Tero

Originally posted by M Hofbauer: in real life, if a soldier takes cover in a russian wooden loghouse (wood thickness >30cm), at 50m he is pretty safe from a SMG. a full power regular rifle round however will simply penetrate, period. Some data on the penetration for Suomi SMG at 100 meters: 2 mm of iron at 300 meters: 1.5 mm of iron, 3 inches of pinewood Unfortunately I could not find data for the PPSh.

Originally posted by Frunze: No, if the SMG ammo weighs 10 kg, and the rifle ammo weighs just over a kg, the weight difference is 9-10 times. Don't tell me they are going to throw them at the enemy. The equal weights of the guns do not cancel each other out. That 10kg is in five 70 round magazines. The 45 rounds are strips, which you do NOT want to get entangled. I just wonder why on earth all the "trade rifle for SMG during combat" stories, never "trade the SMG for rifle during combat" stories. If the two weapons are both around the same weight, is it likely the SMG trooper would carry 10 times the weight in ammo? Not as simple as that. The SMG ammo is 9mm (Para IIRC, 7,62R25 in the case of PPSh) and the rifle ammo is 7,62R53 (or 7,92 for the Germans). Which do you think fits in your pockets or satchels better and is easier to carry and handle, 90 addittional rifle ammo strips, loose ammo or ammo cartons or additional (round 70 round) SMG magazines ? How many riflemen carried 450 ready rounds intended for their own personal use ? And where would they carry them ? Look at some pictures taken in combat. How many times do you see a rifleman carrying his backpack in combat conditions in the eastern front ? Also, please study the load carrying equipement and arrangements in the different armies. I hope you realize the belt fed GPMG as SAW is uniquely German organizational feature. Other armies did not have that kind of LMG/SAW in their organization. The riflemen in the squads were not required to hump ammo for the SAW. I have not seen anybody indicate the main function of a member of a British squad for example was to hump ammo for the Bren. In the Finnish squad the ammo for the SAW was the responsibility of the SAW team (two men, the gunner and his assistant). Sure they could and would ask for more ammo from their squad mates if they run low. But the squad mates did not carry extra ammo for just that purpose like they were required to do in the German army. [ August 06, 2002, 12:22 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

Originally posted by JasonC: 45 rifle rounds may have been a "basic load" in a supply man's log book, but that doesn't mean riflemen carried only 1/8th the ammo. There are certainly some problems with the terminology here. The translation of the term is mine. 45 rounds were a ration unit that I call the basic load. A man could carry up to 1-4 basic loads, depending on the mission and supply status. The rounds are only 2-3 times heavier, and steroids are not issued along with SMGs to make their users carry 3-4 times the weight. What is your source on this ? A Suomi SMG weighs 4,6 kg unloaded. A fully loaded 70 round magazine weighs around 2 kg (a 20 round magazine weighs 500g). 5 of the 70 round magazines make 10 kg. All together they weigh 14 kg. By comparison a Mosin-Nagant type rifle weighs around 4,5 kg. A 5 round strip weighs around 120g. 9 times that make just over a kg. All in all around 6kg total weight. The way I was tought math the weight difference is not 3-4 times. In practice, riflemen carried extra ammo, often for squad LMGs, with the rounds interchangable. Only in the German army. They were the only ones with a belt fed GPMG at squad level. The rest used magazine fed models. The ammo was interchangeable. Pretty much everyone carried whatever ammo they could manage. On that we agree. Find me real riflemen going into action with nothing but their rifle and 45 rounds and I'll eat my hat. Just didn't happen. What makes you think the SMG gunners would not have carried as much or more ? As for the idea that the "only difference" when the Finns fought the Russians in 1940 was that the Finns had Suomi SMGs, it is a silly notion. Finnish KIA 26 000, Russian KIA 130 000. Obviously the Russians dramatically underperformed the Finns in every respect in the winter war; trying to trace it to one small arm is crazy. So is trying to disregard it as a contributing cause. The Red Army High Command seems to have thought there was something to the use of SMG though. Besides, didn't Finns regularly eat a dozen T-26s apiece, and fillet another score while declining to actually consume them, with toothpicks made from tall trees? So it seems. As for the "100m range" standard, SMGs have up to twice the firepower of rifles at that range, per shot. But they do have fewer shots. In closer, they still do far more over their whole ammo load than rifles can, even leaving aside the fact that "front loaded" fp kills and suppresses and so reduces replies, etc. So why do you think the tweak down at longer ranges was necessary ? In open steppe terrain, getting to either range is going to be quite difficult. CMBB infantry fire pins far more readily than it did in CMBO. Long charges across open ground just don't get anywhere if the movers are under (unsuppressed) fire, certainly not rapidly. The big uptick in the importance of LMGs will stem from that sea change in behavior under fire (hitting the deck instead of accelerating to "run"). OK But in cities (where SMGs really mattered), or forests, LOS lines are going to be low enough to make SMGs quite powerful. The PPsh gets 50 fp at 40m, 8 times what a rifle gets. I personally saw Russian SMG tank riders in a night fight in a village at the Chicago preview, and they were nothing to sneeze at. SMGs certainly have not been neutered, but they are not magical wands. That is good to hear. But I think it was you yourself who advocated the SMG be toned down some time ago.

