[The Dupuy formula (so as not to get inundated by the IS-3 debate)]

Dang! 94 replies and only now do I get wind of this thread. I'm I getting old?

After going over this thread, I really only want to add a few things.

Soviet Losses

My assessment of Soviet losses are that things didn't really start to improve until the Belorussian campaign of summer '44. If you look at just the pure levels of Soviet casualties, 1943 is quite heavy. The Battle of Kursk is part of that, but so is the Drive for the Dnepr. The Soviets were engaged in a front-wide offensive which while overwhelming for the Germans was also very costly for the Soviets in equipment and men/women.

As for Stalingrad, it's well known that the Soviets seriously underestimated the size of the 6th Army, think there were a mere 90,000. Of course, the number was about three times that(?). This resulted in more losses than expected when it came to closing the ring, since the actual troops originally assigned to do this were not enough for the task.

Going back to 1943, in winter of 43/44 the STAVKA came to the conclusion that future plans for a front-wide offensive were out of the question, because a)the front would shorten and allow for a denser German line, and b)the terrain would become more defensible as they pushed westwards. Thus, something else needed to be done to compensate, and their answer was a higher level of maskirovka, strategic maskirovka. At this level of deception, it was very important to send false impressions to OKH such that strategic reserves would be placed in the wrong area. A major reason for the winter/spring campaigns in the Ukraine, Romania and the Baltic were to set the table for the offensive against Army Group Center. This, in turn, was to set up the actual Vistula-Oder operation. Thus, a series of feints in the expected areas, followed by the real thing in an unexpected area, followed by the real thing in the expected area was a nightmare for the OKH in 1944. It got to the point where German Intelligence was making knee-jerk reactions to anything even remotely resembling an offensive. This was how the Soviets cut down on their casualties: they were hitting where the Germans did not expect them. And, when the Germans did expect them, the Soviets resorted to hitting them when they did not expect them. This was only possible through a strategic plan that was composed of interrelated operations, each setting up the other.

Soviet Tactics

I often hear the term 'steamroller' to denote Soviet tactics, even when describing actions in '44 or '45. I won't disagree with what this implies, but the use of such a term needs some qualification, or elaboration. The Soviets did not possess the level of tactical flexibilty and expertise that the Germans had - ever. And there was good reason for this that could be found within the doctrinal as well as practical aspects of Red Army training. Basically, the Red Army started on the worst foot possible, then never had the time to really implement a level of training that could approach German excellence. Still, the Soviets found ways of augmenting what level of expertise their troops did possess through other means, and eventually found out that some things were more important than top-notch tactical training. This was operational art, the combination of intelligence, maneuver, and deception that became the Soviet way of war. With the effective use of these three components the actual initial battles were usually anticlimactic, so certainly had the Soviets amassed factors and odds in their favor. It didn't matter that the Germans were better tactically than the Soviets anymore, because from an operational level where tactical engagements were expertly orchestrated by the Soviets, all the important battles were assured through massive numerical superiority, accomplished via deceptive redeployment, simulated troop concentrations, and diversionary attacks. So, in a sense the Soviets did 'steamroll' over the Germans, but only at places of their choosing, and with the intention of creating opportunities for maximum exploitation. And, the key was that the Germans were rarely allowed to either detect the scale of these operations, or if detected, to react in time or with enough reserves.

[Russian and Ukrainian fans of CM?]

The other thing is that since it isn't distributed through a main distribution chain this game is not too well known in places like Russia. Like Miami164 says, it is too expensive for many Russians, and because it isn't distributed even finding a 'burned' version at the bazaar is a rare find. Awhile ago I asked several of my Russian friends on the internet if they had heard of CM and they all said no (though they play games like CC:Eastern Front), and one even tried to find a copy at the bazaar, but he was unsuccessful.

I suspect this game is limited to mostly a western audience.

[ 06-16-2001: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[A BUNCH of answers to your questions!]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by killmore:

From 1943 onward there was also 200,000+ Polish army fighting Axis on East front.

So if Poland was included into CM it should be included into CM2.

Polish troops took part in taking Berlin.

Gee - Do Rumanian troops appear on Soviet side in 1944?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Very true. In fact, there were two Polish Armies in the Soviet OB before war's end. The thing is they probably looked exactly like Red Army soldiers.

