Andreas

Michael, I would consider that, except that I do not actually own it or have access to it. I have just got a couple of pages scanned.

Michael, I would consider that, except that I do not actually own it or have access to it. I have just got a couple of pages scanned.

Indeed. Looking at my first post from the scenario designer's PoV, there is an obvious instance that could become a CMBB scenario. The right wing of 61st GRD that got stuck in front of the strongpoint Ploptuschbej. Obviously the German/Romanian occupants of that strongpoint failed to get the message and kept resisting the juggernaut to a degree that necessitated readjusting plans on the Soviet side. Sounds like a CMBB operation in waiting to me.

Indeed. Looking at my first post from the scenario designer's PoV, there is an obvious instance that could become a CMBB scenario. The right wing of 61st GRD that got stuck in front of the strongpoint Ploptuschbej. Obviously the German/Romanian occupants of that strongpoint failed to get the message and kept resisting the juggernaut to a degree that necessitated readjusting plans on the Soviet side. Sounds like a CMBB operation in waiting to me.

Ebay, 2nd hand bookstores... Not being published at the moment.

Ebay, 2nd hand bookstores... Not being published at the moment.

Would that help? Same source. [ May 21, 2003, 05:04 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

Would that help? Same source. [ May 21, 2003, 05:04 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

Michael, this is hopefully self-explanatory. Source is the November 45 Handbook on USSR Military Forces, TM 40-430. Thanks to Kip for the scan. [ May 21, 2003, 04:50 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

Michael, this is hopefully self-explanatory. Source is the November 45 Handbook on USSR Military Forces, TM 40-430. Thanks to Kip for the scan. [ May 21, 2003, 04:50 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

Cory, I checked this again after you left and we discussed it on the Beta Board, and I think there must have been confusion regarding this one (probably related to large quantities of beer being consumed). You do not get any info other than 'knocked out' (if it is a straight knock-out with the death clock not being activated) or 'penetration' when these occur about enemy tanks. These you should get, as they would be observable. Info like 'spalling' and other is not revealed.

Michael, I have a scanned page showing how the late-war assault battalion was organised, I just have to ask someone to allow me to show it here. Basically the assault battalion was organised in two waves, as was the assault regiment and assault division, as I understand it. They also formed one or two battalions for specific tasks (e.g. assault strongpoints, or night fighting). In operational analysis, the Red Army appears tp use this frontage idea regardless of depth. What is hidden behind that is that the organisation extended not only in space, but also in time. Reserves that were an integral part of the assault organisation, or a different unit, would be committed at the point where things go well, and not where problems develop (see e.g. the commitment of the reserve regiment by GOC 61st GRD in his attack - he does not bother using it to overcome the strongpoint). Reinforcing failure seems to have been out of vogue by 1944.

Michael, I have a scanned page showing how the late-war assault battalion was organised, I just have to ask someone to allow me to show it here. Basically the assault battalion was organised in two waves, as was the assault regiment and assault division, as I understand it. They also formed one or two battalions for specific tasks (e.g. assault strongpoints, or night fighting). In operational analysis, the Red Army appears tp use this frontage idea regardless of depth. What is hidden behind that is that the organisation extended not only in space, but also in time. Reserves that were an integral part of the assault organisation, or a different unit, would be committed at the point where things go well, and not where problems develop (see e.g. the commitment of the reserve regiment by GOC 61st GRD in his attack - he does not bother using it to overcome the strongpoint). Reinforcing failure seems to have been out of vogue by 1944.

Err, this is an historical attack, please read the info on the sources again. And no, they were not full strength. The divisions were (as I said) at far below strength, it is therefore logical to assume that their consituent parts were below strength too. The authorised strength was ~9,200 men based on the 1943 shtat. These divisions are at about 80% of that. One way to deal with that was to lose specialist personnel. Interestingly, according to Zaloga in order to reach 8,000 men division in October 1944, 3rd Ukrainian Front (the front undertaking this operation) ordered a specialist TO&E under which each rifle platoon would lose a squad. So the rifle battalions here would have about 2/3 TO&E strength. Assume a bit more for 61st GRD, since Guards divisions seem to have received more reinforcements. Still, at 4.5 rifle battalions to a km, and 2/3 strength, you are effectively putting 3 full-strength rifle battalions in there per km. Open a CMBO map and have a look at what that looks like. The Germans were heavily outnumbered at this point (as they were at many other points). But this did not happen because of some accident, or because the Germans overlooked something. It was the result of successful planning, Maskirovka that led to the Germans expecting the attack elsewhere or not at all, and consequent superior concentration of overwhelming force in a narrow breakthrough sector. Once resistance there was smashed, rapid movement would bring about the complete disintegration of the German rear areas as well as troop command and control.

