Sgt Joch
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Posts
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Days Won
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Posts posted by Sgt Joch
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Hugh Cole's "The Ardennes" is an excellent book. Available as a free PDF download:
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/007/7-8-1/CMH_Pub_7-8-1.pdf
He served on Patton's staff during the battle. I have read most of it and it is a very good overview, both on the German and Allied side.
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To Sgt Joch I call historical BS. Map scale and Russia side fire support in that scenario each have nothing to do with history.
well Jason, maybe you should actually research the history of the campaign before commenting.
map scale is correct for the force levels in that sector. This was one of the main axis of attack of the 11th Guards Army. German forces were relatively light in the area, since they did not think the Russians would attack in that type of terrain. German troop density is correct for that secor.
As to the fire support, yes that is a game restriction. The Soviet prep bombardement was up to 3 hours, obviously out of scale for a CM mission. The idea was to simulate the tail end of the bombardement and this was the most practical solution. I believe this is also stated in the designer notes?
I spent a lot of time researching this one, so if you have other comments I can swat away, please be my guest.
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I am the one who designed mission 1. The map, opposing forces and defenses are all as close as possible to the historical situation on the morning of June 23rd as we could determine based on the historical records.
you don't like the scenario? I am sure the Russians and Germans who actually had to fight it in real life liked it even less.
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an oldie, but a goodie:
http://www.2ndbn5thmar.com/CoTTP/Suppression%20McBreen%202001.pdf
suppression is the key, whether in real life or the game.
If you own CMBN, a good scenario to practice on is the 1st mission of the "Road to Montebourg" campaign. Get the modded one in the Repository where you have only green troops. You are attacking over 300-400 meters of open terrain directly towards a series of enemy MG nests/bunkers.
If you try to just attack forward, you will lose. The trick is to move shooters into good firing position and fire your MGs/mortars at all suspected enemy strong points. You should then be able to gradually bring your shooters forward taking advantage of the terrain to eventually outflank and capture the enemy position.
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On the dangers of being a TC, on december 23rd 1944, U.S. 4th armored division, CCR was just outside Bigonville on the road to Bastogne. In the course of a few hours, nearly all the TCs in one tank company were picked off by rifle fire.
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well actually, from a tactical military point of view, JasonC is correct, movement does not take ground, fire takes ground. There is no need to physically occupy a position if you can cover it with firepower. The whole point of fire and maneuver tactics should be to actually place your moving troops/AFV in a better firing position to suppress/kill the enemy troops, preferably from multiple angles. That is the way I play the game anyhow.
The problem with physically occupying a position as you see is that one survivor with a SMG can do a lot of damage at close range. Now you may have no choice if the scenario requires you to capture a physical spot, but if I can, I will make sure that objective has been hosed down by all manner of firepower and from multiple angles before sending my troops in.
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well Jason, that is your personal opinion. When the new MG/suppression code was being tested, I spent a lot of time playing the first mission of "Road to Montebourg" where you have to attack with "Green" troops over open ground. If you just try to rush forward without suppressing the defences, you quickly wind up with casualties, broken and pinned squads and a stalled attack. Yes, they will recover, but if they are "rattled" as often happens, they are even more brittle when you try to use them again. yes, I do think the rally code could be tweaked, but not by a factor of three.
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Dismounted tank crews controlled by the AI will also continue the same attack orders they had when they were still in the tank. So this leads to bailed-out tank crews charging mindlessly toward your positions, trying to capture them with their pistols. Most of the time this isn't really noticeable because the crews usually get killed so quickly, but it was very noticeable in the "Red Hordes" scenario in CMRT. That scenario is designed as Germans vs AI, with the AI Russians attacking you with dozens of tanks with almost no infantry support. After knocking out a couple dozen of them at long range, you start seeing waves of tank crewmen streaming across the fields, attempting to storm your trenches all by themselves, shrugging off the heavy losses and machine gun fire.
that is a problem since the tank crew will keep following its AI group order, there have been discussions on how to fix it, for example "triggering" a new order to make the crew move to its friendly side. It will eventually get fixed.
On suppression and panic, it is quite easy to manipulate the code. The harder question is coming up with the right settings. As a player though, this is the easiest factor to control since you can choose whether to play with poor morale conscripts or fanatic elite troops or any other combinations.
