Tero

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by CMplayer: Wait a sec here, according to what you were arguing earlier, the bocage ought to be good terrain to _attack_ in. Just sneak around behind the enemy and surround them, or something like that? You've got me all :confused: <hr></blockquote> Loud and clear. The method the US army deviced to bust the the bocage defences did not involve field artillery support in the tactical sense as such, only massive field artillery preparations. Sure, these artillery fire missions were directed at the proper target points but due to safety regulations there was a gap between the lifting of the barrage and the actual attack. The defences had to be taken out by infantry using direct fire weapons and supported by direct fire support assets. Which was inherently costly to the infantry before they got it right. And even then it was an infantry intensive affair, not an artillery intensive affair. Get me ? [ 12-19-2001: Message edited by: tero ]</p>

I do not question the figures, rather I question how you are interpreting them. You looked at a very narrow set of figures and made some very huge conclusions. The cut off is not the same as presented in the US history books. But there is a clear transition in the combat activities at that point in time. The set of figures is not narrow, it is a set that does not compliment the American (and Commonwealth) tactics and doctrine as much as the wide figure which counts in the casualty German figures up to the Falaise Gap. And my conclusions are not that huge: 1) Despite all their firepower suppremacy the Allied infantry still had to go in and occupy the terrain (which favoured the defender) and took proprotionally the same kind of casualties the Soviet infantry took in similar attacks (the Soviet divisions having minimal rear echelon contingent whereas the American divison had close to 40% non-combat personel in the roster.) Both the Soviet and the American divisions up to D+55 could sustain something like 90 % casualties in the combat element when conducting assault against static defensive positions in close terrain. 2) The Germans were able to get a 1:1 kill ratio during the Normandy battles when defending in static positions in close terrain which curtailed enemy movement. The ratio was better if the German figure includes POW's as the American are almost 100% KIA/WIA. 3) The situation got volatile when the Germans had expended all their assets in trying to prevent the situation from becoming volatile. The Allied free ranging CAS made daylight movement hazardous and tactical redepoyment to block the American forces streaming out of the bridgehead became virtually impossible. Apparently the Germans had not planned ahead for this contigency and that was the undoing of their forces in the area. The US losses in Normandy would have been much larger, perhaps by a factor of 2 or 3, without the heavy use of firepower. This is because the troops were largely green, had to storm beaches under heavy fire, and then were subjected to heavy defensive fire by (in many case) very experienced troops in terrain which was familiar to them using superior equipment. And superior small unit tactics ? Tactical reports of German counter attacks being totally broken up, with heavy losses, when the ground troops failed to stop them are abundant. So are tactical reports of Soviet attacks during the summer of 1944 against the Finnish defences being broken up by precision heavy arty barrages when they were being formed up so that the Finnish infantry did not have to fire a shot to stop them. I am not taking a piss. By this I want simply to convey I am not particularly impressed by these reports, nor am I not totally unaware of the importance of the correct timing and application of firepower in a tactically critical moment. I do admit I am reflecting much of the Normandy dynamics against the dynamics of the Soviet summer assault that was taking place against the Finns simultaneously. All the incredients are the same in both cases: heavy firepower advantage for the attacker, limited resources for the defender, defender having assets in other places than the actual point of assault and to be able to bring them up they would have to relocate, terrain favouring the defender but if the attacker got past a certain point the tactical situation would swing in favour of the attacker. IMO the differences are not fundamental enough for the examples to be too dissimilar to make them incompareable, when the events are examined from the tactical and doctrinal POV. This was not some standard attack/defend situation, but a very intense, large scale, assault of the most difficult nature. I agree, a seaborn invasion is the one form of attack in which there is absolutely no tolerance for errors. In short, I am surprised the US figures weren't higher even WITH the extra firepower. If the US forces had assaulted Normandy without the overwhelming firepower I am 10000% sure they would have been pushed back into the sea. Therefore, the use of firepower there did not only save US lives but it also was most likely the decisive factor. Agreed. But you are mixing the scales. In the startegic level the firepower was decisive and it did save US lives (mostly rear echelon). But, despite this firepower advantage, in the tactical level the combat echelon of the US divisions sustained as heavy casualties as any other army would have sustained , when they were engaged in a static front attrition combat. Once they could excert their inherently better mobility in mobile warfare friendly environment did the firepower/mobility advantage mix start paying dividents. The other disagreement with your broad, sweeping conclusions is that you only picked one small slice of the entire war in the West. These "sweeping conclusion" apply only to that small slice (static phase in Normandy). Perhaps even in isolated places like the Hürtgen forest and to a degree in the Ardennes. Why not look at the figures in other operations and see what they tell? Basing conclusions on just this one sample is in and of itself flawed. How can you draw conclusion about the validity of a tactical approach or a doctrine if you do not disseminate the operations aspects into different parts according to the differences in the circumstances ? The Normandy campaign had distinct phases of which the period up to D+55 was basically attack in close terrain and defence in static linear defences. After that the situation became volatile and the tactical situation altered. If we are to compare the phase up to D+55 to different Allied vs German operations then the correct operations would be other landings (in MTO), or similar operations involving attacking static linear defences, like in the Hürtgen Forest or the West Wall, not other operations in the ETO which are inherently dissimilar (the Allied forces are able to move freely to bypass the German defences). The reason why I compare the early phase of Normandy to the Soviet summer assault is because of the similarities in the tactial, doctrinal and strategic outlooks of the forces involved. Correct me if I am wrong here... but the Finns only got such successes against the Soviets, correct? And also correct me if I am wrong that the US forces in Normandy were fighting against Germans. And finally, also correct me if I am wrong that there are no examples of US forces fighting Soviet forces in WWII that can be used as direct comparison. You are correct. But the criteria you present does not apply when you compare the performance of different forces and their tactical and doctrinal approaches in similar/comparable tactical situations. If you feel more comfortable we can start comparing the actions in the US-German Hürtgen Forest actions againts assorted Fenno-Soviet winter actions. One of the reasons the early Normandy actions are IMO compareable to the Soviet summer assault is the scale in terms of the number of troops and other assets involved. Not to mention the implications and consequences if/when the defenders failed in their mission of stopping the enemy. Again, you seek to compare Apples to Oranges. Therefore, your arguments are flawed from the very ground up. You have to convince me comparing different armies facing similar tactical problems in comparable situations is comparing apples to oranges. As long as there is quantifiable data available on all the actions I see no reason why the actions could not be compared. Other than the criteria I use does not favour the US Army and present it in the best possible light. I cut off the data unorthodoxically against the conventions of the Anglo-American history writing. Does that make my conclusions wrong ? No, because I did not attempt to show that at all with the example I gave. You made a very large and sweeping conclusion that massed firepower to save lives was a failed doctrine. I am simply showing that you don't have not made any basis for such a theory on the scale you claim. How do you explain the turnover rates of the infantry divisions then ? Home leave rotation ? The data I have read over the years almost invariably show higher loss rates in the attacking units. The average US Army in ETO platoon had a 90% turnover rate. That is actually pretty bad. I would consider that normal for a Finnish platoon under attack by the Red Army having 10 guns per frontline kilometer. Or a Red Army platoon in attack. But for a platoon in an army which has bledged to trade firepower for casualties it is a tad much, even when that 90% is bound to include non-combat related medical cases (trench foot etc). Wrong. They were night and day different from the core outward. You can look at superficial similarities, such as you outlined, but they do not amount to anything substantive. You