Err, this is an historical attack, please read the info on the sources again. And no, they were not full strength. The divisions were (as I said) at far below strength, it is therefore logical to assume that their consituent parts were below strength too. The authorised strength was ~9,200 men based on the 1943 shtat. These divisions are at about 80% of that. One way to deal with that was to lose specialist personnel. Interestingly, according to Zaloga in order to reach 8,000 men division in October 1944, 3rd Ukrainian Front (the front undertaking this operation) ordered a specialist TO&E under which each rifle platoon would lose a squad. So the rifle battalions here would have about 2/3 TO&E strength. Assume a bit more for 61st GRD, since Guards divisions seem to have received more reinforcements. Still, at 4.5 rifle battalions to a km, and 2/3 strength, you are effectively putting 3 full-strength rifle battalions in there per km. Open a CMBO map and have a look at what that looks like. The Germans were heavily outnumbered at this point (as they were at many other points). But this did not happen because of some accident, or because the Germans overlooked something. It was the result of successful planning, Maskirovka that led to the Germans expecting the attack elsewhere or not at all, and consequent superior concentration of overwhelming force in a narrow breakthrough sector. Once resistance there was smashed, rapid movement would bring about the complete disintegration of the German rear areas as well as troop command and control.

Don't they always I am sure they did some beautiful maneuvering after 24th of August though. Encircling two Army Groups, rushing to the Romanian borders, and all that.

Don't they always I am sure they did some beautiful maneuvering after 24th of August though. Encircling two Army Groups, rushing to the Romanian borders, and all that.

My mistake, it is 6.0 for 61st GRD and 4,5 for 333rd RD, actually. 7.7 is over the whole frontage of 66th Rifle Corps. I will edit that.

My mistake, it is 6.0 for 61st GRD and 4,5 for 333rd RD, actually. 7.7 is over the whole frontage of 66th Rifle Corps. I will edit that.

Chris - you don't really. One of the German officers on the receiving end commented 'By the end of the barrage, Russian tanks were deep into our position.' (Hoffmann) A German battalion commander (Hauptmann Hans Diebisch, CO II.IR579, 306.ID) commented: 'The fire assets of the German defense were literally destroyed by the Soviet fighter bombers attacking the MLR and the rear positions. When the Russian infantry appeared (auftauchte - indicating they did not see them coming) inside the positions ofthe battalion and it tried to retreat, the Russian air force made this impossible. The battalion was dispersed und partly destroyed through the fire of the air force, mortars and machine guns.' (quoted from Mazulenko)

Chris - you don't really. One of the German officers on the receiving end commented 'By the end of the barrage, Russian tanks were deep into our position.' (Hoffmann) A German battalion commander (Hauptmann Hans Diebisch, CO II.IR579, 306.ID) commented: 'The fire assets of the German defense were literally destroyed by the Soviet fighter bombers attacking the MLR and the rear positions. When the Russian infantry appeared (auftauchte - indicating they did not see them coming) inside the positions ofthe battalion and it tried to retreat, the Russian air force made this impossible. The battalion was dispersed und partly destroyed through the fire of the air force, mortars and machine guns.' (quoted from Mazulenko)

