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Apocal

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Posts posted by Apocal

  1. Is there any way other than engineer or sapper units to clear a minefield?

     

    Heavy artillery, large-bore HE and running tracked vehicles (AP mines only) over it. None of those are especially practical. By the way, engineers/sappers don't clear minefields, they only mark them so it is safe to move across at MOVE speed for infantry.

     

    And once its cleared is it totally safe to move through the minefield or is their still a chance a mine could go off?

    Once it is cleared, it is safe to move across, but as I said before, marked minefields are something different and place a speed limit on your advance if you want them to not go off.

  2. I can see some benefit, but I can see one unit pissing away all the ammo without you realizing it.

     

    For direct fire weapons? I haven't really seen it; either the other team has LoS as well and joins in the firing, there is so much ammo you run out of targets before it is exhausted, or -- being exposed to reply fire -- the offending element is eliminated in turn.

  3. Is this realistic depict of thermal visions under bad weather condition? and how those thermal visions 'restricted' by weather? Their maximum distance to detect in IR wavelength limited? Or bad weather make too much noise or make the signals weak, so that the crews inside the vehicle feels hard to detect the enemy? I'm just very curious and confused, because all those thermal vision companies claim that their product can see 100% same with the day at any condition. 

     

    Moisture has an insulating effect, so as humidity climbs, your thermals degrade. I don't know how you would put a good number on it, but the effect is real. If they are seriously claiming 100% across all conditions, they are absolutely lying. What they can reasonably claim is that thermal works better than Mark 1 Eyeball or image intensifying systems, which can be rendered pretty damned well useless by overcast nights or dense fog.

  4. :D The East Front guys are killing me.  Maybe my memory is failing me, but I do believe that Red Thunder was the last WW2 era release.  The release after that was, of course, CMBS.  So Red Thunder was released after Market Garden and I don't think CMFI hasn't seen anything since before Market Garden.  We all want lots of cool East Front stuff, but I think perhaps a little perspective might be in order.  ;)   Up to this point I think the pattern has been West Front release, followed by Italy release, then comes East Front, with Modern finishing up.  We all know that Bulge is in the pipeline (west front) and the next Italy module was mentioned by Chris in the CMFI forum, so after those come out you can probably expect something else for the East Front.  Then before the next East Front module comes out you will probably have to wait until the cycle completes one more time.  

     

    Nothing wrong with a little enthusiasm for one's favorite theater, but the love has to be spread around.

     

    :huh:

    You think I'm an east front guy?

  5. In some sort of alternate reality CMBS, it'd be neat to give some incentive to losing well.  Like perhaps surrendering is wrong, but instead having a condition to move forces off the map after certain conditions are met, and to that end if you can pull enough forces off the map deny the enemy a major victory/perhaps even force a draw. 

     

    It doesn't need to be alternate CMBS, the tools are already in place. But force preservation and exit objectives are sorely under-utilized in most scenarios.

  6. Something I don't know. Was there any enemy ATGM action in Iraq/Afghanistan? I mean after the initial invasion. I don't recall reading of any. I remember *something* hit an Abrams during the run north to Bagdad and the Pentagon absolutely freaked. They initially thought it was a Kornet and started threatening Syria with hell & damnation for supplying the weapon to Iraq - but it turned out it wasn't and they didn't.

     

    There were a handful of suspected shots from old weapons out of Saddam's toybox (Mulans), but I don't recall any serious threat. It wouldn't surprise me if there were a few -- some insurgents definitely got their hands on MANPADS so it isn't as if they couldn't get relatively modern and effective weapons.

  7. Another issue I´ve detected is combat with tanks, I noticed most of them are destroyed wiht one shot. Consider Combat Mission rules should be designed according to reality, never to war movies or spectacular explosions. That´s Ok if Battlefront decide to follow this path but they shouldn´t sell it like a realistic game. Oh no.

     

    "Ugh, my T-34-85 with loose rounds stowed all over the turret blows up a lot when hit by a 88, this game is so unrealistic."

     

    I see plenty of bounces, partial penetrations, non-fatal full penetrations, etc. in my games. I'm not going to sit up here and do a thousand test iterations to pin a number on it, but if you pushed me for a number, I'd say the typical gun vs. frontal armor takes about 2 hits on average to kill the tank. Although obviously there is going to be a huge range of cases that defy that norm, typically due to overmatching gun or armor, but it isn't anything terribly unreasonable.

