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Grisha

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Posts posted by Grisha

  1. I was just thinking about the many battles that occurred in the Russian front: Smolensk '41, Moscow '41, Sevastopol '42, Kharkov '42, Stalingrad '42/'43, Kharkov '43, Kursk '43, Ukraine '43, Byelorussia '44, etc etc etc. Then I thought of playing these battles within the operation format in CM, and it hit me that this will be awesome! Imagine units of Totenkopf making that final thrust toward Prokhorovka/Oboyan, slamming into elements of the 5th Guards Tank Army, resulting in a series of vicious tank battles! Perfect for a CM operation! Or, how about the final push by the Germans in Stalingrad to oust the last stubborn remnants of Chuikov's 61st Army along the right bank of the Volga? Or, the race to the Don in late '43? The scenarios are endless smile.gif

    I bet CM2 is where the operation really shines.

  2. Warren,

    Now that I've quibbled over a few things with you, I will say that when the western Allies landed in Normandy, many Soviet citizens breathed a sigh of relief, because now it meant they weren't in it alone any longer in Europe. Also, lend lease was very helpful to the Soviet war effort, increasing their mobility, and enhancing their communications. Everything the western Allies did helped to end the war in Germany a little sooner.

    Another thing the Soviets were very appreciative of was the Allied heavy bombing campaign. This campaign forced a large portion of the Luftwaffe jagdfliegeren stationed in the Russian front to redeploy in Germany, aiding the efforts of the VVS in no small measure. The terrible losses sustained by the bomber crews during '43 were known to many Soviets during that time, and taken to heart.

    While we may never agree on who did most to win the war in Europe, there can be no denying that the Germans were defeated by a group effort of primarily the US, the UK/Commonwealth, and the Soviet Union.

  3. There never would have been a 40% increase. Considering the German armies on the Italian front as well in the calculation, even if the western allies only threatened to invade Italy and/or France, there still would have been the necessity of a garrison in those two places, and that would have taken at least 20% of the Wehrmacht for garrison duty. This leaves 20% to be added on the Russian front. And when one realizes that German strength was never any higher than in 1941, and that 90% of German forces were in the Russian front in 1941, I can only say that it wouldn't have altered the outcome of WWII, only the date.

    One thing we haven't addressed either are the Axis allies, such as Romania, Hungary, and Italy that were on the Russian front. Most of these troops were gone by 1943, and they're absence from the line was keenly felt by the Germans.

  4. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>My point was simply that by tying down 40% or so of German combat strength in June 1944, this allowed the disaster to Army group center to happen. Much of the problem was that the German's simply had no reserve to counterattack after the initial breakthroughs.

    - Warren Peace<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

    The Germans had plenty of armor on the Russian front in June of 1944. It's just that they were mainly located in the Army Groups south of Army Group Center. This was due to a massive Soviet deception campaign before Bagration. The Germans took the bait, sent most of their armor south, and Army Group Center was destroyed.

    [This message has been edited by Grisha (edited 10-27-2000).]

  5. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Maj. Bosco:

    I think the major importance of D-Day is that by liberating western Europe before the USSR the allies prevented the Eastern Bloc from being the European Bloc. Probably my American jingoism kicking in again but from everything I've read Uncle Joe's government wasn't the greatest thing in the world to live in. Being completely realistic the cheer at the end of WWII should have been "YAY! THE LESSER EVIL WON! WOOHOOO".<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

    You are most likely right, and if Roosevelt wasn't dwelling on this, I would bet money Churchill was wink.gif

  6. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by machineman:

    Just goes to reinforce the idea it was a team effort that won the war. What if all the resources on the German side could have been concentrated against one front, instead of the crazy 'fire brigade' stuff the Wehrmacht was forced to do?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

    For the Germans, 1941 was about as good as it got. Aside from reserves in France, and the remnants of the Greece operation all German resources were concentrated in Russia in the summer of 1941. Add to that Soviet forces were at their worst at that time.

    But I understand your point, and yes, it was a group effort. Nonetheless, I firmly believe that Russia's contribution to the struggle against Germany was the decisive element in the Third Reich's defeat.

  7. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Kanonier Reichmann:

    Thanks Grisha, very informative. I'm wondering since you seem to have good sources on this, were those forward "heavily" armed detatchments mainly armed with PPShk (if that's the right spelling) SMG's?

    Regards

    Jim R.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

    Reichmann,

    It all depends on the parent unit. For a mech corps one could expect armor and infantry with artillery, engineer, antiair, and antitank assets. For a rifle division it could be mainly infantry with or without armor, and the same sort of assets as the mech corps. However, mobility was very important, so one could expect forward detachments to be mobile at least. The reason they were heavily armed was so that they could be self contained, and ready to encounter most types of combat situations. Also, the type of the mission would determine what type of assets a forward detachment was given. For example, a forward detachment that was assigned to take a bridge might very well have bridging/fording equipment. Whether infantry were armed with PPSh41 all depended on the parent unit, but in armor units submachinegun troops were very common.

  8. Wow, seeing a lot of WWII German-induced fallacies in this thread about Soviet troops.

    Yes, commissars would shoot deserters, but so would regular troops in just about any army. My dad shot at his own troops in the US Army during Korea when they just took off and ran away. Also, commissars no longer had joint command around the time of Operation Uran, and therefore would not have the authority to shoot a deserter from 1943, on. Consider this as well: commissars had a price on their heads on Hitler's specific orders. Many of them were no different from their fellow soldiers, just more 'patriotic'. In fact, in many units the commissar was looked upon as someone to confide with.

