LarryP Posted March 19, 2009 Share Posted March 19, 2009 What is the reasoning behind losing 25% or more morale when using Operate to move? It already costs MPP units to do so. I don't understand why using a train or pavement would cost such high morale points? I have tried to figure out what the ramifications would be in a non-fictional situation and using a train or pavement seems like it would boost a troops morale if anything. Please explain. :confused: Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
SeaMonkey Posted March 19, 2009 Share Posted March 19, 2009 I think its more of a loss of cohesion, organization, and command structure what with the length of the redeployment I'm sure a lot of the equipment is misplaced, lost or diverted to other destinations. So you take a readiness hit. Now, imagine it was you that just lost out on some of the few things in wartime that provide a bit of security and comfort. Perhaps you may be a bit frustrated with the system, devoid of the necessities and facing the unknown. Maybe some apprehension? The human chaos factor = morale degredation.:confused: Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
LarryP Posted March 19, 2009 Author Share Posted March 19, 2009 That makes sense somewhat. However, I was picturing the Vietnam situation, where troops are trudging along in swampy snake infested marshes, and having to worry about foot problems due to so much moisture. They would gladly trade that for pavement walking. What you said makes good sense now that I read your post again. Thanks for the quick reply! Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
pzgndr Posted March 19, 2009 Share Posted March 19, 2009 Basically it reflects a reduction in readiness, since a large unit (corps-sized) would require many transports over a period of time and some consolidation/reorganization would be needed at the disembarkation point. The morale loss is temporary and quickly recovered; besides units cannot operate and then fight in the same turn anyway. What it really does is penalize the player somewhat for rapidly operating defenders into a hotspot rather planning ahead for a deliberate defense. Anyway, that's the reasoning behind it. This morale loss parameter is editable. If you think 25% is too high then change it. For other scenarios with different scales such as brigade- or division-sized, a lower morale/readiness loss may be more appropriate. To offer another perspective, some other games of old which had strategic movement or strategic redeployment rules generally restricted units from being "operated" through enemy ZOCs or adjacent to enemy units at any point. It was meant to help move units long distances but didn't much help you during the turn of movement. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
LarryP Posted March 19, 2009 Author Share Posted March 19, 2009 pzgndr: Excellent explanation. Thank you very much. Now it all is making sense. I have been playing this series off and on, and I own all of them including the expansions. SC1, SC2, WaW, Patton, and SC3 Pacific. When I finally used Operate and also read about it in the manual, I was baffled. I had previously used Operate but never noticed the morale hit. Again, I was not paying attention to detail like I should. I will check out the events for changing this to a lower point if it becomes bothersome. However, now that it makes more sense, I may just leave it alone. Thanks to both replies! Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
zukkov Posted March 19, 2009 Share Posted March 19, 2009 i remember the scene in band of brothers when easy company was "transported" to bastogne without ammo and had to scrounge some from retreating troops... Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
pzgndr Posted March 20, 2009 Share Posted March 20, 2009 A few years ago I read the Eastern Front memoir of General Erhard Raus, Panzer Operations. As commander of 6th Panzer Division, in one chapter of the book he vividly described his unit's role in the unsuccessful effort to relieve the German 6th Army surrounded at Stalingrad. Combat operations literally started the moment his panzers offloaded at the railhead in Kotelnikovo on 27 November 1942 and continued for the next four weeks. Raus had prior Eastern Front experience with Army Group North before moving the division to France for refit. When he "operated" back to the Stalingrad area he kept crews with their tanks on the railcars and fully armed. They successfully fought off partisans enroute at one point. And of course they hit the ground running when they offloaded. This particular example is a notable exception I would say. Most movements are goatscrews in one way or another. I had some experience back in late 80s as a Bde Asst S4 moving our units around Germany to Grafenwoehr/Hohenfels and back and railhead opns were always a pain. So I can personally relate to why a readiness reduction makes sense. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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