Suggested “House Rules” for playing bocage scenarios

[SteveP]

Note: Players who already find that fighting in the hedgerows, in the typical CMBN scenario or campaign, is too difficult and frustrating won’t benefit from these suggestions. These “Rules” are about making things a bit more challenging.

Fighting in the bocage terrain was among the most difficult tactical and operational problems the American army ever faced. In keeping with that, I try to follow some simple rules to make the experience in CMBN a little more realistic. To help with understanding the rationale for each rule, I have added some telling quotes from “Busting the Bocage” by Captain Doubler (which is essential reading. It can be found here)

1.

Demolition:

“… other conditions prevented the burying of explosive charges. Digging holes large and deep enough for the explosives in earthen embankments covered with vines and filled with roots proved too laborious…. Since an attack could proceed only as fast as charges were emplaced and detonated, slow moving American attacks would allow the Germans to coordinate their hedgerow defense better. Engineers and infantrymen would also be dangerously exposed to German mortar fire while planting demolitions. Though technically feasible, burying explosives by hand was a procedure both too difficult and tactically unwise.”

For missions set in June, I try to leave the engineers in the setup zone, or at least avoid the use of demolition in the hedgerows. In July, I use demolition only to open gaps for AFVs, since there is no evidence that demolition was ever used to create openings for infantry. On the other hand, there is this:

“… companies could not deploy and maneuver because of thick vegetation and the compartmentalized nature of the terrain. Platoons were forced to hack their way through the dense vegetation because German defensive fires covered all natural breaks in the hedgerows.”

Since infantry in CMBN aren’t allowed to hack openings in the hedgerows, one could rationalize the use of demolition for that purpose. I don’t do that, however, unless the map virtually requires it.

2.

AFVs:

“The hedgerows' earthen embankments and heavy vegetation were almost impassable obstacles for the M-4 Shermans. Tanks could not lead the attack through the hedgerows nor support leading infantry attacks with maingun and machine-gun fire…. The hedgerows kept the tanks from maneuvering freely, and poor observation prevented the tankers from using their longrange main guns and machine guns. Tanks unaccompanied by friendly infantry were easy targets for German infantry armed with explosives and panzerfausts. Reluctant to operate within the confined spaces and tangles of the hedgerows, tank commanders kept their vehicles road bound.”

In June, I do not move AFVs into bocage fields even when there are openings big enough for them (which seems to be common practice in the design of maps for CMBN scenarios, campaigns and QBs). I keep the AFVs on the roads. I also don’t allow AFVs to fire through hedgerows until July, and even then I limit this to medium or heavier tanks.

3.

Combined Arms:

“Another cause for poor tank-infantry coordination was that many infantry commanders had not worked with tanks before and lacked sufficient experience concerning how tanks should be used in conjunction with infantry. The exact details of how tanks and infantry should work together were largely neglected …. The din of battle and roar of tank engines drowned out voice communications between tank commanders and troops on the ground. Infantrymen could not get the attention of tankers who were busy inside their vehicles. Unable to communicate during combat, infantry squads and tankers failed to coordinate their fires against the Germans.”

I don’t allow infantry to spot for armor until early July, unless the parent unit is an armored division. Otherwise, armor has to spot targets for itself.

4.

Heavy weapons:

“Unable to use normal techniques of fire and maneuver, American commanders were also powerless to influence the battle with increased firepower. Heavy vegetation and the close proximity of the German defenders made it impossible to bring forward and set up heavy machine guns.”

“... hedgerows and the close combat conditions made the observation and adjustment of mortar and artillery fire almost impossible. American and German units often fought one another at ranges of less than 300 yards. Short distances made calling for artillery fire risky, since unadjusted rounds could easily land on friendly troops. Many engagements were fought at such close range that even if friendly rounds landed on German positions, the effects of shrapnel and concussion would endanger American lives. Unable to observe the enemy and to call fire on him from a safe distance, infantrymen were deprived of field artillery and mortar support.”

I try to avoid firing HMGs and MMGs (which were considered heavy machine guns in the quote above) from the protection of a hedgerow when attacking. I also try not to use mortars against enemy troops firing from behind a hedgerow, if I have already advanced infantry into the intervening field, especially in June. I treat guns (such at AT guns) the same as HMGs.

Some maps don’t make it practical to follow these rules and still achieve the objectives. Also, IRL fighting in the bocage, especially in June, caused a very high casualty rate among the attackers. For some missions or campaigns this can be a major problem. So I tend to be flexible in adapting these rules to the situation.

Do these rules make bocage fighting too hard? IMHO, the hedgerows in CMBN don’t provide the level of concealment and cover that they did IRL, and scenario designers sometimes don’t take full advantage of the defensive possibilities in constructing AI Plans or unit selection (for example, too few snipers and TRPs). So the resulting battles aren’t necessarily as nasty or bloody as they would have been IRL. But the rules force you to consider the tactical problems in a way that would have been more familiar to the American commanders at the time.

FWIW

[jbmtintin]

IMHO, the hedgerows in CMBN don’t provide the level of concealment and cover that they did IRL, and scenario designers sometimes don’t take full advantage of the defensive possibilities in constructing AI Plans or unit selection (for example, too few snipers and TRPs). So the resulting battles aren’t necessarily as nasty or bloody as they would have been IRL. But the rules force you to consider the tactical problems in a way that would have been more familiar to the American commanders at the time.

FWIW

Are you sure of that? I find very difficult to kill enemies behind hedgerows with direct fire, even with a tank. Maybe you did not have same game experience?

[SteveP]

Are you sure of that? I find very difficult to kill enemies behind hedgerows with direct fire, even with a tank. Maybe you did not have same game experience?

Well, as I said, it's just my opinion, but ...

There are two components: concealment and cover. The fact that you can spot them to shoot at them from any distance greater than grenade range is a strong argument that concealment isn't realistic. In July, tanks were using MGs to spray the entire opposite hedgerow because they couldn't spot anything. They fired WP into the opposite corners because the Germans obstinately continued to place HMGs there -- but they weren't getting spotted by the tanks. The only way the Americans were able to concentrate fire on the enemy in the hedgerow was from close range.

In my view, the hedgerows should provide better cover for a prepared defense than any of the other fortification types (e.g., trenches, foxholes) we encounter in the game. That's my interpretation based on what was reported about bocage fighting. The only way the Americans could overcome a hedgerow defense was by assaulting at very close range with infantry. Folks have to judge for themselves whether that is what they experience in CMBN.