    Soviet troops in 1941 were very poorly led, because the officer corps had been decimated by the military purges of 1937. Those officers remaining were quickly promoted to command levels that were clearly beyond their capacities. Slowly, but surely, the STAVKA (and Stalin) learned from their mistakes, and began to compile the war experience of the Red Army, taking the best tactics, and incorporating them into their combat regulations. By 1943, Soviet troops were beginning to be quite effective along with the expertise of their generals, like Vasilesky, Konev, Rokossovsky, and Vatutin, just to name a few. While it is true that German tactical skill was generally better than your average Soviet troops, it can also be said that most Soviet mass wave type attacks were from 1941-1942. By 1943, sound tactics were the rule of the day in the Red Army. Many stories abound of stunning German tactical victories, but what is beginning to come out of the Soviet archives are many stories of the Soviets doing the very same thing to the Germans. Of course they mostly occur from the latter part of the war, but they are just as striking nonetheless.

    Soviets did not have 8-to-1 or 10-to-1 advantages against their German counterparts, overall. At the very most it was no higher than 3-to-1 overall, and this only by 1945. Of course, in battles high odds could be obtained, but this is just good operational tactics, something the Germans did many times during the war.

    How did the Soviets defeat the Germans? Well, think about it. The Soviets had a very advanced operational art by 1944, better than the western allies, and on par with the Germans. How could the Soviets have won anything if they had poor tactics with which to base their operations on? It was never Soviet procedure to just keep pouring more men in battle - that was just the result of very poor leadership (sad, but true, Zhukov was not the best leader for an offensive. He was too linear, and relied too much on the initial push). In fact, by 1944 the Red Army had perfected the use of forward detachments, which were small, yet heavily equipped units that were sent ahead of their parent unit, usually with a very specific mission. The notable thing is that commanders of forward detachments were given wide freedom of action to complete their mission, and some of these commanders were every bit as good as the best the Germans had. In any case, a discussion of forward detachments is tangential to this thread, but I just wanted to point it out. Soviets did have sound, innovative tactics.

    Were the Soviets as good as the Germans in tactical expertise, overall? I would say no, they were not. But what the Soviets did have by 1943 were well trained, veteran troops who were led by highly skilled(brilliant, in some cases) operational commanders.

    Finally, most German general memoirs are from the early war years, and as such incorporate flawed perceptions of the Red Army, perceptions that went on to become the "body of truth" later on. Here is a good site to get a better understanding of why these Red Army generalizations came to be. Suffice to say, the Red Army was anything but a plodding, callous machine. And besides, the Germans were much too good to have lost to anything less than well trained troops, using good, sound tactics as part of operations that were commanded by excellent generals.

    [This message has been edited by Grisha (edited 10-17-2000).]

  9. I'm buying CM. I initially was only intending to buy CM2, because I'm a very serious Eastern Front gamer. Then I read your Battlefront.com Manifesto. After going over that page, I had no choice but to support you smile.gif

    I know what you're talking about, because I used to work in an independent bookstore for 8 and a half years. The term Retailers that you used, we referred to as Chains - the chain stores. My order for CM is already a done deal, and I look forward to CM2.

    Best of luck to you, and Live Long!

  10. Sure, the Germans had better equipment - than the USA in 1944. Take it back to Barbarossa, and 1941, through to 1943, and it's a different story in game terms. Soviet tanks ruled (maybe not '41-'42 Soviet tactics or C3, but that's not a game issue at CM's level). From 1943 until mid 1944, the edge swung to the Germans, but by mid 1944 that was mostly neutralized by the IS-II.

    Anyway, Germans were very tactically adept, extremely versed in tactical combat. But I'll still play Soviet any day wink.gif

  11. panzertruppen,

    I concur with just about all Jay states. It's probably true that Prokhorovka was made into a propaganda victory - German armor losses were not anywhere near Soviet losses. But I very much doubt that any Soviet generals were unduly afraid of reporting the loss figures to Stalin, and the primary reason is because they held the field. Against the Germans during a summer offensive. Can you imagine just how big that was? It was world shattering news in 1943. However, Prokhorovka was the place where the Germans finally ran out of steam in the south axis of Citadel, maybe not the epic battle popular history has drummed it up to be, but it was the pivot point. More of a 'groan' than a 'whack!'

    smile.gif

  12. Yes, Glantz is quite detailed in his research, and is now considered one of the top western historians on the Soviets during WWII. I don't know where Panzertruppen got the idea that Stalin was upset with the results of the Kursk operation, since I've never read anything to that effect. In fact, Stalin was continually taking the advice of the STAVKA to not counterattack quite yet (Stalin didn't like being on the defensive), but in hindsight it was a good thing the Soviets held their reserves.

    The most significant point to the battle of Kursk for me was that the Germans actually lost their first summer offensive. Equipped with the finest tanks in the world (unlike 1941), and spearheaded by an SS PanzerKorp, no less. And, still, the Germans lost.

    I would have loved to have seen Manstein's face after he completed that post-Kursk operation that was to have ended any Soviet aspirations for an offensive that summer. From that point on, the panzers were reduced to the role of gap pluggers, though exceedingly good ones at that.

    The Germans simply had no idea just how prepared the Soviets were for the summer of 1943, which says volumes about Soviet intelligence and deception.

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