Rear Screen Element - A different way to fight the recon battle?

[Fionn]

If something works against a poor player it doesn't mean the tactic is, in itself, sound.

[ June 21, 2002, 07:30 AM: Message edited by: Fionn ]

[JasonC]

"you can call it whatever you want"

Thank you, Lord Whorfen. We all needed your permission for that. Obviously the original poster was the one who chose to use the term in that manner. Those of us responding to him noticed how he was using the term and spoke about what he was actually discussing, instead of about his terminology. It was quite obvious to all of us that he was not talking about rear guards at all, and was using "RSE" loosely to discuss a substitute for FSEs via firepower. Somehow, we made the transition from an expectation of the meaning of the "R" to what he was actually talking about quite seemlessly.

And while the positioning of the fire assets involved is indeed on the support line, their usage as described is not to support the MLR. So saying they "really" are just an fire support element (whoops! You mean FSE can mean two entirely different things anyway, based on the context? Surprise surprise) for the MLR misses the point.

No, the physical positioning of the elements of the force is not the only relevant category of tactical thought. Who does what is influenced by factors beyond physical positioning. Maneuver of maneuver elements is not all. Fire exists, and in tactical (rather than operational) contexts it matters. A fire support element that does not fire in support of an engaged MLR is doing something different, even if positioned similarly.

"BUT you shouldn't expect people who know about doctrine etc to continue in discussions"

Actually, he can expect plenty of people who know plenty about doctrine to understand what he is saying quite clearly, not to niggly over terms and snipe at his usage, and instead to engage on the tactical issues actually under discussion and talk about them meaningfully. But oh, not everyone, all the time. Small loss.

I know you are well aware of it from other contexts, but I respectfully suggest you unappoint yourself from the forum term usage police. It is obnoxious and contributes practically nothing to the actual tactical discussions taking place.

Your contributions would be much more highly valued by at least one person here if you talked about e.g. your own experiences with what can go right or wrong with conventional screening elements in the recon battle, or dealing with enemy heavy weapons that open up early, or the issue of whether the defender should want the attacker hitting such things or want it to be hard for him to do so, etc. Believe me, that sort of thing would get a much warmer reception than high handed lectures about what we are all supposed to call things, according to your highness.

[JonS]

Speaking of definitions, here's a handy graphic explaining Intervisibility Lines.

Here is a longer explantion, though the graphics are crappier.

[Tarquelne]

What everyone here is talking about is an MLR featuring a strong support element positioned on ridgelines/in woods 500 metres or so behind the MLR.

And that "strong support element" is called....?

It _doesn't_ necessarily actually support the MRL at all. It isn't really even intended to support the FSE. It's supposed to duplicate the 3 of the main functions of the FSE. (It's success or failure is a different issue.) It may be part of the MRL, but it doesn't _act_ like most of the MRL. A word differentiating it from the rest of the MRL would be usefull.

(Also, I'm not sure if "500m or so behind" is correct. Why would units fulfilling the role bc proposes would need to always be 500m behind?)

It seems that a simply point needs to be restated.

I don't say "I think you're wrong, Fionn." very often. And I won't know. I'll write it, though.

I think you're wrong, Fionn. We don't need to be reminded that "RSE" isn't the correct term - note the amount of time it spent between " " s in my message. I also attempted to supply a new, not-inccorect, label.

What we _do_ need is the correct, or at least "more acceptable" term. Remember - while you might think that the "RSE" idea is impractical, simply arguing that "RSE" isn't the right term is very far from demonstrating that it wouldn't work.

We need _something_ to call it while we talk about it. Apparently my message to Hiram was usefull... It wouldn't have existed if I had to write "support element placed behind the MRL that's meant to duplicate 3 of the major roles of the FSE." every time I wanted to indicate those units bc was talking about.

BTW - A dozen paragraphs about "RARE" being the wrong label too _really isn't necessary._ Just one would do. If you drop the name of the correct term into the discussion that'd be great.

[ June 18, 2002, 06:29 PM: Message edited by: Tarqulene ]

[Fionn]

If something works against a poor player it doesn't mean the tactic is, in itself, sound.

[ June 21, 2002, 07:31 AM: Message edited by: Fionn ]

[Fionn]

If something works against a poor player it doesn't mean the tactic is, in itself, sound.

[ June 21, 2002, 07:33 AM: Message edited by: Fionn ]

[Tarquelne]

Originally posted by Fionn:

[QB]I'm NOT arguing that it won't work ( now that people have explained what it is they are actually talking about). You are not dealing with what I am saying here Tarq.

I said "might"... since the discussion has been about the term RSE, and it's role, AND IV lines, then "dealing with what I am saying" isn't particularly easy.

I AM saying it isn't an RSE and that AS an RSE it won't work. As part of the support to the MLR I think it will be extremely effective.

And - just to perfectly clear - I'm not saying there's anything wrong with that. But I do think hammering out a better term would be far, far more usefull at this point than continued discussion about why "RSE" isn't the right term.

Calling it the "Support Line" conveys different roles, objectives and locations within accepted doctrine.

