Better than Patton?

[CombinedArms]

I realize this might be slightly off topic, but...but this is in the CMBO era and who else can I ask?

I've been trying to get a fix for a while on the characteristics of Courtney Hodges as a military commander. I assume everyone here knows that he was commander of the US First Army from the Cobra breakout till V-E day and that he's chiefly known for not being very colorful (by contrast with his flamboyant counterpart Patton--who, by the way, I am in no way knocking.) Hodges never published his memoirs and even fairly detailed histories of the period (like the voluminous "Eisenhour's Lieutenants") have suprisingly little to say about his qualities as a fighting commander. Yet there's no denying the guy was a very important and very successful leader.

So, first of all, I'm going to ask if anyone can point me to sources that might offer a reasonably detailed portrait of Hodges's qualities as a commander (aside from lack of color.) How 'bout it guys?

Then I'm going to offer a little train of deduction. Bradley says in HIS memoirs that while Hodges wasn't colorful like Patton he was a consumate technician (or something like that.) That fits in my mind with three facts:

1. He moved the First Army speedily and efficiently to the West Wall after Cobra, crushing all opposition in the way. Not as colorfully as Patton, but he got the job done.

2. More significantly, perhaps, it was under Hodges' command that the US First Army moved its forces so effectively to block the northern part of the Axis attack in the Ardennes. Division after division pulled out of the line further north, moved over difficult roads, and set up effective blocking positions that hemmed in the Axis attack. Pieper's spearhead was very skillfully encircled. The Germans kept stepping on their own feet over the limited road net--over the same limited road net, the US forces filtered in flawlessly. In fact, far more First Army (and borrowed Ninth Army) divisions were moved to block the Germans than Third Army (Patton) divisions. Somebody had to be coordinating all of this--my guess is the credit should go to Hodges. Again, I'm not knocking Patton, whose performance seems to me quite brilliant, but if Patton deserves credit for his role in the Ardennes, then perhaps so does Hodges.

3. In the March "Final Offensive" against the West Wall and beyond, the First Army performed brilliantly again. The opponent was faltering but the coordination of the attack was very skillful.

So, my read on this is that, by inference, we can conclude that Hodges must have been a very skillful coordinator of large scale troop movement (which is, of course, an obvious requirement for an Army-level commander). Where I suspect he could be criticized is in his distance from the frontline combat situation. He fed unit after unit into the Hurtgen Forest battle. If he'd gone forward to look at the situation (which apparently he never did), he might have recognized the difficulty of the terrain, pulled back and found a more promising place to attack. Patton would frequently get up close to the front and arguably might have had a better feel for the flow of a battle.

But, since Patton was also at his best as a skillful coordinator of large scale troop movement, in terms of their greatest command strengths Patton and Hodges may turn out to be surprisingly similar.

Just a preliminary view--I'm looking forward to further comment and enlightenment.

[ December 13, 2002, 08:46 PM: Message edited by: CombinedArms ]

[CombinedArms]

Come on now.... any takers? Got no responses with my modest earlier title. Maybe the more provocative "Better than Patton?" will get a reply. Not sure I really think Hodges was better than Patton, but a case could be made that he was just as good....

[ December 13, 2002, 08:47 PM: Message edited by: CombinedArms ]

[Maj. Battaglia]

I don't know a lot about Hodges. But if I had the interest you do I would probably try to get a picture from those who served under him. Anything by or about his corps commanders (e.g. Collins must have a lot written about him) or even below (MacDonald's "Battle for the Hurtgen Forest" has many entries in the index--I have it but not yet read it). Perhaps Marshall talks about him in some detail (or writings about his war time career).

Just some thoughts.

[CombinedArms]

Thanks for the suggestions, which I will try to follow up on.

Here are some further thoughts:

I wouldn’t be surprised if Hodges qualities as a general are rather close to those of US Grant—skillful coordination of large bodies of troops, dogged persistence, an ability to mount brilliant operations without, somehow, giving off the aura of personal brilliance. At their best, they produced operations like the defense of the Ardennes and the encirclement of the Ruhr (Hodges) and the battles of Vicksburg and Chattanooga (Grant’s two best, IMHO). At their worst, we got Cold Harbor and the Hurtgen Forest. But both were apparently colorless and self-effacing men who incontestably knew how to win.

Grant, however, emerged as the chief hero of the war and became a US president. He also wrote a widely praised set of Memoirs. Hodges slipped back into obscurity after the war.

[ December 14, 2002, 07:32 PM: Message edited by: CombinedArms ]

[Maj. Battaglia]

And Grant drank like a fish and swore like a stableboy, while Hodges apparently was clean cut.

[CombinedArms]

Originally posted by Maj. Battaglia:

And Grant drank like a fish and swore like a stableboy, while Hodges apparently was clean cut.

Is the moral that to become president military heros have to swear and drink?

Actually, I guess Ike was fairly moderate along those lines.

[Breakthrough]

Hodges was a WW I veteran and member of the Ft. Benning Infantry School clan between the wars. He was the steady, methodical infantryman compared to Patton the dashing cavalryman. Like most of George Marshalls favorites, he was a solid but uninspired commander.

[Alsatian]

By coincidence came across this description this weekend. It sounds like an example of Hodges's preference for dependable simple & basic tactics rather than flash and risk.

"Hodges was hoarding ammo to make an exploitable breach in the West Wall. He would make his new attack to the north of Aachen...

"The attack opened on October 2...German commanders were slow to realize what was happening. They couldn't believe that Hobbs's two-regiment attack on a 1,500-yard front was the First Army's major effort. They assumed it was only a diversion for somehting bigger. The 2nd Armored Division shot though the gap the infantry opened. By October 8 Hodges had a solid bridgehead six miles north of Aachen...

"Hodges had no intention of pushing deep into Germany without taking it. No bypasser he, but the most conservative tactician, forever worried about his flanks. As a rule, he tended to rely heavily on the advice of Collins and regarded his VII Corps as the spearhead of the First Army. On this occasion, Collins preferred to leave Aachen alone. He didn't think it was worth a street fight, but Hodges ordered him to take it (f.n.16). The Germans agreed to let the civilian popluation leave; then the two armies got down to fighting for the city."

From Geoffrey Perret's, "There's a War to be Won," (1991), p. 374-5 of the Ballantine pb edition 1996.

f.n.16--from: J. Latwon Collins (Sperow interview)USAMHI Archives.

[Breakthrough]

Well, when you think of it, you can hardly blame US WW II commanders for suffering from a lack of Operational expertise. Between 1918 and 1939 the only divisions were administrative (Phillipines, Hawaii). These men had to play catch up with Europe in the Lous. and Tenn. Maneuvers. Many lessons were just being learned by officers with twenty plus years in the Army.

[CombinedArms]

What I'm wondering, though, is whether Hodges isn't getting a bad rap. He moved a lot of men a long way over tough ground. Patton didn't get very far, either during the Sept-Dec period, when both the 1st and 3rd Armies were bogged down facing the West Wall, severely short of supplies (at least at first) and, awaiting reinforcements for the big final push. Until Antwerp was opened a big offensive just wasn't in the cards.

I like the Fort Benning/Marshall connection that's been stressed. Solid, non-flashy, sometimes a bit unimaginative, but fundamentally sound and effective. It's hard to make a major motion picture out of that, but it can win wars.

[btm]

I suggest you post this on the General Forum. You might get a better response.

[CombinedArms]

I'll give it a shot....

[CombinedArms]

I'll give it a shot....