Originally posted by Andreas: finally got round to digging it up. It happened to the lead company of his Kampfgruppe at Paislinis, close to Rossienie. His KG was an armoured regiment plus a tank battalion plus bits & pieces. How close he was depends on how much he liked leading from the front. Judging by his writings, a lot I guess. P.33 Panzers on the eastern front, ed. Tsouras. Greenhill 2002. That is pretty conclusive. But the way I read it they snipers were not tied to the trees. They were IN the trees but at least this quote does not clearly indicate they were actually TIED to the trees. Or if so then the marker in CMBB for running sniper would have to be a running tree... [ August 05, 2002, 05:41 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

Originally posted by Andreas: finally got round to digging it up. It happened to the lead company of his Kampfgruppe at Paislinis, close to Rossienie. His KG was an armoured regiment plus a tank battalion plus bits & pieces. How close he was depends on how much he liked leading from the front. Judging by his writings, a lot I guess. P.33 Panzers on the eastern front, ed. Tsouras. Greenhill 2002. That is pretty conclusive. But the way I read it they snipers were not tied to the trees. They were IN the trees but at least this quote does not clearly indicate they were actually TIED to the trees. Or if so then the marker in CMBB for running sniper would have to be a running tree... [ August 05, 2002, 05:41 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

Originally posted by KwazyDog: Tero to be totally honest infantry battles in CMBB different enough from those in CMBO that discussing CMBB battles based on CMBO knowledge probably wont come to any useful conclusions I know. Maybe some of the guys whom have been lucky enough to see one of the sneak previews would like to comment here though? I would, but Ive still got too much to do I have not heard there was one arranged here in Finland. So: Yes, please. When you are fishing it is the number of fish you get that counts, not the size. Unless of course the big one is really a beauty. And BTW: when will there be more non-Russo-German bones thrown. Seeing the Red Army and the Germans trash each other in various landscapes is indeed pretty but there are people around who would like to see also different things and occurances. Something people may not know and may be worth noting here is that the values displayed in the infantry status window are just representive of the combat power of the squad (in the same way the 'blast rating' works for HE weapons) and much more is actually happening behind the scenes when combat results are calculated. Not quite what I am bitching about. I still fail to see the reasoning behind the downrating of the SMG indicated in previous occasions and which seem to have made the CMBB modifications list. The main motivation I have thought is behind this school of thought is the seeming in-game predominance of the German SMG squads (especially the Sturmtruppe with 13 man squads) over the Allied squads. [ August 05, 2002, 04:47 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