A problem with simply calling it the "support line" is that it, too, might be misleading. It's certainly ambigious. If for no other reason than bc's units aren't meant to directly "support" anything else. (IIRC)

Calling it an RSE is nonsensical

Come now. "Nonsensical" is much too strong... "Wrong" or "Misleading" is much better, and doesn't run the risk of confusing someone. ("Nonsensical" imples that bc's "RSE" is _nothing_ like the FSE.)

This is simple, obvious and I am mystified that people seem to miss it.

What I was afraid you were missing is that the bc's "RSE" might be deployed and used in a different manner than a MRL's "traditional" machine guns, mortars, etc. A term to distinguish bc's units from a standard, not-anti-recon focused support line would be usefull. (What I mean by "traditional" is focused on the MRL's main role, which, I'm pretty sure, _isn't_ taking pot shots at recon elements, acting as _bait_, and trying to look like an MRL.)

An SWL emplaced on the forward slope of an IV in close support of a reverse slope MLR can, of course, be extremely succesful in breaking up enemy recon efforts.

I don't remember if you answered this question unambigiously or not: Are an MRL's support weapons _often_ deployed to be used more against an enemy's recon force than anything else? As a HW group _not_ focused on supporting either the MRL or the FSE? If so, the SWL and bc's RSE are indeed the same. If not, if the SWL's aren't generally used against recon forces, or used to "flush out" enemy long-ranged weapons though being fired upon, then a seperate term is usefull. (Note the presense or lack of IV is another matter.)

Basically though I think that calling it the "Support Weapons Line" would be the simplest and most correct thing to do.

Ah - but _definetly_ not a very "usefull" thing to do. Not if the discussion is about using a SWL in a specific and unusual manner. If we do that it's good to be able to quickly distinguish bettween a more-traditional MRL and support focused SWL, and billcarry's anti-recon/"bait" SWL.

I am already painted as the big bad by a large portion of the forum

Well, that might not be completely inexplicable. You're certainly not wrong to point out that RSE is the wrong term here... but that's percieved as a "negative" activity. Doing it multiple times without strong need will greatly inflate any negative perceptions. OTOH, being willing to discuss what the right term should be - as you've just done - ought to foster warm fuzzy feelings, and thus make discussing the issue easier for everyone.

[ June 18, 2002, 08:36 PM: Message edited by: Tarqulene ]

[billcarey]

I guess there just isn't an acronym for what I'm talking about (though Tarquelene and Jason and Hiram appear to know what I'm talking about)

The FBRRWHWSE (Forward, but really rear with heavy weapons screening element) as it shall be called is most definitely not a "support line to the MLR". It dosen't support the main line (at least not at first). It engages independantly before the main line with the three purposes Tarquelene so eloquently stated:

1. Bother his recon

2. Confuse him as to your disposition

3. Reveal his heavy hitters

Now, as I understood things, that would make it a screening element (of some sort.) I like RARE. I think HWSE (Heavy Weapons Screening Element) works too. I don't really care.

What I do want to know is if people have had any success with things like this.

Jason,

Mortars are usually my biggest worry doing this, but I figure that my HMGs can take a fair pounding from 60mm mortars, and that 20mm flak guns can trade at good odds with his light vehicles.

The HWSE/RARE/FBRRWHWSE can be so spread out that it's not a good trade for the attacker to hit it with his heavy arty. I haven't tried a defense like this as the americans, but I suspect it would work well because of the .50 and the abundance of light mortars. Shame they don't have any small autocannons though...

- Bill

[Tarquelne]

Jason,

Mortars are usually my biggest worry doing this, but I figure that my HMGs can take a fair pounding from 60mm mortars, and that 20mm flak guns can trade at good odds with his light vehicles.

Mortars are my biggest worry too. I've found I usually do something like you describe, bc, when I can use a few buildings for shelter. Pretty good protection from mortars. Your opponent is also often more willing to beleive your MRL - or at least something worth dropping heavy artillery on - is among buildings.

The HWSE/RARE/FBRRWHWSE can be so spread out

Speaking of spread out, I like to have a vehicle of some sort that can "ferry" some HMGs to the true-MRL positions when the early part of a battle is past. A tank, maybe, moving from a "reserve" position to something closer to the front.

You'll want a covered approach route, of course. Though I'm beginning to think a partially covered route is best. It can distract your enemy to let him see a bunch of tanks zooming around your back area.

And a tank parked near your RARE (or whatever) can be used to reply to any long range AFV fire you're lucky enough to draw, if you're willing to reaveal it. (Probably not worth it, unless you've got an experienced Big Cat to place against a short-Sherman, maybe. Or a Firefly to take pot shots at a StuH.)

[Priest]

Just so he is not a man on an island, Fionn thanks for clearing that up and stating what is what. I love how certain folks think that certain facts are actually your opinion.

Once again Jason is in his, "they can call a car a boat and that means it must be a boat or we the listeners must understand that the boat is the car which is being called the boat" mode. Now take that 'boat' errr I mean car to an auto-mechanic and call it a boat, then proceed to get laughed at.