Funnily enough, this is actually CM size, at least when you look at the map size. Iasi-Kischinjow Operation, August 1944 (Kischinjow would probably be called Kischinew in German unit histories) Operations of 3rd Ukrainian Front (GOC General Tolbuchin) Main effort of the front is in the sector of the 37th Army (GOC Lieutenant General Scharochin). Main effort of 37th Army is 66th Rifle Corps and 6th Guards Rifle Corps. The 37th Army has a 4km wide breakthrough frontage assigned to it. It is divided in two groupings, two corps up, one corps reserve. According to plan, it is supposed to break through the depth of the German/Romanian defense in 7 days, to a distance of 110-120km, with the distance to be covered in the first four days 15km each. 66th Rifle Corps (GOC Major General Kuprijanow) consisting of two groupings (61st Guards RD, 333rd RD up, 244th RD reserve). Attached are 46th Gun Artillery Brigade, 152nd Howitzer Artillery Regiment, 184th and 1245th Tank Destroyer Regiment, 10th Mortar Regiment, 26th Light Artillery Brigade, 87th Recoilless Mortar Regiment, 92nd and 52nd Tank Regiment, 398th Assault Gun Regiment, two Pioneer Assault Battalions, and two Light Flamethrower Companies. Corps frontage 4km Corps breakthrough frontage 3.5km (61st RD 1.5km, 333rd RD 2km) Densities per kilometer of frontage: Rifle battalions 7.7 Guns/mortars 248 Tanks and assault guns 18 Superiority Infantry 1:3 Artillery 1:7 Tanks and assault guns 1:11.2 There is no man-power information for the divisions, but expect them to have between 7,000 - 7,500 men each, 61st GRD maybe 8,000-9,000. The soldiers were prepared over the course of August by exercising in areas similar to those they had to attack, and being brought up to speed on special tactics needed to overcome the enemy in their sector. Density in 61st GRD sector per kilometer of frontage: Rifle battalions 6.0 Guns/mortars 234 Tanks and assault guns 18 Density in 333rd RD sector per kilometer of frontage: Rifle battalions 4.5 Guns/mortars 231 Tanks and assault guns 18 The initial attack 333rd RD did not bother with niceties like reserves and put three regiments up. 61st GRD attacked in classic two regiment up, one reserve formation. This proved to be lucky, since its right wing of 188th Guards(?) Rifle Regiment got stuck in front of the strongpoint Ploptuschbej. 189th Rifle Regiment on the left wing made good progress though, as did 333rd RD on its left. The GOC 61st GRD therefore inserted his reserve (187th GRR) behind 189th RR and off they went. When darkness came, 244th RD was inserted to break through the second line of defense. It lost its way though, and only arrived at 2300, by which time elements of 13th Panzer were counterattacking. The German/Romanian opposition was XXX. and XXIX. AK, with 15th, 306th German ID, 4th Romanian Mountain Division, and 21st Romanian ID. 13th PD was in reserve. At the end of day one, 4th Romanian Mountain, and 21st Romanian Divisions were almost completely destroyed, while 15th and 306th ID were heavily damaged (according to a German source: 306th lost 50% in the barrage, and was destroyed apart from local strongpoints by evening). Almost no artillery survived the fire preparation. 13th Panzer counter-attacked 66th Rifle Corps on day one, and tried to stop it on day two but to no avail. A study on the divisions history says 'The Russian dictated the course of events.' 13th Panzer at the time was a materially understrength, but high manpower unit, with a high proportion of recent reinforcements. It only had Panzer IV, Stugs and SP AT guns. The division was at the end of the second day in a condition that it was incapable to attack or of meaningful resistance. At the end of day two, the Red Army stood deep in the rear of German 6th Army. No more organised re-supply of forces would be forthcoming, and 6th Army was doomed to be encircled and chopped up. Franz-Josef Strauss, who was to become a very important German politician after the war, served with the Panzerregiment of 13th Panzer. He comments that the division had ceased to exist as a tactical unit on day three of the Soviet offensive: 'The enemy was everywhere.' The comment on the result of 66th Rifle Corps operations in Mazulenko is: 'Because of the reinforcement of the Corps and the deep battle arrangements of troops and units the enemy defenses were broken through at high speed.' This post is based on two German language sources, one being Mazulenko, 'The destruction of AG South Ukraine', and the other Hoffmann, 'Die Magdeburger Division', a history of 13th Panzer. This is what the Red Army saw as a late war set-piece attack. It is a relentless meat-grinder, that was protected by Maskirovka, full control of the air, and prepared with almost scientific rigour. This kind of stuff made Blitzkrieg look like Kindergarten. Almost exactly after a month the Red Army had destroyed AG South Ukraine completely. On the 6th September it had reached the Jugoslavian border at Turnu-Severin, on the 16th September it stood in Sofia, on the 19th it had reached the Hungarian border at Arad. Before that, on the 17th the old lands of the Danube Swabians at Temeschwar (Timisoara) were occupied. I posted this because I thought some people maybe interested in this rather 'secondary' theatre, and also because it is one of the few accounts I have come across that details almost down to battalion level for some aspects the organisation and preparation for a Soviet offensive of this scale. [ July 20, 2002, 10:18 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

