Missing and incorrect information on Finland

[Keke]

Steve, I´m afraid you didn´t sum up the Continuation War well at all. It is the western myth that the peace was quickly arranged, because Finns found themselves in so much trouble. It ignored the defensive victories, which stopped the Soviet rollercoaster, and the fact that the armistice was not signed until 4.9.1944. I´ll get back to this when I have more time.

[Sardaukar]

This is quite entertaining thread. But what about my request about some "rare beasts" (and some not so rare) like T-28 and Komsomolets ? Could the Finns get radio FO ? (I guess that, if not already available, would resolve most gripes people have with Finn arty).

Finns and Germans had quite strange relationship before and during WW II. Lot of the higher officers were ex-volunteers of Imperial Prussian Jaeger Battaillon 27 during WW I and thus German trained. Lot of Russian trained officers were pushed out of office during 20's and 30's. Despite that and continuous military co-operation, relations were not politically very warm. Adolf and his cronies were not well liked and especially Mannerheim was known about his dislike of Nazi leadership.

Cheers,

M.S.

[ October 19, 2002, 05:59 AM: Message edited by: Sardaukar ]

[Sardaukar]

Soviets were really trying hard to crush Finnish defence during summer 1944. When they were stopped in Tali-Ihantala area, pressure was moved to flanks, resulting heavy battles in Vuosalmi and Gulf of Viipuri (Vyborg). After that, since those didn't gave breakthrough, operational focus was shifted from Isthmus to north of Lake Ladoga. There Soviets managed to get quite deep over the 1940 border in area of Ilomantsi. Unfortunately for them, terrain there was less suitable for mechanized warfare. That resulted 2 Soviet divisions getting cut to pieces and almost annihilated around Ilomantsi area.

Fortunately for Finland, Soviets concluded that further operations would be too costly and started to shift their forces back against Germans. But they were trying very hard during those couple of months.

Cheers,

M.S.

[Foxbat]

Originally posted by Sardaukar:

Could the Finns get radio FO ? (I guess that, if not already available, would resolve most gripes people have with Finn arty).

Those gripes are based on nothing, there is no problem with Finnish FO's and no need for radio FO's (that aren't superior to wire FO's anyway).

It's all just a simple misunderstanding.

[Panzer76]

Originally posted by Keke:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Panzer76:

[QB]Would have been easier not to attacked Russia in the first place, no?

Study history, you ignoramus!

Only reason Finland wasnt crushed was because the stiff German defence, which meant that Russia needed their forces elsewhere. If not, Finland would have ended up as a Russian province, make no mistake about it.

Read my lips: Study history, you ignoramus!</font>

[Panzer76]

JR 8,

thanks for the stories, and welcome to the BBS!

[Olduvai]

I dated a Korjausmuunnin in college once. Nice girl.

(thank you, thank you. i'll be here all week. don't forget to tip your waitress)

[Panzer76]

Olduvai, u working at the firm that is responsible for the Speakeasy DoD servers? If so, whats wrong with the one that dont display the kills? It's lagging like hell, and it's been so for ages now.

[Olduvai]

Originally posted by Panzer76:

Olduvai, u working at the firm that is responsible for the Speakeasy DoD servers? If so, whats wrong with the one that dont display the kills? It's lagging like hell, and it's been so for ages now.

Er, no. Speakeasy was my old ISP; I had to abandon them when I went broadband and dsl wasn't available. Thanks for reminding me to change my profile information, tho!

[ October 19, 2002, 09:05 AM: Message edited by: Olduvai ]

[Nabla]

Originally posted by Battlefront.com:

There are far too many details even for a fairly small force like Finland. Some are going to be wrong, left out, or even entered into the game with a typo. The StuG introduction date is a perfect example.

Our Finnish researchers, and our research, did not initially turn up an exact introduction date. We had sometime in 1943. Charles figured that the first of the year was as good a guess as any and put that in. Obviously this was quite wrong So then we did more research and found that September 1943 was technically correct, and that date was entered into the 1.01 patch. But further research (some of which I dug up myself) showed that they weren't actually used until the Soviet summer offensive of 1944. So the date was changed to reflect that.

Yep, there sure are a lot of details, even for a small country, let alone for the whole front (i.e., the guys at BTS).

We found out that the first Stugs were delivered 29.8.1943, but at that time I really didn't pay enough attention to when they saw action for the very first time. According to Kantakoski they were indeed used for the first time (at least in a large scale) in June 1944, which is the date Steve has successfully dug out.

I'll provide you with some further details on Monday, if you have the patience.