Seeing as I do not like to be considered ignorant I like the fact that Fionn and others share their knowledge freely. There is nothing wrong with the original post, we all "got" it, but Fionn IMHO was trying to help everyone learn something. God forbid. And he is correct, if we want to really get into this discussion then we best use the right terms. Again going to your auto-mechanic and telling him you have an issue with your engine, but call it a cucumber, will not get you anywhere fast, literally!

As far as the idea that spawned this thread, I agree that it seems like a perfectly good support line and this backed up by the fact that it is a real honest to goodness tactic employed by armed forces around the world. My question would be whether or not it really is a MLR Support line? True the main gist of it is to fire at long range over the MLR, but more than likely considering the weapon systems mentioned would be it's most lethal when it supported the MLR during the eventual engagement. Obviously if these weapon systems are functional they will fire in defense of the MLR. Then again maybe it is just a support line, but if it does not support the MLR and you do not have an FSE then what does it support? I am possibly confusing to arguements here (the original and the IV line argument).

[JasonC]

"Sometimes the best way to help is to point out error and give correction."

That much I heartily agree with. And practice. I can also appreciate that in a discussion in which rear guards were also being considered, "RSE" would be potentially confusing and best avoided.

That was not the case here, but being on the lookout for such potential confusions down the pike would be fine. When you stop calling forward screening elements "FSEs" to avoid possible confusion with "Fire Support Elements", it will make sense to say context should be ignored and one abbreviation mapped to only one tactical concept ever.

Until then, the fact the abbreviations are crude summaries and depend on context to control their meaning seems to me so obvious it is not very useful to insist on disentangling everything. Your insistence on the importance of a mythical clarity of terms notwithstanding, I have never seen any sign of confusion between one FSE and another due to their sharing acronyms.

What is noticable to me is that the conversation moved on your intervention not to greater clarity in terminology and resulting greater tactical insight, but quite the reverse. We are now talking about abbreviations instead of stopping enemy scouts. The first being semantics if not vacuous piffle and the second being tactics.

It is also noticable to me that at least three different conceptions or varieties of ranged weapons stopping scouts have been advanced, which share some things but are not quite the same. There are HMGs on a forward slope with the MLR behind that slope. Not "supporting", nor "rearward", in fact somewhat ahead of the MLR. Meant to deny areas of open ground, obviously, and that may include scouts of course. Call that "MGs up".

The second conception is the one the original poster advanced at the start. In that case, the heavy weapons are truly behind the MLR, not in front of it. They are on what Fionn accurately enough calls a fire support line (though in CM anyway, typically 150-250 yards behind it not 500). And as the initial poster presented it, with long LOS lines and inviting counters by enemy long ranged weapons. Call that "heavies back, unhid."

The third (or third and fourth, depending on whether you find the difference between them important) is what I described, which is like "heavies back, unhid" with a sighting block ahead of the MLR (also present in "MGs up"), but with the heavies on the back side of the sighting block, not the front side. The fourth variety - if it is a fourth - is when the heavies are to the side of the MLR, with LOS to locations ahead of it. The MLR is shielded to the front (as in all); the heavies are shielded directly forward (sighted along "inward diagonals"). Call that variation "heavies with inward diagonals".

Why are all of these different? All can perform the job of suppressing scouts approaching the MLR by ranged fire. They thus all address the main subject of this thread, which remains nameless. But they have different characteristics with regard to enemy *replies* to that ranged fire.

With MGs up, the MGs are on the enemy's side of the LOS break. They are "firepower isolated" from the defender's main body - exactly like a conventional infantry recon screen. Meanwhile the attacker is "firepower integrated", between his scouts and his overwatch, with respect to the up MGs.

If you *want* the MGs to draw fire, even many on few fire at long range, then that is fine. You may want to make the attacker waste ammo on relatively robust HMG teams. You may want to draw his ranged weapons into activity, the better to locate them early. In exchange terms, the enemy will have some scouts pinned and expend some ammo, while you will probably lose some MG teams.

In information terms, you will see a lot of his ranged shooters while he doesn't find your MLR, until after that part of the engagement is over. Then he can continue to recon, and if you've lost your MG "eyes" his movements may become harder to track. But very likely you adapt in the meantime with some counter or plan.

That has some characteristics in common with the original poster's "heavies back unhid" idea. But not all. The exchange of fire between ranged weapons idea is the same. The hiding MLR is the same. The exchange of unhid teams for ammo and information is the same. What is potentially different has to do with possible enemy *maneuver counters* as opposed to firepower counters.

See, with "MGs up", the enemy has another option besides blowing ammo at range and exposing his ranged shooters. He can rush the MGs - perhaps suppressing 1-2 with a tank, and sending a platoon or two after them in a blinder spot created by that. With the idea of KOing them in sequence.

Compared to that situation, the "heavies back unhid" is a trap. It wants the enemy to try exactly that. It wants the enemy to suspect "MGs up" is what is being used. Because then the enemy does not expect to hit the MLR until *after* past the MGs, and the next sighting block beyond them. And the point of "heavies back" is that if he thinks so and attacks by maneuver rather than range fire, he will run onto the undiscovered MLR.