can not, repeat CAN NOT, compare Finn vs. Soviet to US vs. German in the way you did and expect me to take your arguments seriously. You have to be more specific that that. Which criteria make the comparison so impossible ? What would have to be substantive enough ? Good, we finally now have a clarification to your earlier thoughts. I still disagree with the degree you feel the Germans had control of the situation, but I do totally agree with you that belief in either überschool is not helpful. I do not feel the Germans were inferior or the Allies superior, in any way shape or form (doctrine, fighting qualities, etc.). However, it is clear that for the given circumstances the Allies won the war. Therefore, at some level (or various levels) the Allies outfought the Germans. And because the casualty ratios in the West were not very favorable to the Germans (overall) as they were in the East, it is probable that US/UK doctrine of emphasizing firepower over human assaults did in fact minimize friendly casualties while obtaining better end results. Actually I think the terminology of the Allied firepower doctrine (firepower for lives) was deviced to give the right impression to the troops and the folks back home much like the daylight bombing rethorics. Not at all. But taking a battle which Sun Tzu or Clausewitz cited in their works and directly comparing it to any WWII battle would be irrelevant. And that is what you continue to attempt to do. And that is to take statistical and superficial examinations of inherently and fundamentally different situations and draw direct comparisons from them without digging beneath even the crust of the surface. It seems you focus on the differences and I focus on the similarities. You deem the differences rule out the similarities while I think there are enough similarities to even out the differences sufficiently so a valid comparison can be made. Yes. Name me one major German counter attack against the Americans which had an operational level of success. The closest two that come to mind are Kasserine and the Ardennes. Both of which shared quite a lot of similarities, including the eventual destruction of the German attacking force and a higher loss of life and equipment for them vs. the US forces they sought to destroy. Anzio springs to mind. But since they lacked this strength, it was inevitable that they would lose. Which means you still have failed to show how the Germans had even a hope of winning against the Western Allies after failing to throw them back into the ocean within the first couple of days of fighting. In other words, your larger conclusions about German abilities to direct the outcome of the larger scale battle are based on nothing. Was their failure more to the strategic desicions and outlines made before the invasion (which affected the eventual disposition of the assets and curtailed their deployment when the attack came) or due to their inability to conduct operations against such odds with the assets they had available ? Show me one quote where I said anything to the contrary. Before you have implied these differences were alledged and unquantifiable. A whole host of factors made the Romanians different fighters from the Hungarians, the Hungarians different from the Finns, the Finns different from the Germans, etc. These factors are available in CM to utilize in order to see such differences (excepting the human's ability to override national tactical doctrine). The Western Allied preferred walking fire but due to running units not being able to fire on the move (even with SMG's in an effort to suppress the enemy) in CM the German bounding overwatch (using RUN/HIDE and UNHIDE for the overwatch element) will fail in the face of a similar force advancing towards it using Move command (simulating walking fire). Word has it the SMG will get emasculated in CMBB. However, to argue that national and sub national forces all fought the same is ludicrous. Just as ludicrous as it is to assign Finn troops a +2 modifier for fighting ability just because in your mind they were über. I have always argued, and will always argue, against your notion of inherent differences in the ability of a soldier from one nation vs. another. And I still find it curious a man of your level of knowledge still thinks any "inherent" non-mechanical and intangible (NOT unquantifiable mind you) superity has to do with the nationality more than the tactics and doctrine employed by the its army. Were the conquistadores inherently superior to the South American indians ? Or did they luck out because the indians had not seen a rider on a horse or a muzzle loading rifle or a cannon ? Were the blacks inferior to the Europeans ? Or were they beaten with superior technology and tactics ? Only once, at Isandwhana, did they prevail. Right after that one victory at Rourkes Drift they were beaten back because they failed to utilize their overwhelming superiority and attack from all sides at the same time. I would be called a racist if I was to imply that the failure at Rourkes Drift was due to inherently better quality of the Europeans as warriors. True to a large extent. However, the kind of superficial and flawed examination and comparisons you have made are not as simple as what you have just stated. You are attempting to use numbers, without any thought about what produced them, to form some sort of opinion about "best" and "superior". This is so flawed that it is actually quite difficult to argue against rationally. For example, it is very hard to argue against someone who things ghosts and monsters are real, yet continue to show faked pictures, stories which can't be proven, and generally poor scientific approaches to examination of evidence. I am trying to determine what produced the approx. 100 000 US and the 100 000 German casualties by a certain point in time just before the tactical situation changed and the nature of the combat operations altered and reconcile that with the US "firepower instead of casualties" mantra. What happened to the US and the German casualties after that date ? I'll hazard a guess: the US casualty rates started dropping and the German casualty rates started increasing. I am not denying the total casualty figures for the entire operation or what caused them. But when the operation is being examined from the tactical/doctrinal POV there is no reason to assume the daily casulties were constant for the duration of the operation. If there was fluctuation then there must have been periods when the casualties ran high and periods when they ran low. If the Allied casualties ran high when the Allies were bottled up in Normandy and they eased up after the break out then there must be a reason for this. If the German casualties ran high when the Allies were bottled up in Normandy and they eased up (or started increasing) after the break out then there must be a reason for this too. It is quite intriquing to find that only recently has there surfaced any concrete numbers about the Allied casualties at various stages of the combat actions and operations. Up to that it was always total numbers with the emphasis on the severity of the German losses. Which BTW I am not denying. But you are suggesting that the figures I mentioned are faked, unproven or poorly researched and it was the ghosts of the dead Germans soldiers and a few unfortunate incidents of firendly fire that caused the US casualties then I suggest you contact the US sources and request these faked bits of data and all traces of them be stricken from the annals of WWII and the total figures of the operation in guestion be enforced forthwith. Totally disagree. Someone who is tied up against a barn wall and gets shot at, without being hit, is not in a position to influence the ultimate outcome. The guy might be lucky, have fast reflexes, and good dodging instincts, but he does not have the initiative to influence the situation beyond that. So on balance, the guy with the gun has the initiative. Whether he has the ability, or even means (for example, ample ammo), to be victorious is a totally seperate issue. Are you assuming the guy was tied up against a barn involuntarily ? If he actively chose to be tied up there then I think he had it coming. Initiative, in the military sense, is having a superior ability to influence the eventual outcome to a desirable conclusion. No. Superior ability is a bonus but not a prequisite. If one side can constantly win small scale battles, but always winds up losing the operations and eventually the whole war... on balance who had the greater degree of initiative? I'd say the losing side took a bite they could not swallow. They retained the initiative but the enemy could take the casualties and did not mind losing the insignificant ones. I think Pyrrhos did not lose initiative at any point, he just lost his army and with it the war. Having Tactical initiative makes for great über stories after the war. However, if those stories are told while the "losers" are running the country under occupation or simply that the local cemetaries are filled with those who died for a lost cause, what does it matter if some platoon constantly racked up impressive tank kills? Dunno. Depends what was being fought over. Winter War was a Finnish victory no matter what the Soviets claim. The diplomatic end result was what the Finns were after: Finland remained independent. The enemy was stopped with massive casualties. Vietnam war was US loss because the diplomatic end result was what the Vietnamese wanted even when the US units racked up impressive kill tallies and inflicted massive casualties to the enemy. Put another way... if you had a choice to have Tactical, Operational, or Strategic initiative... which would you choose? Depends what I am going after.