[A BUNCH of answers to your questions!]

Okay, I reread the question on AT trenches and saw that Steve had used the phrase "regular and AT trenches" would be in. Answers my question, thanks

[A BUNCH of answers to your questions!]

I'm about as pro-Soviet as it gets in WWII gaming, but I doubt I'll ever use a IS-3. Still, it might be cool to see how it 'should' have worked in some QB with the AI. I'd never use the IS-3 in a game with another person though.

So, Steve, guess I'm not going to get an answer about trenches and infantry in CM2???

[A BUNCH of answers to your questions!]

Okay. So, Steve, any word on trenches for infantry?

[A BUNCH of answers to your questions!]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by kipanderson:

Tero, hi,

I should just have said that all my comments referred to the German/Soviet fighting and not Finnish forces or the Winter War. I claim to know nothing about Finnish forces and the Winter War other than that the Finns are regarded as the best by all those that know.

When it comes to Soviet causalities I believe we are no longer in the dark. Both David Glantz and John Erickson, in my view the worlds top men on the Eastern Front, in the English language, regard the work by Colonel-General GF Krivosheev, Soviet Causalities and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century, as reliable and unbiased.

One way to express what I was saying it to illustrate it this way.

If the Germans had been defending against forces that numbered the same as Soviet forces “actually did” but, were in ever detail, “clones” of Germany’s own forces then the casuality ratio, attacker to defender, would have been 1.44:1. In reality it was 1.64:1, Soviet to German. This tells us that the Soviet forces performed nearly as well as German forces would have done in similar circumstances. All comments refer to the post Kursk period.

All the best,

Kip.

PS. If you use the casualties from the above book for the early period of the war you find that the gap between German and Soviet forces is just as great as the Germans claimed in the fifties. It is just that from about the autumn of 43 onwards the Soviets were far better soldiers, and far fewer in number, than the Germans liked to claim post war.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I agree, Kip. Especially wrt Soviet numbers there is no way the Soviets fielded an army that was 8:1 or 10:1 times larger than the Germans in Russia. Physically impossible, because the Soviet had neither that many men of military age, nor the equipment to arm such a tremendous host. From late 1943, on, the Soviets became very adept at deceptive redeployment of their forces along the front, thus creating the odds that German memoirs quote so often. The German memoirs weren't wrong, there really were that many Soviets in the main attack axes. But, those numbers were the result of redeployments done through deception operations, something the Soviets became second to none at. So, as far as the Germans were concerned every time the Soviets launched a major attack from late 1943 until the end of the war the Germans encountered heavy numerical odds in their disfavor. Naturally, it seemed like the Soviets were just swarming across the countryside, but nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, the Soviets had developed the means whereby they could take substantial forces(which were never higher than 3:1 in numerical superiority, and that in late 1944), and redeploy them laterally along the front(along with STAVKA reserves from the rear) to weakpoints in the German line, and German intelligence was by and large unable to detect it.

[A BUNCH of answers to your questions!]

Steve,

Any word on trenches for infantry?

[Western Front CM2 or Eastern Front CM2]

Смерть или Победа!

I would pick the Russian Front, hands down. Here was where no quarter was given, or taken, where ideologies were so intense that it rivalled the fanaticism of a civil war. The German armed forces lost 13.5 million in WWII, and 10.7 million of those losses occurred in the East. That's over 79 percent of total losses by the German armed forces.

[Finland vs. USSR in CM2]

Personally, I think it's interesting that so much emotion surrounds the conflict between Finland and Russia/CCCP, yet these two countries have been quite friendly with each other since war's end. It almost reminds me of close, yet competitive, brothers

[Finland vs. USSR in CM2]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Lala:

And how do you explain the war in 1941-44? USSR didn't invade Finland.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Not quite true, Lala. Soviet began their offensive against Finland on 9 June 1944, taking Vyborg. On 19 September 1944 Finland officially surrendered to the Soviet Union.

[John Erickson goofs?]

