Tero

Originally posted by CMplayer: My reasoning would go like this, and feel free to rip it apart. Premises: *Marching fire was not doctrine. *Marching fire was tried out anyway. *After being tried out it was implemented with increasing frequency (esp. in the 3'rd army). Conclusion: *Marching fire was regarded as effective by the commanders on location where it was being used. Perhaps. But not by all US Army commanding officers. And there were armies which never used it. And a lot of good it did to the Americans in the Hürtgen forest.

Originally posted by CMplayer: On a large scale, Normandy, El Alamein, hell the whole European theatre. You see, the Germans lost. SFW ? Stick to the subject and scale at hand. They were dislodged from Germany at the end to use the word a bit more loosely. That was a ripple effect. One position had to be abandoned and the rest had to abandoned even if the positions could have been held. El Alamein is a single battle, Normandy is referred to as campaign. The one time, single battle collapses are few and far between.

Originally posted by CMplayer: Well yes. But if the defenders are in a line, then someone has to make the initial penetration to even start rolling up the flanks. If you are smart you look for the undefended or lightly defended spot, not the most heavily defended spot.

Originally posted by CMplayer: Thx, and sorry for the multiple post response. So did you think the Lt. ? chose that course of action because he was suicidal after believing his girlfriend was killed in the ambush? I'll have to look the movie again to determine that. But why would he take his troops with him ? He might be indifferent but it is not plausible he would be willing to cause the death of his troops in such a manner. Because it seemed they had no problem sending the wounded back by boat, so couldn't they have tried that if nothing else worked? What kind of an ending would that be in a war movie inteded for international distribution, the heroes rowing into the sunset peacefully and without incident ?

Originally posted by CMplayer: ROTLRFLMFAOTMSB! And they often 'chose to withdraw' precise because of the quantity of brute force being applied to them. True. But not quite accurate. They widrew because the situation had altered: indeed avoid further casualties but also developments elsewhere etc. But pray tell where did the Allies actively dislodge the Germans from their positions with a single deliberate ground attack with infantry, armour, artillery and other assets before the Germans were willing to give up the positions. Thx, that made my lunch hour! Busted

Originally posted by CMplayer: Actually 'marching fire' was used to good effect in WWII as well, by the Americans at least. The "success" of it is debatable.

Originally posted by Sergei: the ambushed convoy thing however was imaginary. Although Soviet partisans did make attacks against Finnish supply lines and civilian villages later in the war, partisan units weren't yet formed in the beginning. I think the attack was supposedly made by stragler regular troops. IIRC they were dressed like regulars.

Originally posted by Simon Fox: The attacker does not always have the luxury of covered avenues of approach and anyway at the tactical scale any modestly competent defender would have such forming up points well covered in their defensive fire plan. Exactly. If the defender picks the ground (which is usually the case) the attacker almost invariably faces a terrain where he has to emerge from cover into the open and he has to traverse that open country to reach the defenders positions. Any cover terrain in between is noted and taken into account. There were numerous successful attacks by both sides in the western desert at far less than 10 or 5 to 1 odds. El Alamein comes to mind. The defender can not be strong all over while the attacker can reach local superiority in the place of his choosing.

Originally posted by JasonC: Many realistic attacking tactics still work, even with all of that. And in particular, all "up" defenses, with long range weapons trying to cover all of the open ground, can usually be beaten by a little scouting and a lot of prep fire on what it reveals, provided any decent starting positions exist for the attackers to sit in, in the meantime. The fact that AT guns shoot at what they damn well please does not exactly help the defender.

