Sheck

Schoerner, I think you are talking about something like the scale from Panzer Leader or Panzer Blitz by Avalon Hill. They use a hex system with the smallest unit being a btl. In your case, you could scale the hexes appropriately. I have seen freeware on the web which creates this type of hex system. Forgot where though...I would look up board wargames and PBEM board wargames. Maybe start with ASL links pages? Regards, Sheck2

The Natziger OOB series is excellent (not offered by BTS now). Additionally the Sharp Soviet OOB Series is the best source of comprehensive OOB/TOEs about the Soviets out now. It is also published via Natziger. The books BTS are offering are more about tactics than OOBs/TOEs. They are good for that type od information. Jentz' stuff is of a different flavor than these. It is a mix of technicals, OOBs/TOEs, first hand, historicals, etc. It really comes down to what you are looking for rather than which is better. BTW - have all of these - so I am not bias one way or the other. Sheck2

Michael, I looked through my books...this makes sense now as GD was still classified as an 'Infantry Regiment/Division' in 1940/1941. The Reconnaissance Btl. for an ID has its first company as a Mounted (cavalry) Squadron (company). Since the GD was special and equipped itself with AC.s vs. horses - it would have utilized the proper symbols but modified to describe what it had done. By 1942, I think, GD had gone over to the 'Krad.' Btl. organization and all equipment bore those symbols. Regards, Stefan

Michael, Where did you get this tactical symbol from (the one indicating a Motorized Reconaissance unit on your website - "The 1st Company of a fully motorized reconnaissance unit would have used this symbol; the A stands for "aufklärungs", or reconnaissance.")? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- From Michael Dorosh: From my GD site - the symbol on the 222 armoured car is period and correct. This is the symbol for a Motorized Reconaissance unit. The "1" (it has been mirrored in the photo) represents Number One company of a reconaissance battalion. The "A" stands for aufklaerungs (German for "reconaissance"). -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The symbol would indicate its a motorized cavalry platoon from a reconnaissance formation OR a motorized military police platoon in a reconnaissance formation not a motorized reconnaisance company. A symbol for a motorized reconnaissance platoon would be lack the diagonal line - that is indicative of cavalry Or the Feldgerarmarie (miltary police). A company has thick bar on the left. This is true for both the pre-May 9143 and post-May 1943 German Tactical Symbols. Thanks. Regards, Stefan

JasonC, Actually we have seen a different situation in CMMC1. Force preservation is important, but most players have a tendency to sustain high losses. Some of the reasons (in no particular order) are: * Desire to win. Few players like to withdrawal to preserve forces as many will think they can 'win' and continue to fight until it is painfully obvious their best resolution is a limited draw. * Tendency to hold whatever ground they occupy regardless of the operational benefits. In simple terms, similar to previous reason, most player hate to withdrawal. * Its easy to fight...virtual soldiers feel no pain and have limited morale. The result is that casaulties tend to be high because it is just a game without real consequences. * In a similar vain - it is a game. So many players do NOT want ot play if they have to subscribe to more realistic actions i.e. typically taking 10% casualties was considered high and was NOT the norm. All of us know of situations with sigifigantly higher casaulties, but these were uncommon. So everyone 'considers' their fight - one of those situaitons. * Lack of casualty implications - we had these and people freaked out for reasons above. They also beleived the GMs should not intervene (this has merit). So most casaulty restrictions and penalites were removed. Interestingly, game behavior dominated historical or realistic behavior. Sheck

JasonC - I stand corrected. What I wrote were not additional formations but additions to what you had already described. Tough crowd with Fallsch. abbrev. Proper and used abbrev. is FJ but have had people confused by this.... So used longer abbrev.

Aside from JasonC's cooments - here is some additional formations you'll find Fallsch. armor.: In Normandy: II.Fallsch.Korps. - 12.Fallsch.StuG.Brig. (Independent assault artillery btl. / abt. were often named brigades when they were actually just btl.) was orginally StuG.Abt.2 der Luftwaffe. other: I.Fallsch.Korps. - 11.Fallsch.StuG.Brig. was orginally StuG.Abt.1 der Luftwaffe. Fallsch.StuG.Brig.21 formed 19.1.45 from Fallsch.StuG.Brig.Schmitz and was with the 1.Fallsch.Armee The Fallsch. Div.s were organized to be infantry and airmobile (no duhhh...), consequenlty no organic armor. However their corps and armee formations did have armor. And they sometimes operated with independent Heer armor units in support (these were typically korps or higher level armor formations). Note - typically each Korps had a Aufkl.Abt. attached to it also (which was gepanzt or mechanized).