EDIT: An interesting thread, BTW.

[ October 19, 2002, 09:47 AM: Message edited by: Nabla ]

[JR 8]

Originally posted by Panzer76:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Keke:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Panzer76:

[QB]Would have been easier not to attacked Russia in the first place, no?

Study history, you ignoramus!

Only reason Finland wasnt crushed was because the stiff German defence, which meant that Russia needed their forces elsewhere. If not, Finland would have ended up as a Russian province, make no mistake about it.

Read my lips: Study history, you ignoramus!</font>

[Soddball]

I think that what it comes down to is that the game has to cater for multiple interests, and isn't going to be the personal wet dream of a few Finnish Supremacists - so they'd better get used to the idea.

[Keke]

I decided to paste an article written by Ilkka Mutanen (didn´t ask for his permission, I hope he don´t mind) which has a nice and balanced summarization of the events on the Finnish front during the summer of 1944. For your information:

Introduction

Outside Finland much has been discussed of the winter war 1939-1940, unlike the Finnish strategic defence in 1944. In 1939 the events in Finland made people throughout the western world hold their breaths merely because it was the only theater of war at the time. In 1944 Finland was suffering of relatively bad image as an ally of Hitler’s evil Third Reich. Its theater of war was an obscure sideshow somewhere in the north, overshadowed by concurrent major military events in France and Byelorussia, which dominated the world news during summer 1944. In Finland however, the Red Army’s fourth strategic attack in summer 1944 is studied as much, if not more, than the events of the winter war. Those two separate campaigns actually have quite a lot in common with each other. Political discussions ended in vain and Soviet Union concentrated massive a force for main attack at Karelian Isthmus, which was supported by offensive in East Karelia. The most obvious distinctions were of course the season and Soviet level of intelligence, propaganda, and material preparations. Furthermore by 1944 the Finnish army had stood immobile at the frontline for years and even though the troops were better equipped if compared to 1939, they were lacking the same spirit and readiness. The dreary static war had evidently taken its toll. On the other hand, the Red Army had spent the very same years in perfecting their operational art theories into practice against the most capable opponent they could have – the German Wehrmacht. In 1939 Finns had faced an unmotivated and green army marching headlong into battle whereas in 1944 the antagonist was an effective, drilled, veteran military force that knew exactly what it was supposed to do and what it could expect from the enemy. Nevertheless, the outcome of the summer campaign became almost analogous.

Political events before the attack

After the German defeat at Stalingrad in 1942-43 the Finnish political and military leadership begun to think seriously how Finland could depart from proximity of Hitler’s seemingly sinking Reich? In the same year Stalin demanded unconditional surrender of Finland, but he was later ready to tone down his strict demand apparently by influence of Churchill who was willing to maintain independent democracy in Finland also after the war. The Finnish supreme command’s idea was that Finland could keep the areas, which she had before the winter war. Stalin however, as a bare minimum, sought back the borderline of the 1940 peace agreement. According to V. Molotov it was impossible that Finland could keep the areas annexed to Soviet Union in the winter war because: "The land areas are bought with Soviet blood". The truth is of course that most of the lands were never literally captured in the war, but instead taken in the peace agreement.

Armistice and peace negotiations started in early 1944. At the same time Soviet air forces rigorously bombarded the Finnish capital Helsinki, obviously to demonstrate power and pressure Finns toward peace. Even though the Finnish Marshal Mannerheim was pessimistic regarding defending possibilities if Soviet Union would launch a major attack, Finnish politicians – as they did before the winter war – stubbornly refused to agree with conditions the Soviet government proposed. As a consequence the peace discussions ended during the spring 1944. The Soviets demanded back the areas annexed in the 1940 peace agreement and in addition the Petsamo region. The Finnish army would have to retreat back behind the 1940 border during April 1944 and demobilize the field army to peacetime strength during July 1944. All Soviet prisoners would have to be relieved immediately and reparations worth of 600 millions US Dollars paid during the five next years. Finally, Finland would have to break all connections to Germany and by April 1944 intern or expel all German troops located in Finnish territory. For the Finnish government these conditions were too hard to accept.