One Finnish infantry basic ammo load (tuliannos) per gun was: rifle 45 rounds = 9 x 5 round strips SMG 350 rounds = 5 x full 70 round magazines/18 x 20 round clips LMG 600 rounds = 30 x full 20 round magazines/10 full 60 round drums HMG 1200 rounds = 12 x 100 round belts 1,5 basic ammo loads was considered to be dangerously low when preparing for defensive fighting. For prolonged heavy fighting one basic load was totally inadequate. With one basic ammo load The rifleman would run out of ammo after 9 minutes if the ROF was 5 aimed shots a minute The Suomi SMG gunner would run out of ammo after 35 bursts firing 10 round bursts (or 3 seconds at full ROF of 800 RPM) With 10 round bursts the LMG (LS-26 or Degtrayev) would last for 60 bursts and the HMG 120 bursts. The fraction which claims the SMG is too powerfull in the game has won the ear of BTS/BFC. The claim is the SMG gets an unfair advantage because of the constant ROF in the game makes the rifle heavy units depleate the ammo at uneffective ranges while the SMG's get to save theirs for the close up work. For some reason the average engagement range of 100 meters was selected as the yard stick for CMBO. IMO this range default should be re-evaluated for CMBB. Early on during Barbarossa the Germans with their more manouverable, long range LMG's were more effective than the Red Army armed mainly with Mosin Nagant bolt action rifles when fighting in the open. Some time prior to Barbarossa the Finnish army was able to trash the Red Army and the only difference in infantry weaponry was the Suomi SMG. And close terrain. Later on when the Red Army got more SMG's they could outshoot the Germans at close range. The GPMG's of the Germans were no longer enough to stem the tide. The few rifle/several semiauto rifles and SMG's /1 LMG of the Soviets make up got to be more effective than the many rifles/few SMG's/1 LMG squad make up of the Germans. And this is unfortunately how the cookie crumbled IRL for squads with few full automatics in the squad make up. The squad carrying more full automatic weapons was more effective close up. And this is why the 100 standard engagement range as a base should IMO be re-evaluated. The Red Army had to bend the "rules" and get close to make it tactids work in the steppes. The 100 meter basic engagent range does make the bolt action rifle heavy squads lose ammo sooner than the SMG heavy squads. What would happen if the basic engagent range was dropped to 50 meters ?

Originally posted by Munter: "auftauchen" is virtually the same expression as "dyka upp" in Swedish, i.e. "ilmestyä" in our beautifully concise mothertongue. IMO you should translate it as "sukeltaa esiin" instead of "ilmestyä". Translated like that the connotation is more evident. From L. Jäntti "Kannaksen suurtaisteluissa kesällä 1944" written in 1955 p 51: major Tirronen, the arty commander of 10D in the IVAK sector where the breakthrough happened June 10th, inspected the positions May 13th and discovered the Soviet troops had started digging assault trenches already in May 11th. These trenches ran all the way up to Finnish obstacles, as near as 70 meters from the defensive positions. (Ohohoh... reading on it says the Finnish High Command was aware of the Normandy Invasion and the co-ordinaton between the Soviets and the Western Allies already in May. VERY interesting......) The 10D frontage was 12-15 km's. The Soviets had 300-400 tubes per kilometer in the sector. They fired 50 000-60 000 rounds in June 9th alone. The barrage on the 10th was even heavier. The Finnish arty had 5 tubes per km and they fired approx. 9 000 rounds that day. The Soviet fire preparations: up to 1000 aircrafts at and up to 15 km's behind the front lines. Apparently the artillery concentrated on pulverizing the front lines. The breakthrough made by the XXX GAC (45th GD, 63rd GD, Guards Armoured Brigade, three Guards Armoured Breakthrough Regiments and 64th GD in the second echelon) in the 10th extended up to 15km's behind the front line and was approx. 20 km's wide. JR1, JR58 and ErP 20 casualties on June 9th-10th were 159 KIA, 619 WIA and 647 MIA (later found to have been killed). 172 men were returned in the POW exchange. JR1, which was took the worst beating, lost all in all 872 men, 396 of them WIA. Of the 350 horses the regiment had they lost approx. 200. The arty of 10D suffered in those two days 104 casualties, 16 of them KIA. 68 guns were lost to the enemy, most of them abandoned for lack of tractors and horses.