Okay, Jeff, I hear ya. And I agree that an operational work, whether German or Soviet, shouldn't be invalidated on such inconsequential details like a date that's off by a few days, or a caliber of gun on a tank(though I would prefer the second error to the first if the work is operational in scope). I'm guessing that Glantz is trying to emphasize two points though. One, that these memoirs were after all based on memory alone, and not archival data. And, two, since a historian's work is only as valid as his sources, it is extemely frustrating when working with memoir material, since what is factual and what isn't is never certain, requiring in itself research with archival material to verify. Thus, the German war memoirs make for difficult source material when discussing the War in Russian with an emphasis on reliable recorded data.

Still, these memoirs written by Guderian, Mellenthin, and von Manstein are historical gems in that they capture the 'picture' of that war from the German side, much like Alexander Werth's War in Russia does for the Soviet side.

[ 05-14-2001: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[John Erickson goofs?]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Duquette:

Regarding David Glantz; He has in past writings (ala his essay entitled “American Perspectives on Eastern Front Operations in WWII” been very openly critical of several crusty old German References such as “Lost Victories” and “Panzer Battles”. A fair bit of this critiscism was apparently founded on nit-picks such as German misidentification of Soviet Units. Discount the entire work simply because the 5th Guards Tank Corps was refered to as the 6th Tank Corps. Yet Glantz gives us a bit on Panthers equipped with 88’s. I reckon people that live in glass houses shouldn’t be so quick to start throwing rocks.

[ 05-13-2001: Message edited by: Jeff Duquette ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

My good friend, Jeff. Wrt Glantz, I think his references about the German memoirs had more to do with a general lacking in Soviet operational data, as well as omissions of operational contexts so as to better highlight tactical successes. It looks much better to read about the Germans tactically thrashing a Soviet thrust without realizing that operationally the German front is collapsing elsewhere.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>From an article by David Glantz, concerning American Perceptions of the Eastern Front...

One of the most influential postwar German war critiques was General von Mellenthin's Panzer Battles published ln English in 1956. Mellenthin's work, an operational/tactical account of considerable merit, echoed the criticism of Hitler voiced by Guderian and showed how Hitler's adverse influence affected tactical operations. Beyond this, Mellenthin's work adopted a didactic approach in order to analyze operations and hence educate officers. Throughout the book are judgments concerning military principles and assessments of the nature of the Soviet fighting men and officers, most of which have been incorporated into the current "body of truth" about Soviet military capabilities. Hence, Mellenthin made such judgments as these: the Russian soldier is tenacious on defense, inflexible on offense, subject to panic when facing unforeseen eventualities, an excellent night fighter, a master of infiltra- tion, a resolute and implacable defender of bridgeheads, and neglectful of the value of human life. As was in the case of Guderian, Mellenthin's experiences against the Red Army encompassed the period before spring 1944 and reflected impressions acquired principally during years of German success.

Mellenthln's work, written without benefit of archival materials, tended to treat tactical cases without fully describing their operational context. Opposing Soviet units, as in Guderian's work, were faceless. Mellenthin's classic account of XXXXVIII Panzer Corps' operations along the Chir River after the encirclement of German 6th Army at Stalingrad stands as an example of the weaknesses of his book. In it he describes the brilliant operations of that panzer corps in fending off assaults by Soviet 5th Tank Army's units which included first the 1st Tank Corps and later 5th Mechanized Corps. On 7-8 December 1942, 11ch Panzer Division parried a thrust of 1st Tank Corps at State Farm 79 while on 19 December, 11th Panzer checked the advance of 5th Mechanized Corps. Despite the vivid accounts of these tactical successes, Mellenthin only in passing describes the operational disaster that provided a context for these fleeting tactical successes. For, in fact, while Soviet 5th Tank Army occupied XXXXVIII Panzer Corps' attention, to the northwest Soviet forces overwhelmed and destroyed the Italian 8th Army and severely damaged Army Detachment Hollidt. Moreover, Mellenthin did not mention (probably because he did not know) that Soviet 1st Tank Corps had been in nearly continuous operation since 19 November and was under strength and worn down when it began its march across the Chir.

Similar flaws appear elsewhere in Mellenthin's work, many of which result from a lack of knowledge of opposing Soviet forces or their strengths.