”Finns are particularly unintelligent and stubborn people. They must be taught with a hammer.” J.Stalin

Military preconditions

In early summer 1944 the overall strategic situation on the eastern front seemed promising to the Soviets. The Western Allies had finally set up a second front to France with a remarkable invasion at Normandy. Clearly this made German east front even more vulnerable than before – and it was crumbling already. Soviet army planned to crush the German Army Group Center with a gigantic strategic offensive called Bagration. Stalin wasn’t certain however whether the Overlord was a serious attempt or just a feint, and he didn’t want to launch his major operations prior to he could be sure the Allies are serious at Northern France and not planning major maneuver to the Balkans for instance. Nevertheless Stalin had promised Allies that he would start an offensive at the same time with Overlord. An attack to Finland seemed to be an excellent way to fulfill this promise. Additionally it would cover up preparations of the more important operation Bagration, eventually shorter the frontline and thus relieve troops, re-open a sea route to the Baltic for the Red Banner Baltic Fleet that had been closed to operate at bay of Leningrad since 1941, and finally if Stalin would left Finland alone until surrender of Germany he would possibly face a similar difficult foreign political situation like he had during the winter war. In June 1944 he could “take care” of Finland in all secrecy without jeopardizing his relations to the USA, Britain, and France.

During the late spring Soviet 21st army was brought to Karelian Isthmus and especially trained to attack typical Finnish defence in difficult terrain. The Finnish frontline positions were thoroughly studied from air-photographs and reports of ground reconnaissance. There was also another Soviet army – the 23rd – that had been in the isthmus since 1941. In Finnish general headquarters at Mikkeli Mannerheim considered the Soviet concentration a feint to weight Finland for peace and in the same time rest and refit units, which soon would be needed against Germans. Indeed he was right anticipating the main Soviet summer offensive that destroyed the German Army Group Center, but in retrospect a mistake was made when the point of main effort of Finnish defence was not decisively at Karelian Isthmus. Although if it was, it would also mean a general withdrawal from the Svir’ River and Maaselkä Isthmus before nothing had actually happened. That wouldn’t be in accordance with Finnish political plans and thus the Finnish army was deployed rather equally along the three fronts. All Finnish commanders at the front were warned though of probable Soviet assault and it was highly recommended to increase the level of training and readiness. To defend Mannerheim we must acknowledge the skilful Soviet Maskirovka – deception, that misled Finnish intelligence to believe Soviet attack against Germans at Narva and/or Petsamo.

In the Finnish main theater of war at the Karelian Isthmus the defense was based on three lines: main defence line or the frontline, VT-line, and VKT-line. To Soviets these distinct lines represented a major defence system constructed in depth. The main Finnish defence line was only field fortifications built by the troops and the line wasn’t in good shape after the winter. The VT-line on the other hand was quite complete a system of both field fortifications and concrete bunkers. In fact it was considerably better and stronger than the famous Mannerheim line of the winter war, which didn’t exist anymore in 1944. The VKT-line from Viipuri to Taipale was totally incomplete, but to some extent the difficult terrain of the region – namely the formidable Vuoksi River and rocky, hilly, and heavily wooded terrain north and northeast of Viipuri, which canalized motorized troops on the roads, compensated the lack of human made obstacles. There was yet one more defense line planned and partially built behind the VKT-line, it was called Salpa. Along the Svir River Finns had entrenched positions backed up with PSS-line and behind the old border U-line that was yet under construction. Maaselkä Isthmus between lakes Ääninen (Onega) and Seesjärvi had relatively strong field fortifications.

Soviet plan

The operational plan of Marshal Govorov was, in typical Red Army fashion, based upon thorough calculations for overwhelming quantitative superiority at the point of main effort. The attack force had to be irresistible. The God of war was the artillery that would simply pulverize the defenders, which the red infantry and armour would mop-up afterwards. The Leningrad Front estimated that it would advance approximately 12 kilometers per day. This meant that the first strategic objective Viipuri would be reached within 10 days, although already by then the Finnish army had to be eliminated – the Soviet commanders estimated it would happen during the initial 4-5 days.

Once the attack at Karelian Isthmus began affecting, the Karelian Front’s 7th Army would launch attack across the River Svir followed by the 32nd Army at the Maaselkä Isthmus. The general idea was that Finns would have to move their reserves from the Svir’ to Karelian Isthmus, which in turn would make the 7th Army’s way across the Svir’ easier. This was a good plan when everything went well. However, if the Finnish force at Karelian Isthmus wasn’t destroyed during the initial 5 days and the reinforcements were successfully arriving from the Svir’, the Soviet momentum would be in danger to halt. Why leave open a possibility that the enemy can reinforce defence along the main attack axis? Why not tie up the Finnish reserves to the secondary direction at Svir’ by conducting simultaneous active attack operations there? Finally, once the decision was made to allow withdrawal of Finnish reserves from Svir, why not interrupt or prevent their move with the Red Air Force? In fact it seems that the Soviet plan almost searched for troubles to hinder their main effort at Karelian Isthmus. This is something, which is hard to understand in retrospect. It is somewhat more understandable though at the time prior to the offensive because the Red Army calculated by the textbook that Finnish defense will collapse in matter of a week, and how could calculations ever go wrong?