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in most cases, its a holdover from the old days, i.e. CMSF, where there was no Mod folder and you actually needed to create a "Z" folder.
its mostly redundant these days, although for certain mods, for example using a special editor overlay when creating a map, you still need to use a Z folder.
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What you fail to grasp is that the criticism leveled at your concept is well reasoned and very solidly backed up by reality. That means your proposal isn't well informed. It might not be "silly" or "stupid", but defending it without addressing any of the criticism leveled at it certainly isn't doing you any favors.
well Steve, as you know, my proposal is a means, a policy is desired end goals. Assuming the policy is removing Assad from power and replacing him with someone better, the means are how you get there.
Right now stated western aims in Syria are to remove Assad from power and to replace him with a more inclusive, democratic government.
The means which are currently used are to provide arms to the Rebels and bomb ISIL. The consensus is that this will probably produce at best, an Islamic republic, at worst, a failed state like Libya, neither of which are better than the current situation. Qaddafi was a brutal dictator, but the current situation in Libya is not an improvement for the rest of the region.
It should be obvious that the only way the West achieves its stated policy of installing the more inclusive, democratic government in Damascus that western liberals want is if NATO goes in there and installs one. Now if the consensus is that this will take 100,000+ troops and 10+ years of war and that it will probably turn into a debacle like Iraq and Afghanistan, then obviously yes, that is non starter.
which brings me back to my original question, namely what are they smoking in Washington? It must be obvious to them that the means they are using will not achieve their stated policy goals and in fact will probably lead to a worst outcome.
So the policy has to be scrapped and the west has to come up with more modest and realistic goals which would mean coming up with a compromise that will probably leave Assad in power in the west and grant autonomy to the Sunni areas as you discussed. However, none of that will happen until both sides burn themselves out and a new President is in the WH.
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While you jeer at my course of action, I will contend not acting is better than acting stupidly.
well considering your proposal is to continue the current policy and considering the current policy is basically a carbon copy of the 2011 Libya operation, I would not be so quick to judge which proposal is "acting stupidly" or a "silly course of action".
Is'nt the definition of insanity to keep repeating the same thing, but hope for a different result?
At least my proposal may result in a desired outcome, while your proposal can only result in a failed state. Now it might be the U.S. decides that it is not in their interest to step into the Syria mess which is of course their absolute right. However, let us assume Syria becomes another Libya, what will be the next target of the Islamists? Jordan? Egypt? Can the U.S. afford to stand on the sidelines forever while the middle east goes up in smoke?
As to Canadian troops, they were in Afghanistan, where they had one of the highest per capita casualty rate than any NATO country, they were involved in the Mali op and are currently in Syria.
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Libya is actually a really good example of exactly why Sgt Joch is advocating a silly course of action. about as messy as it comes.
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here is why a failed state, like Libya, is in no one's interest: weapons.
Libyan Weapons Arming Al Qaeda Militias Across North Africa, Officials Say
WASHINGTON -- An unchecked flood of weapons out of Libya, including thousands of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, is providing new firepower to al Qaeda-linked jihadist militias across northern Africa, according to Defense Department officials, accelerating conflict and raising new risks for U.S. and western interests.
There has been a continuing flow of weaponry since the fall of Libyan strongman Muammar Gaddafi in October 2011, said outside experts and Pentagon defense officials, who agreed to brief The Huffington Post on the North African arms trade on the basis of anonymity to protect their identities. The weapons include small arms, anti-tank mines, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, light machine guns, crates of ammunition and rockets, truck-mounted heavy machine guns, anti-aircraft artillery and Russian-made Strela anti-aircraft missiles.
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Arms looted from Libyan depots or sold by fleeing Gaddafi loyalists make up the bulk of the weapons that are being transported across Libya's poorly guarded borders.
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"Conditions in that part of Africa, North Africa, are not entirely dissimilar to Iraq after the U.S. invasion in 2003, with lots of different militias and armed groups feeding off of vast arms stockpiles," Hoffman said. The al Qaeda-linked militias "are armed almost to the extent of a small army -- we're not talking about yesterday's terrorist with an AK-47 and a knapsack. Look what they're carrying away from Libya -- heavy machine guns, heavy mortars, plastic explosives are the accoutrements of a small army."
