The idea of making the enemy "deploy early"

[JasonC]

To Cuirassier - "The Soviets fired a counter-preparation anyway, with seemingly limited results. I'm assuming this is because of the wide German deployment, lack of LOS to the German side of the field"

Well they fired the counter-prep at 2 AM, on a dark and stormy night. So yeah naturally it was unobserved. Yes an observed fire would have been more effective, but the Germans started their recon in force well before dawn for that reason. Also, observed fire and fire that all starts at the same time at one word of command are fundamentally at odds. Observation occurs when it occurs. It is an eyes-forward-pull vs. brains-rearward-push trade off. In my opinion the eyes have it, pretty clearly. But you can't get both just because you want them - the enemy does not show himself uniformly along a whole front hundreds of miles long.

[Cuirassier]

JasonC,

"Well they fired the counter-prep at 2 AM, on a dark and stormy night. So yeah naturally it was unobserved. Yes an observed fire would have been more effective, but the Germans started their recon in force well before dawn for that reason."

As I understand it, the 48th PK conducted their recon in force during the afternoon on the 4th.

"Also, observed fire and fire that all starts at the same time at one word of command are fundamentally at odds. Observation occurs when it occurs. It is an eyes-forward-pull vs. brains-rearward-push trade off. In my opinion the eyes have it, pretty clearly. But you can't get both just because you want them - the enemy does not show himself uniformly along a whole front hundreds of miles long."

Agreed. I'm not arguing that the Soviets should have adopted an opportunity-pull artillery system. I'm just using the Kursk example to help visualize how an opportunity -pull artillery system could gain fire effects by having previously forced the enemy to deploy early. The advantages of course being a more concentrated and visible enemy to shoot at. This is of course something the Soviets couldn't have achieved, given command-push doctrine and German night infiltration. But its something that modern western forces, for example, could achieve.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

I'm just using the Kursk example to help visualize how an opportunity -pull artillery system could gain fire effects by having previously forced the enemy to deploy early. The advantages of course being a more concentrated and visible enemy to shoot at.

could you explain the rationale of having a more concentrated enemy as a result of early deployment?

typically units move in columns during approach marches and have security elements in the lead. when forced to deploy early (e.g. by receiving arty fire), elements of the unit are scattered in depth & along various approach routes. if the unit still wishes to push forward in schedule it most likely has to commit its elements in less coordinated piecemeal hasty attacks. this favors defender specifically because he has less enemies to shoot at. he may also enjoy artillery superiority if his presence was unexpected and the attacker doesn't have artillery available for support.

if a deliberate attack is preferred new plans are drawn, contact between elements is established, support arms are deployed, elements concentrate to attack formations etc and are employed in a deliberate attack. this takes hours and the defender is happy because he has delayed enemy actions -- happy even if he now faces a more numerous, concentrated enemy. he most likely has withdrawn the main body of the delaying force from the positions a couple of hours ago anyway.

[Cuirassier]

URC,

My rationale is that the attacker, who has deployed early expecting the MLR to be just ahead, concentrates to apply maximum force (via shock) against the defending line. He instead hits air (the outpost line) while being shelled by the artillery. So by committing more forces to the attack, the attacker increases his force to space ratio, which increases the effectiveness of the artillery. An infiltrating recon screen (used to lead a march or gain assembly room for the main body) is relatively thin on ground by comparison, and therefore not as good an artillery target.

The fact that there is lots of enemy visible does not really hurt the outpost line because they are just acting as FO's for the artillery. The artillery isn't vulnerable to attacking tanks or infantry until they've broken through the MLR. Only counter-battery or air attack would have to be worried about.

When the attacker is in march column and engaged, it is true that this can favor the defense. But this doesn't improve the effectiveness of the artillery (which prefers a denser enemy). The advantage of counterattacking leading units of the march column comes with armor and shock action. There are plenty of midwar examples of concentrated panzer units smashing leading Soviet tank brigades because the main body is a good 50km behind and unable to help.

So I agree that the main use of making an enemy deploy early is simply to gain time, which is especially useful when the attacker seeks breakthrough and exploitation. But I think it is also useful by making the attacker concentrate under artillery, instead of infiltrating with a more limited force.

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[undead reindeer cavalry]

Cuirassier,

ah, i see. i was thinking about this more as a normal deliberate attack vs prematurely deployed attack. in your scenario attacker force densities are naturally equal in both cases.

compared to the actual MLR the defender at outpost line most likely has less artillery available and it is less effective because it's not fired at good targets. yes, attack densities are equal, but attacks are not fully developed and fires are not fully observed, as defenders withdraw from the outpost line before the actual assault, where as on MLR fires are directed on advancing assault groupings & with more shells.

i naturally agree that trading space for bonus arty fires is very useful, but i am not convinced that those arty fires at outpost line are more effective than those at MLR.