Unlike what Soviet propaganda told after the war, the attack had to be continued towards Finnish southern heartlands after Viipuri was seized. Kotka Operation – a deep breakout from narrow Karelian Isthmus would become the deathblow to Finnish resistance and eventually end up with the Red Army in Helsinki. This is a fact, which Finns have known since 1944, but which Soviet history writing has tried to bury. It seemed to be too embarrassing for the Soviet Union to admit in public that their fourth strategic attack failed to accomplish its strategic objective – occupation of Finland. Fortunately now, as the Soviet archives are opening for scholars, more objective history of the Great Patriotic War can be written.

“Lack of operational imagination and flexibility was ordinary to the Russians during the winter war and was factual also in 1944, hence we were able to make a similar retreat maneuver.” C.G.E. Mannerheim.

Viipuri Operation

According to the plan, heavy artillery barrages (about 200 000 shells were fired on positions of Finnish 10th Division during June 10th) and substantial air support was used to create a breakthrough: the Finnish main defence line was simply overrun at Valkeasaari by mechanized Red Army. The attack, albeit surprising, wasn’t a shock, but the sheer power of it was. The Soviets were able to concentrate approximately 400 artillery tubes per frontline kilometer at the breakthrough area. It caused a barrage, which “still is in our minds and brains”, as dubbed by a Finnish veteran. In fact a barrage of such a scale caused a lot of mental problems for those who it left alive – for example during the opening days one officer went mad and started shooting his own men. Additionally some panicked men had to be tied to trees to keep them stable. The Finnish troops were deployed forward to the main defence line, which was a mistake that was now paid for. Finns had grossly underestimated the enemy capability and ignored German reports that clearly told about increased Soviet tactical-operational skills and that the Soviets could punch through even the strongest defence lines. Finns still believed to methods of 1939 and division and corps commanders had constantly assured to Mannerheim that “the frontline will stand everything”. Nonetheless, some staff officers of the General HQ had studied the German experiences more closely and suggested a retreat beforehand to the VT-line with the bulk of the forces and leaving only a “curtain” forward. Thus, anticipated heavy enemy artillery barrage would hit on mostly empty ground. Unfortunately Mannerheim believed the overly confident reports from commanders of the frontline and moreover he was afraid that a retreat in advance might make the troops and commanders nervous. An error was made.

“The ground rose and fell down, boiled and stirred-up. Sky became dark, bright summer morning vanished and the air was full of earth, dust, and splinters.” A Finnish veteran.

Mannerheim issued orders of retreat to the VT-line. In addition 4th and 17th Division, and 3rd and 20th Brigade, that were all deployed in East Karelia, began moving to Karelian Isthmus. The Finnish Armoured Division made a counter-attack against the 30th Guards Rifle Corps demonstrating attack oriented Finnish doctrine, even under, and especially in desperate conditions. The counter-attack failed however mainly because the enemy was overwhelming, it merely confused the Soviet command. On 14th of June the VT-line was breached at town of Kuuterselkä after the Finnish Cavalry Brigade was defeated. As a consequence, Mannerheim gave orders to relocate 6th and 11th Divisions from the Svir’ to the Isthmus. This in turn left the defence line at Svir’ so weak that Mannerheim ordered a general retreat behind the PSS-line. Actually now the defence in the Svir’ followed what should have been done in the Isthmus too: retreat in advance with only a screening force left to the frontline. Hitler protested this withdrawal and advocated his firm defence concept. I am quite convinced had Hitler’s strategy been carried out there would be a total disaster in the East Karelia as it would lead to a pure material battle on Soviet terms instead of Mannerheim’s elastic and thus more rational defence concept.

The Viipuri Operation came to an end on 20th June when the Soviets occupied Viipuri. The Finnish 20th Brigade defending the city retreated in panic allowing the Soviets to take the city almost without a fight. As a conclusion to the operation, the Leningrad Front failed to accomplish planned destruction of Finnish Army, which had successfully retreated to the VKT-Line. Moreover, in cooperation with the Karelian Front and the Red Air Force, it failed to prevent the re-deployment of Finnish reserves. Four Finnish infantry divisions and two brigades were successfully moved to block the Soviet main attempt at Karelian Isthmus where every division would prove out to be mandatory. The Soviet textbook calculations were seemingly flawed.