Originally posted by Munter: "auftauchen" is virtually the same expression as "dyka upp" in Swedish, i.e. "ilmestyä" in our beautifully concise mothertongue. IMO you should translate it as "sukeltaa esiin" instead of "ilmestyä". Translated like that the connotation is more evident. From L. Jäntti "Kannaksen suurtaisteluissa kesällä 1944" written in 1955 p 51: major Tirronen, the arty commander of 10D in the IVAK sector where the breakthrough happened June 10th, inspected the positions May 13th and discovered the Soviet troops had started digging assault trenches already in May 11th. These trenches ran all the way up to Finnish obstacles, as near as 70 meters from the defensive positions. (Ohohoh... reading on it says the Finnish High Command was aware of the Normandy Invasion and the co-ordinaton between the Soviets and the Western Allies already in May. VERY interesting......) The 10D frontage was 12-15 km's. The Soviets had 300-400 tubes per kilometer in the sector. They fired 50 000-60 000 rounds in June 9th alone. The barrage on the 10th was even heavier. The Finnish arty had 5 tubes per km and they fired approx. 9 000 rounds that day. The Soviet fire preparations: up to 1000 aircrafts at and up to 15 km's behind the front lines. Apparently the artillery concentrated on pulverizing the front lines. The breakthrough made by the XXX GAC (45th GD, 63rd GD, Guards Armoured Brigade, three Guards Armoured Breakthrough Regiments and 64th GD in the second echelon) in the 10th extended up to 15km's behind the front line and was approx. 20 km's wide. JR1, JR58 and ErP 20 casualties on June 9th-10th were 159 KIA, 619 WIA and 647 MIA (later found to have been killed). 172 men were returned in the POW exchange. JR1, which was took the worst beating, lost all in all 872 men, 396 of them WIA. Of the 350 horses the regiment had they lost approx. 200. The arty of 10D suffered in those two days 104 casualties, 16 of them KIA. 68 guns were lost to the enemy, most of them abandoned for lack of tractors and horses.

Originally posted by Grisha: I think Jason makes a great assessment of the situation. By late 1944, the Soviet practice of intelligence/reconnaissance( razvedka ) and deception ( maskirovka ) was highly effective in producing surprise for their attacks. Soviet intelligence collection and processing probably enabled them to create precise plans of attack, while the deception planning guaranteed very favorable odds. What is more they anticipated the German reactions and used that to work in their favour.

Originally posted by Grisha: I think Jason makes a great assessment of the situation. By late 1944, the Soviet practice of intelligence/reconnaissance( razvedka ) and deception ( maskirovka ) was highly effective in producing surprise for their attacks. Soviet intelligence collection and processing probably enabled them to create precise plans of attack, while the deception planning guaranteed very favorable odds. What is more they anticipated the German reactions and used that to work in their favour.

