Preview

[Guest Pillar]

Food for thought:

What if a real world army used defensive tactics as illustrated in the article?

ScoutPL, this is not addressed to you. As far as I'm concerned our debate is over.

[ScoutPL]

I sent this email to Pillar in response to one he sent me. I thought I would make it public, kinda my final thought.

"I give you nothing but facts, reasons, explanations, and yet I still get questions like "Please explain yourself." Sorry Adam but I'm not sure we'll ever be able to discuss this stuff amicably. I make no apologies for my attitude or my statements. I think they are all well founded and justified. I still hold to the belief that you are taking doctrine and tactics that are better applied to upper levels of command and trying to apply them to a battlespace that is little more then a few klicks square. I know you dont think thats the way it is and thats fine. I'll keep to my corner from now on.

Todd"

[Guest Pillar]

Since you want this public, I'll respond publicly.

Scout,

You do make some good points but you take these debates far too personally and you get too emotionally involved. As a result productive discussion is difficult to accomplish.

I've talked to other members of the Military and they are not at all opposed to my tactics the way you are.

I think we should just leave it at this and go our seperate ways.

- Adam

[This message has been edited by Pillar (edited 01-26-2001).]

[ScoutPL]

I'm sure you get plenty of military types who say, sure broad front recon's a good idea. Yes, definately recon to gain all the intel you can before you make an attack. Who wouldn't? I wouldnt be surprised if you asked a US armor officer today about recon efforts at the division/corps level and he outlined something very similiar to broad front. But for a rifle company in the attack? Starting basically from their assault position in relation to the objective? I dont think so. Really what we're arguing about here is a matter of scale, I suppose. Not my hurt feelings or emotional instability. Pillar, I'm a very aggressive guy, its what made me a successful infantry officer in the first place, I was often rewarded for it. If I sound a litle cross or seem to be attacking you then thats just my nature, bud. You want to debate with me then stand up and take the heat. I havent really said anything that bad or offensive about you personally, you were the first to cast that stone.

Bottom line I feel like you are trying to use CM to explore aspects of maneuver warfare on a scale it wasnt designed for. And folks may get the idea that they can realisticaly employ those methods at battalion or even company level. I dont think they should. We both have admitted that different armies fight pretty much the same way when it gets down to the last 500 meters or so. If you want to come out and say that you are experimenting with brigade level ops with CM and that those methods you advocate are your focus then groovy, I say burn up your machine and spend hours sitting there waiting for the turns to play out, entirely up to you (yes for the record, that IS an exageration and I'm totally aware of that fact). If you want to send "scouting" parties forward to bump into the enemy that arent properly supported by the main body, because you think it wins fights in CM then go for it. Just qualify it as such. Because I still havent seen any evidence that any army, past or present, does it at the small unit scale.

[Gremlin]

A suggestion for making this argument a constructive debate for the CM community: you two should both make and post AAR's of the same scenario, each employing your own stance on these tactics, and then see who fares better and why. And make a clear distinction between real-world doctrine and what does and doesn't work in CM and why. That could be instructive to other players.

------------------

When men are inhuman, take care not to feel towards them as they do towards other humans.

--Marcus Aurelius

[Bil Hardenberger]

Forget it

[This message has been edited by Bil Hardenberger (edited 01-26-2001).]

[Guest Pillar]

Scout,

I usually do support my recon with my main body.

As for your temper: The problem isn't really in how you word things, it's that when you get hot-headed it clouds your judgement. I posted a few days ago a list of questions, very specific in nature. In reply I got a short little blurb about penis-envy and other bull****. That sort of discouraged me from wanting to deal with you anymore.

Let this drop. This is not what the forum is for. If you wish to continue, do so privately.

[This message has been edited by Pillar (edited 01-26-2001).]

[Guest Mr. Johnson-<THC>-]

Why don't you guys play 2 games each taking turns on the defense and post ya AARs, I mean you guys still love each other right? you guys do have CM in common.