Kotka Operation

On 21st June the STAVKA gave orders for Leningrad Front to continue attack in the Karelian Isthmus. Kotka Operation would start with an attack by Gusev’s 21st Army to Imatra-Lappeenranta line, which would be reached in 7 days. Concurrently Tsherepanov’s 23rd Army would strike to Käkisalmi direction and clean up the northwest corner of the Lake Ladoga. After this was accomplished the Soviet attack would turn to west and seize Kotka-Kouvola line. During the same time the Karelian Front would launch offensive over the Svir’. In essence the Leningrad Front would severe Finnish connections to north of Lake Ladoga and prepare an advance to Helsinki, whilst the Karelian Front would strike and destroy depleted Finns in East Karelia. The two Fronts would join northwest of Lake Ladoga. This would become the decisive operation in order to accomplish the strategic objective.

Leningrad Front commander Marshal Govorov was already paying attention to own casualties and growing Finnish resistance. Hence he asked two additional rifle corps from the STAVKA. The previous “success” in Viipuri Operation had indicated however, that the Finns are already about to rout. Furthermore the attack of the Karelian Front would pressure Finns simultaneously so the STAVKA decided that there was no need to reinforce the Leningrad Front with the forces – requested replacements were delivered nonetheless. In addition Lt.Gen Korovnikov’s 59th Army headquarters, 94th Rifle Corps and 43rd Rifle Corps were transferred to Karelian Isthmus. It was planned that Korovnikov would conduct the second phase of the Kotka Operation from Lappeenranta to Kouvola-Kotka line.

On 22nd June Gusev’s 21st Army began the operation by attempting a breakout along the roads of Tali-Ihantala area, northeast of Viipuri. The Soviets found the terrain relatively easy for armour and the dense road network would lead them directly to Lappeenranta and Imatra. However, also the Finns studied the maps and as the terrain elsewhere was rocky and thus difficult for tanks, the Soviet assault in Tali direction was predictable. Mannerheim had established a new army level headquarters (KaJokE) and appointed an able commander – General Oesch – to supervise the crisis in the Karelian Isthmus. Gen. Oesch, who commanded troops in Viipuri area back in 1940 and –41, had concentrated all obtainable force, including recently arrived German assault guns, to block the Soviet offensive. Finnish reserves had arrived from the East-Karelia and were now successfully holding the Soviet main attack. In fact the initiative was shifting to Finns by counter-attack of Lagus’ Armoured Division. Finnish artillery once again proved to be very accurate and effective a weapon despite of its small resources and variety of equipment. Indeed in a week the Soviets advanced only about 8 kilometers and actually Finns almost closed a Russian Rifle Corps into a motti, but the last strength needed to complete the counter-offensive was lacking. Anyway Govorov had to reorganize his offensive. Now he sent his fresh 59th Army across the Bay of Viipuri against Finnish right flank. Nonetheless Oesch was again anticipating the Soviet maneuver because the bay of Viipuri had been a Soviet attack axis already in the winter war and Oesch had successfully crossed the bay himself during the Finnish attack back in the summer of 1941. The Finns and Mannerheim’s reserve, recently arrived German 122nd Infanterie Division, held the coast. By July 12th the Soviet attack was ultimately stuck. Meanwhile the Soviet 23rd Army launched an assault with intention to cross the Vuoksi River and advance to Käkisalmi. Like in Viipuri area the Finnish defenders seemed to stand firmly in positions, notwithstanding what the Soviets threw against them. Thus the heavy Soviet attack was stopped also at the eastern Isthmus.

German help was crucial. First of all by occupying the entire northern Finland the Germans were allowing Finnish Army to commit all available force to the south. Secondly, the German ground, and particularly the air forces provided remarkable help. The elite Kampfgruppe Kuhlmey of the Luftwaffe with approximately 70 airplanes balanced the air battle and provided critical ground support with Stukas. Finally: ammunition, mines, guns, spare parts, and above all, personal AT weapons like Panzerschreck and Panzerfaust were without a doubt playing a significant role in the battle of Finland. Unfortunately the German efforts for the Finnish defense have not always been acknowledged properly by Finnish history literature, but recent studies are paying more attention to this critical issue.