Originally posted by Ari Maenpaa: You mean: kill = write-off ? I have seen this indicated in many sources. At least when it comes to awarding kills to infantry and AT gunners. I would like to know how they calculated the tank kills attributed to CAS and artillery though. I suspect the radio listening service might be involved in determining the overall KO figures. I know the Finns themselves were eager to repair everything which had even remote hope to get fixed, because there was always shortage of war equipment. Particularly of tanks. But did this practice lead correspondingly to so rigid terms demanded for a succesful tank kill that basically a verified kill meant a write off? It might be when it comes to kills awarded to individuals. I did find it quite incredible the AT gunners would be willing (and indeed able) to use as many as 41 PAK-38 rounds (according to Marskin Panssarintuhoojat) to make a "kill" of a tank. It seems it was required the kill had to be a total loss before it was awarded to a specific individual. From Leppänen’s book I got indeed an impression of easily flammable Soviet tanks. More than half of the destroyed tanks started to burn or smoke. Reading the appendix in Marskin Panssarintuhoojat made me think the opposite. It seems the PAK40 was very much more effective than the PAK38. None of the counterattacks resulted as catastrophes, I agree. Kuuterselkä was as bad as it got and even then the attack was partly succesful. And yep, all killed armour from the enemy spearheads were left to Finnish hands at least for some time as the StuGs continued their advance. But what about the kills resulted on noman’s land where the main enemy force was met? In Marskin Panssarintuhoojat the trend seems to be that unless the tank did not burn or the enemy was seen hauling it away the kill was marked but not it did not get you awarded with the shoulder patch. To put it other way: how many uncertain kills were dropped out from the official stats? Any hunch? According to When Titans Clashed the Soviet sources admit to losing 294 tanks and SP-guns during the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation (so with a pinch of salt this can be considered to be the absolute bare minimum). The Finnish figure of KO'd tanks stands at 600-900 depending on the source. 1/3 total write off/all kills ratio is not IMO too wide a margin (less than the Western Front one anyway). The Finnish official figure for all kills is IMO in the ball park when talking about KO'd Soviet tanks. You suggest that the rigidity in getting verified tank kills may have resulted in too few kill rings? It did at least deny some kill awards from the infantry and AT gunners of the Jääkäriprikaati at least. Then there were diffences in training standards and levels between the Finnish and Soviet tank crews. All the anecdotes suggest the first shot hit and kill) almost invariably fell to the Stugs. Then again there is the subject of optics... Another odd thing is how surpringly well the StuGs performed in close range engagements. The gunner – driver connection must have been trained very well. Indeed. I have also seen remarks that the Germans did not like to drive their Stugs in dense vegetation for fear of throwing a track. In that light it may be that what you say about the recless use of Stugs might be correct after all. I don’t quite agree. If we look at what happened in Vuosalmi for instance. Wasn’t Lagus’ armoured division there for pushing the Soviets back to the other side of Vuoksi-river? But the counterattack couldn’t reach it’s goal and RKKA remained on the northern bank. True. But what about to the North of Lake Ladoga once the TT line was reached ? No innish armour there. The Finnish SOP across the board was to counter attack to slow the enemy down. Even before Lagus' division entered the stage. The practise was a part of the widrawal plan. It bought time for the high command to mass the forces around Viipuri. Naturally today we know how horribly imbalanced the scenario was to even begin with Soviets advance. Soviets: A battalion of infantry, around 20 tanks, tons of arty, a dozen or so CAS Finns: A reinforced company (with depleted squads), 1-2 AT guns, some arty, 20mm ATR for AA. Reinforcements at turn 7: 2 Stugs and two companies of infantry. End result: the Soviet force trashed and thrown back to its line of departure. Finnish losses 30-40 KIA, Soviet losses 100-300 KIA, 12 tanks KO'd. Can't wait to see it. Sure, but I was writing only about those where the StuGs were in play. I would like to see more data of other units. It seems the Jääkäriprikaati is getting the lions share of press nowadays. I didn’t have time to analyze all the surrounding circumstances. Well, I haven’t throughout sources right now, but the counterattack at Kuuterselkä fits well in the description, doesn’t it? And broadly taken, wasn’t the situation later at Talinmylly and Vuosalmi quite similar if looked solely from POV of a single StuG company? StuGs advancing along a road. A face-to-face meeting with armoured enemy spearhead. StuGs score lots of quick kills against T-34-85s/ISU-152s at short to medium ranges. A bit later StuGs reach a large open area where lots of Soviet tanks and AT-guns are waiting in hulldown/hedgehog positions. The counterattack stops. The Soviet attack stops. IIRC this strongly simplified theme repeated many times and every single time there were some unique nuances to it. Yes. And no. When was the other time we lost 5 Stugs at one go ? At Nummilahti, 2. At Vuosalmi, 1. All the other instances no write off's. So in that respect the Kuuterselkä counter attack is by no means an average counter attack from the Stug POV. From the infantry POV it was a very typical counter attack. But not from the Stug POV. [ August 03, 2002, 12:20 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

Originally posted by Ari Maenpaa: Note that those 8 losses were total write offs whereas all of the 87 documented kills not necessarily were. Then again kills were not awarded if it was not verified or the target did not catch fire. That’s unsure because usually the battleground was eventually lost to the enemy. Not necessarily. But not before the ground had been contested first. You have to remember most of these Stug battles were during counter attacks, none of which were total and utter failures. Also, the official Winter War figure for KO enemy tanks was 1200. The real figure as per Russian sources is slightly above that. And that counts only the ones in the Isthmus. It’s also interesting to note that the Finns used their StuGs very recklessly. Basically against the German doctrine I guess. Most of the kills were achieved not in ambushes, but in vigorous counterattacks. Perhaps the rare but sudden armoured counterattacks threw the Soviet tank crews off-balance and thus helped the Finns to overcome. I'd say it was more due to the low silhouette of the Stug making them harder targets. In all fairness it must be said that most counterattacks got finally stopped by the Soviets. When being fair be totally fair. What you are talking about takes place during the first 10 days of the Soviet invasion. After Viipuri it is a totally different story. Also, most of the counter attacks were not supported by armour. And most of the positive results were negated by the overall situation making a widrawal necessary even hours after the counter attack had been done and the Red Army was inactive. A typical simplified pattern for such an attack went like this: A Finnish StuG company (with supporting infantry) counterattacks against a larger advancing RKKA formation and sweeps it’s armoured spearhead. I would not call that a typical counter attack.