JasonC, Very good explanation/response about MG42 LMG firepower. Had not considered that. Stefan

1. How often were the 75mm and 105mm recoilless rifles used to replace the 120mm mortars in the regimental mortar company? Would these be best applied as 75mm or 105mm arty spotters or "on-table?" A – Theoretically, all 75mm & 105mm batteries in a Fallsch.Div. should be the LG1rh. 75mm recoilless) or LG2kp. (105mm recoilless). Given their weight advantage (LG1Rh. Weighs ~2800 lbs. less than FH38; ~1300 lbs. less than Geb.G36 & LG2kp. Weighs ~3500 lbs. less than le.FH18 and ~2800 lbs. less than Geb.H40). However – production never meet these goals and the Fallsch. Role became more of leg infantry. Consequently, there was not a pressing need for recoilless. And most Fallsch. formations were equipped with standard light artillery. In either case, they would be employed as off-board artillery. 2. How were the regimental engineer and recce platoons organized? A – unknown. However, since the div. engineering formation was organized similarly to an infantry engineering formation. I would think it would be a standard engineering platoon. 3. How was the divisional reconnaissance company organized? Was it typically employed in direct combat (as was the case in many Panzer formations) or only in extreme circumstances (more like infantry divisional recon)? A – As far as I can tell, there is not a Div.Aufkl.Kp. in a Fallsch. Division. Many other types of divisions had a Div.Begleit.Kp. (Divisional Escort Companies which usually consisted of a ‘reconnaissance platoon’ (an infantry platoon), a AT platoon (with 2 or 3 AT guns), and a AA platoon (a battery of 2-4 light flak guns)). Occasionally division’s which lacked a escort company would ‘create’ a ‘escort company from its component btls. If it existed, it would be serve as the ‘guard’ unit for the division and would typically be guarding divisional HQ not being used in the field. 4. Same as above, except for the divisional engineer battalion. A – There was not a great variance in how engineering btls. were organized. However, there was a huge difference in how they were equipped e.g. a parachute engineering btl. would not have the heavy equipment a normal infantry would have (such as tractors, heavy movers, etc.). It would not have the bridging company a tank division would have… 5. CM allows purchase of several armored or lightly armored vehicles in the FJ menu; where were the Sdkfz 250/1 and 251/1s and StuG IIIG and IVs employed? Other than one reference to a "parachute gun brigade," which seems to have been employed in II Parachute Corps in Normandy (parent formation of 3rd Fallshirmjäger Division at the time), no idea where these would have been. A – There were no organic SPW or Stu. units assigned to any Fallsch. Div. Except to the Herman Goering (HG) divisions. However, each Fallsch. Corps had a Aufkl.Btl. (which had gep. companies e.g. no ACs but had SPWs) and a Stu.Btl. ****** Now on to your initial query of whether the CM Fallsch. OOB/TOE is accurate or how accurate? Here are some points that provide depth to the discussion…Note this is not to criticize BTS. They made a game and had to make decisions based on technical characteristics and playability. And I think they have done a good job. This harkens back to a problem that is inherent in all German Cm squad units – the LMG. The Germans used the MG42 as both an LMG and as a HMG. The ONLY differences between the MG 42 being a light or heavy MG was whether it was bipod mounted (LMG) or tripod/fixed mounted (HMG and AAMG). All types of MGs had the same fire rate, used the same ammo, etc. The HMG / AAMG had better stability providing accurate fire at greater ranges, greater firing arcs (the tripod or fixed mount allowed a gunner to easily move the barrel across a greater arc – the HMG did NOT have an inherently greater arc), and typically greater ammunition loads. So why in CM is the LMG represented with a firepower of 50/45/30/18/- (ranges 40m/100m/250m/500m/1000m)? While the HMG is represented with a firepower of 155/125/77/52/27 (I will ONLY use ranges 40m and 100m from now on for the discussion…)? The HMG is 300% more powerful than the exact same weapon called an LMG… The HMG ‘unit’ is 6 men. So maybe the other 5 men are armed with additional weapons that have not been represented in CM? A K98 has 6/5, a MP40 SMG has 36/9, and a MP44 has 34/12. Typically a separate heavy MG section had 5-6 men with 1 gunner, 2 assistant gunners (one feeding ammo and the other preparing more ammo or acting as a rifleman), and 2-3 riflemen. So if the other men were armed with rifles the firepower would be 50 (MG), 8 (pistol), 24 (4 x rifles) = 82 NOT 155. This is academic because we could play around with the numbers / weapons to come up with some combo. The problem is that an HMG unit in CM is only represented as having a single MG, which is inaccurate. The LMG should have the same firepower as the HMG just less range and less ammo. IMO it should not be included in the infantry squad. The Brits had a Bren and the Americans have a BAR both of which are