Originally posted by Sergei: But should there be more accurate weather modeling in general? AFAIK, right know it's pretty random, while in reality it usually rains and is muddy in autumn, and that kinda things. Agreed. When you now pick random weather for January 45 you are liable to get wet/rain instead of snow.

Originally posted by YankeeDog: As I understand your suggestion, you are saying that the random distribution of dawn/day/dusk/night should be skewed one direction or another depending on latitude. In essense, yes. So we do not need an additional category for 'northern summer night' (I assume the new dawn or dusk settings would suffice to simulate this), but rather just an adjustment of random values to account for the fact that, in June at 60 degrees north latitude, you have something like 14 hours of "day", 3 hours each of dawn and dusk, and only 4 hours of real night?? The opposite, of course, would be true in the winter. Actually daylight in the winter lasts from approx. 09.00hrs until 15.00hrs in the dead of winter. The farther North you go the less light you get. In the summer the light lasts for approx 20-22hrs, the sun does not really set at all, it just dips behind the horizon for a few moments. Up North the sun does not set at all. This is also a worthwhile note for scenario designers, especially for operations - I doubt there were many night battles in the North in June!! You'd be surprised. Incidentally, I wonder what the difference is between the new dawn and dusk settings. Or did I misread, and there is just one setting for dawn/dusk? except for direction of the light (as mentioned above), I see little difference between the two. Being blinded by the sun glaring at you from the horizon is not modelled so the direction from which the light is coming from is irrelevant.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Porajkl: Now we're a becoming too big nitpickers (spelling bad), aren't we? Average battle is 30 minutes and AFAIK if it begins in the dawn, whole battle will be in the dawn. Don't you think it would be a little too demanding that in the 1st minute of the battle is darker than in 28th? Or maybe we could also try to persuade BTS that they could somehow put up with an equation which will realistically take in effect bouncing of light from vehicles (so my panther which has sun behind his back, will kill your t34, who is looking toard the sun and is therefore more blinded. And also my position is better, because the sun reflects from your glacis and I can spot you earlier! And of course, since every minute sun changes position, BTS should take that in consideration ) But seriously, don't we all want CMBB to be finished in year 2002? [ 12-17-2001: Message edited by: Porajkl ]<hr></blockquote> I know, I know. But when you assign random climatic values for a winter and summer battles in the North and you draw good/decent visibility dawn at 06.30 for the winter days or pitch black for the summer nights then some of the nuances of the climatic conditions will not just feel right. We both know that you can read the news paper outside at 02.00 (or later) hrs in the night in the summer and that you can not read a news paper outside at 15.00 (or earlier) hrs in the winter. Then again the presence or absence of snow affects visibility in the dark..... Just a though......

I know, they are in. The question is: will the lighter summer nights of the North (midnight sun) be modelled realistically and thus be different from the darker summer nights of the South ? By the same token: will the Northern winter days be shorter (dawn and dusk periods longer) than they are in the South ? [ 12-17-2001: Message edited by: tero ]</p>