Originally posted by gatpr: I would have used Finns as an example, but everyone knows they wouldn't need the help. Actually we did need help. But the thing is our leaders did not trust the German troops (in combat or to be present near the capital to facilitate a coup when the armistice was signed). We were glad to get the weapons though. There were no German troops in the Ishmus (facing Leningrad) from 1941 to 1944. Stug abteilung 330 (IIRC) and some infantry arrived to bolster the defences in the Isthmus in 1944 but they were used as back up behind the lines after the fall of Viipuri in case the Red Army happened to break through at Ihantala. The only major action the infantry engaged in was to fight back an invasion across the bay of Viipuri. And even that they did laced by some Finnish troops. The Stugs saw some action (enough to remark the Finnish infantry was not very good at combined arms operations, which is true since the troops they fought alongside with had never fought having tanks help them ever before). What we also used was the CAS given by the Detachment Kuhlmey (mainly Ju-87's and FW190's). This was VERY crucial in the dire days of the Soviet assault in 1944. So, we did ask for help. But what was needed was mainly the new infantry AT weaponry and CAS (which the FAF was not really equipped to give properly). The German troops sent up were not posted in the immediate front line because the Finnish leaders feared they would not be as resilient as Finnish troops.

Originally posted by Holien: P.s. Tero write your AAR if you have time on your hands. I could do with a laugh at work... Here is the short, short version: DAMN !!!

Originally posted by TSword: tero, You're arguing concerning the term "auftauchen" is most probably wrong. It just means that they came into sight. If i have an apointment with somebody for instance, i can refer to his appearance with the term "auftauchen", if i use "streetlanguange". I just wonder about that "come into sight by surprise" bit. My knowledge of the practises of the Red Army in situations like this predisposes me to think they might have burrowed down and dug trenches towards the Germans lines and used them to get the edge over the defenders who were under heavy artillery barrage. Also, was it German SOP to clear fire lanes and vegetation from in front of their positions to facilitate spotting ? The kind of terrain this fight was fought over would have required some LOS obstruction be left in place to mask the defensive positions.

Originally posted by TSword: tero, You're arguing concerning the term "auftauchen" is most probably wrong. It just means that they came into sight. If i have an apointment with somebody for instance, i can refer to his appearance with the term "auftauchen", if i use "streetlanguange". I just wonder about that "come into sight by surprise" bit. My knowledge of the practises of the Red Army in situations like this predisposes me to think they might have burrowed down and dug trenches towards the Germans lines and used them to get the edge over the defenders who were under heavy artillery barrage. Also, was it German SOP to clear fire lanes and vegetation from in front of their positions to facilitate spotting ? The kind of terrain this fight was fought over would have required some LOS obstruction be left in place to mask the defensive positions.

Originally posted by Mike: With FOW set to extreme AT guns will be difficult to spot even when they've fired several shots. That is good to hear. In my preview a 150mm IG took out 2 Matildas and a KV-2 with only 1 shot from the KV-2 in return (direct fire) - various MG's and things shot at tit, sometimes only area fire at the icon when it disappeared after a couple of shots. Eventually about the last shot of a 81mm mortar barrage killed it - grr.....talk about tough! I'd like to draw your attention to the following snippets at J.D. Salts page at http://www.britwar.co.uk/salts/ WW2 weapon effectiveness WO 291/620 The vulnerability of guns to attack by bombs and shell German guns are considered as the following equivalent target areas of ¼-inch mild steel: 88mm 4.8 sq ft "IFH 18" 105mm howitzer 1.8 sq ft "SFH 18" 150mm howitzer 5.5 sq ft The vulnerable area of a 5.5" 100lb shell is "of the order of 1000 sq ft against a gun in the open". "A sunken or sandbagged emplacement restricts effective rounds to those actually bursting in the emplacement except where part of the recoil system is above the barrel." The British 6-pdr, with its recoil system below the barrel, "is probably rather less vulnerable than the German 105mm". Vulnerable areas, in square feet, for various weapons on 105mm and 150mm targets are given below. The 25-pdr, 20lb 'F' bomb and 40lb GP bomb are listed with no VAs, and so are assumed ineffective except for direct hits. Weapon 150mm 105mm 5.5" shell 1300 600 250lb GP bomb 12500 5800 1000lb GP bomb 24300 11700 WO 291/1322 Vulnerability of Enemy Equipment to Shell Fire Based on the results of CB bombardments tabulated below, this report concludes that the agreement with theory is good, as the number of total casualties in columns 5 and 6 is about the same, and that the method of calculating vulnerable areas is well established. Column 1 Serial number of target Column 2 Number of rounds fired in a square of side 100 yards Column 3 Number of targets Column 4 Nature of targets Column 5 Chance of damage Column 6 Number of targets reported damaged 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 20 3 105mm 0.43 – 2 10 3 105mm 0.22 – 3 21 1 Nebelwerfer 0.21 1 4 5 3 105mm 0.11 – 5 12 3 105mm 0.27 – 6 63 1 105mm 0.39 – 7 35 2 Nebelwerfer 0.65 1 8 44 3 75mm 1.16 – 9 21 1 Nebelwerfer 0.21 1 10 7 2 75mm 0.15 – 11 26 2 105mm 0.36 – 12 11 1 150mm 0.04 1 13 8 1 75mm 0.08 1 14 59 1 Nebelwerfer 0.48 – 15 48 2 105mm 0.57 – 16 57 1 170mm 0.47 1 17 35 2 150mm 0.22 1 18 35 3 75mm 0.97 1 19 22 3 105mm 0.47 – 20 28 3 105mm 0.58 – 21 49 3 105mm 0.95 – 22 35 1 105mm 0.24 – Tabulation in the PDF is way better. I know the mortar is one of the most accurate artillery weapon systems in existence. I hear you actually have to deliberately nudge the tube to change the aiming to get some spread. Otherwise the shells would all land in the same place. Still, I think the loss ratio of onboard arty pieces to any kind of fire is a bit overstated.