That is, in "heavies back unhid", you are giving the enemy points to attack. And want him to attack them with a serious maneuver force, rather than just scouts. You are trying to mislead him about the location of the MLR, and sucker him into running onto it while he thinks it must be farther back. That was the original poster's idea, as I understand him.

My own ideas about using a sighting block to "firepower dislocate" the scouts from attacker overwatch have a different motivation. I don't want to engage his long range firepower assets in a firefight with my heavy weapons alone. Because I don't want that many-on-few. Against an attacker who relies on aggressive maneuver, I can definitely see the attraction. It is a great sucker-punch for anyone whose fangs get too long (and who therefore tries a maneuver-shock attack on the IDed heavy weapons).

But against a methodical firepower attacker, I see the prospect of losing my ranged weapons before the main firefight, or worse, losing them and then watching the enemy resuming scouting with a small probing force, and finding my MLR, since my ranged weapons (being dead) can no longer stop them. Methodical firepower attackers don't run forward (with more than a probing platoon etc) when they have LOS lines to anything from way back. Not until they first blow the heck out of everything they can see.

So, I want the heavies to cover the open ground ahead of the MLR, yes. But I want the enemy to not even be able to firefight them, unless he steps right up in front of the MLR. I want him to have no LOS from farther back. To get at my heavy weapons, not just with maneuver-shock but even with fire, he has to come a lot closer.

There is a danger to this alternate approach of mine, however. Especially when I don't have neat ridges for the two ridgeline version, and must make use of the inward diagonals instead. The danger is that the enemy will use maneuver-shock on the flanks of the MLR, avoiding the MLR but running into a small portion of my heavies on one flank. He doesn't know where the MLR is at this stage. But he may guess, or just get lucky, or be particularly partial to gamey edge rushes that happen to avoid the spot I put the MLR, etc.

Not the end of the world, but not the opening of the engagement one would like either. The reason this is more serious in my approach is that mine is a comparatively "closed" defense. Meaning, LOS is drastically more limited forward, at places other than the MLR or the interior of my defensive zone. The "firepower integration" of a force using my verions varies relatively sharply from point to point, because I am using LOS blocks to avoid enemy ranged firepower, and that means the sighting picture (or "LOS footprint") of each piece of my force is comparatively limited.

To me the above variations are clearly move and counter in a sort of head-game with the attacking player. If he plans on and prepares for a methodical firepower attack, it is best to get out of the way of his ranged firepower (IMnsHO). If on the other hand he plans aggressive maneuver against targets located by his scouts, then billcarey's approach looks great to me. If I were planning counterstrokes of my own e.g. with a whole platoon of armor, then "MGs up" would give an intel edge before it launched, at a modest cost in sacrificed units.

Aren't tactics more interesting than semantics?

For what it is worth.

[ June 18, 2002, 10:02 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[imported_Hiram Sedai]

I usually stay away from discussions (let’s just call it a discussion, gentlemen) like this because of how quickly I get overwhelmed by the verbosity. Yes, I’m still surprised and a bit confused by how subjective the terminology is. I had thought that there was one standard and everyone but me used them with proficiency.

Thanks to those of you who allowed me to step in and ask questions. The personality clashes aren’t really my business inasmuch as I am here to glean some knowledge from those in the know. What I will take away from this discussion is that there are separate elements in a defense with interesting roles. I had never thought of my defense being quite like this. I thank Fionn for explaining how to be aggressive and for clarifying some points that were raised.

This thread does well to remind me that I’ve been operating at a kindergarten level in my PBEM’s. I won’t be shy about asking even more questions even if it does cause arguments. See? I actually typed all of that without being self-deprecating. Who would have thought?

[Fionn]

If something works against a poor player it doesn't mean the tactic is, in itself, sound.

[ June 21, 2002, 07:34 AM: Message edited by: Fionn ]

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Fionn:

It seems that a simple point needs to be restated.

Vanguard = Forward Screen Element.

Rearguard = Rear Screen Element.

Well, not quite, at least as understood in the British Army for quite a while. Obviously, the forward things go at the front, and the rear things go at the rear -- not a terribly difficult concept to grasp, I agree -- but there is a modest distinction between a "screen" and a "guard".

One of the questions often used to annoy cavalrymen is "What is the difference between a guard and a screen?"; the answer is that a guard is expected to fight, whereas a screen isn't (except in self-defence). This discussion seems to concern gaurds rather than screens, and I would guess that screens are a relative rarity in CM:BO.

The other question used to annoy cavalrymen is "What is the role of cavalry in modern warfare?", to which the canonical answer is "To add tone to what would otherwise be merely a vulgar brawl".

All the best,

John.

[Fionn]

John,

Well I couldn't even get people to agree that heavy weapons in support of the MLR wasn't an RSE so let's just say I was trying to keep things simple ;~). By introducing more complexity I'd just give people more options for getting confused.