Originally posted by CMplayer: Who said anything about not sustaining any casualties? Nobody really. But good LOS works both ways. And if the defences are done properly any and all potential cover areas are covered by mines or what not to prevent their use. And a lump of trees or a depression in the middle of a field are SO obvious target areas even the British army advised against their use during WWII. I'm just trying to suggest what I thought was an axiom of WWII theory, that ideal terrain is open enough to allow full combined-arms coordination: infantry, armor, artillery and air support. That's the ideal for attacking. That's all I'm really suggesting, and I'm looking at that only from the point of view of the Allies in the period and theatre covered by CMBO. Then you should take into account the fact that in most cases the Germans were not dislodged from their positions by brute force until they chose to widraw. In the tactical level their preponderance on manouver warfare worked well against the attritionist warfare waged by the Allies. Attrition warfare works well only if the opponent plays ball. Because of your personality you might prefer, if you had to fight yourself, to fight in dense forest as a sneaky and resourceful patroller. If that's the kind of soldier you are then I bow to you. Seriously. But if you've got a simulated WWII force comprised of normal, physically timid pixellated infantrymen, then you're best off in terrain where they can work in a combined arms manner. I never denied WWI style frontal assaults work in CM. You can experiment this by running a QB twice or side by side: use uninterrupted Move order (simulating walking fire) for all the infantry in one and Run/Hide with bounding overwatch (unhide the overwatch element) combination to simulate RL WWII tactics in the other. The way things are modelled now the former tactics work better (generally) than the latter in open terrain. The combined arms support element work pretty much the same in both but the force using walking fire does not get suppressed as easily as the infantry using RL WWII infantry tactics. But much of this "walking fire vs bouding overwatch" falls into the "force specific tactics and doctrine" realm and are out of the scope of this debate. Dense forests inhibit that and lead to much more casualty intensive battles, against a determined defender. Of course there are exceptions, such as in very uneven situations like a beach landing. I'm not sure we actually disagree so much, it just seems we are misreading each others' intentions. You talk of the trees and I talk of the woods ? BTW I haven't seen the movie you mentioned though I'd like to. The only Finnish war movie I can think of right off that I've seen is the one about the long range bicycle patrol, which I really enjoyed. I have a question about it though. When they broke through the Russian line from behind, were they really supposed to do that? Or did the commander just make it up, as some kind of suicidal wish. They didn't seem to be expected on the other side. Maybe I went to the toilet right when they explained that bit. AFAIK Finnish LRRP's sometimes did have to break through in that manner. But the preferred and recommended practise was to avoid contact if at all possible.

My first ever double post. [ 12-13-2001: Message edited by: tero ]</p>

Originally posted by Sergei: On the other hand, Red Army really couldn't have done better if the terrain was something different, except if it was summer (snow hindered mobility, thus not making it truly open). Snow cover does not turn open ground into unopen ground. Unless it is deep enough for the troops to walk upright without being spotted. And in that case all the lakes and swamps would have posed a problem. As they did in the summer of 1944. Funnily enough though both attacks used pretty much the same route despite different climatic conditions and (arguably) diffrent attack doctrines used. If it was a closed terrain, Finns surely could have intercepted attacks swiftly compared to how quickly Soviets would have noticed the counter-attack, and that way gained a local superiority, destroying Soviets piece-meal. Or stopping them in their tracks. This did happen North of lake Ladoga both in 1939-40 and again in 1944. As you well know counter attacks against Soviet troops ran into troubles if the Soviet troops had had time to consolidate and dig in. If the counterattack was done within 12hrs of the breach it was more than likely they would be driven off the positions. Of course it is true that the Soviet tactic wasn't effective. But what would you have done if you were the commander, considering training of the forces? Hmmmmm.... the question is loaded. With the same level of initial preparation and prevailing tactics and doctrine there was precious little a commander could do and not get shot for going againts orders. As of November 30th 1939 there was nothing wrong in the tactics and doctrine of the Red Army. By December 31st 1939 the shortcomings were obvious. And the renewed assault in February 1940 was not done with THAT dissimilar tactics and doctrine. It was just more focused and this time around the preparations were up to speed with the task at hand.

Originally posted by CMplayer: I think what you're describing makes sense if you have extensive forests with a relatively low population density, like in Finland. But I was thinking of the opposite situation, like for example Huertgen, which is quite small and was packed with troops. That is actually irrelevant. If you compare troop density per square km Huertgen is no more (or less ) packed than most of the killing grounds along the Finnish frontier. The fact that the forests continue beyond the borders of the combat zone is irrelevant. Incidentaly, if you look at the succesful Soviet 1940 and 1944 breakthrough attacks you will find that the Soviets massed up to 10 000 (give or take) guns along a 50km stretch of the front in the most open part (best tank country in the Western part) of the of the Isthmus. And even then they sustained heavy armour and infantry casualties and failed in their objective. The LOS was up to 1000 meters in that part of the front. I mean that there is a advantage in attacking in generally open country, and where the defender is in the same kind of ground as the attacker. Then there could be lots of good long LOS (to take advantage of the attacker's advantage in long range support), but local uneveness of the ground or wooded patches etc. for the groundpounders to creep into or hide tanks behind while waiting for air recon to call in the arty. You should rent the movie Winter War in case you have not seen it already. The combat sequences are filmed in 98% topographically correct terrain (as in the match with the historical places and the movie location are VERY accurate). Unlike the Hollywood epic sagas the story is actually true. Look past the Soviet period tactics and you will find that no way no how can any force come across such "uncovered" terrain and not sustain casualties if going against a determined defender.

Converting to ADSL. I'll use alternate route to send the turns over but there will be some delays.