Of equal importance to Mellenthin's work, but written from a higher level perspective, was the memoir of Eric von Manstein entitled Lost Victories. An important work by an acknowledged master at the operational level of war, Manstein's book viewed operations from 1941 to early 1944 at the strategic and operational level. Manstein's criticism of Hitler reflected active disputes which ultimately led to Manstein's dismissal as Army Group South commander. Manstein's account of operations is accurate although again Soviet forces are faceless, and opposing force ratios are in conflict with those shown by archival materials of Fremde Heeres 0st (Foreign Armies East), Gehlen's organizations, and of the OKH (the Army High Command). Again Soviet superiorities are overstated.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

[ 05-13-2001: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[Lend Lease to Russia]

As Jason & Chris have stated, it really is just speculation as to whether Lend Lease was a decisive factor in the Soviet victory over Germany. While Greg & Ralph have put together a fine article that was well researched it is impossible to state conclusively <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Was Lend-Lease the factor that enabled the Soviets to win their war with Germany? A qualified yes.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I have read from well respected historians like Glantz and Overy who have pretty much stated doubts as whether Lend Lease had this level of decisiveness. Also, when one reads more about Soviet operational art and how it had matured in WWII, one comes away with a sense of awe at the depth of their combat abilities. In the end, all that can be said conclusively is that the Soviet Union was better at their method of war than the Third Reich.

[ 05-08-2001: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[Lend Lease to Russia]

Yes, it is a very good list, though I cannot agree with their conclusions.

[Soviet uniform question]

Commissar,

Are you talking about the padded/quilted jackets that were used in wintertime? They are telogreika and were basically winterwear. By Stalingrad they started to become more common.

[ 05-07-2001: Message edited by: Grisha ]

[What were the highlights for each nation?]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

> Soviets didn't possess overall 3:1 odds

> until late in 1944.

To me it is not new at all. Moreover, all strategic successes of 1941-43 were achieved with rough equality in numbers. As for 22 June 1941 - what is Glantz's definition of "mobilised"?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I'm sorry, but I was posting from memory(was at work at the time). Now that I'm home I can post exactly what is in this book. the title of the table is:

Table C. Comparative Strengths of Combat Forces, Eastern Front 1941-1945

On 22 June 1941, the Soviets had 2,680,000 combat forces in the Western Military Districts. Germans numbered 3,050,000 in Eastern Europe, and her allies of note were 500,000 Finns, 150,000 Romanians.

By 1 November 1941, there were 2,200,000 Soviets and 2,800,000 Germans at the front. Numbers for major allies remained the same.

Glantz' sources for this table are from both German and Soviet archival origins, and is a bit lengthy.

[What were the highlights for each nation?]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

> mobilized army along the Soviet Union’s

> western borders was numerically inferior

> to the invading German Army.

In my understanding, the part of RKKA that was already present in the first strategic echelon was not inferior in pure head counts to the invading german army. However, it was inferior in mobility and heavy weapons, not to mention strategic initiative, f...d up airforce and such. Ie, deployment too late, too close to the border.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Skipper, the data Glantz presents in the appendix of When Titans Clashed includes a comparison of total mobilized combat strength in manpower for both the Soviets, her allies, and the Germans and her allies. The comparison is made through the entire war, and is eye-opening. For example, according to Glantz' research the Soviets didn't possess overall 3:1 odds until late in 1944. 2:1 Soviet odds didn't occur until late 1943 - early 1944. Until seeing Glantz' data, I would have agreed with you, but I greatly respect the work David Glantz has done in this area, and his reputation among the western historians of the Soviet military is probably only exceeded by John Erickson.

[What were the highlights for each nation?]

> I would say that the Soviet skill at

> escaping encirclement during Operation

> Blau is a good indicator of why

> Kharkov '42 was so wasteful.

I dont understand this phrase. Must be the bloody flu getting to my brain. Could you elaborate?

Sorry for the confusion, Skipper. If we don’t include the Kharkov encirclement, Operation Blau did not result in any further encirclements of note. The Soviets were finally conducting a fighting retreat, having learned from their mistakes in ’41. It wasn’t pretty, and was very close to becoming a strategic rout at times, but it was a fighting retreat. All the way to Stalingrad and the Caucasus.