Of course you are correct. There's a difference between a screen and a guard... although that difference exists mostly in British and American doctrine. In Soviet doctrine, for example, a screen is expected to avoid the fight in the pure recon phase whilst forming the 1st echelon of the fight once the attack goes in. It is all related to the phasing of the assault etc. (The above is, of course, simplified as to go into detail about it would just confuse everyone again.)

P.s. Thanks for the input John. That was a good point.

[JasonC]

"Terminology is NOT semantics"

The term semantics means "of or relating to meaning in language", from the greek semantikos "significant", semainein "to signify, mean" sema "sign, token". What terms mean is semantics. That is the definition of the word semantics. There, now we have ascended the very spires of absurdity. We've gone "meta" - we aren't arguing about the meaning of terms anymore, but the meaning of "term". You insist that the technical meaning of terms is the critical all important thing for clarity of thought, while denying that the meanings of words are semantics, when that is the meaning of the word semantic. The involuntary parody is complete. And I thought it was good when you told us we were just hiding behind hills hoping enemy scouts wouldn't dare walk over them.

"But if you don't use terms the right way, you can't talk to professionals". The right way to use terms is to make your ideas clearly understood by those you are talking to. The wrong way to use terms is as distractions from the underlying ideas, secret handshakes, or inhibitions to understanding the thoughts of others. Clarity of thought is good, and if terminology helps it, fine. If talking about terminology replaces clarity, and thought, about the actual subject matter, I don't count that as progress. If an alphabet soup of acronyms serves only to distract us from discussing counter-recon tactics, then it is getting in the way not helping.

"Does that mean you insist on calling these things RSEs?" No, nobody has insisted on it in the entire thread. Nobody else gives a darn. You not only want us to use certain terms, you want us to care. The former is easy enough to accomodate. Nobody has been calling them RSEs for pages and pages, because nobody cared one way or the other what the thing is called. Meanwhile, it seems there are several varities of them that have interesting tactical differences. About which you've offered "don't call them RSEs". If you hadn't noticed, nobody is. Meanwhile, the small caliber amateurs have tried to discuss the actual tactics, and met only a noisy form of silence.

[imported_Hiram Sedai]

"Small caliber amateurs" Now, that was funny!! I'm a 5.56 MM amateur, myself.

"No brass, no ammo!!"

[Tarquelne]

" ("Nonsensical" imples that bc's "RSE" is _nothing_ like the FSE.)"

That is correct. I implied precisely what I meant to imply.

Ok, then you just don't understand.

"bc's "RSE"" _is_ like a Forward Screen Element. Note the quotes around RSE. Note "bc's"? Notice the word "like"? They're supposed to share many of the same primary functions - That's enough to consider them "like" things. (I think this is a very important point, so I'd appreciate a response to the above.)

OTOH, A Rear Screen Element _isn't_ like "bc's "RSE". AFAIK, everyone agrees on that. See the distinction?

When you say that comparing the-thing-bc-described to a "real life" RSE is wrong you are, indeed, correct. But when you so strongly deny the similarity between bc's "thing" and a FSE you sow confusion.

Look at all the time you've spent attempting to gently persuade us to abandon the term. I still think 80% of that was time ill spent. Give us the correct term - but "SWL" or "MRL" _isn't_ going to work, unless a "RARE" is really one of the uses they were commonly put to. I'm _sure_ you have far more that you could contribute that telling us, over and over, that RSE isn't the term we want. There have been a few posts now that have bent over backward to avoid the irritating misnomer, pehaps you could just reply to them?

Well I couldn't even get people to agree that heavy weapons in support of the MLR wasn't an RSE

YES YOU HAVE! We _still_ want to talk about heavy weapons used as anti-recon, "bait", and to mask the location of the MRL. We don't want to talk about Rear Screen Elements, just "bc's "RSE"'. And untill a professional is kind enough to give us a satisfactory term (I've already discussed why "SWL" and "MRL" won't work unless our understanding of "SWL" is changed), "bc's "RSE" or something we poor, ignorant amatuers make up is the best we can do.

This is OT, but I think it should be said:

I'm just saying that if you want high-calibre contributions from professionals then you must make an effort to use the correct terminology. Otherwise they just stand on the sidelines and laugh OR figure that there's no point giving insight since the contributors aren't even getting the basics right.

Personally, I try to understand just whats being discussed and then supply the correct term. I know others do this too. Ignoring the discussion, mocking it, or, ah, "chiding" them for failure to fully comply with the terminology you think best are not the only options.

[ June 19, 2002, 10:54 AM: Message edited by: Tarqulene ]

[Cortes]

Honestly, I don't see why everyone gets so damned pissy around here. The jokes are funny up to a point, and then it's just brutal.

C'mon boys, leave the bloodshed for the games.

[Priest]

The term semantics means "of or relating to meaning in language", from the greek semantikos "significant", semainein "to signify, mean" sema "sign, token". What terms mean is semantics. That is the definition of the word semantics. There, now we have ascended the very spires of absurdity. We've gone "meta" - we aren't arguing about the meaning of terms anymore, but the meaning of "term".

This was from the person who thought me breaking down the word Sniper between noun and verb was "splitting hairs". Can someone say hypocrite? I knew you could.