Originally posted by Simon Fox: At what distance would the observer be? More than a couple of bounds away if you were to advance towards him and you would have to use bounding overwatch. Beyond minumum safe distance if he calls in mortars. A bit vague and convoluted I know but it depends on the situation.

Originally posted by Simon Fox: Before this 'conversation' goes any further it might do well to define what people mean by "open ground". From a tactical point of view you can hardly lump all terrain which is denuded of vegetation into the same category regardless of topography. To me "open terrain" means any terrain not covered by dense woods, regardless of topography. In other words if you can not traverse the terrain diddy bobing upright without being spotted from several points over a 180º arc in front of you then the terrain is open.

Originally posted by CMplayer: You guys must be trolling me. Tero is singular, plural would be Teros. No tanks to help you. So ? That means the opposition will not have any either. Direct fire support you get from MG's, grenades, infantry cannons etc. Planes can't see well through the canopy. Which is bad ? You don't know exactly where the defenders are so you have to find them. So ? You go find them. They will wait to engage you at very close range, and they will get off the first burst every time. Not if you spot them first and get to their rear. IRL it works differently from the CM, VERY differently. Then when you finally are about to take their foxholes they will bug out and shell your position with great precision, i.e. you will be under treebursts. Not if you have them surrounded. And if you locate them first what prevents you from shelling them first. Then you have to do it all over again in the afternoon or the next day. Repeat for 2 weeks and you have 300% casualties. You really should get some books on the überFinnish war experience. I mean seriously, have you ever heard of guerrillas heading for the open plains to make their last stand? Report on discovery channel: the partisans dug in in the OPEN GROUND where they had nice long lines of sight. The army just couldn't get them. But some other dumb partisans went to the rugged, forested mountains, but since that is such great ATTACKING GROUND the army just went right in and cleaned 'em out. Apparently they never heard of the Yugoslavs. You and Slappy must just be pulling my leg. It is not your leg we are pulling.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by SuperTed: Tero, No, sir.<hr></blockquote> My WinZIP does not recognize .asp which my NS4.7 is downloading. The only one I got was right the sound mod and a couple came up "can not find/show page" error.

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by SuperTed: HB, Right here.<hr></blockquote> Are the links to the ZIP files in the list broken or what ?

Originally posted by CMplayer: Think about it. Would you rather attack across the steppes of Russia or through dense forests? Of course the forests favor the defender, whereas the open ground is ideal for tank armies. I'd take the forest. The LOS impediments work both ways. In the open you stand out like a sore thumb making an excellent target for any LR asset the defender has for a longer period of time.

Originally posted by CMplayer: Yes but in truly open ground your tanks and SP guns can provide long range direct fire support. So that single LMG won't be around long. IRL there is no absolute spotting. Each and every swinging dick has to spot the location the fire is coming from to suppress and/or take it out.

Originally posted by CMplayer: Slappy, open ground IS ideal for attacks. How many times do we have to explain this to you. I'm with Slappy on this one. Open ground is ideal only in CM. The modelling favours the WWI style assault. A tight fist, all in LOS approach works best when you are overpowering the defenders units one by one. What you need is local superiority. You can do the squad/platoon rushed but when the shooting starts the side which can get the local firepower superiority in the LOS will most propably get the upper hand. IRL an attack like that will most propably fail. A single LMG/HMG can suppress a whole company in the open with short controlled bursts. Even a single SMG can do the job (an überFinn tale I will not burden you with, if any of you have read the Unknown Soldier by Väinö Linna you can find a description of the action).

Originally posted by JasonC: Also, there is a bit of a problem with your idea of an "overall" "how they fared". The Germans lost the war, and by the end of it that means they lost everything they made - KOed, broken down, captured, whatever. You cannot get any meaningful info by aggregating the whole war, certainly not about average vehicle lifespan, which is the subject under discussion. I got to love the way you guys never fail to pull out the "they lost the war" card every time your reasonings in in jeopardy of getting bogged down. So, why weren't turreted tanks scarcer than SP guns by late 1944? When you go look at unit returns in 1944, middle or late, you see about 30-40% SP guns and about 60-70% turreted tanks. How did they get that way? Because Stugs were artillery, turreted tanks armour ? The Stugs in armoured formations got counted in while the ones in Stug Brigades were not counted as armour but artillery ? Can you give any specific numbers ?