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Defense officials at the Pentagon expressed frustration at having an incomplete picture of where the arms are going. One official, discussing the shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles known as MANPADS, for Man-Portable Air Defense Systems, said "there are thousands of them" flowing out of Libya, "but we're not sure where they are, exactly. It's really a gap for us."
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/20/libyan-weapons-al-qaeda-north-africa_n_2727326.html
The AQIM/Ansar Dine militants that conquered northern Mali in 2012 were equipped with the same Libyan weapons. If the Gaddafi regime had not fallen, the crisis in Mali in 2012-13 might not have happened. A failed state like Libya is a problem not just inside its borders, but throughout all of North Africa.
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The US should petition the UN to approve the redrawing of national borders. Syria would become divided up into three areas (Alawite to the west, Sunni to the east and south, Kurdish to the north) and Iraq would be as well (Shia to the south and east, Sunni to the west, Kurdish to the north). The Sunni sections would become their own country, Shia would become its own, and Kurdish its own. The governments would be set up along a semi-representational system which guaranteed Human Rights and regional security, but otherwise leaves them to work out the details for themselves.
This is the only practical way to stop the killing long term. Unfortunately, it has no chance for success because certain parties (Russia, Iran, and Turkey in particular) would never agree to it. So it's dead in the water as is pretty much every single other reasonable means of ending this war. In that light, my suggestion is just as useless as yours is because it's never going to happen.
not necessarily, there is the South Sudan example and even if you can't have formal international borders, you can still have "de facto" autonomy like the Kurds in northern Iraq or even a more formal federal structure with wide legal powers for each region. There are many ways to get there.
First you need a plan, then you need someone to drive that plan. Who thought a few years ago that the U.S. would be able to conclude a nuclear agreement with Iran?
A US ground force contingent in Iraq should be contemplated if the Shia lead government agrees to certain concessions.
yes, much better than my plan ..... attack ISIS from the East!
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Steve,
On Syria. I will guess you did not read my post of yesterday morning where I said:
First, in the interest of full disclosure, I don't believe the U.S. will ever send any combat troops into Syria, not under this President any way.
Second, the Syrian civil war has been going on for 4 years and is no closer to being resolved. The current policy is not working IMHO, so nothing wrong with doing some "what ifs" CMSF was a "what if" about the invasion of Syria after it was taken over by Islamic terrorists. Prescience?
Third, U.S. forces would have to be involved for the simple reason that if the U.S. does not go in, no other NATO ally will. However, if the U.S. did commit ground forces, there is a good chance other NATO countries (i.e. UK, France, maybe Germany) would as well.
now on this I agree:
With that said, I think the industrialized nation's response to Syria sucks badly. I think the US' entire Middle East policies for the previous 50+ years has sucked badly. I think the Obama Admin's approach to foreign policy sucks badly on most days in most ways. Which means I do think something better should be done to deal with Syria.
so what I am getting from this discussion is that even though everyone agrees the current approach is not working, no one has any interest whatsoever in even discussing possible alternatives.
On Ukraine, we have had this discussion way too many times and it always ends the same way. Anyway, it is really academic at this point, the ceasefire is holding and both sides are talking.
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Worse than that... the US usually gets criticized far more when it actually does something than when it does not. Sgt Joch was a huge critic of US and NATO doing so much as criticizing Putin in regards to Ukraine. Which is rather odd when you consider on the one hand he's arguing the US should do absolutely nothing but capitulate when its core national interests are threatened, but go all kinds of Rambo in a place that has almost nothing to do with US national interests.
Steve
you know Steve, at one point you will have to decide exactly what hat you wear in these debates, moderator, participant or website owner. I don't appreciate you personalising and misrepresenting my personal opinions. You are the one who wants to risk war with Russia over Ukraine which no, IMHO has no national interest whatsoever to the USA and which BTW, is now pretty much contained. Meanwhile everyone's policy on Syria, which is a real international crisis is to do nothing constructive and let it fall to pieces.
If you can't run these debates in an objective and impartial manner, as other websites seem to have no problem doing, you should just shut them down.
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Which you've spent quite a long time describing how either ineffective, or secretly sunni extremists they are. I find it interesting that their base utility entirely varies based upon what argument you're trying to make.
That is only because everyone here is so quick to argue that they are "moderate rebels". Odd how everyone wants to give them advanced weapons, but no one trusts them. I am guessing understanding sarcasm is not your strong suit.