[Henri]

At the risk of sticking my nose in a catfight, I would like to point out that this debate is related to the US Army "controversy" described in Leonhard's "The Art of Maneuver" regarding "recon-push" vs "recon-pull".

On page 185, Leonhard describes recon-push as "...A command-push appraoch to an attack is one in which the commander ad his staff to use available intelligence to evise a route of advance (or by extrapolation, of attack) against the enemy. The commander then communicates his plan to his subordinate elements , and their role is to execute the mission in the manner chosen beforehand. All meaninful reconnaissance is performed before the unit crosses the line of departure (LD), and there is little inclination to change the plan once the operation commences."

Leonhard goes on "...The recon-pull approach differs in that the Commander refrains from deciding beforehand upon one inflexible plan. Rather he communicates his intent vis-a-vis the enemy , and relies on his subordinates to conduct reconnaissance in order to find an unprotected gap in the enemy defenses."

It seems to me that CavScout was trained in the former and believes that it is the only way to go, which is his right, and that Pillar is proposing the latter, which, since it is supported by reputable authorities, is certainly worth considering.

It seems clear to me that Leonhard is supporting broad-front reconnaissance by company-level assets as part of a larger operation.

And as some have pointed out, the proof is in the pudding, although I have no confidence in a single battle proving anything one way or the other, I find it refreshing to have more than one point of view on how to win battles.

Henri

[ScoutPL]

These are the Q's I found:

Posted 01-24, 0110 hrs. "Do you not use an SRE? Do you wait until the enemy has hit your MLR before you commit reserves? I'm still totally in the dark as to your own concepts of the battlefield."

Answered in depth, 01-24, 1000 hrs.

Posted 01-24, 1648 hrs. "Finally, and most importantly, I want you to sit down some time and really explain what you dissaproove of regarding the tactics I use.

Is it just that you can't concieve of them being used in your battalion? A soviet battalion? A german one?"

Answered in my 01-24, 1000 hrs and 1753 hrs post.

"Is it that you feel that they are gamey, and only work in a computer game?"

Answered in my 01-24, 1000 hrs and 1753 hrs post.

"Is it that you think they won't lead to success?"

Answered in my 01-24, 1000 hrs and 1753 hrs post.

Most of your questions seemed like moot points to me since I had already addressed them in earlier posts. Your questionaire made me think you really werent reading my stuff at all, just looking for me to agree with you and support your ideas.

Step back for a minute, this statement doesnt sound provacative to you?

"Do you mean that ScoutPL's perspective will be different than mine since his experience relates mostly to commanding a platoon on the field? I.E. As opposed to a Battalion commander or Regimental commander?"

Basically what this said to me was that even though I had years of experience as a junior officer I was unable to take that experience and apply it to higher levels of command, thus giving me a better understanding of those levels of command over someone who had never even worn a uniform.

I'm a police officer by trade now Pillar, I deal with provacative statements all day long. But this provoked me even though it wasnt addressed to me. Does anyone else out there think I over reacted to this?

Let me address these directly, so there's no confusion, hopefully.

"Why is it always "If you aren't using ScoutPL's tactics you are simply playing a computer game"? I have never stated this. Its obvious I'm not the only one making assumptions about the other, right? I may have stated that it seemed to me you were just playing the game, Pillar, but I never told anyone they had to use "my" tactics to do it. I have said this a hundred times but I'll say it again. CM was designed for battalion level fights and smaller. Everything about it screams this point. Yes it can handle bigger engagements if you want to take the time and energy to do that. Personally I dont and I'm pretty sure most of the players out there dont, otherwise we wouldnt see new small unit action scenarios all the time. Instead we'd see larger stuff, right? A better game for that level stuff IS TOAW which can handle a scale of 5km per hex and company level icons. Perfect for fighting say a division attack on a regiment. I urge you Pillar to continue to explore doctrine at all levels and in all facets. Attack, defense, reconnaissance, latrine installation, whatever strikes your fancy. I'll happily read your work and let you know what I think of it. But I also feel like its necessary to play devils advocate sometimes. I'm not trying to run you down or make you look bad or make myself look good. I could give two damns about any of that. I just honestly dont think CM was designed for these huge fights you're experimenting with and I think alot of the doctrine you're using doesnt apply at small unit level. THATS ALL! I'm not trying to say your full of it or wrong or that you put your pants on backwards or anything like that. I just think your misapplying some TTP's. Can I not say that without getting my experience/knowledge challenged or made to feel like I'm yelling suff across cyber space but no one's listening?

