tell us how this is all our fault and just another example for Russian provocation. I mean Russia was simply minding its own business after all…

So I really do not have a dog in this whole EU fight but what I am seeing on both sides of the discussion are classic symptoms of information operations. Russia has not simply been “troll farming”, evidence points to a re-emergence of subversive warfare doctrines re-tooled for the 21st century. This is basically a lot of effort aimed at finding and exploiting the fractures and divisions in a society, leveraging that to either create negative decision (undeciding things, like EU membership), null decision (paralysis by rendering something undecidable) or positive decision (reflexive control type stuff where decisions are made that are in the interest of the sponsor, not the targeted state). The things to watch out for just unfolded in these last two pages. Polarized information spheres - Cpl S is clearly in one where the narrative is the EU is ruling the UK like a monarch to the detriment of the “working man”. While others are being given evidence the EU was beneficial etc. in reality there is enough truth in both to sustain the spheres and keep them accelerating away from each other - we saw the exact same thing with NAFTA here in NA. The actual truth is almost immaterial, and is usually pretty mundane - something which some have glanced off of. And then there is the agency reflex - “well I was not influenced”. Well you probably were, how much and how far it influenced your decisions is variable and likely linked to how much you cared (although there is plenty of evidence of apathy reinforcement). The reality is that if you were involved in a decisive issue you likely have been influenced to a degree. Now how successful Russia has been is a major problem. If they have not been the reflex will be to ignore and continue, which is good for the sponsor of the campaign. Or if it is over subscribed it hijacks heathy discourse and makes a boogeyman where none exists, also good for the sponsor. We have seen the results right here - sides yell at each other pretty much abandoning any and all facts. Someone leaves in a huff, which is pretty much what subversive sponsors want because meaningful discourse and compromise do nothing for their effort. Agency reflex/active denial and actual facts getting lost in the noise. Finally, the other place to watch for these sorts of things is on issues that are not only highly divisive but hang in a fine balance. Subversion rarely works in creating massive landslides, they are not designed to and the costs are too high. On tight races where a few thousand votes can swing things (or conversely in an autocratic society, a few key decision making nodes) this is where subversive warfare really kicks in. Now as to how well Russia influenced Brexit? Who really knows. We do know they were involved and put some effort as it is in their interests to split up the EU. How successfully they pulled that off would take a lot of effort to figure out. But in reality the fact that people are still divided and yelling past each other is a pretty good sign they are still getting something out of the whole affair.

From experience, it is the best way to do these things. Plenty of time for emotion when it is all over.

Well then like a lot of other times, those ten days were when history was hanging in the balance. I am still not sure more infantry would have made a difference. Unless we are talking 1-2 million but the Russian military was not setup for a campaign of those sizes even back before when it lost 10k vehicles. They may have created security corridors for molotovs and shotguns but most reports show that artillery did most of the killing with next-gen ATGMs likely coming in next. Then other tanks/AFVs with direct fire. The Russian Air Force was blunted a few days in by a much smaller force and hella denial effort. So unless infantry could catch artillery, establish air superiority or turn off the UA ISR, again I am not sure how more of them would yield success. Regardless, we are where we are and I do not see “more infantry” actually solving much for Russia at this point. Of course at the rate they are burning through vehicles and platforms it might be all the RA has left.