  8. Maybe getting a little off topic, but what would the German strong points look like and what kind of terrain would they exploit, in areas outside of what you already mentioned? Would they be at the company level, with the company's machine guns upfront and the platoons several hundred meters back? Would a Russian attack try to take out one MG Strong point or attack on a general front to find the weakness?

     

    He wrote a post about that a few years ago:

     

    Apocal - strongpoint defense is a scheme for defending a whole sector, as well as a single element within that scheme, the strongpoint proper.

    As a scheme, the idea is to have large portions of the frontage covered only by obstacles and ranged fire (both direct and artillery registrations), with at most a thin screen of outposts and listening posts as a supplement to those, as the overall "linear" defense. No even spreading of the available force along the entire line.

    Then strongpoints act as anchors between sectors only covered in the manner described above. They are themselves typically layered in 2-3 belts or lines, but are discontinuous. A blob here, nothing for 800 meters, a blob there, nothing for 600 meters, etc. Then, behind the 800 meter gap but 1200 meters farther to the rear, another such blob.

    The usual formation strength assigned to a single strongpoint is an infantry company. But that varied. A reduced company because some forces were detached to the outpost line would be the most common variation. Or a reinforced company (extra platoon), in the middle of a battalion defensive scheme, say, meant as an "overage" that could act as a reserve. But think company as the baseline amount.

    The second or third line "tiers" could be formed around artillery or mortar formations with some infantry attachment, or could be looser, less fortified positions (assembly areas, rally points) for mobile reserves (tanks, mechanized infantry, etc). Again these would be more likely in the last tier of the strongpoint layers.

    The core of any strongpoint is some form of range firepower that can reach out to either side to cover the obstacle barriers between that strongpoint and the next along the line. The strongest schemes would overlap the effective ranges and lines of sight from two adjacent strongpoints, to that both could "bear" with their ranged weapons on any force assaulting either one, let alone a force trying to pass between them.

    That ranged firepower component could be as limited as a pair of 82mm mortars and a few heavy machineguns, or as elaborate as a PAK, field artillery, or light FLAK battery. Or an infantry gun section, you get the idea. Something bigger than rifles and personal side arms. There would also be FOs in each strongpoint, with authority to call down div arty fires on registration points in front of their perimeter, and between the strongpoints, in dead ground areas for direct fire especially (a low draw, a large wood, etc).

    The forward defense screen is an obstacle belt. Mines were the favorite form, with uneven density, some heavy enough to actually block passage, some just light enough to deter it by looking like the previous. Dead ground areas could be mined without being covered by direct fire. Wire obstacles, on the other hand, needed to be covered by direct fire. Natural terrain would be incorporated here - water barriers, steep terrain, bogs e.g.

    Next string a screen of small outposts, fire team size, along the frontage. These would be around 200 meters apart, the idea being listening post coverage at night, and close small arms coverage during the day, overlapping from one to the next. These might have covered routes to them, or might just have to be manned or relieved in darkness. One log bunker, or a fire team in a foxhole, is all we are talking about here. Overall they are a "tripwire", early warning system, and meant to prevent the whole position from being scouted or penetrated without a full attack. There wouldn't be more than a single platoon deployed on such duties (at any one time that is), even for a full battalion scheme.

    Ok, that covers everything about the scheme and why it is expected to work, other than the actual strongpoint itself. Those are typically all around defense, but might be weaker in a rear direction away from the enemy. They use platoon sized sub-forts, linked by communications trenches. Plus heavy weapons positions, best case in log bunkers, sometimes open firing pits (e.g. for mortars, infantry guns, or howitzers). A mortar position toward the rear but within the strongpoint is a typical addition, perhaps a second rear position that serves as a company CP, or a reserve point.

    The platoon subforts and company CP area each would get a dugout, a deeper fortification with overhead cover in which to shelter from artillery fire. Depth of a cellar or more, wood ladders to get out of them, tunnel rat living. Usually only one per platoon subposition. Then radiating from that, short communication trenches to firing trench positions (fire step, embankment with sandbags, that sort of thing), which let the riflemen and LMGs cover one of the approach routes to the strongpoint itself. Their main mission was direct defense of the strongpoint proper against enemy infantry assault. Each subfort might also have associated heavy weapons (HMGs at a minimum) that had a role in the strongpoint to strongpoint, open areas fire scheme. These heavy weapons could also help defend that part of the strongpoint from direct attack, but that was not their main mission. Interdicting the obstacle barriers and unmanned open ground to the next strongpoint over on their side, was.