Fionn your points are well taken, now why are my Jacksons taking up my armour points, they are halftracks right?????

[Tarquelne]

Maybe if we go back to the last completely on topic question:

What I do want to know is if people have had any success with things like this.

(First, I should mention that I exchanged a few e-mails with Fionn. For fear of misrepresenting his position I don't want to just say "This is what Fionn says"... but I don't want to pretend that my thinking is completely origional. How about we just say that most "good points" I have are Fionns, and all the "bad points" are mine? Ok?)

Lets use "RARE" - there are a bunch of reasons to avoid the "screen". Rear Anti-Recon Elements, OTOH, is nice and vauge. (And short.)

Lets also think about whether we really want to use a new term at all.. err, ok... I will quote something:

Fionn:

A thinly held MLR with reserves cycling up to replace casualties before the enemy can assault weakened positions will do ALL of the above ( kill enemy recon, have the enemy waste arty on thinly held positions and confuse the enemy as the position of the MLR snce it won't really look quite as strong as an MLR).

Fionn's words, but I agree. That's pretty much what I do. Moving the units back up to the MLR is important to me. In part because I don't want to weaken the MLR, in part because I don't think the SW units out of the main SWL will survive very long. (It's also more common for me to open fire with the rearmost SW early than actually place any SWs significantly behind the MLR.)

The nice thing about thinking of the units in the above way (as detached parts of the SWL/MLR) is that it encourages you to use them in sort of a dual role. They'll plink away at recce for awhile, and hopefully accomplish those three tasks, but they still serve on the Line.

The assumption here, which I'm sure everyone has picked up on, is that dedicated-RAREs don't work very well.

billcarry - how long/well do your RARE units survive after they start fireing? (And is this against the AI or humans.) Which units do the most damage (or draw the biggest response? I rarely use anything other than HMGs.

My little SWL "strongpoints" don't last very long - either because I move them, or they get hammered. (Obviously if you "draw fire" you're going to recieve some.) The most I hope to get out of the exercise, as far as inflicting damage on recce, is a HT/AC, or AFV commander or two. (Sounds like using a HMG or maybe a mortar as a "super Sharpshooter", eh?)

I think I'll try most of one of bc's RARE groups... everything but the fixed guns. I'll have multiple HMGs and mortars, and maybe a vehicle's cannon, open fire on an enemy recce element or two, and then I'll load up the infantry into vehicles and bugger off. So, much more firepower than my usual "HMG Sharpshooter" - hopefully to do some real damage and draw significant fire. But I'll leave the area quickly to. Hmm... a little line of these Fanged Rabbits might be best, to give the impression of a "line." How far away can HT's be heard anyway? Is it a fixed radius?

To return to a subject that interests _me_, if no one else: As far as applying a seperate term to "RAREs" goes, success might be a good criteria. For me, RARE-role units have never really been successfull enough, or used in enough numbers (because of lack of previous success, of course) to really merit a new term. I just thought of them as "bait." Or, if I was feeling pedantic, "detached MLR (support weapon)elements.") (Yes, I think in parenthesis.)

[ June 19, 2002, 10:02 PM: Message edited by: Tarqulene ]

[JasonC]

Cortes said "Honestly, I don't see why everyone gets so damned pissy around here". A fair enough point. I will henceforth stop being so damn pissy. OK? I must "pass" on some aspects of the discussion, but it is hardly a loss, and better to spare Cortes and those like him.

To Tarq - I've had good results with this overall approach, firing support weapons and hidden MLR. Against humans (everything has good results against the AI). I've used two main variants and one minor gambit in a special "bite sized" situation with many factors known beforehand.

The minor gambit was a case where I knew the attacking German force outnumbered me in squad infantry and included one 120mm FO. This was a truly tiny battle - 4 platoons all told on the map, both sides combined, and one of them a weapons platoon on the defending side. The defender also had a few nearly useless isolated obstacles, like 1 wire and 1 AP mine or something.

I expected the following straightforward German plan - send forward 1-2 half scouts, locate defenders, drop 120mm on them, move 2 platoons to about 100 yards away from the barrage impact point while it is falling, rush the moment the barrage ends. Nothing fancy at all. Time was limited, space even more limited, forces limited too. Both sides knew the overall composition of the enemy force.

So as the defender, it was clear to me victory would turn on whether his 120mm barrage hit my squad infantry accurately enough to hurt it. With support from a few MGs, 1 platoon in cover can hold off 2. Ragged out and suppressed by arty before the main infantry event, they haven't got a chance.

So the mission was to create the appearence of a platoon position, while also hitting the scouts hard enough that they did not stick around to find out different. I did this with 2 5-man US MMGs, a platoon HQ, 2 60mm mortars pretty deep in woods, and the odd zook. These were spread out, with the position around the HQ and mortars looking more concentrated.

I planned to burn the 60mm ammo if possible before the 120s (hopefully) landed, since an empty 5-man mortar team is the ideal "decoy" for ranged fire. The MMGs are also relatively robust in damage they can sustain without serious effect, since they can fire down to the last man and had no intention of moving.

