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argie

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Posts posted by argie

  1. Ok. Good answers. Lets see how I reasoned on that.

    1 - Game Scope: the CM battle is the critical point of the assault after the recon and the assembly for the battle was done. The assemble for an attack of 1500 points could take from half an hour to a few hours, depending on the Intel and resources.

    2 - Terrain: there was good LOS for most of the map. The Attacker had a fairly big deploying zone, 200 m deep, being at 500 m from the defender deployment zone Western border. There were patches of threes to hide inside or behind infantry and vehicles. In fact, the two AFVs still carrying troops were out of LOS from the Defender.

    3 - Game Limitations: at turn one, an armored force of 17 vehicles carrying two Coys of infantry suddenly appears, tele-transported, at 500 m from the defensive zone, in full LOS from the defensive positions. The assembly of such force is artificially 'hidden' by the arbitrary starting of the game.

    4 - Attacker apparent intention: to exploit such game limitation, by deploying a force unmolested artificially close to the enemy and proceed to rush it inside the defensive position, by the most exposed flank.

    5 - Attacker Tactical mistakes: to deploy packed. To deploy in full LOS from enemy.

    6 - Defender's line of thinking:

    A) Game related: the intention of the Attacker is to exploit the artificial start of the battle with a rush. The tool the defender has to prevent this kind of exploitation of the game limitation is the pre-planned barrage.

    B) Realism related: the Attacker has a formation that is not tactically sound (a bunch of tightly packed vehicles). No real life commander can have the luxury of 'deploying' such force at 500m from enemy in full LOS without being subject of some kind of 'ambush'.

    C) Historically related: the 'rush tactic' can be done, but is not doctrinal of any army in any time period. In real life is suicidal. Artillery bombardment of assembly zones (or suspected assembly zones) is doctrinal. The time for the assemble of an attacking force to take a town will vary, but will not be lower than a half hour.

    D) Psychologically related: the Attacker was an experienced player. He knew that a prep barrage was possible. Thus, deploying that way, i.e., not in tactical formation, nor concealed or spread, was considered by the defender as a gamble, done by assuming that the defender wouldn't have purchased IF arty, or was unaware of the possible use of it.

    7 - Defender's resolution: the Defender first choice was to use only one FO in the prep barrage, just to make the troops dismount and to show the Attacker what was he doing wrong. After further thinking, being the Attacker an experienced player and not a novice, the Defender finally choose to unload all his arty on the Attacker's formation, as an experienced player doing that was definitely taking a high risk with the expectation of a huge gain: to take his troops to the weaker (by terrain) defensive flank as soon as possible.

    My opponent is accusing me of cheating and of unethical behavior. I've followed a well reasoned path to come to the use of the prep barrage in that way and I'm not yet convinced I was doing wrong.

    Please, show me the fails in my reasoning.

    Thanks.

    [ November 13, 2003, 08:01 PM: Message edited by: Ariel ]

  2. I will put the 'facts' as neutral as possible. I will expose my reasoning later, when some people says what they think.

    Sit Rep:

    - Two experienced players met in a ladder's game. Axis attack 1500 points. medium map, 25 turns variable, town, gentle slopes, moderate three coverage (IIRC).

    - The map is fairly flat, with patchs of threes spread as usual with those settings. Little cover at Attacker's setup zone. Defender's left flank has more buildings and LOS obstacles than the other. Defender's right flank has a paved road running towards the East side of the map behind the town. Another paved road intersecting it goes diagonally from NW at ~600 m from West border to the NW corner of the town.

    - Set up of involved troops: The Attacker sets 7 AFVs + 7 HTs all carrying troops at 500 mts from the NW corner town in parallel lines of 7, back to front and side to side one of each other. Another 3 AFVs carrying troops are deployed something like 30 m at the South from this main body of troops.

    - Turn 1: Some Batteries of Soviet artillery fell over the heads of the main formation, killing 2 HTs, killing the gunners in another 3, and making all the troops on the AFVs, but 2, to dismount under fire. The vehicles started to move forward.

    Thoughts?

  3. All the opposite, Vanir. I think if someone was in the mood to bleed a bit more was USA, just that they would have eventually do the bleeding after losing Continental Europe.

    To me, the example of Ardennes offensive is the more accurate portrayal of what can have happened: an operational surprise by Soviets in one or some points, pushing the lines maybe 500 kms to the West in some point in the first two months of battles. If they managed to capture a few crucial ports in that push, WA could have been expulsed in the next 'push'. At that time, UK forces could have been pretty bleed.

    From there, all fall in the strategical realm, with blockades, amphibious operations and the like, with USA doing all the work and USSR with less and less resources to keep the fight. But if USSR succeed in the first stages driving WA from Europe, then the most probable scenario is one of a "Warmer War".

  4. Very plausible.

    But I think USA military, and USA people, would kept the resolve to continue the fight. Not anymore in Europe, but maybe like a blockade against USSR and European countries, helped by UK and a increasing effort from South America and other world areas to which USSR influence didn't reach.

    Of course, this may have meant a more clever USA foreign affairs politics regarding de-colonization, to prevent native forces to become communist, or negotiate with such forces from a non-ideological point of view, but in desperate times, wisdom may appear.

    [ October 20, 2003, 11:42 AM: Message edited by: Ariel ]

  5. Originally posted by flamingknives:

    I was under the impression that the Soviets had a large part in equipping and training the N.K.s at least.

    In such a case, one might have expected some of the operational skills to have rubbed off.

    Not so easy. The Soviet Army already had the main aspects of the Operational Theory fairly well developed by 1941, and look what happened.
  6. I don't remember exactly where I read this, but got sticked to my mind as a very clever system: the Red Army divisions were supposed to fight until they reach something like 1/3 of their initial strength. With the division transformed in a sort of Rgt or Bde with heavy support, the second in command of the division, and all the seconds in all surviving echelons, take command and the remaining force was named after the new commander. The whole CoC was sent to the RVGK to render a new division around them, with returning wounded and new recruits and weapons. I don't remember if this new division took the name of the former, but surely they were from the same region in USSR.

    That way you got very experienced commander at all levels in a new division and minimizes the flow of troops to the rear for refitting, as the fighting core was left at the front, where it was eventually merged with the divisions that replaced their former unit, keeping them up to strength after the attrition of the march from the rear to the front.

    I'm not sure if I'm clear, or if it was the system truly used. But I think is pretty clever anyway smile.gif

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