like a modern day SAW (Squad Automatic Weapon – essentially a scaled down MG or an upgraded assault rifle depending on how you look at it). How were LMGs used? They were used like HMGs just could advance with a squad i.e. LMG provides covering fire as squad advances and then is brought up rather than currently moving with squad…So, IMO, a German rifle squad should be represented by 8-10 men without an LMG and have a separate MG attached to them. The LMG should have the same firepower as an HMG but less range and ammunition. Additionally, the concept of having 2 LMGs is also problematic. The whole 2 LMGs concept comes from PzGr. Squads, who had 2 LMGs. But this is typically represented incorrectly. The first PzGr squads were motorized infantry upgrades from Light Infantry units who had a greater percentage of MGs than line infantry (this was not official, but they tended to be better equipped…). Then PzGr.gp. were formed for the Pz.Div.s where the 2 LMGs per squad became standard. But what most people forget is that the second LMG was designed to be mounted on the SPW i.e. SPW 251s have a forward fixed mounted MG (MG42) and many have a AA mount in the back where another MG42 can be mounted. This mount allows rapid attachment/detachment – so the MG42 could be taken with the squad. Thus a PzGr.gp. squad has 1 fixed MG42 on the SPW, 1 semi-fixed MG42 on the SPW, and 1 bipod MG42 with the squad. In all cases, it still would be used as an MG not a SAW. The PzGr.gp. TOE was used by the PzGr.mot. units beefing up their firepower. There was a lack of equipment in general. So often a PzGr. Platoon would have each squad equipped with (accompanied by IMO) an MG42 and any extra MG42s, which was not too often, would be deployed with the platoon HQ. So a PzGr. Platoon would have 4 MG42s – 1 accompanying each squad and 1 accompanying the Platoon HQ. Now in regard to Fallsch. They had/have FG42s. the first assault rifle. Due to its high rate of fire could be used as a SAW if drum or belt feed and bipod mounted. So it could be an LMG and could represent the LMG in CM i.e. it would have more firepower than the MP40, MP44, etc. but much less than MG42. The LMG in CM corresponds to this. Thus the LMG representation in CM for Fallsch. Squads is realistic if the LMG is considered a FG42 not an MG42. However, having two of them per squad is also problematic. Like the MG42s, FG42s were in short supply (there were plenty but not enough to fully stock out every TOE). So typically each squad was deployed with one and the platoon HQ was equipped with one making 4 FG42s per platoon rather than 6 per platoon. And as resupply and equipment be worse the FG42s would be replaced by MG42s. Also the platoon HQ FG42 could be an MG42 providing the platoon with a dedicated MG rather than a SAW. The Fallsch. comapnies did have their own organic m.Gr.W. platoons (assuming the equipent was supplied) - so having a 81mm spotter per company si OK. THE Psk per platoon is problematic to me. All AT weapons, regardless of type of division, branch of service, etc., were organized into separate platoons/sections that were typically under separate commands such as a heavy weapons company, heavy weapons platoon, regimental company ,etc. The basic reason for thsi was to allow multiple mission types such as being attached to a infantry platoon as AT support, being formed into individual AT hunter teams, etc. If the AT weapon is assigned to a platoon it is the platoon's and cannot be utilized most effectively by regiment or division, which tended to maintain command authority on heavy or support weapons. So teh sole reason I can think of for including in teh Fallsch. OOB/TOE is that they were authorized to have so many more than other units, that the ywere very plentiful. If that was the case, why not decrease their point cost for fallsch. Psks? Rather than include them in teh OOB/TOE - it is inconsistent with the other OOBs/TOEs. Scott, most of this discussion is academic because actual field strength and equipment varied so much. An excellent source for ‘generic’ OOBs/TOEs from a platoon level to Army level is the Talonsoft Campaign Series (West Front, East Front II, etc…). They have done very good research into OOBs/TOEs. These are generic and provide a good basis if you cannot find any other specific sources. They do not do anything below the platoon level as Talonsoft uses their created units in the game to create a squad, etc. Also the Series provides a good indication of what type of vehicle or gun could be in the platoon / squad. Note – I recommend this as someone who has the Nafziger German & Russian Series, Stanton’s WW2 Order of battle (all US Army units in WW2), Mitcham’s Hitler’s Legions: German Order of Battle WW2, who has 12 of 15 volumes of Tessin’s Verbaende u. Truppen d. deutschen Wehrmacht u. Waffen-SS 1939-45, who has numerous German division histories where specific OOB/TOE and actual field strengths are indicated, the Handbook of German Military Forces, etc…So when I say the Talonsoft Series is a good source , it is from comparisons to these excellent references.