Originally posted by redwolf: Tero, I'm afraid your number have a weakness. The number of losses obviously depends on the number of existing vehicles. However, you compare 1943 losses against 1943 production, not 1930-1943 production minus 1930-1942 losses. Only because the losses source starts counting from 1941 and the Stug's came into service in a big way in 1943. Also, most of the earlier tanks were lost or converted to other uses by 1943. Prior to 1941 the Feldgrau source counts 4 941 turreted tanks manufactured. 1941 production was 3 094 while losses were 2 262. The 1942 production was 4 281 while the losses were 2 546. In 1942 Stug losses were 330 while the production up to and including 1942 numbers 1 521 vehicles. Prior to and including 1942 the production of SP AT guns numbered 1 609 while the losses in 1942 were 127. The clear trend from 1943 onwards was more SP, less turreted tanks. And the losses were more severe for the turreted tanks than for the SP's. They made less turreted tanks and they lost them faster than they made them while the SP production could keep the production ahead of the losses. I hope to find the time to come up with data without this weakness using my loss rate accounting stats. I hope to find the loss data for the eraly years. Any hints appreciated. We need (complete) losses in one year or the number of existing vehicles. Concur. If the loss data starts counting from June 1941 (and not 1944 as the * indicates) the losses can be for the Eastern Front alone for all I know. But the data is an indication anyway.

Originally posted by JasonC: the SP guns only about 1/3rd of the total, roughly matched by each of the other two main types (Pz IV and Panther I mean). 1/3 SP, 1/3 PzKw-IV and 1/3 Panther or 1/3 SP, 1/3 PzKw-IV and Panther and 1/3 others (PzKw-III/Tiger/35(t),38(t)) ? Production figures from http://www.feldgrau.com/afvstats.html (entire war) SP AT guns 2 545 TD 5 363 AG 10 550 SP total 18 458 all turreted gun tanks 29 910 1940 SP AT guns 173 TD 0 AG 184 SP total 357 all turreted gun tanks 1512 1942 SP AT guns 835 TD 0 AG 789 SP total 1 624 all turreted gun tanks 4281 1944 SP AT guns 456 TD 3400 AG 4999 SP total 8 855 all turreted gun tanks 7975 Ergo, the tanks are living longer than the SP guns. A force commander might be disposed to pulling out his turreted tanks and leaving the SP guns to cover the retreat. Or in attack the infantry might be supported directly by their organic SP's instead of tanks. Being artillery does mean that a armoured force might be more willing to sacrifice assest not directly under their care. But please look below for loss stats that do not comply with your conclusions. Because the tanks are fielded in much larger groups than the SP guns. They fight in mobile divisions, which are more survivable overall, less likely to be overrun, better equipped with supplies and spares, etc. In contrast: more likely to be forced to execute long road marches from one crisis spot to another = more basic maintanance required. Also more likely to find itself on unfavourable terrain. Whereas, 10 StuG as one company of a divisional AT battalion in a Heer infantry division, are seperated from support, committed in tiny numbers, etc. The support being denied is what ? Arty ? Each Heer infantry division had it. Infantry ? Each Heer infantry division had it. (Duh ! ) There were also towed AT guns in the Heer infantry division OB so they could rely on some support from there too. Being commited in tiny numbers is not necessarily a bad thing in tactical terms, even if it can prove to be a logistical nightmere. Also, the Stugs were organized in separate battalions of 27 or 31 vehicles or brigades of 45 vehicles (corps and army level formations) so their deployment was not necessarily just that 10 vehicle penny packet. They may benefit from defensive use (both can, but they may be more likely to - fine). But that is not as big a deal as being part of a Panzer division or corps, with hundreds of AFVs. Where the tanks appear on the front in more concentrated doses, it makes sense that each vehicle will have a longer lifespan, even if it gets fewer unique opportunities (per unit time) to kill enemy AFVs. And the production vs. fleet strength comparison bears that out. When the data from http://www.feldgrau.com/afvstats.html is combined with data from http://www.freeport-tech.com/WWII/011_germany/999_AFV_losses.htm your comparison becomes questionable. PzKw-III losses in 1943 - 2 395 PzKw-III production in 1943 - ~235 PzKw-IV losses in 1943 - 2 352 PzKw-IV production in 1943 - 3 013 total production 3 248 vehicles total losses 4 747 net loss in 1943 1 499 StuG III losses in 1943 - 1 566 StuG III production in 1943 - 3011 net gain in 1943 1 445 In 1943 925 SP AT guns were lost and 1 227 built. In 1944 the Germans lost 3 555 Stugs and 5 748 turreted tanks while they built 4 999 Stugs and 3 400 TD's ( lost 412) and 456 SP AT guns (lost 1 155 - 1943 production 1 227) and 7 975 turreted tanks. Lookind at the 1941-45 loss figures and comparing them to I would say the SP's fared better than the turreted tanks. Overall. The SP AT guns did get punished but the Stugs seem to have been better. Speaks volumes for the benefits of enclosed fighting compartments.