[McIvan]

I'm amazed really. 10,000 rounds is staggering. At 4 rounds a minute that means the 25pdr barrel can fire continuously for 41 hours and 40 minutes straight. Is that correct? 300 rounds doesn't sound like a lot but if the T-72 is firing that many rounds it is getting towards the upper limit of lifespan, in terms of exposure to enemy fire. Anything that can't harm the tank can be engaged with the machine guns, when it is being used in auxiliary roles. It's still an hour and a half of firing at a steady average of 3 rounds a minute. But 10,000 is out of the park.

So why so few barrages? By few, I mean "not continuous" Didn't Great Britain and America have the capacity to basically stream rounds in real time to the guns of several divisions' artillery battalions? Or the Stalinists?

No....iirc both British and US armies in the Western ETO were often limited by artillery ammo shortages. Not shortages such as the Germans would have been experiencing, but shortages in terms of the intensive ammo use needed to support an offensive.

[Cuirassier]

First off, thanks for the replies. This forum has been void of interesting discussion for too long, imo.

Adam,

"The argument "Moving columns are always more vulnerable to fire effects" ignores all kinds of particulars and specifics of the situation. It's cliche. Sometimes moving columns are better off against this kind of massed artillery, and being "deployed" as an attacker is no advantage when weathering a barrage of this magnitude."

In most cases I would assume that the moving column is more vulnerable, if most of the column is caught under the barrage. This is simply because the force is quite tight together, all moving at once and probably not expecting to be under observation/fire. Of course, for this to happen, the marching troops needed to have had made a huge mistake by marching a whole column unprepared into an enemy defense. It is unlikely to happen.

Proper tactics would have the advanced guard/forward detachment drive into the defenders security zone and seize advantageous terrain, allowing the main body to continue safely in march with a pick of routes. If instead the FD hits the MLR, it takes a beating, but at least the main body gets some intel and knows where to deploy.

"The German solution is to send in as small a force as is neccessary to remove the screens. They *do* deploy, but they are company-sized forces and the artillery effects are limited by their targets. If an entire infantry division could somehow be forced to deploy on a town or sector where artillery fires have been pre-registered and massed, that is a great thing for that otherwise inflexible arm"

I agree that attackers have numerous options to counter an outpost line back by arty. But even attacking forces deployed in depth and using packet movement need to concentrate more than a thin skirmish line looking to infiltrate or screen only.

"Right if he deploys, otherwise the security screen is penetrated and deployment doesn't need to occur. It's just an error and exposes the attacker to both fire and other effects. It's not just one or the other."

Agreed. I'm not saying that the enemy will always deploy prematurely. The whole art and risk of the thing is tricking the attacker that your outpost line is your MLR. The point of the recon in force and advanced guard/forward detachment is to correctly identify the structure of the defenses and seize the outpost line, facilitating proper deployment of the main body. Most of the time I would say these units do their job. But look at 48PK sector during Kursk, for example. Their reconnaissance failed to fully identify and deal with the Soviet security zone. So it does happen sometimes.

"ps - I really miss our CMBB game. "

I was under the impression you didn't want to continue after I sent a few files with no reply. My email has done strange things in the past though. They didn't get through?

URC,

"i naturally agree that trading space for bonus arty fires is very useful, but i am not convinced that those arty fires at outpost line are more effective than those at MLR."

Which is the point I'm trying to make. I'm not saying that arty is more useful in the outpost line than in the MLR. Indeed, assuming a defense in depth, the more the attacker penetrates, the more dangerous the defense becomes. But an outpost using artillery against a prematurely deployed attacker will get decent fire opportunities, without significantly reducing the fire opportunities that would occur later in front of the MLR.

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[undead reindeer cavalry]

Which is the point I'm trying to make. I'm not saying that arty is more useful in the outpost line than in the MLR. Indeed, assuming a defense in depth, the more the attacker penetrates, the more dangerous the defense becomes. But an outpost using artillery against a prematurely deployed attacker will get decent fire opportunities, without significantly reducing the fire opportunities that would occur later in front of the MLR.

yes, you get to fire at the attacker "for free", though in practice it may be that there's not too much artillery available at forward positions.

my marginal beef with this, as with the vulnerability of marching columns, is that it's not the impression i get from action reports or doctrinal works. i may very well be wrong, but my impression is that the role of arty fires at forward positions & outposts was to cause the early deployment (which of course implies arty fires effective enough to force it -- not just harassing fires), rather than to cause meaningful damage on the attacking enemy once he had deployed. so the role played by arty fires takes place before the early deployment, not after it -- it is what is used to cause it, not what is used to make profit out of it later. i don't mean that the latter would not take place, i just have the impression that it was not the important part. my impression is that those forward positions are withdrawn once enemy deploys, unless those positions hold special importance due to terrain covered.

likewise my impression is that marching columns are actually less concentrated and worse artillery targets than units deployed for attack. effects of typical arty strikes on marching columns is primarily that of causing disorganization, though there are exceptions which typically include elements like knowledge of enemy intentions or positions due to intelligence (yes, forward positions are part of the intelligence arsenal) or terrain which forces enemy to concentrate on narrow forest roads and such.

yes, good to have some discussion.