Regardless you are rather setting things up for Libya part two in that you're neither addressing the reasons the Sunnis revolved in the first place, or giving the Shia a reason to feel safe around the Sunnis. This is likely what'll happen if/when ISIS collapses anyway, but you propose doing it at great cost to everyone vs simply to the involved parties.
and how exactly is the current U.S. policy leading anywhere other than Libya II in any case?
Iraq and Syria (and you'll have to go to Iraq too if you're looking to defeat ISIS) are not the same problem as Mali, and it continues to baffle me why you're drawing the connection.
and it continues to baffle me why you are unable to see the parallels.
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He also thinks Sgt Joch would do really well to listen and accept input rather than digging himself a deeper hole.
you know "Captain" this is a public war gaming discussion forum. Just repeating the same arguments over and over gets boring, it is much more interesting to think out of the box.
why don't you lay out what you would do if you were President.
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part 3, "Operation Syria".
first let's look at the forces:
1. ISIS: controls eastern Syria/western Iraq, mostly desert, low population density, similar to Northern Mali. According to the CIA, there are a total of 20,000-30,000 ISIS fighters in Syria and Iraq. In Mali, there were an estimated 5-10,000 Islamic militants, so to maintain a similar force ratios, you would need a minimum 10-15,000 regular troops.
French forces in Mali were basically equivalent to a Stryker brigade on a budget, so U.S. forces at a minimum could be a Stryker Brigade (4500 men, 300 vehicles), which was designed for this type of operation and was the lead invasion force in CMSF. Again, prescience? The other 5-10,000 could come from other NATO members. Several EU members would have their own reasons to join, as well as perhaps Turkey, Iraq and Jordan.
2. Rebels: if the FSA/"moderate Rebels" want U.S. aid and have apparently the same aim, they should not have an issue with getting help from NATO troops.
In Mali, the French used several Rebel militias as additional troops and to provide policing in liberated areas. These Rebel militias had been fighting against the Malian army and/or each other, but they had a common enemy in the Islamic militants. The French did not trust them and knew they had incompatible long term goals, but they freed French combat troops from policing duties and more importantly gave the French a "buy in" in securing the neutrality of the locals. It was not a perfect solution to our western sensibilities, since the militia did commit abuses in the towns they "policed", but it was better than wath the Islamists had done.
So with that force, it should be possible to clear ISIS out of Syria/Iraq in 2-3 months? The French liberated all the cities in northern Mali in 1 month all the way up to the Algerian border. The remaining militants holed up in mountains on the Algeria-Mali border.
3. Syrian Army: the last group, manned mostly by Alawites at this point. After 4 years of war, the Alawites are the Assad's only remaining domestic power base. Now is that because they love the Assad family or because the only other alternative is to hope the "moderate Rebels" won't kill them all if they take over? Maybe if they had a third alternative, they might be more open to a compromise solution. If not, it is certainly easier to negotiate a compromise if you have troops on the ground that can go into action to support the Rebels.
If anyone is interested in the French operation in Mali, RAND did an excellent study:
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR770.html
Now does the U.S. have a national interest in Syria? probably not. Does the U.S. have a national interest in South Korea? The U.S. still has 38,000 troops there 62 years after the end of the Korean War even though the South Korean army has 500,000 men.
The U.S. does not have to send troops to Syria, but then it has to accept that other troops will decide the future of Syria. The Iranians are already reshaping Syria into a satellite.
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now I am not the only one saying Mali 2013 is relevant:
As with ISIS in Iraq, this syndicate of non-state armed groups in Mali succeeded in overwhelming Malian government forces. Similar to what ISIS has thus far achieved in Iraq, MNLA and Ansar Dine seized major cities in northern Mali, including Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. In response, the UN Security Council passed a number of resolutions that provided international legal authority for an armed intervention. This led, ultimately, to Operation Serval – a French-led multinational engagement in Mali that included regional components and has been largely viewed as successful. This multinational effort was coupled with capacity-building efforts by numerous international partners.
While there are certainly differences between Iraq and Mali, there is reason to believe that a similar multinational effort in Iraq will yield similar results.
» Dan Stigall is an attorney with the US Department of Justice, Office of International Affairs. He previously served in Iraq with the US Army JAG Corps. He is the author of Counterterrorism and the Comparative Law of Investigative Detention.