Originally posted by Big Time Software: Well, if you play with the numbers like you did... sure Official US figures. The party line is "firepower to conserve troops" but the US infantry divisions which were in the initial landing contingent had a huge turnover rate (between 95,1% and 252,3%). Those which arrived at the front after October had a markedly lower turnover rates. But they do not cancel each other out. All these casualties were in the group that represented 14% of the overseas manpower. The actual fighting men represented 68% of the infantry divisions manpower but took 95% of the casualties. These figures do raise my eyebrows a fraction, when the firepower axiom is taken into account. How much worse would the infantry casualties have been when the "reduced" casualties were this severe ? How was it calculated the firepower saved lives ? But look at other operations other than the first, and least favorable from the attacker's standpoint, and I think the record is clear that the US/UK strategy of applying firepower to reduce casualties did in fact work. For example, the 12th SS Panzer Division during the Bulge practically ceased to exist as a fighting formation when it ran up against a tiny US blocking force. US casualties were tiny, yet the attacker's were crippling. How did this happen? Massive and overwhelming use of artillery, good use of defending terrain, and carefull coordination between the various friendly forces involved. ÜberFinns were able to pull that off with (or without) decent arty cover in numerous engagements. Does your example prove the US doctrine worked when they were the attackers and the Germans were entrenched in good defensive terrain like the bogace ? Apples to oranges. The US did not face the Soviets, nor did the Finns face the Germans. You are therefore comparing one Doctrine A vs. Doctrine B to Doctrine C vs. Doctrine D. Direct comparisions are therefore utterly impossible to draw. Actually more like a comparison between Granny Smiths and Red Delicious. The problems the respective forces faced were essentially the same. The approach the Soviets and the Western Allies took pretty much the same with emphasis on slightly different aspects but still within the parameters. The only real difference could be said to be the fact the Soviets were not as timid in their use of infantry as the Western Allies were. The Germans and the Finnish approaches were distinctly different but not incomparable IMO since the differences were brough on by different strategic and doctrinal outlooks and goals. while you are the one who is saying that the Germans basically always had things go just the way they wanted them to (at least in the West). If they had had things go their way Eisenhower would have had to send the other message he drafted. This is actually a misunderstanding brought on by the common misconception that I lean towards the überGerman school of thought when in fact I refuse to buy the teachings of the überAllied school of thought line, hook and sinker. I see now initiative was a very poor choise of terms. When I picked it I was thinking about the way the Germans were able to counter the Allied moves by holding on to the defensive positions and slowing down their advance. Or by disrupting the attacks. I do readily admit is my axiom is works only as far as D+55 when the Germans ran out of means to counter the Allied firepower superiority in terms the they had chosen to take and which they could implement. And since I was only talking about the battles in the West, your examples are totally irrelevant. I take it you would not object to me citing Sun Tsu or Clausewits and their principles and deem them irrelevant. The fact is that German counter attacks in the West did very little to influence Operational conditions in their favor. In fact, they more often than not resulted in the exact opposite. And from the Strategic point of view, they failed miserably. Not just in France and Belgium, but also in North Africa and Italy as well. Against the Americans ? True, but they also couldn't afford to stand up to a battle of attrition. At that point in time, no. So I say once again, how can you possibly argue that the Germans had a viable choice to make and that they in fact held the initiative? The only real choice they had (a fighting retreat across France to shorter frontlines and supply routes) was not a choice at all in their opinion. And as long as they had the Allies bottled up they had options (limited number of them but still) open for them. As long as they had strenght to counter attack they could interfere with the Allied plans. BTW: please take a look at the Soviet Petsamo-Kirkenes operation and how the Germans acted against a force over 3 times their size. They most certainly did not have a viable solution, nor did they have the ability to decide which of the poor choices they would have to live with. They had to try and beat the Allies in a short battle of attrition, even though the odds were long. They failed to do this and so ended their only chance for even a stalemate in the West. Agreed. Mind you that Finland was a minor blip on the Soviet strategic radar both during the Winter War and during the War of Continuation. Not really. The defence of Leningrad was a prime concern for them and since the Finnish border ran so close to the city limits they did not have space to trade for time in the NW. Finland may have been a minor blip but it was right smack in the middle of their screen. This meant that all Finland had to do was put up a good enough fight and make victory "not worth the effort" for the Soviets. True. The army was tasked to hold out as long as possible so that a diplomatic settlement could be reached. But that does not mean that the Finnish experiences and dotrinal choises were any less irrelevant than those made by the other, bigger, armies. In 1944 they had far bigger fish to fry in Central and Eastern Europe. Finland was very much a "let's see if we can take them out, otherwise we'll just quit and forget about it" situation for the Soviets. This was not the case on either the Western, Southern, or Eastern Fronts. The entire energy was focused on taking Germany out and occupying every inch of its soil. So one should expect to see differences in how the nations on these fronts fought. What !?! You admit openly there WERE differences in the performance of the different armies which are based on force specific approaches (tactics, doctrines and underlying political considerations) ? I'll be damned. While I very much admire and take great interest in Finland's military experiences, they simply can not be compared with the Western forces fighting the Germans in the way you have attempted to do. Might as well bring in examples from the Pacific Theater for all the similarities they shared. E=MC² is a constant. The problems different armies are basically the same: how to attack a fortified position, how to implement defensive positions, an invasion must be beaten at the beach and not to allowed to expand etc. Therefore the image of German tactical units doing as they pleased to the frustration of Allied forces, as a rule, is something I find unsuportable. Doing as they please does not equal being able to retain initiative. Even such a desperate choice as where to direct the counter attack is a way to show you are responding to the enemy moves but not according to the enemy plan. Even such a doctrine as keeping the MLR at all costs is an act of showing you have initiative, as long as you can hold on to the MLR and make the enemy attack over the same terrain (and over his own fallen) over and over again. Holding the MLR at the end of the battle whenever possible by immediate counterattacks, turning a retreat in the face of a superior enemy into an encirclement and preferring fading away when encirceled and making for the friendly lines instead of surrendering enmasse were all überFinnish practises in the face of overwhelming odds in every department you care to mention. [ 12-17-2001: Message edited by: tero ]</p>