My main position, with infantry and a 50 cal, was to the right of the fake one, behind a rise, and hiding. The 50 cal a bit behind, up in a second story for LOS. Hiding zooks ahead of this part gave notice of the enemy. The MMGs were unhidden from the start.

They shot up the scouts fine. He sent 2 half squads and one came at the fake position. They easily pinned it and it retired across the next field. A supporting German HMG acting as overwatch too some of them under fire, without hurting them seriously. Meanwhile, the other 1/2 squad range by zooks and was hit by the rightmost MMG. It went to ground in scattered trees short of the ridgeline behind which my infantry was hiding.

So, he IDed a platoon on his right, retreating tripwire-warning forces on his left. He put the 120mm on the IDed platoon and sent both of his platoon heavy left, picking up the 1/2 squad on that side as well. Exactly the moves I wanted. Worked to a tee.

The 60mms got off a few shots on his main body as it moved out, but blew most on the scouting squads before that. The 120s put them and one MMG out of action; the other ran back to a nearby house but managed to rally and help in the main firefight a few minutes later. His 5 squads and 2 HQs ran into 3 squads, a 50 cal, and a recovering MMG in far better cover (wooded foxholes or stone buildings vs. scattered trees and light buildings, after a few shots in open ground) and were outshot. A tiny example, though, so not much more than a head-game gambit that happened to pay off.

The second type I've used, especially with a German infantry force type on defense, is the simple "MGs up", with only the barest of additional factors. Meaning a few German HMGs as bait, typically in buildings and sometimes up on second stories for wide LOS. With small platoons of rifle infantry typically located nearby but not immediately with them (to support them if an infantry platoon comes calling, basically, and to hold the area after the HMG dies). Schrecks, PAK, AT mines, and TRPs sighted on obvious places to shoot at them from.

My HMGs generally get ragged when I do it that way. They draw all kinds of fire, from light mortars to multiple MGs to (the favorite) tanks. They have 6 men and can keep firing with only 1 left. They have 95 shots, so even if 2 out of 3 get KOed the last keeps chugging along. Their firepower is only enough to pin, not to kill, and even that only into open ground areas. But that is often enough for shoestring scouts.

By the time more robust forces are moving up, you see them and tanks going after the HMGs, and they are performing their bait function. Schrecks or PAK get their opening round kills on tanks pulled into positions to KO the MGs. The escalation chain runs - half squad, HMG, tank, PAK or schreck.

In exchange terms, he gets a pinned half squad and a dead tank, I get a ragged out 2-4 man HMG that can be back in the fight annoying the heck out of him and sucking ammo out of everybody 2-3 minutes after the tank dies. I then typically also lose the ambusher (although schrecks hit less often than PAK, but also die less often if they succeed, since they can relocate).

In info terms, he "finds" little by direct approach, finds HMGs that were trying to be found, and finds AT weapons if they had a good shot and took it, a little too late. I see whole maneuvering platoons and multiple AFVs. If he tries again in the same area and the HMGs are completely dead or broken, then the rifle infantry near them waits until they get reasonably close and open up themselves Which is typically main firefight stuff, not counter recon anymore.

But sure, MGs up is much more vunerable to a well played, deliberate firepower attack. If the tanks needn't move forward and the attacker halts all open ground movement until the HMGs are solidly killed, than I will be out heavy weapons and he will mostly just be out ammo. Sometimes a lot of ammo.

If his infantry tries to help at all, at medium ranges, then he will blow infantry firepower he will seriously miss late in the game. So his firepower odds aren't really all that daunting. He can't waste infantry ammo, and if he blows his very limited light mortar ammo on HMGs then he doesn't have them for use against guns. MGs can't do the job at 250m plus into good cover. The target ducks, reads alerted, and pops right back up again. FO ammo would be grand.

The only truly cheap assymmetric counters are tanks with lots of HE (where finding them matters, and drawing the forward prematurely really matters) or infantry that manages to get quite close in platoon strength or higher. Well, he sent scouts to avoid sending those things at your undisclosed defenses. If he sends then at disclosed HMGs while your main defense is still hidden, you are way ahead of the game.

What you *don't* want to do is put 2 heavy PAK, a full heavy weapons platoon, and 2-3 cheap guns on this kind of duty, "up" and unhidden. Or any two of those for that matter. If he can KO those things one at a time in many-on-few engagements, use his light mortars on them, etc he will be happy. Yes, that would get clobbered by enemy ranged firepower if he doesn't advance but just blows away each one before creeping into LOS of the next.

Which is the reason for the third type, which again I use most with a German infantry force type force. Which has given me mixed results, because it strains one's terrain analysis and route prediction to the utmost. And it is common enough for a lucky or smart attacker to find a good spot for the third type. Which was the one I was talking about much earlier in the thread, with LOS blocks meant to protect the heavy weapons from enemy ranged firepower.

I find these can fail for different reasons. Sometimes the scouts get too close to the hiding MLR before the heavy weapons pin them, fire discipline is loose, and part of the MLR engages before it was asked. That leads to stopping the scouts, but failure to hide the MLR. Then you play artillery tag.