While newscasts of the conflict were dominated by the exploits of the French Foreign Legion and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aircraft, the 1er Régiment d’Infanterie de Marine and the Régiment d’Infanterie Chars de Marine provided much of the muscle necessary to liberate northern Mali from extremist control. Each of the regiments, part of mechanized brigades designed to deploy on short notice, deployed a squadron of AMX-10 RCs (a wheeled, amphibious light reconnaissance vehicle) in support of Operation Serval. These vehicles, mounting 105mm cannon, gave French commanders the ability to strike with a high level of firepower, survivability and tactical mobility. These capabilities proved critical as they provided French forces with an asymmetric advantage over their opponents and allowed them to rapidly shift overwhelming combat power across Mali’s vast plains. The successful conclusion of Operation Serval in five months of combat validates the concept that rapidly deployable armored and mechanized forces can play a key role in limited contingency operations.
An elite armor/cavalry regiment, trained to partner with other “first responders” – such as the units of Special Operations Command or the global response force – and given priority for strategic lift assets would provide American policy-makers with a broader menu of landpower options when faced with the need to mount a contingency operation. Infantry-centric formations from units such as 82nd Airborne could be supplemented by detachments from an elite armor/cavalry regiment and provide an intervention force with a much higher level of lethality and survivability.
Such an enhancement to the nation’s rapid-intervention capabilities is warranted by recent developments. As the conflicts in Libya and Syria illustrate, contingency operations against state actors or non-state actors with access to advanced weaponry is becoming a distinct possibility. In such an operation, the unique capabilities of armored and mechanized forces would provide a twofold advantage. The superior speed and firepower associated with these formations enables combatant commanders to achieve decisive results in shorter timeframes while maintaining a level of contact on the human plane not provided by precision airpower. The enhanced protection offered by armored platforms within these formations would lead to lower casualty rates than would be expected in purely light formations.
In short, an elite armor/cavalry regiment would provide the ideal landpower option for contingencies in which minimizing casualties and the duration of combat operations were leading concerns.
1LT Kier Elmonairy is serving as the assistant S-3, training/plans, 1-91 Cavalry, 173rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (A), Garrison Bavaria, Grafenwoehr, Germany. He also served as officer-in-charge of the company intelligence-support team, A Troop, 1-91 Cav, in Afghanistan, Schweinfurt, Germany, and Grafenwoehr; and platoon leader, 1st Platoon, A Troop, 1-91 Cav, in Afghanistan and Schweinfurt. 1LT Elmonairy’s military schooling includes Airborne School, Level I Combatives, Small Weapons Expert Course, Army Reconnaissance Course, Armor Basic Officer Leader’s Course, Company Intelligence Support Team Course and Air Assault School. He holds two bachelor’s of science degrees from the U.S. Military Academy – one in international relations and the other in defense and strategic studies.
http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/earmor/content/issues/2014/MAR_JUN/Elmonairy.html
more to follow...
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ok, now that that is over, let's get back to the discussion.
First, in the interest of full disclosure, I don't believe the U.S. will ever send any combat troops into Syria, not under this President any way.
Second, the Syrian civil war has been going on for 4 years and is no closer to being resolved. The current policy is not working IMHO, so nothing wrong with doing some "what ifs" CMSF was a "what if" about the invasion of Syria after it was taken over by Islamic terrorists. Prescience?
Third, U.S. forces would have to be involved for the simple reason that if the U.S. does not go in, no other NATO ally will. However, if the U.S. did commit ground forces, there is a good chance other NATO countries (i.e. UK, France, maybe Germany) would as well.
more to follow...
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It exists, it holds key territory, therefore it is a player. Why do you think Assad and Russia are targeting it? Now, is it capable of defeating the other groups? No. But the other groups aren't showing any more signs of defeating each other than the FSA is.