BTS: Please fix or somefink

Originally posted by Big Time Software: Do you mean to tell me that the Germans decided to lose 6th German, 8th Italian, 4th Romanian, 2nd Hungarian Armies on purpose during the Stalingrad battle? Deliberately ? No. And yes. Hitler did deny breaking out or later surrender so they would tie up the Soviet forces that much longer. So Hitler did write them off before they got erased. Or was it that they screwed up royally and the Soviets did a very good job of capitalizing on this despite the wishes of Hitler and the rest of the Axis forces? The actions they took to rescue the forces encirceled in Stalingrad point towards either explanations, depending on your preferences. What I actually meant by my remark is that when the two forces engaged plan for actions in the same space chances are the plans you draw may work fine. Or not, depending what the opponent has planned. Take the Soviet assault in Kharkov. The plan itself was viable. Only, the Germans refused to play ball and their planed simultaneous action worked better because Stalin refused to deviate from his plan one inch while the Germans adapted their plan to suit the situation. The Soviet plan in and around Stalingrad worked fine because the Germans got greedy, deviated from the original plan and when all went to hell refused to face facts and take immediate action to salvage the situation. Quite untrue, as the facts clearly show. If the attacker wishes to attrit the other, and has the means to do it, then the defender has really only two options - get smashed ("play ball") or withdraw ("refuse to play ball"). Refuse to play ball 2: weather out the storm and outlast you. Drive towards Moscow, Kursk, Normandy, Winter War Refuse to play ball 3: turn the attrition battle into manouver battle thus denying the initial advantage of superior firepower through avoiding getting caught under it until your forces are sufficiently depleated or exhausted. Kharkov, Soviet assault on the Finns in the summer of 1944. Counter attacking by the defender isn't a viable option if the enemy is superior since it generally only makes a battle of attrition easier for the attacker. Or do you disagree with this? In the West it would seem to be true. The Germans counter attacked. The Americans supposedly used firepower to avoid casualties. Yet the amount of front line infantry casualties sustained by the Americans is surprisingly high, given their axiom of using firepower to save lives. 100 000 German casualties vs 100 000 American casualties before the break out (by June 30something IIRC). The US infantry division turnover figures are anything but indicative that the use of massive firepower prevented serious friendly casualties. They managed to get a 1:1 kill loss ratio and that was good enough as the Germans could not take a ratio like that for prolonged periods of time. But these figures do not indicate counterattacking was counterproductive in and of itself. The Germans just did not have the resources to sustain that kind of operations. Nor did they have the space they could trade for time as they knew that once out of the bag the better roads of France would work against them the same way the poor roads had worked against them in the East. The Finnish doctrine during the Winter War worked and it was based on counter attacking to hold the MLR. In 1944 the doctrine was somewhat modified but basically the same. It was costly (for a people of 3,5 million) but it worked to wear down the Soviet divisions. ~23 000 Finnish KIA vs ~130 000 Soviet KIA. In the summer of 1944 the Soviets admit losing 23 674 KIA/MIA and 72 701 WIA (Soviet era figures) while the Finnish casualties were ~15 000 KIA/MIA (unfortunately I do not have the number of WIA but it could be around 45 000). The Soviet forces steamed ahead for ~10 days and then spent the better part of a two months trying to grind their way through the Finnish defences, without success. So I would have to say I disagree on principle. Counterattacking is not counterproductive in a attrition type battle in and of itself without circumstantial provisos. Assuming there are only two choices (getting smashed or withdrawing), if the decision is to withdraw then how can one expect to hold a front line if one is always retreating everytime the enemy brings up decent sized forces? And if the decision is to remain put, then how can that side possibly win the war if it is outnumbered, out gunned, and generally out produced by a nation which is at least competent on the battlefield? And what if during the withdrawal the enemy seizes upon this and does some fancy maneuvering and hits the defending forces while they are in the process of redeploying? You are aware, aren't you, that withdrawing is considered the most difficult military maneuver to do under pressure? You also should be aware that an individual battle does not happen in a vacuum. So individual units can't just withdraw willy nilly simply because they are facing attrition. Sometimes, actually very often, they have to stick it out and suffer badly so that the front as a whole can be maintained. A little of this can be absorbed, but if the war drags on it adds up. A perfect example of this is Normandy. The Germans had the Allied pretty well bottled up at first. But their initial counter attacks failed to yield the desired results (i.e. pushing the Allies back into the sea) and so much of the subsequent fighting was attritional in nature. These battles weakened the existing German formations to a serious degree, while the Allied formations got stronger and stronger. For a while the Germans were able to withstand the onslaught of Allied power, but once again at the cost of huge amounts of men and equipment. This caused the German's mobile formations to be fully committed to holding the line, which greatly nullified their intended role. Then, after even more attrition, the German positions were simply too thinly and weakly held to withstand a serious Allied push. The Allies finally did this and got to do some maneuvering, destroying most of the German forces in the area (remains of 2 Armies) quite quickly, followed by a wild and fast paced drive across the rest of France. I totally depends on what kind of a plan you are working with. The Germans could not afford to retreat in front of the Allies so bottling up was the only thing they could do. Mind you, the Finnish army faces a similar situation during Winter War and it held on for 105 days. Bottling up the Soviet army was the only way to go about it and it was enough to convince the Soviets to go for a negotiated settlement. The situation was repeated in the summer of 1944 but this time around the Finnish army ended up being in a much better shape in terms of manpower and materiel than was the case during Winter War. So tell me... how was it that the Germans won these tactical battles (which clearly they lost operationally and strategically) by "not playing ball"? As long as they could keep the Allies bottled up they had a chance. And they could stand up the heat for ~55 days. During those 55 days they could partially negate the Allied advantages by denying them movement to open country. But once the jig was up they were up **** creek because they could not pull out in an orderly fashion. They had not planned for that because that was not an option for them. In my view their gravest mistake was feeding in reinforcements piece meal when the situation was clearly lost. Instead of trading space for time they traded time for enemy casualties (which the enemy could sustain). Leaving garrisons to defend the ports was a lost cause and a waste of resources as the Allies could picket them until such time they could take them or starve them out at leisure. One problem they faces of course was the fact that there was no suitable defensive terrain between the bogace and the border in the East and the Netherlands it the NE. The frontage was too wide and the natural barriers (rivers) too easily traversible. In my thinking if you force the enemy to retreat that is at least a partial victory, while every step backwards for the defender is potentially one step closer to ultimate defeat. If the defender manages to withdraw in one piece, dishing out huge losses to the attacker in the process, then perhaps it can stalemate the situation. But the chances of this happening against a larger and at least competent foe are slim to none. There are no example of German operational or strategic level withdrawals that I would call a success. Some were better than others, but all of them were costly and impacted future chances of victory to the point of not having any chance at all. Agreed. But I would say that is not because they could not execute such plans but because certain people in the top of the chain of command refused to even consider them as options. I'd say the Germans were damned no matter what in NW Europe. They couldn't win a war of attrition, nor were the circumstances favorable for them to withdraw slowly on their own terms. In other words, the day the Allies became impossible to dislodge from Normandy, it was only a matter of time before the entire German front collapsed and the Allies reached the Rein. I agree 100%. That is why I think they should have husbanded their reserves instead of sending them in to be butchered. They put all their eggs in one basket which was already gathering speed on its way down. It is quite funny actually how the Germans told the Finnish high command our defensive operation in 1944 was flawed and totally wrong (and it failed in their opinion, as told by Ehrfurt and Ziemke) and the only real way to stop a Soviet assault was a defecesive zone in depth, considering the success they had in stopping similar assaults with their doctrine. I guess I see what you are saying, and in theory or on a VERY small scale it makes some sense. But at the operational and strategic level you are 100% wrong. The attacker dictates how and where the battles are to be fought. The defender can influence this to some degree, but can not control it. I would not say the Soviet summer assault of the summer of 1944 was a VERY small scale affair (even if the terrain is not your typical Central European type): In the outset the Soviets had in the Istmus 260 000-280 000 men (Finnish estimates) men against 70 000 men. By mid July the Finnish army had ~500 000 men at arms against 451 500 Soviet troops (their own figure for the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation from When Titans Clashed) in two fronts, the Isthmus and North of lake Ladoga. The assault started with a barrage of 280 000 gun and mortar shells which (quite surprisingly ) pulverized the Finnish frontline defences.