As the Kotka Operation had failed to the start the Leningrad Front concentrated on operations at south. Several formations including the 30th Guards Rifle Corps were withdrawn from Finland during July. Now as the critical moments in the Karelian Isthmus were over, Mannerheim reinforced northern directions that were grossly suffering because of the concentration to Isthmus. In fact the Finns had quite a powerful force of three corps deployed in the Karelian Isthmus, consisting of 11 infantry divisions including a coastal division and the German 122nd Division, 4 brigades, the Armoured Division and the German 303rd Assault Gun Brigade. Perhaps even a counter-offensive could have been possible...

Operations in East Karelia – the Finnish east front

On June 21st, according to an order of STAVKA, Soviet Karelian Front under command of Army General Meretskov launched an offensive at the Svir’ River. Krutikov’s 7th Army began the Svir’-Petrozavodsk Operation with a characteristic Soviet artillery barrage, this time lasting for 3 hours 32 minutes. A day later the 32nd Army joined the offensive in the Maaselkä Isthmus. Meretskov, who was a Finnish front veteran, placed his point of main effort to the Lotinapelto-Aunus axis. This didn’t come as a surprise to Finns at all; a war game of Group Aunus during the spring had clearly indicated that the coastal road and railroad built during the war was definitely the most likely Soviet attack direction. The first Soviet strategic objectives were Sortavala and Värtsilä.

Finnish force was called Group Aunus, which was initially under command of Gen. Oesch, but because he was ordered to Karelian Isthmus, Gen. Talvela took his place. Talvela’s operational plan was to conduct a fighting withdrawal towards the old Finnish-Russian border. The intention was that the VI Corps in the PSS-line would firmly hold the Soviet main attack in order to buy time for retreat of the 7th Division. If the PSS-line would collapse, the Russians would have an opportunity to cut off the Finnish force at coast of Onega and large supply depots in Äänislinna as well as the 7th Division. The PSS-line held the necessary time, but it had to be left quickly after Soviet naval infantry made a bold invasion to Tuulos intending to cut off Finnish supply and retreat route. Finnish reserves were inadequate and hasty counter-operations failed. Thus the Soviets were able to keep their bridgehead and reinforce it, which eventually resulted a general Finnish withdrawal. Impulsive Talvela and the VI Corps commander Gen. Blick had a grave disagreement of the withdrawal. Consequently Mannerheim replaced Blick by Gen. Martola who could better come along with Talvela. To Finns the biggest problem was lack of reserves that were all sent to Karelian Isthmus. Furthermore the bulk of any material like AT-weapons as well as air support went to the Isthmus, while the Finnish east front had to carry on outnumbered and utterly exhausted. On the other hand here the nature of battle was different: difficult terrain and meager “roads” were preconditions for aggressive delaying action and guerrilla activity. Indeed the Soviets were already depleted when they reached the U-line where the attack eventually stopped. The vital Finnish objective in the attack back in 1941, the city of Äänislinna – or Petrozavodsk for Russians – was left to Soviets without a fight in late June.

Finnish II Corps at Maaselkä Isthmus had a similar task with the Group Aunus: organized, slow retreat towards the old border. There was no rational reason to try to stand and fight there because the defence crumbled in everywhere else. As well as elsewhere in Karelia, the Soviets did not keep only on roads, but continuously small assault groups tried to outflank Finnish defenders through wilderness. It seemed that Russians had learned a lot from the Finnish attack tactics and now used them in practice. The Soviet 289th Rifle Division and 33rd Ski Brigade even had Finnish commanders. As Mannerheim needed the 6th Division at Karelian Isthmus the II Corps had only a division and a brigade against three Soviet divisions.

A final lesson: battle of Ilomantsi

In late July the Soviet 32nd Army continued advance towards town of Ilomantsi. The Finnish 21st Brigade was clearly outnumbered and thus forced to retreat. However, the battles were calmed down in the Karelian Isthmus and Mannerheim was hence able to reinforce almost defenseless Ilomantsi direction. The Cavalry Brigade and the 20th Brigade were transferred to north for a new formation called Group Raappana. In his typical fashion Mannerheim ordered Raappana to stop the Soviet advance with a counter-attack. In early August the Group attacked and isolated two Soviet rifle divisions. Russian heavy equipment were captured, but fragments of the Soviet divisions managed to escape through the forests. Although the Finns were not able to completely eliminate the Soviet divisions within the motti, the victory cannot be questioned. In its tactical wisdom and flexibility the Finnish attack was a final sign to Russians to not to continue attacks anymore.

“Every soldier, officer, or commander wants to be on the main theater of war. On a secondary front the tasks are not so momentous. There will be less troops and war material and it receives less attention. Nevertheless a battle on a secondary front is not any easier; it can be even harder.” Gen. S.M. Shtemenko

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Erfurth, Waldemar: Suomi sodan myrskyssä 1941-1944, WSOY 1951

Glantz, David M.: The Siege of Leningrad 1941-1944: 900 days of terror, MBI Publishing 2001.