    A typical configuration of one of these platoon subforts would be a semi circle of firing trench looking over say the east face of the overall strongpoint, one log bunker HMG to the left and 20-30 yards behind that semi circle, communication trenches of all of those to a central dugout, which could also hold a local reserve squad to "repel borders" by remanning a threatened point or "grenading up the trenches". The perimeter of the platoon subfort itself might be covered by wire obstacles at 50 yards or so - meant to be far enough away to prevent approach within grenade-throw of the fighting trenches, without crossing the wire. But otherwise close enough that small arms from those trenches would be murderous to anyone trying to make such a movement. The layout of the individual subfort would however confirm to the nature of the ground, sighting opportunities, etc.

    Last elements of the scheme... It was expected that in quiet periods, the enemy might try to infiltrate through the gaps e.g. at night, so one of the active parts of the defense would be occasional night patrols of squad to platoon strength into the uncovered areas, to see what was moving around out there.

    And second, when actually under attack, it was expected that some strongpoints in the whole scheme would be hit harder than others, while others would be left alone or rapidly defeat their local attackers. Reserves could be gathered from those, and from the second tier strongpoints if unmolested so far, to retake any lost portions of the defensive works by a local counterattack. The ideal was to organize and launch those as soon as possible after it was learned a position was lost, or even when it was still just threatened. The hope was that the occupiers would be so disorganized and lack battlefield situational awareness at the conclusion of their fight into the strongpoint itself, and could thus be temporarily vulnerable to a sharp counterattack (up communications trenches / covered routes wherever possible), even by numerically shoestring forces.

    With that idea in mind, all the defense weapons and sighting schemes included someone or other having the job of being able to plaster friendly positions that fell to the enemy, to cover such attempts by fire. The company HQ position might e.g. be "reverse slope" to the original enemy start line, but have observation to the platoon subforts, for example. Artillery or mortars from adjacent strongpoints could also have the range to those positions, to drop fire on them if they fell, whether to support a counterattack or just to pin down the intruders and keep them from getting any further.

    If many of these tactics sound quite WWI trench warfare -ee, that is because they were developed in the last 2 years of that war, basically. Formations tended to be thinner on the ground in WW II, and the gaps between strongpoints wider. But the internals of each followed WWI lessons, that were still sound on a small unit level.

    Does that give a clear picture of the tactics?

  9. FWIW, there are so many things the CM engine DOESN'T even do that are KEY to even getting close to providing a realistic experience of WW2 night combat.  Without modelling the range of illumination sources that you would find under realistic low light/night conditions the whole exercise becomes kind of farcical.  eg. light from burning vehicles structures, illumination flares.  Not to mention how these sources of light can actually further impair vision depending on the position and facing of a unit relative to the light source.  It really is just too complex, why bother.  If you are going to do something, do it right and do it well. It seems the current LOS engine comes no where near to what it needs to be. Save ourselves the trouble of caring, and let BFC focus on more important stuff.

     

    People bitch a lot more about there being no night/bad weather combat at all (example: early Close Combat games) than they do about not having illum or units spotting poorly in dense fog.

  10. "The initial battle was a complete shock for Germans, who’ve lost the initiative and suddenly understood their troops are concentrated along the single road and their flanks are completely unprotected."
     
    "US commander decided to split the reinforcement battalion, sending ⅓ of it to Dieuze and ⅔ to Moncourt. So, instead of bringing it’s entire weight at the northern sector (as high command demanded), the reinforcement was distributed along the whole front as a reserves, and were effectively wasted, as Germans did not attempt to attack in the southern half at all."
     
    "By the end of the second day of the battle, Germans had lost Heming (that was left undefended) and got their main supply line cut. But this success was not supported by any additional forces, nor any development of the success was planned."
     
    "Moreover, the infantry company was ordered to leave Heming and retreat to Cutting. That was the biggest operational mistake, for some reason US command gave away all the achievements and positional advantages it had by then. German supply route was clear again and their troops at Heming were now free for actions."
     
    "In the same time, Germans considered the situation to be very complex. German companies were only 20-50% strength, and it became usual for panzers to attack without infantry support and without artillery (who did not participate in combat until Turn 12 at all and suffered of poor supply afterwards)."

     

     

    It sounds like operational missteps defined this campaign.