Originally posted by Big Time Software: So why is it so hard to believe that the combination of the two is the best of both worlds, provided each is planned and executed with one set of conditions for success? Because none of the approaches, pure attrition, pure manouver or a combination of both, work if the opponent won't play ball and assume the position for getting shafted like he is supposed to ? Only when the opponent buys your agenda or thinks along the same lines you think (including admiration and proper awe towards your assets) will there be any chance for any of it working like you plan. Attrition warfare missapplied: Winter War: attrited the enemy into submission but not according to plan, also friendly losses were way out of proportion to the gains and enemy casualties (Winter War did have a pure manouver aspect to it as well but that led to a total annihilation of the two attacking divisions along the Raate road, mostly due to poor planning). Dien Bien Phu (the French plan). [ 12-15-2001: Message edited by: tero ]</p>

Originally posted by Andreas: Cough cough - excuse me. You are excused. You better go to the doctors if that cough of yours gets any worse. I believe that this would be news to German staff officers who had to replace these guys. At the time, I am sure they were listed MIA, as everyone else. True. But that is not quite the issue here. Think of it in CM game terms. If we look at the combat performance cost effectiness if you will the German and the Allied casualties in terms of KIA and WIA being practically the same but the Allies expending more ordnance there are some questions that need answering. Like: Howcome, for all their firepower, do the Allies sustain similar casualties as their less lavishly endowed opponents ? Situation: a fortified hamlet has been by-passed by an Commonwealth force in the night. Come dawn, the Commonwealth force (say 250 men altogether) attacks the hamlet, which is held by infantry (say 250 men), with a combined arms attack. Tanks shoot the place up, artillery rains down on it, the infantry closes in. For the sake of the argument, let's assume that KIA/WIA are roughly similar (50 each). After an hour or so, 200 Germans surrender. Are these men combat casualties or not? Discuss In my view they are not combat casualties as such, they are strategic casualties. How long is the Allied advance delayed and how does it affect the events that follow ? Mind you, the Allied wounded will return to battle (except for the seriously wounded and maimed) within, say, one day to six months. The German wounded won't, no matter how lightly WIA they are. Also, the 200 still combat capable Allies move on to the next objective. How many actions before the Allied formation runs out of infantry (for all intents and purposes) and can not keep up the operations and as a result more than 20 000 German troops evade capture ? Also, did it ever occur instances when the German defenders evade in small groups and later rejoin their parent unit (I honestly don't know) ?

Originally posted by Andreas: tero, you seem to be concluding that the Germans outperformed the Allies in Normandy because of Allied squabbling. That is an interesting jump in logic. That is actually an idea you put into my head with your stories of mismanagent and poor relations between the Allied commanders at the most critical time when the Allies could have removed the last serious obstacle between themselves and the Rhine. The performance of the German formations along the lenght of the campaign is irrelevant and had nothing to do with it, the Allies shot themselves in the foot. Right ? An überFinn parallel: the Soviet assault in the summer of 1944 bears the same marks as the Normandy invasion. It started in the 10th of June (as per Stalins promise to Churchill and Roosevelt about a simultaneous operation to distract the Germans). What was done differently was the fact that instead of feeding in reinforcements into the breach piece meal the Finnish high command gathered a defensive force some distance (~100 km) behind the frontline and the troops on the spot fought a rear guar action in effort to slow down and attrit the Soviet hordes. The Soviets took in 10 days what had taken them 105 days to take during Winter War. What happened then was they slammed into the Finnish defensive positions in the place our high command had picked. The Soviet assault got stopped and it ground to a halt by mid July. The Soviets botched up the timing of a secondary attack to tie up Finnish reserves north of Lake Ladoga. I'll have to look up the stats so I can pick an Western Allied operation of the same order of maginitude. You initially asked for a single example of the Allies outfighting the Germans on the tactical level to a degree that they had to give up ground they did not want to give up. Instead of broadening the subject out as you do, thereby obscuring it, Actually, invoking the operational level is not my idea at all. Never mind that Phase II did not go as well. That is like saying "we won at half time, never mind the opponents scored a few more goals than we did during the second half". And this is exactly the kind of douple standard I abhor. Is it OK to disregard the less than excellent performance for the Allies but not OK to include better than average to poor performance for the Germans. 4.This one is a bit unfair in terms of tactical fighting, since the Germans really only folded because of the flooding. You may elect to drop this example. No reason to exclude it. Please note that the spectre of Bagration and/or the moustachioed one himself was not invoked in the making of this post. Duely noted. I look forward to your comments. I'll look up some places where the Germans faired a bit better than in your selection. Or can you cite some off the top of your head ?

Originally posted by Kallimakhos: Secondly we shouldn't assume that defender places all his forces on the MLR. IIRC the German defensive positions facing Goodwood were 15 km deep. All in all attacker really needs to get that ground and more importantly to keep it, so that they won't have to attack again, which would mean again more attrition to the attacker, or that they would have to do (oh no!) a manouverist flanking movement to avoid difficult terraine! As has been said, better ground means better odds in attrition, that's why taking ground is often important. An interesting comparison: the Allied casualties were almost 100% KIA and WIA while the German casualties were KIA, WIA and captured. The number of KIA and WIA for the Allies and for the Germans are almost the same in any engagement or operation. If the POW are disregarded and we look at the "pure" combat casualties we find the combat kill to loss ratio for the (atritionist ?) Allies is virtually the same (or worse) as for the (manouverist ?) Germans. What has brought up the Allied casualtie ratio is the huge numbers of captured Germans who are not combat casualties technically speaking. [ 12-14-2001: Message edited by: tero ]</p>