"You still haven't explained to me what "rules" say my tactics conflict with reality? Which law of physics?"

Your tactics are sound Pillar, since they come right out of someones FM. A few months ago they were a little flaky but we've already been around the mulberry bush about that. I just dont think you're applying those tactics in the right battlespace. Or should I say game? But hey, remember my Ranger School story? The RI reply to every eager Ranger Student? "Weellll...That IS a technique." It didnt really matter how ate up it was, as long as it worked. Well if your stuff works Pillar, go for it. But I can still disagree with it right?

"And because I like to use it for larger battles I'm missing out? On what?"

See above

"Can you give me some solid reasoning behind why CM can't handle anything larger, other than CPU power?"

See above

Henri, Mr Johnson and Gremlin, thanks for the input guys, but you've got it wrong. Pillar and I quit argueing over specific tactics and doctrine months ago. We agree on the use of pull vs. push recon and the value of each. Now its more of a debate over scale and application. A double AAR wouldnt solve anything since we'd both probably get the same result just using different means.

I just want Pillar to come out and say that most of his doctrinal study has been based on large unit "operational" levels (something he has already admitted to) and that small unit tactics are pretty much the same world over. Doctrine has absolutely nothing to do with how a battalion attacks a fortified village or hilltop, once it crosses the LD. And that is the realm that CM was designed for, that is where it excels. As long as all of Pillars readers understand that then I'll shutup.

[Guest Pillar]

deleted

[This message has been edited by Pillar (edited 01-26-2001).]

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

Scout asked - "Does anyone else out there think I over reacted to this?"

Yes. I read that comment as an honest question by someone who was trying to understand two points of view, both of which he respected as more informed than his own, which puzzled him by their contrast. Nothing more. The writer, I thought, was thinking that you probably had a point about no time for recon when conducting an attack, if the body involved was 40 guys, and that therefore Pillar's ideas would indeed be inapplicable at that scale, just as you were saying. But he also saw something to Pillar's ideas about finding out where the enemy was before launching at him, and to put the two together he formulated a hypothesis. To wit, that perhaps there is time and need for such pre-attack recon at the battalion scale, but no time for it at the platoon scale.

He was trying to reconcile the two positions presented by making a distinction between levels. I saw nothing more than that in the comment, no attempt to cast aspersions, no slight. You know, when people go to your webpage to read your fine strategy articles, we all see you in BDUs addressing a platoon of guys. It is easy to think of that as the perspective you will bring to a discussion, without examining or thinking over the other positions you've occupied or what you have learned from them.

And to the average civy or even former reservist (like myself), that pigeonholing is not meant as a slight at all. I have darn little sense of what can and cannot be accomplished with 40 guys up at the pointy end in battle time-scales and amid fog-of-war, because I was a gun-bunny miles away throwing 100+ lbs firecrackers in your general direction - LOL. I've got a sense of such things from wargames, sure, but cross-checking that against reality is exactly what these sorts of discussions are about.

When the person who said that cast you in the role of the expert on realistic limits on battle-field recon at the platoon level, I do not think any slight was intended at all. Quite the contrary.

As for the substance and atmospherics of your discussion with Pillar, I have several things to say. First, I entirely agree with Scout that CM is made for company-level fights. Even battalions are cumbersome in CM, in terms of the command-span involved. A scale like TacOps is better for battalion level fights (it can handle brigades as long as their are in echelon, but even that is pushing it).

