Military strategy

[Sgt.Sanders fan]

Hi Gang, I am in need of some good reading material on strategy for combat techiques. If anyone has some please let me know what they are. I am learning as I am playing but reading some good techinques that actually work would be great. I have played CC 1,2,3,4 / West front,East front(talonsoft)and now am really enjoying CM; however, not that good at any of them really because I don't understand combat strategy. Thanks, SSF

[Guest Michael emrys]

Just pick a nit, there isn't a whole lot of what could properly called 'strategy' in CM. It's all about tactics. I know people tend to use the words interchangebly, but that only ends in confusion when you talk to or read someone who knows the difference and uses the distinction to make his point.

The concepts are fairly fuzzy with overlapping grey areas and subdivisions. But one of the best definitions I ever heard was that tactics is the art of winning battles and strategy is the art of arranging battles to win a war.

The distinction is important because a different set of skills is required in each. A person might be a genius at tactics and totally lost in space when it comes to strategy, or vice versa.

Michael

[Guest AlfieE]

There seems to be a general absence of written matter devoted to small unit tactics. I've been looking myself and the only stuff I've been able to find is contained within books, not as a book in its own right. Of course, it also has to be accessible!

One of the best examples I've found to date is a copy of Erwin Rommel's 'Infantry Tactics' Greenhill books, London or Stackpole books, Pennsylvania, last reprint 1995 ISBN 1 85367 199 1. In this interesting tome Rommel describes his time as an infantry commander in WWI. His format follows a story describing the action, maps and then, vitally, his observations. These are very useful since they describe how to 'use' different types of units to their best effect. Recomended.

General sections on tactics can be found in the various nations 'Handbooks...' series, e.g. British Army Handbook, 1939 - 1945, George Forty, Sutton Publishing, Stroud, UK ISBN 0 7509 1403 3. German, Russian, American and Japanese copies also exist I believe.

Highly reccomended as an introduction is Britannia Miniature's 'Tactical Aide Memoir: Basic minor unit skills, ambush techniques and street fighting'. It is written for 20mm tabletop wargamers but the principles are sound and it's affordable, £4.95 or around $10.00. Available from Britannia Miniatures, 33 St. Mary's Road, Halton Village, Runcorn, Cheshire, WA7 2BJ, UK. Tel / FAX (+44) (0)1928 564906 or www.wargame.com/britannia/

Hope some of this is of assistance.

AlfieE.

[Guest Rommel22]

Pick up a copy of Erwin Rommel's Infantry Tactics. I have the book, i read it a while and it helped me a it. i read it again just a week ago. Rommel describes the best tactics. In each chapter he ends with a observation paragraph where he suggest what he should of done instead or what hte enemy should of done. All of this is squad, or platton based. sometimes companie based. Very good book.

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Russian tactics as said by von Mellenthin "Bridge heads everywhere"

[Olle Petersson]

Here are some books about strategy in general:

An absolute must is the mother of all books on the topic: 'The art of war' by Zun Tsu, Sunzi or any other spelling of that Chineese name.

It was originally written around 600 b.c. and is applicable to all sorts of strategy; large scale, small scale, military and financial.

I've read a fairly recent modern interpretation made by a Chineese general who also comment on the theses and give modern examples. (Written in english.)

'The art of war' is available in most libraries (and book shops).

Another "must" for the dedicated is 'Vom Kriege' ('On war'), by von Clausewitz. A seven volume masterpiece, unfinished(?), about war and strategy. This one is only about 100 years old...

There is a short (relatively speaking) extract version of it as well for those less dedicated.

I think these two books are mandatory reading for cadets worldwide.

Cheers

Olle

[Disaster@work]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Olle Petersson:

Here are some books about strategy in general:

An absolute must is the mother of all books on the topic: 'The art of war' by Zun Tsu, Sunzi or any other spelling of that Chineese name.

It was originally written around 600 b.c. and is applicable to all sorts of strategy; large scale, small scale, military and financial.

I've read a fairly recent modern interpretation made by a Chineese general who also comment on the theses and give modern examples. (Written in english.)