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[undead reindeer cavalry]

Adam,

it all depens a bit on nationality, campaign, local situation and especially what type of forces we are talking about exactly. strongpoints, resistance groups, advanced positions, resistance lines and outposts are all a bit different.

arty fires may be limited both to save ammo for the decisive battles and to not reveal positions of batteries (when enemy has artillery superiority). other than that, a reinforced platoon really does not have the kind of firepower that is required to force enemy to deploy early.

can you explain that a bit more? You mean marching columns of foot infantry versus deployed?

well, almost any kind of column. it's long and narrow, most likely moving by a covered route with uncertain destination and total force size. when it attacks it's concentrated into a very visible small blobs with obvious target areas. if you can figure out or observe likely assembly points that's where the pre-battle fires should go.

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[undead reindeer cavalry]

I guess, I was just talking about what I gathered from my western-published red field manuals and such. Doctrinal stuff. I'm not even sure it was all exactly what the east was doing at the time.

interesting. can you post a quote or source? is it for mobile defence based on resistance lines or for more static setups?

my impression is that Soviet WW2 era security zone troops depended on obstacles and long range artillery to stop approaching enemy columns. those troops would mostly be recon guys protecting FOs -- not the relatively heavy troops as in post-war Soviet forward detachments (though rear guards for withdrawing battalion strong resistance lines would preferably be of similar mechanized types) .

i would be happy to be corrected.

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[Cuirassier]

URC,

"my marginal beef with this, as with the vulnerability of marching columns, is that it's not the impression i get from action reports or doctrinal works. i may very well be wrong, but my impression is that the role of arty fires at forward positions & outposts was to cause the early deployment (which of course implies arty fires effective enough to force it -- not just harassing fires),"

Yes, there aren't any reports that I'm aware of where arty in the outpost line was used with the purposed of causing casualties to prematurely deployed forces. But I think that is mainly a doctrinal issue (all the major armies put artillery in the back seat to maneuver arms in ww2) Maybe there is some useful ww1 stuff on this but I haven't looked into it. My argument is merely theoretical.

"i don't mean that the latter would not take place, i just have the impression that it was not the important part. my impression is that those forward positions are withdrawn once enemy deploys, unless those positions hold special importance due to terrain covered."

In most cases, probably yes. There are many instances however where Soviet forward positions hold on, allowing themselves to be bypassed. The Soviets believed that enveloped positions, if fortified and prepared well enough could still be useful tactically.

"ikewise my impression is that marching columns are actually less concentrated and worse artillery targets than units deployed for attack. effects of typical arty strikes on marching columns is primarily that of causing disorganization, though there are exceptions which typically include elements like knowledge of enemy intentions or positions due to intelligence (yes, forward positions are part of the intelligence arsenal) or terrain which forces enemy to concentrate on narrow forest roads and such."

Well this depends. As I touched on earlier, a whole marching column caught by surprise (with most of it under the arty foot print) is quite vulnerable as men aren't in cover and tend to be fairly concentrated (laterally).

If the FD is doing its job however, then the column will be in alright shape, as it is presumed that the enemy will be found and fixed before the main body makes contact or comes in range.

As you've mentioned before however, the biggest vulnerability of the marching column is its front to back separation, allowing concentrated counter-attacking elements to engage the forward elements piecemeal.

"my impression is that Soviet WW2 era security zone troops depended on obstacles and long range artillery to stop approaching enemy columns. those troops would mostly be recon guys protecting FOs -- not the relatively heavy troops as in post-war Soviet forward detachments (though rear guards for withdrawing battalion strong resistance lines would preferably be of similar mechanized types) ."

Which is correct. Most often, iirc, the Soviet security zone was composed of strongpoints formed from a battalion of the second echelon rifle regiment (for a RD). Obstacles and fortification (especially of villages) was especially important to the Soviets. Long Range arty from corps and army launched prep fires in their sectors, but it wasn't controlled by these guys. It was a command push system. Often AT guns would be pushed down into the security zone to give them extra punch. For the most part however, I think their task was simply to observe and grind with attacking forward elements, full expecting that many would get encircled and maybe only half would make it back to friendly lines. Remnants would typically withdraw at night if possible.