Steve,
again it is not that clear:
The existence of the Free Syrian Army as an actual operational armed group has been called into question: British journalist Robert Fisk of The Independent, in an interview from March 2015 on Lateline, said he believed that the army did not actually exist,[21] an assertion he repeated in October 2015.[22]Rami Jarrah claimed, 'There is no such thing as the Free Syrian Army, people still use the term in Syria to make it seem like the rebels have some sort of structure. But there really isn’t.'[23] In October 2015, Irish journalist Patrick Cockburn stated that "The Free Syrian Army was always a mosaic of fractions and is now largely ineffectual."[221]
In 2013 U.S. "senior military officials" speaking on condition of anonymity indicated that the Pentagon estimates that "extreme Islamist groups" constitute “more than 50 percent” of the Free Syrian Army with the percentage "growing by the day" and NBC added that the FSA "is an army in name only. It is made up of hundreds of small units, some secular, some religious – whether mainstream or radical. Others are family gangs, or simply criminals."[222] Commentators have suggested that "few media outlets are willing to say that out loud, but..there is no Free Syrian Army. It's an umbrella for providing Western aid to a front group run by the Muslim Brotherhood."[223]
In October 2015, Dan Glazebrook, an author and columnist for The Guardian[224] and the Independent[225] in the UK, told RT "The whole business about funding moderate rebels has always been a bit of a fantasy. There is nothing moderate about what they are being trained to do. There is nothing moderate about forming a militia and then going and killing as many police and soldiers of a sovereign state as you can. The Free Syrian Army – the so-called moderate rebels – celebrated their arrival in Aleppo for example by planting 2,000-kilo bombs in the city center and looting the city’s schools. This whole idea of moderate rebels was always a myth."[226]
The number of US backed fighters in the Free Syrian Army has been criticized after it was admitted by a top U.S. general that they only numbered four or five troops.[227]
In October 2015, shortly after Russia′s intervention, Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov referred to the Free Syrian Army as being "an already phantom structure", adding that he was waiting to receive any specific information about it from his U.S. counterpart John Kerry
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_Syrian_Army#Criticism_and_questions_about_actual_existence
it is wiki, but backed up by a lot of interesting articles.
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Panzerkrautwoofer,
your post has once more convinced me that you are one of the less intelligent and more obtuse member on this forum, but then you are a product of the U.S. education system.
In Mali, France:
1. got a unanimous resolution adopted by the Security Council, including with the support of Russia and China;
2. convinced the military junta in power to hand power back to a democratic government;
3. with a maximum of 5,000 French ground personnel, and other allied ground and support personnel, reconquered all of Mali in 1 month.
Meanwhile the U.S. bombing campaign against ISIL has been going on for 16 months with not much to show for it.
Mali is 6 times the size of Syria and has 80% of the population, are you really telling me that the U.S. military is so inefficient and so bad at coalition building that they would need 30 times as many troops.
The aim is not to create a western liberal democracy in Syria, but merely to come up with something better and more stable than simply handing power to a bunch of Islamic radicals.
Current U.S. policy in Syria is a failure and thinking that if it works, it will actually lead to a good result is just another form of insanity. The problem in Washington is not a lack of resources, but a lack of imagination.
p.s. - I can sling insults with the best of them, so if that is where you want to go, take your shot rookie.
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sorry JK, but a few more points:
1. it does not make much sense to keep talking about the "Free Syrian Army". According to most observers, after 4 years of civil war and internal strife, it is no longer a player. The two main non-ISIL rebel groups are Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham. A good summary here:
Now if you drill down and take a hard look at both groups, you will see there is not much of a difference between them and ISIL. Do you really want to give them advanced SAM/AT systems? If you do, don't be surprised if 6 months from now those same weapons are being used against U.S. assets.
2. It really is time for the U.S. to step up and send in ground troops as part of an international force to restore order and set up a transitional government. Yes, Iraq was a mistake, blah, blah, blah, but if ever there was a case for international intervention, Syria 2015 is it. The U.S. has to realise that since the end of the Cold War, it "owns" the Middle East. If the U.S. is not going to step in and restore order as required, then don't be surprised if Russia or China are more than willing to fill the void.
3. The U.S. has to take a page from French foreign policy. France has taken responsibility for North/Central Africa for over 50 years and has no problem sending in gound troops as required to kick butt and restore order, like they did in Mali in 2013. French foreign policy is consistent, no matter what party is in power and it is not driven by domestic political considerations as is so often the case in the U.S.A.
4. how you deal with Islamic militants:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Serval#French_Army
Suggested reads for Bulge / Ardennes??
in Combat Mission Final Blitzkrieg
Posted
Anhony Beevor has a new book, "Ardennes 1944". I have only flipped through a few pages, but some details leave me wondering how thorough the research is. For example, he just parrots the wiki article on the supposed "Chenogne" massacre, without delving into the controversy of whether it even occured or is just a Neo Nazi invention. Glantz he is not.