Haupt, Werner: Army Group North, Schiffer Publishing Ltd. 1997.

Jatkosodan historia I-VI, Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulun Historian Laitos, Porvoo 1988-1994.

Karhunen, Veikko: Syväriltä U-asemaan, WSOY 1982.

Koskimaa, Matti: Syväriltä Nietjärvelle: Aunuksen Ryhmän taistelut kesällä 1944, WSOY 1998.

Kuprijanov, G.N: Taistelut Suomen rintamalla 1941-1944, Kirjayhtymä 1984.

Mannerheim, C.G.E: Muistelmat II, Otava 1952.

Platonov, S.P.: Taistelut Suomen rintamalla 1941-44, Kirjayhtymä 1976

Polvinen, Tuomo: Suomi suurvaltojen politiikassa 1941-1944, WSOY 1964.

Seppälä, Helge: Taistelu Leningradista ja Suomi, WSOY 1969.

Seppälä, Helge: Asemasodasta katkeraan rauhaan, Orient Express 1991

Seppälä, Helge: K.L.Oesch - Suomen pelastaja, Gummerus 1998.

Suomen Puolustusvoimat ennen ja nyt, Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulun historian laitos, WSOY 1998.

Sotahistoriallinen aikakauskirja 12, Sotahistoriallinen Seura, Gummerus 1993.

Sotahistoriallinen aikakauskirja 13: Torjuntavoitto 1944, Sotahistoriallinen Seura, Gummerus 1994.

Shtemenko, S.M.: Kohti Berliiniä, Karisto Oy 1980.

Talvela, Paavo: Sotilaan elämä I-II, Gummerus Oy 1976

Tiihonen, Tapio: Karjalan Kannaksen suurtaistelut kesällä 1944, Helsingin Yliopiston Historian Laitos 1999.

Visuri, Pekka: Puolustusvoimat itsenäisyyden turvana, Karisto Oy 1998

[ October 19, 2002, 01:35 PM: Message edited by: Keke ]

[Keke]

Originally posted by Panzer76:

As many have pointed out also, many of your aruguments are flawed and clearly wrong. I see it hurts you to have people point this fact out for you. One day you'll learn to tackle critizism, hopefully.

One day you´ll learn to read history and maybe then your arguments about war history are not so moronic in the first place, hopefully.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Soddball:

I think that what it comes down to is that the game has to cater for multiple interests, and isn't going to be the personal wet dream of a few Finnish Supremacists

How stupid was that?

What it comes down to is the game, and especially the scenario editor, don´t allow historical accuracy. Fe how hard it is to make a change which allows Finnish tank hunter teams to have stachel charges and panzerfausts, which were the backbone of Finn AT-equipment during the summer of 1944? I´m very pleased to see the Stug change in the next patch, maybe there will be more changes later.

[Soddball]

No, Keke. Let me point out the disparity here. If we had a handful of Germans arguing for superior German this, superior German that, better German the other for NINE PAGES in one thread, let alone the other million threads in which this has been discussed, we would be putting them into the Neo-Nazi box.

My comment obviously touched a nerve and you clearly identified with it, so if the cap fits, wear it.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Foxbat:

"As a rule, prepared fire was opened in 1.5-3 minutes after it was called for and the opening of unplanned fire took 4-7 minutes.”

The Battle of Kursk, The Soviet General Staff Study, 1944.

Hrm..actually that might not be the best source in the world to quote. I mean, lets face it, we arent looking at the pillar of unbiased truth here.

...Wasnt it that same General staff study that put the German tank losses at Kursk to 600 something (and not only that, most were Tigers and Panthers too).</font>

[Keke]

Originally posted by Soddball:

No, Keke. Let me point out the disparity here. If we had a handful of Germans arguing for superior German this, superior German that, better German the other for NINE PAGES in one thread, let alone the other million threads in which this has been discussed, we would be putting them into the Neo-Nazi box.

My comment obviously touched a nerve and you clearly identified with it, so if the cap fits, wear it.

Finnish White supremacist? Come on. How can discussion about suggested changes to the game be a racial issue?

[Soddball]

I never brought colour into it, Keke. I said nothing about white supremacists. I said Finnish supremacists. I'm not making it an issue of colour. I am using the term "Finnish Supremacist" to indicate the constant bleating about why Finns were the best, why they won everything, why they were better at everything.