In passing, I make note of the "monster" tendency in wargaming. Many wargames are expanded in size and complexity simply by including one additional level down, below the level of the actual important decisions the overall battle-size turns on. This is often a measure taken to increase realism, or player immersion, and sometimes to smooth out the impacts of random events the game system requires. It is a general rule of wargaming that the system design does not have to be as good or as clever if this is done, to get a decent game out of it. But the cost of this is a much heavier burden on the player. In a way, it is a lazy designers choice, but sometimes the results justify the procedure. Other times, it makes the game harder to play for little gain, and is a design mistake.

Too abstract, so I will give examples. The old U.S. civil war games like AH Gettysburg, with division-level units, were obviously poor simulations. The unit interactions were wrong. Single die rolls matched against a combat result table determined the outcome of a battle for one flank. The flow of the battle was far from historical.

So SPI designed TSS, which used regimental counters with step-loss results about the size of companies. Brigades were represented by commanders and the command system effectively made these brigades the manuever units, but each was represented by 3-5 counters and 10-20 strength points. The CRT was changed to a range-fire basis, of absolute firepower effects rather than odds, and fire effects in turn had morale consequences including retreats and loss of ability to fire, temporarily.

The new system captured the flow of the battle extremely well. Single die rolls no longer determined the outcome of whole attacks. The capabilities of formations reflected those of the historical counterparts. This was a successful "monster" design. The load put on the player, however, was high, especially in the board wargame days. (Essentially the same system is used today by the Battleground series).

The most famous unsuccessful "monstering" of a game is probably Campaign for North Africa. It was essentially trying to do for the old AH game Afrika Corps what TSS had done for Gettysburg. But the designers so overdid it, that it would have taken a command general staff to run the simulation, and the conduct of the game would have been as slow as the actual war - LOL. I mean, they had "truck points" of light, medium, and heavy that each represented 5 trucks, to cover the entire North African campaign. Individual planes, and even individually rated pilots. It was absurd. I once managed to play a single game turn of the smallest scenario, over the course of several months and with several others - LOL.

But the most common case of monstering is an operational-level wargame that gets the command span wrong by one level - that gives the German commander in some portion of the Russian campaign, regiments rather than divisions, for example. Often these are then immediately re-"stacked", to get enough combat power for a bit of frontage, so the result is almost entirely just to make the game far more unwieldy to play.

Using any game system in "monster" fashion for the size of fight that is one command level too big for it, therefore, is a very common thing in wargaming, but it is almost always the result of a design mistake and nothing else. On rare occasions, it performs admirably (like TSS). But usually a system one level up with clever rules (like step losses, to take a trivial example) simulates the events just as well, while keeping the player out of the minutae and focused on the actually decisive elements for the overall battle scale.

(E.g. if CM had individual men given orders or running around as directed by the AI, it would fail utterly, as a game even if not as a simulation (and it would fail as a simulation with anything like the present AI). The individual casualty and firepower but squad movement mix, does much better.

All of that is by way of explaining that I agree very strongly that CM is best at the company scale. What do I think someone is missing who "uses it" for higher scales? He is wasting his time on minutae, for one, for the types of decisions that matter for e.g. brigade level combat.

He is missing the sense of the importance of each decision, and each manuever element, that an actual battlefield commander must have, for another. That is a consequence of the small size of the command span. There is nothing "expendable" to a platoon leader with only 3 squads to conduct his whole mission with all day, as an example. He is intensely conscious of the limited number of formations his unit can adopt, which is itself a trivial consequence of the limited number of sub-units that make it up.

But those are minor matters, and obviously Pillar or anyone else can do whatever he likes with his own CPU.

