Slaughter. Tank spotting.

[JasonC]

First let's get the terminological confusion out of the way.

*Breakthrough* means passing all enemy defenses and reaching operational depth. It does not mean there are no enemy left ahead of friendly forces, that never happens, since he always has some deep rear forces, forces on other fronts, forces forming up, etc. But after a *breakthrough*, all enemy positions established, are established *after* the breakthrough occurred, and use exclusively *reserve* forces, physically moved to the threatened area. Distances and ranges are not critical for this definition, and vary with the depth of the enemy deployment, scale of his preparations, time and tech and therefore weapon mixes and effective ranges, terrain, etc. But roughly, breakthroughs move fronts by 50 to 100 miles and upward, and resolve in weeks to months of "pursuit fighting" that they set off, as entire armies reposition.

A *break-in*, on the other hand, is not a breakthrough. A break-in means, attacking forces pass beyond their original start lines, reach the original defender positions, destroy or displace all defenders on forward positions of the enemy defense, and then operate *inside* the region where the defenders were initially deployed. Hence the "in", in contrast to "through". The attackers are fighting *in* the defensive position. More, they are fighting within defensive positions *that existed at the offensive's outset*. They also typically fight arriving enemy reserves, of course. A break *in* typically involves movements of several miles and forces of division size and larger - just a recon company infiltrated somewhere would not qualify.

Neither is certain in any attack. Break *in* failure means the defensive system retains its integrity throughout the combat. The defender remains in possession of his field works. He may lose small pieces briefly but retakes them in local counterattacks, and along large parts of the frontage even that doesn't happen. Substantial defending forces are able to simply man their positions and direct effective tactical fire at observed ranges onto the attackers, breaking them up by fire or shooting them to rags. The defender may counter-concentrate using artillery; he may man positions initially left thinned; he may pancake the front line 1 back reserves to the front or shift a "linebacker" armor formation or two opposite a threatened point. But fundamentally, the defender stops the attack cold without loss of his ground.

Such *break in failure* did happen. It was typically a sign of an attack that had no business being launched in the first place, or poor choice of combined arms or tactics used, or the wrong arm or other approach for a terrain problem, or a failure of surprise caused by a particularly vigilant enemy or compromised intel. Break in failures are generally a sign of intellectual bankruptcy on the attacking side. They are fearsome Fups, and they happen, more often than the brass kissing histories generally talk about.

But the much more common case for a major set-to is *break in success, breakthrough failure*. The front line defensive formations are smashed by concentrated superior odds or a particular choice of combined arms that surgically destroys them. The attackers proceed into the deeper defensive zone; they occupy defender positions. Then then need to brawl with (1) second echelons already in position in depth, (2) units on flanks sliding over to the break-in (3) arriving reserves (4) counter-concentrated artillery and (5) major counterattacks by formations at least as large as the initial front line forces hit.

Whether or not a break *in* becomes a break *through* is generally *not* decided in the break *in* phase of the fighting. (Very thin fronts and very rapid break-ins, generally only found early in the war, are limited exceptions to this general rule. In those cases there simply isn't much behind and the attack leaves no time for other measures to work, and the break-in becomes a break-through by default). It is generally determined *after* that has succeeded, precisely *in* the fight against the arriving reserves and other defensive counter-measures detailed in the previous paragraph.

Goodwood was a break through failure, but not a break in failure. The British advanced 12000 yards and took over 2000 prisoners. The north front of Kursk was a break through failure but not a break in failure. The Germans advanced over 5 miles and destroyed 2 successive echelons of Russians forces plus a premature major counterattack. Moreover, they were not losing the fight against arriving reserves even then. They were gradually feeding their own armor reserves to picked parts of the frontage while destroying Russian forces as they arrived. They had to stop and call it off because of the counteroffensive farther north (Orel bulge), which required all remaining uncommitted armor ASAP.

The Russians broke *in* on the east face of the Orel salient, but did not break *through* there. They did however break *through* on the north face of the Orel salient (11th Guards' attack), and that more than anything sealed the fate of both the northern drive and the entire battle, and the summer campaign. The Germans were still able to *contain* that break through with arriving mobile reserves. For a while - exchange brawling reduced those reserves and they never fully stopped the northern drive, forcing the evacuation of the remainder of the salient.

The Germans broke *in* even in such minor attacks as Lehr's in Normandy in early July, or Mortain. But they didn't break through, and were decimated in the fight with arriving reserves. They broke *through* in the Bulge, though the penetration was then sealed by arriving reserves. But notice, none of the later fighting is occurring on positions the US stood on at the start of the battle, and the entire line (away from the shoulder flanks) displaced westward etc. Characteristic marks of a breakthrough.

As that example should make clear, even a full break *through* does not ensure any *decision*, on its own. The penetrating offensive force will *still* have to fight enemy reserves in the operational depth to achieve anything, and may lose that fight. But the usual defensive advantages of prepared positions, tactical defensive stance, chosen ground carefully integrated with weapon choices and positioning, etc - those reserves generally will *not* possess. (They may still however enjoy an edge in intel or time to front or supply reaching the spearhead fight locations etc).

The proposition before the house is, "break *in* is easy, if you can mass armor". I also contend the Russians made it much harder on themselves than they needed to, and lost acres of good rifle infantry in consequence, for lack of any better intelligence or doctrine in how to use that arm.

As for occasions in which others also showed that break in is easy - US armor breaking out of the Anzio bridgehead; 2nd armored in Cobra; crossing the Moselle and taking Nancy, 2nd armored crossing the Siegfried line in the Aachen battle, both 3rd army and 2nd armored in their counterattacks into the Bulge. Russians first screwing up the combined arms aspect of the initial attack include - Mars wild hammering at corner posts instead of supporting successful mech formations, stuffed arty cooperation on the morning of Uranus; direct frontal rifle attacks on German 2nd army late in Saturn even though its flanks were already folded; initial east face of Orel attack, with penny-packet armor slaughtered on the first day, Donets basin attack, fiasco; hamfisted wild hammering out of Dnepr bridgeheads south of Kiev before the shift to north of the city; etc, etc.

These are the characteristic signs of total dose stupidity. Yes Monty had the same problem in spades and Goodwood is full of single-arm tactical crimes of sequencing and uncoordinated employment in succession.

But no, the western allies did not lose more in successful offensive periods than they inflicted, while the Russians did. Yes in attrition fighting periods the loss rate in the west could and did run 2 to 1 in favor of the Germans, but not when the breakthrough phases are included. Then the loss rate is favorable, well under unity. The Russians exceed unity in their most successful large outliers of the war, including the full pursuit periods. In the attrition fighting phases they routinely hit 5 to 1 losses.