Scott, Here is teh TOE for the 6th Fallsch. Rgt.organized in Nov. 1943. Source is Fighting the Invasion edited by David Isby. Specific section written by Oblt. Heydte. 3 btl.s (I., II., III.) * I.: 1-4. (1-3. Parachute rifle)(4. Hvy weapons) * II.: 5-8. (5-7. Parachute rifle)(8. Hvy weapons) * III. 9-12. (9-11. Parachute rifle)(12. Hvy weapons) Rgt. ko.s: * 13. Mortar Ko. * 14. Pz.Jg. Ko. * 15. Pion. Ko. (originally just a platoon) * 16. Aufkl. Ko. (bicycle) (originally just a platoon) * 17. Flak. Ko. (added early summer '44) * 18. Transport Ko. * 19. Supply/Maintenance Ko. * 20. Ersatz. Ko. ** Ko. 13. and 17. were combined to form IV. Btl. (Heavy Btl.) * each Btl. had a signals platoon and supply platoon. - Heydte says each hvy wpns Ko. had 12 HMGs and 6 120mm mtr.s (in constrast to typical Heer of 6 HMGs and 4 s.Gr.W.). Noter typically this would be 6 HMGs, 6 m.Gr.W. (81mm), and 4 s.Gr.W. (120mm). - 13. Ko. was equipped with both 81mm and 120mm as substitutes for the 105mm Chemical Mortar (10cm Nebelwerfer 35) - 14. Ko. had 1 Pak.Zg. of 4 75mm At guns and 3 PzJg.Zg. (Panzerschrek) each with 6 Panzerschreks. It also had Pueppchen. Not sure if thsi was 'standard' for all Fallsch. but it could be another piece. Regards, Stefan

Scott, Here is information for the 2.Fallsch.Div., 3.Fallsch.Div., 5.Fallsch.Div., and 6.Fallsch.Div. It is from Normandy 1944 by Niklas Zetterling. These can be found on thsi website, which is copied directly from teh above book. http://w1.183.telia.com/~u18313395/normandy/gerob/gerob.html

Gents, This is why I rarely comment here because too often things are skewed. I did not write first person accounts are not good history or should not be read. I did point out that first person accounts typically contain inaccuracies and are bias (which is not necessarily a bad thing - just something to be aware of...). I would say that many 'commonly' read books (and where many, but not most, people seem to get their history from) are first person accounts which provide a skewed version of history. IMHO a well rounded approach is the best where 'dry facts' are read and first person accounts are also read. Too often people just read the mass printed stuff, which must sell 10,000s of copies and often is a 'dramatic' first person accounts. And yes, several of teh books listed are first person accounts - I left off some of teh russian authors/books because people would not recognize them or be able to get them. Also was trying to point out that there is a more history (better selection of material) out there than your local Border's or B&N can usually provide. I applaud Bump's desire for more books and IMHO provided a fairly good list for the EF.

