Russian Armor in CMBB

[PJungnitsch]

A few points:

Cost is not directly proportional to the size or weight of the tank, or how formidable it is. The Germans own figures show the PzIII, PzIV, and Panther at being about the same cost. The Tiger was almost three times the cost of the Panther, and it is only about 25% heavier. The Kingtiger is only slightly more expensive than a Tiger, despite being considerably more well armed and armoured.

German tank costs

Just because it seemed a Sherman or a T-34 seems like it should be cheap does not mean it would be so as there are many other factors involved.

About the slave labor issue that Panther costs are actually inflated to account for that. Actual cost of a Panther is closer to $32,000. The costs quoted are those of Alex Hellmunds from this thread:

Onwar tank cost discussion

If you think the Shermans that the Americans used were expensive, just keep in mind they charged the British $90,000!

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Tmu:

Must have been hard atleast in the Kursk battle for the russians. Since the ZIS3 gun can kill german cats from ranges less than 300 only. Has anyone actually won that mission "von Lauchert" I have found it impossible to play with russians. German panthers allways knock out my t34s & kv1 from ranges beyond 2 km and i can't even shoot at those ranges. Even the 122 mm is not enough to deal with Panthers.

And the unrepairable tank losses for each side during Kursk highlight how far the T-34 had slipped in the Gun/armour race vs. German 7,5cm guns and 7/8cm armour.

[Bastables]

Originally posted by Paul Jungnitsch:

A few points:

Cost is not directly proportional to the size or weight of the tank, or how formidable it is.

If Weight were the primary determinate the StuG would end up as more expensive to build than the lighter PIII.

[Brian Rock]

Thanks for the source, Paul.

I've seen figures on the net for German armour in Reichsmarks (the Achtung Panzer figures), and figures for T-34s in roubles ( http://www.geocities.com/pentagon/quarters/4635/tanks/t3476/t3476.htm ). I haven't seen what these figures are based on, nor any information on how to convert them to US dollars (straight conversion or better still some form of purchase parity).

I'll try to get hold of Harrison's book - it may have more detail on sources and methods.

[ October 15, 2002, 11:22 PM: Message edited by: Brian Rock ]

[Foreigner]

I have a problem with wartime pricing of any kind, because all belligerents employed at least some form of additional central government intervention in the economy - be it simple rationing, price/wage controls, centralized resource allocation, forced labor... In such an environment prices would not accurately reflect the relative availability/productivity of a particular resource - be it raw materials, precision tools or trained technicians, and there are no simple solutions to that problem.

For example, if the Panther and Tiger II were relatively "cheap" for their fighting capabilities, why were they not produced in greater numbers? One possible answer is "wrong decision due to stupidity/conservative thinking/inertia/political infighting..." However, a much more realistic answer would be along the lines of "scarce materials/lack of trained workforce/insufficient production capacity/the need to extensively modify existing production lines/..." And IMHO it is precisely such resource scarcity that is not adequately reflected in wartime prices (even corrected for exchange rates) - especially so for the German economy, which was in the most severe resource crunch.

Now let's assume copper is the only restricted resource, and assume that a Tiger II uses twice as much as a Panther. So by building a Tiger II you are effectively giving up two Panthers. Will accounting "cost" show the Tiger II as being twice the cost of a Panther based on the usage of copper alone? No, unless both tanks are made of copper only . Will the battlefield "feel" the absence of two Panthers? My guess, yes. Will the benefit of one Tiger II outweigh the benefit of two Panthers? Open for debate, but not in this post.

So, IMO, to work out a really meaningful and comprehensive comparative "war economics" cost estimates for any vehicle, you need to identify the critical scarce resources for each economy, set a "fair" price for each resource and obtain reliable data on how much of each any particular vehicle used up. Throw in such indirect costs as lifetime operating costs (fuel consumption, anyone?), training, costs of adapting or expanding production...

If it looks bad already, it gets worse. Unless vehicles are so accomodating as to come up consistently better or worse in all parameters, you also need some system of rating or assigning relative weights so that you can come up with a single "cost" value.

And to top it off, you have to convince others that your prices and weights are the right ones. I suspect any argument over those would make a Peng™ thread look like a church ice-cream social.

Anyway, just thought the thread and the forum could use a little more confusion...

[PJungnitsch]

Originally posted by Foreigner:

For example, if the Panther and Tiger II were relatively "cheap" for their fighting capabilities, why were they not produced in greater numbers?

This comes up quite a lot.

One thing to keep in mind however is that Panther production ramped up somewhat faster than the T-34 did, despite having a much shorter development time.

T-34 prototypes (developed from BT series) 1937-1939

First year of production:1940 110 made

Cancelling the T-34 completely was considered, because of the huge problems building it.

Second year of production:1941 2800 made

Third year of production things took off.

From Russian Battlefield

First Panther prototypes (from scratch) 1942

First year of production:1943 1769 made

Second year of production:1944 3462 made despite massive Allied air raids.

Third year of production the war ended

From The Desert Fox

[Foreigner]

Originally posted by Paul Jungnitsch:

One thing to keep in mind however is that Panther production ramped up somewhat faster than the T-34 did, despite having a much shorter development time.

I would agree with the longer developmental cycle for T-34, but the problem with production statistics (or any statistics, for that matter) is that it's like a bathing suit - it shows a lot, but usually hides the most important.