Adam,

"My impression of the process is:

A security echelon is made of platoon sized strong-points reinforced with some anti-tank weapons. Each strong-point preferably deploys on terrain offering long fields of view. This is because the security outposts are to fire at their weapon's maximum targeting range. (Not necessarily under the effective range.) When they see the enemy, they open fire and do as much damage as they can before reply fire, and then they withdraw under cover of artillery.

So, at this point, the artillery is primarily used to get the strong-points evacuated safely."

Which is a common doctrinal approach, but not the only way to do things. As I look at this discussion, I am beginning to see that the outpost/observed arty approach is not much different from the later defensive tactics seen in ww1. The idea being to keep as few maneuver units in the forward positions while arty is the dominant arm and attrits the attacker. Either way though, I question the ability of security elements to cause premature deployments. Late-war Soviet FD's, for example, were quite powerful and required a fair bit of force to necessitate the deployment of the main body.

As for the pbem game, I don't have the files of last one anymore. I would prefer to start a new game, but will continue the old one if you want. Did you have anything new in mind?

[undead reindeer cavalry]

np man. both. for defensive operations, withdrawals and delays. I think your point holds anyhow, but here is what was written:

From FM 100-2-1, Soviet Army Operations and Tactics

Under Chap 6, "Security Echelon"

The security ech or zone is that port of the field forward of the main defensive area. It is occupied by a force whose mission is to delay and deceive the enemy as to the location and deployment of the main defensive forces. The security forces engages the enemy at the longest possible range and attempts to cause him to deploy prematurely.

The security force's size and comp depend on those factors mentioned earlier. The zone may extend to a depth of 30 k at army level and 15 k at div level. It is at least far enough forward to prevent aimed direct fire from being placed on the main defensive area.

The security force deploys on the best terrain to effect max daage to the attacking enemy. Obstacles and barriers are used extensively. When faced with encirclement or decisive engagement, the forces of the sec zone attempt to withdraw under cover of artillery fire and to return to the mda.

sorry for the mess, typed it quick

thanks.

that's fairly general stuff. withdrawing under cover of artillery fire makes perfect sense. i'd imagine engagement at maximum range actually includes artillery, as that's how Red Army regulations state it.

[undead reindeer cavalry]

In most cases, probably yes. There are many instances however where Soviet forward positions hold on, allowing themselves to be bypassed. The Soviets believed that enveloped positions, if fortified and prepared well enough could still be useful tactically.

yes, it was up to the commanders to make the decisions of wether to pull back or not. units as large as division could continue fighting their local battle even after enemy had penetrated and bypassed them, if rear echelon counterattacks had potential to defeating enemy penetration. at security zone elements of forward detachments could decide to let enemy advance guards bypass so that FOs could call arty fires on more lucrative targets.

Well this depends. As I touched on earlier, a whole marching column caught by surprise (with most of it under the arty foot print) is quite vulnerable as men aren't in cover and tend to be fairly concentrated (laterally).

If the FD is doing its job however, then the column will be in alright shape, as it is presumed that the enemy will be found and fixed before the main body makes contact or comes in range.

yes, Soviets did not really expect to get to fire at enemy main bodies before they were deployed for deliberate attacks. even outpost line was doctrinally assumed to halt just enemy advance guard and make it believe the outpost line was actually MLR.

Most often, iirc, the Soviet security zone was composed of strongpoints formed from a battalion of the second echelon rifle regiment (for a RD).

doctrinally it was up to the RD commander to decide, but as outpost line was manned by troops from first line battalions, it's quite safe to assume that in most cases forward detachments at security zone were from second echelon units or from divisional specialist units.

Obstacles and fortification (especially of villages) was especially important to the Soviets.

indeed.

Long Range arty from corps and army launched prep fires in their sectors, but it wasn't controlled by these guys. It was a command push system.

for Soviets counterpreparations were army or corps level decisions and should not be confused with smaller level fires.

at outpost line fires are coordinated at division level or from infantry close support arty groups, just like at MLR. at security zone, however, artillery control was decentralized per mobile defence doctrine.

Often AT guns would be pushed down into the security zone to give them extra punch. For the most part however, I think their task was simply to observe and grind with attacking forward elements, full expecting that many would get encircled and maybe only half would make it back to friendly lines. Remnants would typically withdraw at night if possible.

yes, exactly. similarly outpost line was mostly just a security buffer which would give time for the MLR to get ready for the battle, and also to deny or deceive the enemy of the actual location of the MLR. usually enemy attacks are at least division sized, so it's a wasted effort to try to stop him with platoon or company sized strongpoints. the battle those forward elements fought was that of information, time, initiative and C&C.

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[Cuirassier]

I'm up for CMSF. I actually haven't played it pbem yet. What did you have in mind?

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[Cuirassier]

Ok. Well send me a setup or some more info at rdinsdal@ualberta.ca. My only request is that the scenario/test not be larger than reinforced company size.