Funnily enough, this is actually CM size, at least when you look at the map size. Iasi-Kischinjow Operation, August 1944 (Kischinjow would probably be called Kischinew in German unit histories) Operations of 3rd Ukrainian Front (GOC General Tolbuchin) Main effort of the front is in the sector of the 37th Army (GOC Lieutenant General Scharochin). Main effort of 37th Army is 66th Rifle Corps and 6th Guards Rifle Corps. The 37th Army has a 4km wide breakthrough frontage assigned to it. It is divided in two groupings, two corps up, one corps reserve. According to plan, it is supposed to break through the depth of the German/Romanian defense in 7 days, to a distance of 110-120km, with the distance to be covered in the first four days 15km each. 66th Rifle Corps (GOC Major General Kuprijanow) consisting of two groupings (61st Guards RD, 333rd RD up, 244th RD reserve). Attached are 46th Gun Artillery Brigade, 152nd Howitzer Artillery Regiment, 184th and 1245th Tank Destroyer Regiment, 10th Mortar Regiment, 26th Light Artillery Brigade, 87th Recoilless Mortar Regiment, 92nd and 52nd Tank Regiment, 398th Assault Gun Regiment, two Pioneer Assault Battalions, and two Light Flamethrower Companies. Corps frontage 4km Corps breakthrough frontage 3.5km (61st RD 1.5km, 333rd RD 2km) Densities per kilometer of frontage: Rifle battalions 7.7 Guns/mortars 248 Tanks and assault guns 18 Superiority Infantry 1:3 Artillery 1:7 Tanks and assault guns 1:11.2 There is no man-power information for the divisions, but expect them to have between 7,000 - 7,500 men each, 61st GRD maybe 8,000-9,000. The soldiers were prepared over the course of August by exercising in areas similar to those they had to attack, and being brought up to speed on special tactics needed to overcome the enemy in their sector. Density in 61st GRD sector per kilometer of frontage: Rifle battalions 6.0 Guns/mortars 234 Tanks and assault guns 18 Density in 333rd RD sector per kilometer of frontage: Rifle battalions 4.5 Guns/mortars 231 Tanks and assault guns 18 The initial attack 333rd RD did not bother with niceties like reserves and put three regiments up. 61st GRD attacked in classic two regiment up, one reserve formation. This proved to be lucky, since its right wing of 188th Guards(?) Rifle Regiment got stuck in front of the strongpoint Ploptuschbej. 189th Rifle Regiment on the left wing made good progress though, as did 333rd RD on its left. The GOC 61st GRD therefore inserted his reserve (187th GRR) behind 189th RR and off they went. When darkness came, 244th RD was inserted to break through the second line of defense. It lost its way though, and only arrived at 2300, by which time elements of 13th Panzer were counterattacking. The German/Romanian opposition was XXX. and XXIX. AK, with 15th, 306th German ID, 4th Romanian Mountain Division, and 21st Romanian ID. 13th PD was in reserve. At the end of day one, 4th Romanian Mountain, and 21st Romanian Divisions were almost completely destroyed, while 15th and 306th ID were heavily damaged (according to a German source: 306th lost 50% in the barrage, and was destroyed apart from local strongpoints by evening). Almost no artillery survived the fire preparation. 13th Panzer counter-attacked 66th Rifle Corps on day one, and tried to stop it on day two but to no avail. A study on the divisions history says 'The Russian dictated the course of events.' 13th Panzer at the time was a materially understrength, but high manpower unit, with a high proportion of recent reinforcements. It only had Panzer IV, Stugs and SP AT guns. The division was at the end of the second day in a condition that it was incapable to attack or of meaningful resistance. At the end of day two, the Red Army stood deep in the rear of German 6th Army. No more organised re-supply of forces would be forthcoming, and 6th Army was doomed to be encircled and chopped up. Franz-Josef Strauss, who was to become a very important German politician after the war, served with the Panzerregiment of 13th Panzer. He comments that the division had ceased to exist as a tactical unit on day three of the Soviet offensive: 'The enemy was everywhere.' The comment on the result of 66th Rifle Corps operations in Mazulenko is: 'Because of the reinforcement of the Corps and the deep battle arrangements of troops and units the enemy defenses were broken through at high speed.' This post is based on two German language sources, one being Mazulenko, 'The destruction of AG South Ukraine', and the other Hoffmann, 'Die Magdeburger Division', a history of 13th Panzer. This is what the Red Army saw as a late war set-piece attack. It is a relentless meat-grinder, that was protected by Maskirovka, full control of the air, and prepared with almost scientific rigour. This kind of stuff made Blitzkrieg look like Kindergarten. Almost exactly after a month the Red Army had destroyed AG South Ukraine completely. On the 6th September it had reached the Jugoslavian border at Turnu-Severin, on the 16th September it stood in Sofia, on the 19th it had reached the Hungarian border at Arad. Before that, on the 17th the old lands of the Danube Swabians at Temeschwar (Timisoara) were occupied. I posted this because I thought some people maybe interested in this rather 'secondary' theatre, and also because it is one of the few accounts I have come across that details almost down to battalion level for some aspects the organisation and preparation for a Soviet offensive of this scale. [ July 20, 2002, 10:18 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

One more bump...

Here they are: 1941 1:7 1942 1:6 1943 1:4 1944 1:4 1945 1:1,2 Total 1:4.4 I don't think he included assault guns in this, judging by the terminology (he just says 'tanks' and the production numbers in this table, which only make sense if assault guns are not included. Then again, the loss figures are so high, they could include assault guns... Very confusing. He is making an educated guesstimate of German losses in other theatres, which are not included in the ratios.