For starters, although the Soviet Union had more (potential) resources, no one would argue that the industrial development of Germany was much higher, with a much longer and stronger industrial tradition. As a result of WWI Germany (apart from human casualties) lost some territory, had some serious restrictions imposed by the Versailles Treaty, and had to pay reparations. Not to mention the political and economical turmoil of the Weimar Republic and the effects of the Great Depression. But AFAIK its territory was not occupied by foreign troops, and no signifant fighting went on on German soil (actually, until 1944), so at least the physical stock of capital was not significantly damaged. On the other hand, the Soviet Union had to deal with both a civil war and foreign intervention from 1918 till 1920 (at least). Plus, even Czarist Russia wasn't an industrial power, so the Soviets had to first rebuild the devastation, and then start industrialization in the mid to late 1920s, IIRC, "from scratch". Along the following lines, I remember a quote from a British report on the T-34 that, while noting the crude finish of the armor, specifically stated that it didn't seem to compromise the quality to the welding seams or any other critical performance features. To borrow a quote about AK-47, "...it is a crude design and finish except where it matters most..." (in AK-47's case - the barrel and action). The same British report concludes that "...for a country industrialized so recently..." T-34 was a surprisingly solid and effective design.

Another factor to note is that T-34's development started in the interwar years - when no one knew they will be "interwar". War definitely adds urgency - and lack of war always reduces the willingness of any nation to invest in military research and production. While the Panther was comissioned precisely as a means to address an urgent war problem - namely the T-34/KV combo. This article gives some details on why and how the Panther came to be.

Then, from what I have read about the air war over Europe, the main industrial focus of allied attacks were first the aircraft industry, then the ball-bearing plants, but that didn't cripple the German war machine (many attribute this to the sound management approach of Albert Speer). The thing that worked was attacks on oil. So I doubt the Panther got the worst of it. And if we mention the bombing of the Reich by the Allies, it will be only fair to note that in 1941 and the first half of 1942 the Soviet's industrial capacity was not only bombed and captured, but what survived was being relocated East to the Urals, so it was at least temporarily out of comission as well. In 1942 they churned out more than 12000 - a four-fold increase over 1941, and I doubt in their third year Panters could have reached such "growth rates" (There were still 4 months to go in 1945). It is entirely subjective, of course, but reading the Desert Fox site's monthly target and production data it seems to me Panther production took off very quickly, but within a year hit a ceiling of about 380/month and flatlined afterwards.

But all these comparisons are, IMHO, harder to justify than the more relevant question - if the prices were so similar, why was the PzIV still built at about the same rate as the Panther throughout 1944, as the Panther was superior in many critical aspects? In 1944, more than 600 Tiger Is were built. At an "exchange rate" of, let's say, 2 Panthers to a Tiger, that would mean about 30% boost in Panther output - no chump change. Then why didn't it happen?

One obvious answer - "You don't change horses in midstream." But since we are talking costs, if you doubt that your current train will carry you to the other side, a more appropriate question would be - "How much would it cost me to change my horses?" And in my mind, this should include not only the sticker price (which might or might not be what you actually pay), but the oats you need to feed the horses, the immunization shots and veterinarian's fee, the price of the horseshoes and what you pay the blacksmith to nail them on, and the beer for the groom that will finally change the horses for you.

Finally, one interesting thing I only recently learned about tanks with forward drive sprockets (among others, the Sherman and the Panther) - for any significant repair or overhaul of the transmission, you had to take off the turret first. A little bit of a hassle, isn't it?

[Guest Mike]

I believe the main problem with changing horses is that for some period of time you don't have a horse at all.

Thus you cannot take a Mk-IV factory and have it turn ouot Panthers immediately after the last Mk-IV is produced - for soem time (weeks, days, months??) the factory will produce nothing at all.

This limitation affected an awful lot of decisions during the war by both sides. Well known ones are the UK's continuing production of 2 pdr AT guns instead of switching to the 6 pdr in 1941.

Lesser known ones include (I believe) the USSR ditching improved tank mdels to stay with the T34 - such as the T43 & T50. The UK churning out Hurricane 1's and Spitfire 2's in record numbers in 1940 and thus setting back development of the Hurricane II and Spitfire V considerably, the USA retaining the Sherman when it was known to be less than optimal.

And no doubt there are others.

Note I'm not saying that thsi was the only factor in those decisinos - but it is one that was consciously considered at the time.

[zukkov]

say what you want, but it was the quantity of horses the allies had, not the quality that won that horse race. from a strictly logistical point of view the shermans and t34s were "good enough"....

[Guest Mike]

Umm...yeah...which is precisely why they didn't ant to stop production in order to upgrade - since then they'd have lost the quality that numbers bring that ws the only one that they realy had!!

[Foreigner]

Well, to continue the horse analogy further...

If you have more than one horse in your cart, no one said you absolutely have to replace them all at once. If you have more than one tank assembly line running, you can modify them one at the time without completely stopping production of the old model until it's phased out. Sure enough, any modification to a manufacturing process or facility will decrease output initially - there's no way around it. The question is - decrease by how much and for how long and (eventually) will the benefit of the change (higher productivity or a better tank model) be worth the "cost" of the change. The extent to which you disrupt your current production will depend a lot on the tank design. Therefore, I think the "cost" estimates for a tank should take into account not only what you spend on each one after everything is up and running smoothly, but what it had cost you or will cost you to set up or increase the production (whether starting anew or converting an existing facility). If we take that into account, the Panther doesn't seem to me to be that cheap.

And going back to the beaten "horse analogy", it is one thing to simply fit your new horse into your existing harness with relatively little hassle, and quite another to acually get a new cart because your new horse won't fit into the old buggy...