Originally posted by Andreas: Allied timetable: reach the Seine by D+90. Reality: Seine reached by D+66. I would argue the Germans did not handle themselves well on that one. The issue is not that simple and clear cut. If you care to take a look at the Allied plan and their projected advance on D+35 you will find that they were behind schedule. By D+35 they should have been past Avrances and as far as St Nazaire but they hade barely cleared Lessay. Avranches was cleared by July 31st (D+55 ?). Things developed more rapidly after that because the German left flank was blown wide open and the Americans could stream out to the open country side and the Germans could not hold such a long continuous frontline. The Falaise pocked had formed by August 13th (D+68 ?). German goal: delay allied advance across France by resistance behind water/terrain obstacles e.g. Somme. Reality: they did not manage to, except in the Vosges. Because they had expended all their reserves in trying to contain the Normandy beachhead. German goal: destroy Allied spearheads (Mortain, Nancy) Reality: both attempts by the Germans ended in utter defeat, and destruction of the German attacking force. Was the Mortain attack really intended to destroy the spearhead more than a first step to take Avrances and seal the invasion force off from the open ground ? I doubt that. AFAIK this only became the goal when the opportunity presented itself with the Mortain counter-offensive, i.e. relatively late in the war. The sudden collapse during the two weeks of August and September came as a total surprise, as can be seen by the airlanding operations that were planned and then cancelled because the ground forces had seized the dropzones. I think the operational goal was far more limited - establish a sustainable bridgehead on the continent, capture a large harbour, and undertake operations against Germany as are possible. The German flank blew wide open when Avranche was taken. If you take a look at the plan and compare it with the actual advance you can see that it was indeed an action brought on by the prevailing situation. BUT the Anglo-American history writing has compartmentalized the Normandy campaing all the way up to the Falaise pocket and its destruction, as if it was all planned that way. Now, if you are willing to accomadate changes in the Allied operational planning then I see no reason why the changing situation should not be allowed to affect the German planning and their execution. All the way up to D+55 the Allies were behind schedule. Then within a few weeks they managed to take up the lost time and then some. The initial plan did indeed call for a sustainable bridgehead. But when the change in the plan was made the operational objective was the destruction of the German forces. And they failed to adcheive that goal even if the losses the Germans sustained were very serious indeed. The Germans on the other hand had failed in their operational goals, but (arguably) only after 55 days of hard fighting.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by CMplayer: I agree. That comment was tongue in cheek. Thanks for the info though, I hadn't considered the craters hindering vehicles.<hr></blockquote> Consider this http://rhino.shef.ac.uk:3001/mr-home/hobbies/rocket.txt

A graduation for the 360º circle to facilitate the infantry in telling where the target is ? [ 12-14-2001: Message edited by: tero ]</p>

Allow some flexible thinking that you yourself can define or constraint these "parameters" at your option. It's perfectly valid, and provides a frame of reference to others on what your thinking is. Which you in turn debunk and/or exclude according to your frame of reference. Your basic assupmtion, based on your frame of reference, is "of course the Allies performed better" whereas my basic assuption, according to my frame of reference, is "there were instances when the Germans performed better and there were instances when the Allies performed better". I've never invoked "grand strategic things" when I regarded such to be inappropriate for a comparison discussion, or if the scale is improper. You yourself said there were things that affected the flow events. I posed (what I think is) a fair question about the relevance of the simultaneous events on the Eastern Front when OKW/OKH level decisions are being examined. Anglo-American history writing seldom forgets to mention the effect the landings had on the events in the Eastern Front (Kursk and beyond) but when there should be similar paralles drawn the other way around no correlation is not readily recognised and/or admitted. This is the point I'm leading you to; to see if you can allow for exceptions, or enough such exceptions exist as to nullify the presumption of a consistent German advantage in West Front military operations for 1944-45. You presume too much. My presumption is: there was no consistent ALLIED advantage in West Front military operations for 1944-45. Sure, I would say overall that the Germans performed better than the Allies at Falaise during the "escape" phase, given that many cadres escaped than should've likely been the case. Then again, that the Germans allowed themselves to get pocketed in the first place, and then strafed & bombed into a near-mob, could be a whole added issue to discuss. That is a what-if you excluded by ruling out Hitlers meddling. I think it would have been an interesting option if instead of sending the forces from Calais to get butchered in Normandy they would have been deployed along the Seine or other appropriate place and the the Normandy perimeter would have been abandoned and a fighting retreat had been conducted towards the new prepared defensive line. The lesson: If you are trying to make a case here one way or the other regarding this issue, it's best not to expect that one example alone will suffice. Andreas earlier reeled off an interesting set of examples that seem counter to your position, but that you haven't responded to. The boss and wife keep bugging me. Something about the work and kids and other such trivialities. He reeled out a number of examples and he rebutted my thesis. I'm gathering data so bear with me. As I noted earlier, you yourself are capable of answering these questions and including the same in your response, so to help put your answer in context. The focus I was seeking from you, however, was on the initial points above concerning "failure to meet operational goals" based on decisions by German commanders. At what level and in what scale ? The Normandy campaign was an Allied success culminating in the Falaise Pocket victory, right ? The operational goal was the annihilation of the German army in the West, righ ? The Germans avoided total annihilation due to Allied ineffective use of assets and personal beefs more than the German combat performance (ultimately ?), right ? At no point could the Germans counter the Allied superiority at any level or scale, right ? The fact that the Germans could escape and regroup would indicate the Allies failed to meet their operational goal. Ergo, the Allies failed partially in the Normandy campaing to meet the operational objectives set down by the Allies themselves. That makes me wonder if there were other instances when the Germans could outperform the Allies, if the scope and scale is appropriately set. No, I was talking about conduct & execution of operational plans with all other things being equal. Is the success or failure determined according to the Allied or German yardstick ? Also, is the only appropriate scale operational level ? If so, why ? Because at lower level I might have a case ? And I didn't rule out "supply status" for the Germans. Recall that I had added the term "ideallic conditions"? That is how I interpreted were it not for external circumstances (like interference from Hitler, lack of supplies, etc.)?

Originally posted by Spook: Now, tero, I posed the questions to you first. You did. But you did not define the parameters. But for your convenience, do not invoke the East Front as a side issue, or West Front overall strategy. You guys invoke these same grand strategic things all the time so why not me ? did the Germans on the West Front always perform more effectively, regardless of the strategic end results? I'm not just talking about Normandy here. Always ? It has been suggested the Falaise Gap was an Allied fiasko as much as it was an Allied victory in that it failed in its ultimate goal of trapping the Germans due to personal clashes and ineffective use of assets rather than due to fierce resistance by the Germans keeping the Gap open. Were the Germans more effective than the Allies in this case ? To help refine the question as to account for the historic German operational failures, was it a case, even in these, that the Germans always had the inherent potential advantage, were it not for external circumstances (like interference from Hitler, lack of supplies, etc.)? Essentially what it boils down to is the question: what were the reasons the Germans failed the goals they set for themselves ? Did they fail the goals they set for themselves ? By the same token: did the Allies reach their goals on schedule and the way they had planned ? Or were there actual operational cases in which either the German planning was not good enough even in ideallic conditions, or that Allied countermoves were just better? You must define what "just better" entails ? You ruled out supply status for the Germans. Do you count them in for the Allies ?