'The art of war' is available in most libraries (and book shops).<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I like the Samuel B. Griffith's translation myself. Here are the Amazon details:

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0195015401/o/qid=965249748/sr=8-3/ref=aps_sr_b_1_5/104-5853095-1324768

Sun Tzu is an excellent thoughtful treatise (i.e. not a handbook) on general strategic common sense. I recommend this version because it contains forwards and commentaries that speak towards military interpretations rather than business strategy.

[Thrash]

One of the best books I've read on squad to company level tactics, is "The Combat Leader's Field Guide" by MSG Brett A. Stoneberger. It's my bible for CM.

[IMHO]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael emrys:

The concepts are fairly fuzzy with overlapping grey areas and subdivisions. But one of the best definitions I ever heard was that tactics is the art of winning battles and strategy is the art of arranging battles to win a war.

Michael<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

in soviet doctrines grey area is called "operative" level (the art of conducting operations which consist of battles (tac level) and form strategic level). if i'm not mistaken a similar concept exists in the west but rarely used.

[Guest Michael emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by IMHO:

in soviet doctrines grey area is called "operative" level (the art of conducting operations which consist of battles (tac level) and form strategic level). if i'm not mistaken a similar concept exists in the west but rarely used.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

This is yet one more way to slice the cake. It is often spoken of as different 'levels' of warmaking, depending mostly on the size of the units involved. In this system (and here I must perforce generalize to a certain extent), tactical refers to units up to a company in size and totaling a force of anywhere from a company to a division in size; operational refers to units up to a regiment/brigade in size with a total force up to a corps in size; grand tactical refers to up to a corps in size with a total force up to an entire theater of operations; strategic refers to up to an army group (or in the Soviet parlance, a front) in size, and might encompass the entire globe; grand strategic refers to the entire warmaking capability of a nation, including military, economic, political, and propaganda assets.

So we see, of the two definitions (i.e., the one I stated in the earlier post vs. the one here), one is primarily doctrinal and the other organizational.

Michael

[Guest Michael emrys]

Oh yes, there's one more definition of the distinction between strategy and tactics:

"Strategy is big maps with pins stuck in them and people pointing at them

with long sticks. Tactics is written on the back of an old fag packet

with a broken pencil."

Michael

[jekell]

A great book on tactics applicable to CM:

"Closing with the Enemy How the GI's Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945" by Michael D. Doubler ISBN# 0-7006-0744-7.

jekell

[Henri]

A book applicable at all levels, is Liddell-Hart's "Stategy of the Indirect Approach", available at most bookstores and a online places like Amazon.com. The ideas are modernized versions of Sun Tzu's book to a great extent, but with many concrete examples.

Henri

[Guest Michael emrys]

Henri, is that the same book that has carried the title Strategy? Or did the name get changed because it was re-edited or something?

Michael

[Marty]

Although not a single publication, you might want to go to the following homepage of the U.S. Army Military History Institute

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/

They have a long list of scanned (PDF) documents from all of the American military historical periods. The documents are of all types - personal papers and official publications.

Of particular interest, the monthly AAR's of the 38th Cavalry Regiment from July 44 to May 45. They took part in many of the actions across France and into Germany. Reading those AAR's is a lot like reading the ones done on this board.

Also, amongst those documents are the 8 or 9 volumes of a 1945 publication called Combat Lessons. Each one contains some of the accumulated "street knowledge" the veterans had acquired and wanted to pass on to the rest of the Army quickly without waiting for formal publications. The chapters in them are broken out by several categories, branch of service (Infantry, Tank Destroyers, etc.) or type of action (Patrolling, River Crossings, etc.). A couple examples of the kinds of things found in them are (paraphrased here):

- One sergeant holding a position that he thought would soon be attacked deployed one squad in the center and then the other two squads were each deployed way out on the two flanks of the center squad. When the Germans attacked, he had directed the flank squads to remain under cover and not to fire. As the Germans finally fought their way very close to the center squad, the flank squads opened fire with the German machine guns and submacine guns the sergeant had given them. The German attackers were so confused by the fire, they thought their own men were shooting at them, the attack faltered.