Now, all of that said, I do agree with Pillar about one substantive thing, though with qualification. It is indeed very important to figure out exactly where the enemy is on the CM-scale battlefield. It is not enough to know the enemy is "holding that village", which is all a CM briefing, to represent prior recon, can typically tell you.

But the qualification has to do with losses of small units in CM fights. CM infantry firefights are not very bloody, fast, unless the ranges are very close or the targeted men are in the open. because of this, each infantry formation has a certain staying power. But there is an exception to this. When detached squads or especially half-squads run into distinctly larger infantry formations, they usually die very rapidly while accomplishing practically nothing.

I give an example. A scouting half-squad is sneaking to the edge of a body of woods to get a look on who is trying to cross the open ground to reach it. As it gets to the point where it can see the clearing, it sees an MG and a number of "?s" on the far side of the clearing, then a full squad walks right out into the open heading toward it. In the same minute of time, that squad walks right by the half-squad into the woods next to it, despite being fired upon and taking 1-2 casualties. Meanwhile, the MG and other guys across the way open up and partially suppress the half-squad. The following minute, even with "withdraw-run" orders, the half-squad is shot pieces by the squad in the woods <15 yards away before it can withdraw.

Now, this is close to the best "ambush" situation you can realistically expect for a scouting half-squad. If the "charging" squad hadn't been supported at all, or hadn't come so close, or hadn't ended with concealment rather than in the open, then the ambusher might have done a little better. But really, the case shows that any half-squad, in pure CM terms and moving in cover as they usually do, is risking an "overrun" by any full squad it stumbles upon.

Why this long digression about half-squads? Simply to illustrate a larger point. At the scale of CM, light recon forces will tend to give the enemy many-on-one engagements and get wiped out very easily. Unless you know you will succeed in spotting the enemy a long way off (to lower firepowers), such seperated forces are extremely vunerable. And in a company-scale fight, you really can't afford to make your enemy a gift of an entire platoon's worth of infantry, in a series of such clashes.

It is real easy to get 1/4 of your men killed in less than five minutes, thinking you are "scouting" the enemy, or "delaying" him, when all you are really doing is giving him the dream many-on-one lopsided shoot-out he'd kill for, even if it required a long flanking movement. I've seen more than one company advance on-line, run into a "OP line" platoon and shoot the heck out of it in less than 2 minutes, with the end result like 5 guys down in the company, and the platoon half dead and the rest broken and running.

These incidents lend credence to Scout's points about "knowing how to attack" and "just doing it", instead of feeding in teams piecemeal, and attriting yourself much more than any company can really afford.

The trick is to manage to figure out where the other guy is without letting him overrun a line of OPs. And he *will* overrun it, for nothing more than mussed hair, if he runs in to it with a force a "level" higher (platoon v. squad, etc). This means if you do use OPs, they should not even stick around for a single minute of "ambush" firing, but should run like a warm place as soon as they see the enemy.

It also means the best scouters are units with longer range with covered positions that see one area but are not seen by all others. E.g. a unit on the back side of a wood, that sees forward at a 45 degree angle only at what advances on the right flank, say. Then if it spots something, everything in front of it is not going to be able to fire, and if its range is good (an MG or sniper e.g.) it can shoot a little before withdrawing.

Obviously this is harder on the attack. But teamed advances can have the effect, looking over their "inward" sides.

I do agree, then, on the importance of finding the enemy exactly, not just at the level of the briefing. But one has to be quite careful with recon or screening elements in CM-scale fights. They are much weaker than they appear, and concentrated attackers can blow through them, even if e.g. said attackers are caught in open ground. In practice, you will not "pin and delay" a platoon or company advance with the "cross-fire" of two half-squads or LMGs.

The best way to scout on the attack, in my experience, is simply to have the lead infantry platoons use fire and movement principles, with a wedge or a modification of it, without anything more elaborate. Meaning, the point squad, as a full squad, goes into the piece of cover, while the rest of the platoon overwatches, a squad sorta toward each side and (if caught up) the MG and support weapons centered. The distance ahead for the "point" should not be allowed to increase beyond 100 yards, and in tight terrain should be closer still.