Originally posted by Andreas: Konew, but Shukow got all the glory So did they "think about it a bit more" ? Or did they break the eggs as necessary ? Regarding the willingness to take casualties. According to Raus 'Panzers on the eastern front', the first encounter with snipers tied to trees was in June 1941. He professes disbelief that a soldier would do this, because there was no way to be taken POW. Interestingly, his feelings mirror those of British soldiers regarding snipers in Normandy. Even more interestingly this same theme was echoed in the Kukuska (Finnish snipers in the tree tops during Winter War) fable which still circulates in the Russian sources. I have never seen anything that would suggest any Finns would have sacrificed himself in this kind of manner. Did he actually encounter one or is he just telling the story as he heard it ?

Originally posted by Andreas: Konew, but Shukow got all the glory So did they "think about it a bit more" ? Or did they break the eggs as necessary ? Regarding the willingness to take casualties. According to Raus 'Panzers on the eastern front', the first encounter with snipers tied to trees was in June 1941. He professes disbelief that a soldier would do this, because there was no way to be taken POW. Interestingly, his feelings mirror those of British soldiers regarding snipers in Normandy. Even more interestingly this same theme was echoed in the Kukuska (Finnish snipers in the tree tops during Winter War) fable which still circulates in the Russian sources. I have never seen anything that would suggest any Finns would have sacrificed himself in this kind of manner. Did he actually encounter one or is he just telling the story as he heard it ?

Originally posted by Juha Keratar: Well, I trust that CMBB will realistically model every aspect of überfinn combat prowess. If you believe the universal soldier axiom is 100% on the money and there are practically no differences in tactics and doctrine in various armies. I just wonder how much better (or worse ) the radio equipped German units will perform compared to the landline telephone equipped Finnish units in the Finnish sector. All will be totally in line with what happened IRL of course. And if it doesn't we'll model it perfectly anyway by playing the game only against you foreigners. But back to the topic: does the theatre affect anything else besides map? Units one can buy definitely, I don't expect to see Finnish troops in other theatres than arctic (after all, Germany lost there ), but what else? Weather? I assume that certain axis allies won't be found on all fronts, but any ideas which ones will be where? Also, the german unit selections in arctic area should realistically be somewhat limited, to the troops operating in Lapland. I think the German units up North will be limited to what was actually there: a few selected armoured units (ie. appropriate vehicles) and WaffenGrenadier ( ) and regular Gebirgs Jaeger formations. It may well be the regular Wehrmacht armour and infantry will also be available for the 1941/42 Ladoga Karelia and the summer of 1944 Isthmus operations further south but that is just a hunch based on what Steve divulged a few months ago.