- At night, one unit would position a machine gun on either side of a parked Tank Destroyer. If, during the night, they heard the motors of German tanks moving, one of the machine guns would fire tracer ammo until the tracers started bouncing back, reflected by the tank's armor. When this happened, the other machine gun would then open fire at the same location until it's tracers were bouncing also. The tracers from the two machine guns then looked like an inverted letter "V" meeting at the location of the tank. At this time the U.S. Tank Destroyer would just fire at that center point.

A lot of the Combat Leesons are pretty ingenious, but Steve and Charles would probably be cringing at how to emulate them!

One other document at that site is the INFANTRY JOURNAL of November, 1920. It has an article called "A Tank Discussion" which is rather interesting in that it is defending the tank concept and future uses of that vehicle with an extremely perceptive eye - almost indicative of a Guderian approach. What makes it really interesting is that the article was written by a guy known most as a staff officer, rather than as a tankie, Captain D. D. Eisenhower of (Tanks) Infantry.

[Guest Michael emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Marty:

One other document at that site is the INFANTRY JOURNAL of November, 1920. It has an article called "A Tank Discussion" which is rather interesting in that it is defending the tank concept and future uses of that vehicle with an extremely perceptive eye - almost indicative of a Guderian approach. What makes it really interesting is that the article was written by a guy known most as a staff officer, rather than as a tankie, Captain D. D. Eisenhower of (Tanks) Infantry. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Interesting! I know many of his contemporaries regarded Eisenhower as a bit of a tactical dunderhead, but my own study of his conduct of the war suggest that he was much more shrewd than he is given credit for. Although many writers assume he was given the Job of Supreme Commander more for his diplomatic than military skills, his writings, both at the time and subsequently, show that he had a keen appreciation for the crucial factors.

His broad front strategy is often criticised (particularly by those who would have liked to see a more heroic role for themselves), but when you consider that it was perfectly reasonable, based on their past peformance, to assume the Germans would engage in a last man, last bullet defense of the Reich, Eisenhower's approach starts to look more like the only one a responsible commander could take. Ike wasn't perfect, but he did okay!

Michael

[Noba]

--------------------------------------------

His broad front strategy is often criticised (particularly by those who would have liked to see a more heroic role for themselves), but when you consider that it was perfectly reasonable, based on their past peformance, to assume the Germans would engage in a last man, last bullet defense of the Reich, Eisenhower's approach starts to look more like the only one a responsible commander could take. Ike wasn't perfect, but he did okay!

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Michael, I know it's off thread but could a more 'concentrated' front by the western allies resulted in a faster approach to Berlin, i.e. before christmas and thus complicated the political perception that the Russians were to be the first to Berlin ?

Was Eisenhower reacting to political pressure only ?

[Guest Michael emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Noba:

Michael, I know it's off thread but could a more 'concentrated' front by the western allies resulted in a faster approach to Berlin, i.e. before christmas and thus complicated the political perception that the Russians were to be the first to Berlin ?

Was Eisenhower reacting to political pressure only ?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Eisenhower was responding to intelligence that the Nazis were planning to establish a National Redoubt in the Bavarian Alps and fight it out to the bitter end. Toward that end, they had in fact moved caches of arms and treasure to underground mines and tunnels there.

As it turned out, Hitler stayed in Berlin and the National Redoubt never came into operation. The Germans had had more than enough fighting; their country was overrun already anyway; there was nothing to gain by dragging things out. But Eisenhower couldn't know that in February when the strategy was established.

The only credible claim IMHO that we could have beat the Soviets to Berlin came from Major General James Gavin, commander of the 82nd. Airborne, who wrote in his book On to Berlin that there was a plan to drop his divsion onto one of the major Berlin airfields and hold it until reinforcements arrived. Even this is shaky, as the Germans in Berlin were pretty heavily armed. The Sovs pretty much had to destroy the city (that which was left after the Western Allies got through bombing it) in order to get in.