[ October 19, 2002, 11:28 AM: Message edited by: Soddball ]

[Hortlund]

Originally posted by Foxbat:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:

One example of such a source is the Kubinka test report on soviet 100mm and 122mm tank guns and their effectiveness versus German armor. This was a report made by the armaments board, and the report was to be used as a base for desicion regarding the future development and use of tank guns. In that report (that was presented to Stalin himself) the test results were falsified by the use of sub-quality German armor.

I know the report, but I have never heard about it being falsified. So I would like to know more about it how and why was it falsified? (was one target of less quality armour, or were they both sub-quality).</font>

[Keke]

Originally posted by Soddball:

I never brought colour into it, Keke. I said nothing about white supremacists. I said Finnish supremacists. I'm not making it an issue of colour. I am using the term "Finnish Supremacist" to indicate the constant bleating about why Finns were the best, why they won everything, why they were better at everything.

Ooops, sorry, maybe that cap fit too well...

Just kidding. But you are oversimplifying the issue. I have started making operations about battles of Siiranmäki, Äyräpää and Portinhoikka (maps first). Finns will have hard time in each of them. No supremacy indicators, believe me. It is just dissapointing to have limited TO&E for the Finns, in which many important weapons or units are missing.

[Panzer76]

Originally posted by JR 8:

Hmm, I think some finnish mates here are watching this thing behind blue & white glasses and Mr. Panzer 76, you on the other hand are in other far side with those comments. But maybe this Ubertalk about Finns irritates and provocates you a bit. Truth lies between somewhere middle, or it is still out there.

Yes the truth is out there. Maybe I have been on the far side of the comments, but it doesnt mean it's wrong. And ur very correct about the whole uber finn thing!

I always thought the finns said that stuff in good humor, but now it seems some of them actually belives it.

[Panzer76]

Originally posted by Keke:

One day you´ll learn to read history and maybe then your arguments about war history are not so moronic in the first place, hopefully.

Im sorry, after commets like how the finns won over the Red Army twice,I dont take uber finns seriously anymore.

[Vilho Nenonen]

Greetings to all. Great game. Yes indeed.

Yet there are few things I'd like to see corrected here.

The artillery/mortar indirect fire procedure on the whole needs much tweaking imho, not just finnish artillery. But I'll concentrate on the finnish issue here. My fellow finns here have tried to explain our system of indirect fire, but perhaps not in the best way.

First of all, the system originated by gen. Nenonen was a system based on accuracy not on speed. I believe that the russians and other nations could throw shells into air much more rapidly. But not that accurately. Russians had like 1000 guns for every front km, so why deal with the number crunching?

Trigonometric calculations based on the FO point (won't go into too much detail here)and its relation to the target were/are kinda hard to calculate in comparison to corrections made in shooting distance and arc. Belive me. Yet if these calculations have been made beforehand (as the trp handily does), the response speed is merely based on the discipline of a firing unit.

Also, the structure of our FO hierarchy made it possible for a single FO to target different artillery units. So the current system, where a FO person has but one unit behind his orders is totally inappropriate for finns. This was a major factor in those days and still gives us great deal of flexibility (how is it in your armies nowadays?).

So I propose a slower but more accurate finnish indirect fire, plus the flexible FO organization.

Secondly, is there a difference between phone and radio FO? Haven't played this game too much yet. But if there is, I'd say that the phone is always much more efficient _if_ the line is drawn into the front line. I know from a personal experience (as far as these things can be experienced without real combat) that the line goes as fast as the FO. Radio is a poor substitute for a line.

But the main problem is the indirect fire procedure on the whole. Like the time that the shells are in the air doesn't seem to be in the calculations. Corrected shells find their way in less time it takes them to travel in the air, not much time to make adjustment calculations or redirecting the weapons... Not to mention many other minor tweaks that I have in mind. After two years in a mortar company, these problems just don't feel too right.

And finally, let's not go into a quarrel over this computer game. We finns are proud of our forefathers as are any nation that I know. Please accept that as natural phenomenon.

Yet as far as I can tell, there aren't too much hybris in these suggestions that some have made. Few minor corrections based on the fact that we know better what kind of equipment or organization we used in the WWII. I belive in you, when you tell us about your history.

But again, thanks for the great game.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Panzer76:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Keke:

One day you´ll learn to read history and maybe then your arguments about war history are not so moronic in the first place, hopefully.

Im sorry, after commets like how the finns won over the Red Army twice,I dont take uber finns seriously anymore.</font>