Originally posted by Soddball: Well Tero, since you're obviously a neutral observer in this debate, I'm waiting for the documentary proof that finnish men used to urinate on the welds of the russian tanks to weaken them before they attacked them head on with rusty knives. Unfortunately it is all in Finnish. If you want to play "Invincible Finns rule the world", why don't you fire up a game of Unreal Tournament with the cheats on? I wish you überFinn bashers would even once actually read what is written before you draw your conclusions and start the rabid dog act. - Finnish Maxim's being modelled to take in snow as coollant in winter ? Ever cared to actually think about asking what the modification was like ? - AT guns pumping up to 20-40 rounds on a KO'd tank trying to make it burn - and survive ? The survivability of the onboard arty pieces, including AT guns, in CMBO is not what it should be. If you can believe any of the Finnish wartime records, legends, folk stories and fairy tales on the subject. Sure, they got knocked out. But they also survived barrages more ferocious than the CMBO game engine can produce in a run of the mill QB. Also, when was the last time you heard a gun fire 20-40 rounds at a target. How über were those überFinnish gunners ? Or is it just that making a T-34 with an empty gas tank and empty ammo rafters is a bitch to set alight ? What was the supporting Red Army infatry doing while those 20-40 rounds were being fired ? - having Finnish AFV's survive without any losses the hordes of IL-2's and Aira/Kingcobras (or heavy arty barrages for that matter) ? Well, this is just a fact of life. I have never ever seen any data that would even hint the Soviet CS was able to kill any Finnish AFV's. Horse transports and infantry were quite harrassed by it. I have seen reports of AA gunners duking it out with the IL's, jump out of the gun pit and jump back in to continue once the IL had fired and pulling up. Incidentaly, I wonder if the IL will have its rear gunner shoot at the targets when pulling up. A further subject of wonder: will a BA-3/BA-10/T-70/T-26 be able to take a T-34/KV/IS(Tiger/Panther etc) head on and be as wonderful a weapons system as Stuart/M-8 are now in the CMBO ? OK, this was sarcasm through and through. But still IMO a valid concern, given the quite phenomenal performace of the Stuart and M8. [ July 29, 2002, 02:01 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

Originally posted by Ari Maenpaa: Not to say that the terrain wasn't friendly for the defender, but those trees just weren't everywhere So how will these little historical facts play out in the CMBB: - Finnish Maxim's being modelled to take in snow as coollant in winter ? - AT guns pumping up to 20-40 rounds on a KO'd tank trying to make it burn - and survive ? - having Finnish AFV's survive without any losses the hordes of IL-2's and Aira/Kingcobras (or heavy arty barrages for that matter) ? Incidentaly, anybody ever seen the data on the lost T-26's (which make out the overwhelming bulk of the actual losses) ? I recall seeing reports of a few being lost in tank-vs-tank duels and to infantry (AT rifles ?) but I have never seen a detailed list of causes for anything but the BT-42's and Stugs. As we all know the KV's survised and the number of T-34's actually increased during the fighting. A further subject of wonder: will a BA-3/BA-10/T-70/T-26 be able to take a T-34/KV/IS(Tiger/Panther etc) head on and be as wonderful a weapons system as Stuart/M-8 are now in the CMBO ?

Originally posted by Andreas: A destroyed Soviet tank outside Tschudowo (in the map above. The caption says BT7, but it looks more like an early T34 to me. Are you sure the timeframe for this photo is OK ? The turret looks an awful lot like a T-34/76 1943 (angle at the middle of the turret) and the road wheels are mixed rubber rimmed/all steel too indicating the tank is not your typical 1941 but of later make. Notice the WW 1 look of the battlefield. That is what is usually left of forrest after prolonged barrages. Will that terrain type be modelled in CMBB ? A bomb run on the supply route of 2nd Shock Army. Notice the endless forests to the side of the road. You call THAT endless ? A German patrol in the Wolchow swamps, were they tracked down the remnants of 2nd Shock Army. Notice how bunched up the German troops are given the terrain. Not good. A German supply cart passes a knocked-out T34 somewhere in the Wolchow area. I wonder what kind of a motor tractor they would have needed to traverse that terrain....

Originally posted by Treeburst155: Jazza has become a casualty of RL. I hate when that happens. I'm looking for a replacement. Please let me know the status of your game with him. Thanks!! A couple of turns into the Polish Push. Forces quite heavily engaged (at least from where I am standing).