Sometimes sighting block terrain issues suggest positions that the enemy then comes at from another angle, getting too close by a covered route. A right heavy weapons position is set to keyhole inward, and several platoons compact come right at them along the right edge, from their relatively masked direct front. The MLR doesn't get discovered. But a break-in can happen on one flank.

And sometimes sighting block terrain stuff and failure to predict the actual avenue of advance leads to some uselessly stranded guns. The rifle infantry supporting them can shift. The guns may get LOS later to e.g. right around the block. But dug in slow teams and guns on the right don't help a heck of a lot against a heavy concentration up the left flank.

The wider the LOS of the heavy weapons, the more "firepower integrated" they are with the rest of the force. Which limits the risk of the second two forms of failure. But wider LOS is what exposes them to overwatch firepower. You pick your poison and you take your chances.

The easiest position for avoiding such dislocations is directly behind the central block/MLR, or behind and only marginally to either side. Since the block is usually sighted on - just behind an LOS obstacle, though, it is not always easy to see open ground areas scouts will come through from back there.

Perfect ridges can do it. Everything else is tougher and gives less than perfect coverage forward. Also, when all the heavy weapons are behind the MLR and not in "up" positions (second stories, etc), the successful close approach - fire discipline - discovered MLR problem is most likely to bite you. Particularly with green troops, whose fire discipline is poor.

So yeah, it has worked out for me, and a fair portion of the time. It is nothing like infalliable. It has exploitable weaknesses, if you know that is the counter recon idea the enemy is going to try, and know the exact variety too. Since you don't, though, it is one choice in the defender's "head game" toolbox.

I hope this helps.

[JasonC]

Hmm. 50 posts and a live-wire of a thread. Somebody asks us not to be "so pissy". I promise not to be and go on with the discussion. Everybody else seems to be gone. Crickets chirp. Maybe it wasn't tactics the 50 posts were interested in? Just a thought. Consider this nothing more than a -

bump.

[Fionn]

" Maybe it wasn't tactics the 50 posts were interested in? "

*Cue sarcasm mode* Ah and with such CONSTRUCTIVE and absolutely non-derogatory comments *end sarcasm mode* we may just have found the reason no-one wants to "discuss" with you about the "SWL" anymore.

If everyone who disagrees with you about tactics is to be called names then soon enough no-one will disagree with you publicly. That is just a fact of life.

If the choice is to be insulted for not taking part or to be insulted when taking part ( and thus investing a lot of free time in typing up responses) then I'll take being insulted for not taking part. At least that way I have more free time to go to indulge in movies and going out.

[JasonC]

Twasn't meant to be pissy. It was just meant to be a bump, and an invitation to talk the tactical substance. I trust you are by now clear on

(1) what billcarey meant by a new use of hvy wpns groups

(2) that billcarey cheerfully accepted any revision to terms

(3) what Pillar meant by a role of LOS blockages within the hvy weapons use described

(4) that Pillar did not mean SOLEY sitting behind a hill

(5) that Pillar HAS had an FSE-less "screen" (function, not deployment) succeed, without revealing his MLR

(6) that Tarq understood what billcarey was talking about and proposed an alterate name for it, using challenged acronyms in quotes

(7) that by doing so he cleared up Hiram's concerns

(8) that actually, therefore, there wasn't much need for reiteration of points about names, as Tarq tried to tell you

(9) that you by then had figured out, last of us all, what we were talking about and weren't saying it wouldn't work, or anything else about it for that matter, except the point that had been cheerfully accepted a page and a half ago by billcarey about a name, and already adhered to by everyone else

(10) that, as billcarey noted long ago, "Tarq and Jason and Hiram appear to know what I am talking about", and you can call his use of heavy weapons "FBRRWHWSE"

(11) that guarding and screening are different

(12) that seeing some commonality of function between "FBRRWHWSE" and "FSE" is a sign of having seen billcarey's idea and its difference from a standard heavy weapons group firing in support of an MLR, as Tarq explained

(13) that a very patient Tarq was actually reduce to shouting at you that actually, no offending usage had occurred since billcarey's cheerful acknowledgement back on page one

(14) that everybody else has happily discussed the actual tactics

(15) that there is a person in this thread that others cannot discuss things with, but

(16) that his name isn't Jason.

In case you don't get it, you aren't the one I hoped would come back. I'd much rather you went away, and the other fellows who actually talk rationally about tactics came back. When you can misunderstand as many reasonable people as you managed to in this thread, about such simple tactical points, and still think you are the one they all want to talk to about tactics, you've got a problem. And no, this isn't meant to be "pissy" either, although I fear you may take it that way. Actually, it is meant to be rather charitable.

Oh, and you didn't disagree with me about tactics anywhere in this thread. I watched very carefully, not to say eagerly, for that, both from you and from the others. Billcarry did, and Tarq did in a way, both fruitfully. I didn't insult them. But perhaps there is another person somewhere who insults publicly all he thinks disagree with him, in the (vain) hope that eventually no one will disagree with him publicly. That would be a vain hope, though.