> Had the STAVKA resorted to a fighting

> retreat from the start

With hindsight 20:20? Maybe. Or maybe not.

You do know, I suppose, that despite numerical superiority of RKKA, nearly every big engagement during Barbarossa had German numerical superiority? In an oversimplified way, to play fighting retreat one needed a lot of trucks.

It's true that not only Stalin, but most of the Soviet General Staff believed the next German thrust in 1942 to be directed at Moscow. However, it was Stalin who demanded a limited offensive in the south in May. By and large, the Soviet General Staff was opposed to this, recommending instead a strategic defense overall. Regarding Barbarossa, while the Soviets had millions of unmobilized reserves, in the summer of 1941 the actual standing, mobilized army along the Soviet Union’s western borders was numerically inferior to the invading German Army. This ratio wasn’t reversed until October-November 1941. At one point even, the Germans had a numerical advantage of 1.9:1. My source for this is When Titans Clashed by Glantz & House.

[What were the highlights for each nation?]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Skipper:

On Kharkov and Rzhev. A fighting force that had a lot of low mobility formations and suffered from the opponent's air superiority probably had no better choice than offensive operations, even at a cost of many lives. Otherwise, it would be encircled and destroyed in piecemeal fashion by the more mobile opponent, exactly as it had happened to RKKA in 1941. Which would cost more lives and a lost war in the end of the day.

This is not to say that these meatgrinders were planned as such from the start, just that soviet high command fully realised that these operations were very risky.

By the way, how many people here know that the first German version of "Not a single step back" order was issued to the german troops defending around Rzhev?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Regarding Kharkov '42, I would say that the Soviet skill at escaping encirclement during Operation Blau is a good indicator of why Kharkov '42 was so wasteful. After that fiasco, there were no other encirclements of note during '42. Had the STAVKA resorted to a fighting retreat from the start, rather than a blind offensive who's to say if the Germans would've reached the Caucasus, or even Stalingrad? Of course, there would've been losses and air superiority would've taken its toll on the Soviets, but there is nothing quite as destructive as an encirclement, because when done correctly, there is, quite simply, nothing left.

[What were the highlights for each nation?]

Being a russophile my picks for the Soviet Union would be:<UL TYPE=SQUARE><LI>High Point: Vistula-Oder - I pick this operation over the Belorussian operations, because of a few things. One, The entire operation began from three bridgeheads during winter, and it was started prematurely to complicate German planning during the Ardennes offensive. Two, the Soviet were no longer on Soviet territory, thus they no longer had the benefit of partisan intelligence. Due to excellent maskirovka the German defenses were quickly penetrated to operational depths, and excellent ongoing razvedka insured no surprises from German reserve counterattacks.

<LI>Low Point(other than Winter War): Kharkov '42 - What a waste of armor, and men. Stalin was still obsessed with attacking and overriding his generals' advise. And it could have been avoided really.

[How many different subsets of troops should Cm2 have ?]

Soviet Guards!

And, yes, Guards troops should be better than the average Soviet caliber of the time. Oh, and Soviets should improve with time on average. A good possible progression would be:<UL TYPE=SQUARE><LI>1941-1942: Green

<LI>1943: Regular

<LI>1944-45: Veteran

[Just came across at (voodooextreme) an interview with Charles M at SimHQ dealing CM2]

Really cool to see that BTS are including a wide array of nations in CM2. WTG BTS!

and those models of Soviet Red Steel are awesome

[45mm Penetration of Panther at Kursk]

Interesting info. Does the German data/records imply that PzVs had little impact at Kursk? I'm finding this confusing ... were heavy tank references mainly PzVIs?

[Soviet Artillery in CM2]

I don't mind so much if all these penalties get placed on Soviet forces, just so long as none of them are still in place by 1944. By this time, the Soviets were very effective, especially in the exploitation phase with their own version of the Kampfgruppe, the forward detachment. This military unit was very flexible and combat capable, commanded by experienced and skilled commanders. It usually contained a little bit of everything, armor, infantry, SP arty, arty, antitank, engineers, and antiair. These are the guys that would risk driving in ravines, rather than risk detection on the open road. For them, the order of the day was go deep and wreak havoc, and they knew what they were doing.