Originally posted by Spook: Truth speaking, tero, I'm having difficulty following your presently argued point. You are not alone. Are you saying that on an operational level, the Germans, when fighting the western allies, were consistently able to define the "tempo" of operations? Meaning that the Germans were almost always able to attack, defend, delay, or withdraw on the terms most favorable to them? In short: who had the initiative (locally) ? Lets reverse the question: how many times were the Germans forced to react without a chance or ability to counter the Allied move ? How many times could they foil the Allied timetable enought to be able to recover and counter attack and organize defences or a retreat ? Take note -- I'm not citing the old "the Allies won, the Germans lost" canard, so let's leave that aside. And let's not divert into comparing against relative successes & failures of the Allies. I'm game. Rather, the question remains in specific: on the grand-tactical or operational levels (divsion, corps, or army), were the Germans always able to maintain a sufficient advantage on the West Front? Depends what is "sufficient advantage". I would have to say no if the advantage means ability to fulfill strategic goals. But then again the question is loaded as it does not take into account operational goals. What were they at various times during 1944/45 ? In Normandy the goal was to foil the invasion. Except the grand strategy of Hitler was following was expecting the main invasion in the Pas de Calais and every operational move was geared to that goal. When that avenue proved to be a dead end it was too late to squash the beachhead in Normandy. So, what is the background we view the German performance in Normandy: the Allied operational goals or the German operational goals which did not coincide from the outset ? How did the German forces stationed in the Normandy area perform ? They were not able to fullfil the task they were given. But can it be said they prevented the Allies from completing their operational task ? How did the Allied timetable hold against the German forces in the Normandy area (which did not include the startegic reserves stationed at Pas de Calais because the operational outlook did not take into account the fact that Pas de Calais was not in the Allied plan) ? Later on the German goal was to perform a pull out from France while the Allied task was to utterly defeat the German army in the West. Were the Germans able to fulfill the goal ? Were the Allies ? How do the Eastern Front developments figure in in all this ? Are they relevant ?

Originally posted by Andreas: But since arguably all these discrete events are in reality affected by others, and in turn affect them, you have to look at the strategic level. If it were possible the best indicator would be to follow individual companies, battalions and regiments throughout the campaign. That way the strategic events and the tactical events and how they affect the flow events could be separated and examined. And quite unsurprisingly what I am conditioned to expect as that is the approach Finnish military history has been taking. But even so, in the majority of actions, viewed from a purely tactical perspective, following Normandy, the Germans were resoundingly defeated, either by maneuver, or by attrition. There are a few actions where they won, but they are not many. What is victory, actually ? If a unit is detailed to hold the position for a determined period of time and it manages that and after that the unit conducts a successful widrawal is the action a victory or a defeat for the defender ? IMO being able to fulfill a given task is one criteria when success is determined. Reality was that they had no such thing. The gap was help open because the Canadian 1st Army (in particular 3rd Infantry, 4th Armoured and 1st Polish Armoured) failed to close it, because of inability to control the battle. The Canadian blocking force was too weak in infantry to close the gap. The Germans swamped them with numbers at night, and got a lot of guys out. The only organised attempt was the attack on the Poles sitting on the Mace from outside the gap, but that was about all, and did not achieve its objective. Why then the version (floated also by Anglo-American sources) where the gap was held open by "gallant" efforts of the German troops at the bottle neck ? Again, they were soundly beaten by the time of the gap, on the tactical and operational level. What do you attribute the subsequent recovery to: Allied resupply problems and inability to continue offensive operations or active German efforts to shore up the troops ?

Originally posted by Andreas: They did not, and in particular situations their assets did not suffice to withstand an orchestrated, well-executed attack, so they had to go. Assuming the attacks were orchestrated and well-executed. You listed the Allied high water marks. What about the low water marks ? There are the operations when the Allied effort was botched up good even before the troops crossed the line of departure. And cases when the Allied effort was not enough to break the deadlock despite their superiority. This is where the operational and strategic links into the tactical. They were beaten at these places tactically, and all these tactical losses combined to become operational and strategic loss. Indeed. But which is the predominant trend in a multi-month operation: the drone of the operations that fail or the flashes when the operation succeeds ? They were outmaneuvered during the 'Swan' across northern France (otherwise Antwerp would never have fallen so easily), and they were beaten in very brutal battles of attrition in the Scheldt and the Rhineland, while they in their turn did beat the US in the Huertgenwald. Interestingly enough Hürtgen is one of the "forgotten ones" in the history of WWII. I wonder why..... and if there are others that have been overshadowed by the more illustrious victories and defeats.

Originally posted by CMplayer: Or am I just unbelievably stupid for believing the Germans were defeated and didn't just decide to sacrifice their armed forces in a giant fireworks show? You are not stupid. But how much did Hitler and his idiotic commands affect the flow of events ? He was willing (and eventually determined) to sacrifice the armed forces in a giant fireworks show. The Germans were defeated. But that is beside the point if you look at the events at the pure tactical level. The argument "the Germans lost the war, 'nuff said" does not carry very far. Yes, the lost the war. But that is irrelevant when things are being examined at this level. You simply can not take some aspects from one level and other aspects from another level and combine them without taking into account what you are combining. Yes, the strategic aspects played a part in the tactical level but where does one draw the limit ?

Originally posted by CMplayer: And if you are really smart you find the most heavily defended spot and carpetbomb it. That did not work too good. You had to use ground troops instead. Look it up.

Originally posted by Andreas: Or do you really want to tell us that the Germans withdrew voluntarily from all these places with no reason to do so? That is not my intention. The widrawals were not by no means voluntary. But were there cases when the widrawal was dictated by other reasons than tactical situation on that particular spot ? Were there cases when the Germans retreated despite still having enough assets to continue holding on to the positions after having done so for some time ?

Originally posted by CMplayer: I really don't understand your point. Anywhere that the Allies penetrated an important defensive line would be a case of combined arms tactics achieving a significant collapse, from the smalles t scale to the largest. It is a question of timeframe. Yes, the allies broke through the defences. But it was a process of erroding them with attrition, not taking the positions by storm. And it took months, not the 60mins in the CM timeframe. The Germans could contain the beachhead but not indefinitely. And they could not annihilate it. The Allies could not inflict casualties in proportion to the fire power used (bang for the buck). When the damn burst the Germans had to pull back to save what they can, even from sectors that could have held the positions against the attacks. Take the Falaise Cap. The Germans held the corridor open as long as they needed and could. Then, and only then did the defenders of the cap widraw. No matter what kind of a pressure the Allies excerted they could not close the cap = dislodge the defenders from their positions. [ 12-13-2001: Message edited by: tero ]</p>