"Are you saying that some or all of the first person accounts mentioned in other posts on this thread are based on third hand documentation?" Yes and No. I was saying that first person accounts are notoriously inaccurate. They are good accounts for feelings, expereinces, etc. but often have facts wrong or mixed together. Human memory is very subjective. Which also brings in that many first acccounts subliment details from other sources - so they are often not completely / solely a 'first person account.' You are correct - a first person account could be considered a primary source. However, most history is based on an account of facts most best persented by a non-bias source. First person accounts are incredibly bias, so they are usually lableled as first person accounts rather than a 'primary source.' Hence my differentiation between teh two.

Books about Eastern Front: * german battle tactics on russian front 1941-1945. Steven Newton * combat history of Sturmgeschuetz bridage 276. edited by heinz fleischer * with our backss to berlin. tony le tissier * in the firestorm of the last years of the war - II. ss panzerkorps...wilhelm tieke * the nazi war against the soviet partisans 1941-1945. matthew cooper * tragedy of tehfaithful - a history of II.ss panzerkorps...wilhem tiecke * decisivie battles of the Soviet army. progressive publishers - originally by vakim novikor * east front drama - 1944. r hinze * retreat from leningrad. army group north 1944/1945. steven newton * scorched earth. paul carrel * ostfront 1944. alex bucher * army group north. werner haupt * comrades to teh end - 4th ss pzgr reg. otto weidinger * hitler's last bastion. franz kurowski * campaign in russia. leon degrelle * gotterdammerung 1945. russ schneider * gebrigsjaeger im kaukaus. leipold stocker * decision in the ukraine summer 1943. george nipe, jr. teh german defeat in teh east 1944. sameul mitcham Many books people recommend are not terribly historical being first person accounts (notoriously inaccurate), based on third hand or worse documents, subjective accounts, etc. They are not based on primary documentation - most of the books above are based on primary documentation. If you wnat more titles - I can provide another 30 or so titles. Good publishers for 'better quality history' are Schiffer Military History and JJ Fedorowisc Publishing. regards, Stefan Sheckells

I am the Head German GM. Unfortunately the individual who was updating teh webpage was the same one who did such a great job with the Press Corps in CPX. Real life commitments has signifigantly reduced his ability to update both of these. Since everything we do is voluntary...often real life cuts CMMC time short... We are starting turn 4 which is 9 hours into the game (0600 to 1500 hours Aug 16, 1944). So far we have had about 30+ battles (PBEMs / TCPs...). Cannot give a sitrep without revealing too much FOW... All of teh battles will be available after CMMC is over - they are all based on actual terrain in the Elbeuf area, historical OOBs/TOEs, and from what most players have said - absolutely beautiful maps (and have a 'real' feel about versus the generated maps in QBs). Regards, Stefan

I believe what wrote is correct. I have read many first hand accounts by both unit commanders, senior commanders, and flag rank German officers discussing how destructive the Allied aircraft was. The problem is that the facts, actual German losses from Allied aircraft, do not match what many of these commanders/soldiers say. An example, is Kurt Meyer (I am going by memeory here so I do not remember the exact sources - I can look them up if anyone is interested), who 'claims' an attack by his 12th SS was broken up and had to abort due to losses from Allied air attacks. Yet when you look into the daily reports and casualties, they (the losses he claims) are not there. This was not uncommon. Many commanders wrote books based on memeories without unit records and sources to factual evidence. First hand accounts are very good, but one of their drawbacks is you are relying upon memories that are often jumbled - combat is completely choatic and no soldier 'sees' the whole picture. Consequnetly, first hand account have signifignat relevance but do have limitations. BTW: There has been discussion in literature about this very subject i.e. how veterans say one thing and then the 'facts' bear out something else, which is one of the problems with a lot of popular WW2 literature. They simply took what the veterans had to say without researching the actual events from both sides and put it out as 'the way it was.'