As for the political side of it, the occupation zones had been drawn up months before, at Yalta perhaps. It was up to each of the Allies to grab his piece of the pie, which more or less they managed to do.

Hope this answers your question.

Michael

[Guest Michael emrys]

Oops! Forgot that you asked about finishing the war before Christmas. I can't see that there was any real chance of that. When the Allied armies arrived at the German border, they were at the end of their logistical rope. Their supplies were still mainly coming in over the assualt beaches of Normandy. Cherbourgh had been opened, but was rather disappointing in the tonnage it could handle. The channel ports were mostly still held by German garrisons. The rail net had been destroyed by Allied bombing and the road net was beginning to disintegrate under heavy usage. Marseille and Toulon had been opened, but were slow to come on line and were really only useful for supplying the southern part of the front.

What resources were available had been squandered on the unsuccessful Market-Garden, diverting effort away from clearing the Scheldt Estuary and opening the port of Amsterdam.

At the same time, the German armies which had fled pell-mell across France in a high state of disorganization, had by the time of Market-Garden gotten themselves back into a semblance of order, and ensconced in the fortifications of the West Wall had stiffened their resistance. The post-Cobra pursuit phase had ended. For the next six months it would be nothing but a hard grind.

The Battle of the Bulge helped in that it drew the Germans out where their formations could more easily be destroyed. May have shortened the war by a month.

So as far as a thrust deep into Germany in the fall of 1944 is concerned, it is extremely unlikely because (a) the Allied offensive had essentially run out of supply and inevitably had to halt until supplies could be brought up; and ( the Germans still had a lot of fight left in them.

Michael

[Fionn]

Noba,

An advance along a single axis allows a counter to be made along a single axis.

The Germans had enough power to defeat an isolated thrust AND enough power to perhaps cut it at certain points.

Eisenhower's choice was between a risky but possibly quick win via the focussed front strategy OR a more sure, predictable and steady advance via the broad front strategy.

He, understandably enough, chose to advance along a broad front so as to keep the Germans fully committed and prevent any nasty surprises whereby counter-attacks cut off and anihilated an Allied division or two.

[Henri]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Henri, is that the same book that has carried the title Strategy? Or did the name get changed because it was re-edited or something?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

It's the same book, but the newer versions have new chapters on the Israeli-Arab wars.

Henri

[Henri]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Noba:

Michael, I know it's off thread but could a more 'concentrated' front by the western allies resulted in a faster approach to Berlin, i.e. before christmas and thus complicated the political perception that the Russians were to be the first to Berlin ?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

What would have been the point of reaching Berlin first? The Soviets lost 100,000 men taking Berlin.The division of Germany was decided at the Yalta Conference, and the Allies actualy had to give back some areas they had taken in Czechoslovakia.

Patton loudly proclaimed his wish to kick the Soviets all the way back to Moscow, but Eisenhower wisely sacked him to avoid a conflict that the US Congress would not have tolerated.

Henri

[patboivin]

Reading this thread reminds me that I don't know much.

I wish I knew as much history as you do!

[Guest Michael emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Henri:

It's the same book, but the newer versions have new chapters on the Israeli-Arab wars.

Henri<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thanks. I think my copy was printed in the early '70s so I must have just missed it.

Although I think Liddel-Hart kind of drives his thesis into the ground, he's basically right and I use his strategy whenever I can. I've even noticed that the AI units in CM start to get nervous if you threaten to cut off their retreat route.

Michael

[Guest Michael emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by patboivin:

Reading this thread reminds me that I don't know much.

I wish I knew as much history as you do!

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well, if it makes you feel any better, none of us knew **** when we started out (or maybe it would be more correct to say that **** was all we knew). Chances are we saw a movie or a tv show that grabbed us and decided we wanted to know more about the subject. And once we started reading, we discovered that what was in the books was a hell of a lot more fascinating than any movie. So we just naturally kept at it.

Michael

[HRKing]

You can try this link. It has some good info. Look at the back issues.

http://147.238.100.101/dtdd/armormag/

HRKing