  11. Probably been suggested before but I'm sure I'm not the only one who finds what's available in the present Movement menu often to be inappropriate for what is trying to be achieved. More appropriate to civilian movement than to military personnel.

     

    The entire present Movement menu could be replaced with order type commands eg Move to Sighting, Move to Contact, Move to Engage which respectively would mean stop moving when enemy sighted, stop when enemy contacted and engage him, and, engage the enemy while continuing to move. These sorts of orders would reduce the amount of micromanaging and intense supervision presently necessary and allow the player to better concentrate on tactics and strategy which to me would greatly enhance the playing experience. 

     

    Not that Battlefront are going to rush around changing stuff but this subject may be appropriate in the future. What do you think?

     

    I think it is easier to work in terms of "move slow," "move normally," and "move fast" with the behavior currently held in the "Hunt" command being a toggle-switch. People would inevitably trip themselves up using the "Move to Sighting" command;stumbling into a short-range shootout that their troops don't respond effectively to, similar to the complaints with Hunt now. Moreso with the Move to Engage command running you into something like a tank or pair of dug-in MGs and you really, really want your troops to stop but they don't.

  12. First understand that the standard formation carrying out the mech way of fighting is the tank corps, which consists of 3 tank and 1 rifle brigade, plus minimal attachments of motorized guns, recon, and pioneers.  The rifle brigade is 3 battalions and is normally trailing the tank brigades and holds what they take.  Sometimes it doubles their infantry weight and sometimes it has to lead for a specific mission (force a river crossing, say, or a night infiltration attack that needs stealth - things only infantry can do), but in the normal offensive case it is just driving up behind something a tank brigade took, dismounting, and manning the position to let the tank brigade go on to its next mission.  It has trucks to keep up, and the usual infantry heavy weapons of 82mm mortars and heavy MGs, but it uses them to defend ground taken.  Notionally, the rifle brigade is the tank corps' "shield" and it maneuvers it separately as such.

     

    Excellent post, Jason. I have just one question. As I understand it, there were also mechanized corps as part of the Soviet mech arm. What was their role, compared to the tank corps? Or am I mistaken and mechanized corps served as supplements to the rifle arm?

  13. On top of what Krasno already pointed out, are you going to have me believe that there were 3695 KIA and only 4262 WIA? That is some bull **** if I have seen it.

     

    Irrecoverable losses doesn't necessarily mean KIA. It also includes wounds so severe as to preclude additional service.

  14. Have "Hedgehog Obstacles" not made it into BS?

     

    On considering it further, I'm a little bit surprised they're available to buy in QBs, since they are indestructible, and can be used to deny road transport anywhere in the defender's setup zone... Certainly something to consider; they're a bit expensive, and they won't kill any vehicles, but if you want to stop tanks crossing a bridge, or make roads difficult to use, they're very effective, and all you can do is find another way.

     

    Just barbed wire and sandbag walls, as far as I can tell. If I'm doing something wrong here and there are hedgehogs, logs, dragon's teeth, etc. available, by all means, please tell me.

  15. The M1114 is nearly an APC is terms of protection and size. I can see fighting from the mount in something that is at least protected from rifle rounds as practical. By pitched battles though i'm really thinking of "the works" ie: MBTs, IFVs, etc. If you guys drilled to fighting things like that mounted i'd be interested to hear what procedure was

     

    Not really my area, but the jist, as I understand it: basic mobile defense stuff, focus on fighting from a series of pre-planned battle positions, shoot-and-scoot, built-in as part of a rifle company's defensive scheme and not as an independent maneuver element.  The MAPs are literally the heavy weapons platoon of a rifle company, just nowadays people have stopped pretending guys are going to hump a TOW or MK19 plus ammo across broken terrain fast enough to actually be relevant or survivable.

  16. At least in BN it's sort of important to keep in mind that the vehicles like the Hanomag, and M3 are not "fighting vehicles". They're battlefield taxis/w protection from splinters and MG fire at range. They're not meant to be directly involved in high intensity firefights. Light vehicles like HMMWVs and and Jeeps literally have no business being anywhere near the pitched battles we get most scenarios. They usually just are due to circumstance.

     

    All that said, these things certainly haven't stopped me from using them in such ways before. 

     

    We've used MAPs during pitched battles before. Deliberately so, since they are a part of every rifle company in a IBCT and haul most of the unit's firepower.

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