Conservative figures for the Falaise Pocket put the Germans at at least 30,000 vehicles e.g. they had the bulk of the 7.AOK + 5.Pz.AOK. + attached units + Heersgruppe 'B' units + all misc. vehicles that were in rear area commands all retreating. Some estimates put the number as high as 50,000. BTW: That is all vehicles. Yes, I used the higher end of the range / scale. Another consideration that has not been brought up is air observation. The greatest tactical bonus airpower brought to the battlefield, which exceeded 'breaking up' of a German attack was arial observation. The planes could radio back to HQ where the Germans were, especially armored units. This in turn brought the superior Allied artillery in play (superior in the sense of better fire control, more tubes, and a greater quantity of projectiles / shells). There were ground to air coordinators in th field, but in general they were not effective - so most information flowed from air units to air HQ, who in turn provided it to higher echelon ground commanders. Artillery could immobilze tanks, but most importantly, it stripped away their infantry support. Contrary to popular belief, most tank commanders did not to operate without infantry support (there are many cases where they did not, but if they could find a reason not to advance when they lacked infantry, they did - air attacks became a frequent 'excuse' not to proceed.) Air observation provides intelligence and intelligence allows you to focus resources, which wins battles. The Germans lacked that support and fought 'blindly'.

An excellent book discussing Allied Airpower and combat results is Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness by Niklas Zetterling. The main problem with drawing conclusions of effectiveness from Allied pilots or German first hand accounts is that they are both inaccurate. Allied pilots exaggerated their kills - a number of times their # of reported kills exceeded the number of German tanks operating in a given battle. In turn, many German accounts of Allied airpower exaggerated their destructive affect on their forces. When the actual kills are tabulated - Allied airpower killed between 5% to 7% of German AFVs. It was about double (10%-15%) for non-AFV combat vehicles i.e HTs, ACs, etc. For example, Allied airpower destroyed between 1100-1200 vehicles in the Falaise Pocket (the best opportunity during the war for airpower destructiveness of vehicles). This may seem large but this meant that Allied airpower, at best, destroyed around 3%-4% of vehicles in Falaise and that ONLY 3%-9% of sorties flown actually destroyed a vehicle. Note - claims by pilots were 5 to 10 times greater. In general when comparing actual kills (not claims), Allied airpower was not that destructive to vehicles. Allied airpower did: 1. Inhibit movement which prevented supply, mobilty, etc. 2. Destroyed transportation i.e. supplu columns. 3. Forced advancing Germans to seek cover and thereby delay or 'break up' an advance (in most cases, few casualties resulted, but the affect inhibited the attack). 4. Destroy transport trains, which was the primary method of transportation of the German forces in the West. All of this caused disruption but not the lethality airpower currently has in CM.

Working on: 1. 2 Historical Scenarios - The Royal Winnipeg Rifles' defense of Putut-en-Bessin vs. II./26th SS PzGr Reg./12th SS Pz Div-HJ. And then second scenario depicting counter-attack. 2. 2 to 3 Historical Scenarios - C C./Regina Rifles' epic defense of Norrey-en-Bessin vs. I./26th SS PzGr Reg./12th SS Pz Div-HJ. and two other scenarios (follow-up attacks by the I./26th and 3./I./12. SS Pz Reg.). 3. 1 Historical Ops - No. 46 British Commandos clearing the Mue valley (vs. elements of 12th SS Pz). 4. Two to three Semi-Historical Ops yet unnamed involving (1) American attacks / advances on & in Aachen and (2) German counter-attack to breach of West Wall and American northern pincer of Aachen. It is the German 48. Reg./12th Inf. Div. (Wild Buffaloes) vs. US 3rd Armored Div. * Historical means using 1/25,000 or less maps to create Cm map; all forces based on actual forces used so you must have accurate sources (emphasis on sources i.e. multiple sources); placement and timing of forces also corresponds to actual circumstances. * Semi-historical means having some of above info, but not enough to complete all - so I am speculating on some elements. Regards, Sheck

Created a new operation and would like some beta testers to evaluate it. Title: Commandos at la Mue Brief background: Historically operation of the No. 46 Royal Marine Commando clearing the Mue River Valley June 12th to 13th, 1944. The Germans are elements of the 12th SS Pz Div. Map, units, reinforcements, etc. are historical. The operation is 6 battles each 15 turns - primarily designed for human to human rather than human to AI. Any takers please e-mail me and I'll send you the ops. Regards, Sheck