I suspect this is exactly the sort of thing Scout has in mind when he says "just do it", and he thinks of this as traveling or the attack, not as any preliminary recon time-period.

Anyway, those are my thoughts on the substance of your fracas. I should also say that I am disappointed in that fracas itself. I understand why Scout got "set off", but I do think that began from an overreaction. I don't think Pillar has been very reasonable after that, though, and I do get the sense that he expects people to agree with him and is annoyed if they simply don't. I think you both have useful things to say about tactics and CM tactics in particular. And that you'd do all of us a service if you remembered, that we want to hear what each of you think and decide for ourselves. You aren't going to convince, for one me, of anything, by pretending the other guy doesn't have any point at all, when he obviously does.

[Guest Mr. Johnson-<THC>-]

Yes I think you overreacted. I think Pillar just wanted to banter and discuss tatics. I think maybe Pillar got a little overenthusiastact about trying to get you to agree with him, maybe. Your pretty right ScoutPl CM's scale is mostly about company lvl tatics. But if your playing a human and you got 2 1.4 gig computers in the same room, you can make a Battlion +++ game, over a pretty big area too. I think I said this early, you guys are talking about how big a risk your willing to take in most situations. First off this was about tatical defense then kind of turned into recon on a company lvl to an operation lvl. I don't know, maybe you guys are sending nasty emails back and forth but I don't see why we can't go back to BS, agreeing on everyting or disagreeing about everything.

[Guest Pillar]

Jason,

That was an exceptionally well written and well thought out post.

I want to clarify a few things for the readers of this thread, including yourself.

First, I'm not at all in favour of sending out unsupported half squads to die. I agree completely with your analysis that this is simply gifting the enemy with your dead troops.

Second, I don't have a "set" method of conducting reconaissance. I think the ideal method is one which uses the least amount of men and provides a substantial base of support for those men. I also take into account terrain, enemy analysis, and other factors to determine where I think the enemy *might* be. I make sure I don't go running into those areas any time soon. Often I'll recon by fire places where I think the enemy may be.

Third, the difference between what Scout has refered to as "just doing it" and my idea of broad front tactical recon is very clear: He is attacking with a plan in mind, and discovering enemy forces as he does so. I am discovering enemy forces, AND THEN formulating a plan based on what my limited reconaissance assets have told me. Holes the recon is unssuccesful in identifying are plugged by terrain and enemy analysis, ESPECIALLY based on the data from other sectors.

Fourth, what you refer to as OP's (Observation Posts) are very similar to what I call the "SRE". The difference is that my SRE is largely more mobile and can go combat-capable if need be. This is a personal preference: I like to use my infantry as highly mobile units. Rommel illustrates mobile infantry usage in his "Infantry Attacks" and Fionn shows it even more explicitly in his AAR's.

Fifth, I use CM as a testbed for my studies. I think the fact that it leaves little to be abstracted ("monster" mode) means fairly accurate results for tests on bigger scales. It means my plans have to incoroporate more things, such as "What if that platoon doesn't make it to the key terrain?", "What if my reserves are flanked by enemy tanks on the approach?" and so on.

CM is the *ONLY* world war two tactical game that lets me simulate this accurately. Other games, such as TOAW, completely abstract the process. Furthermore, TOAW is *operational* in nature. There are no *tactics*. And I think it is a huge mistake to assume that Divisions don't participate in tactical combat; they do. David Glantz's "Soviet Conduct of the Tactical Maneuver" is nothing *BUT* Battalion + Level tactical art!!

The disadvantage of using CM for this, as you point out, is the time it takes to do all the orders. Essentially, I'm role playing the platoon leader, the company commander, and the Battalion commander. BUT I LOVE IT! I know another member of the US Army who is using Combat Mission for this EXACT SAME PURPOSE, and we have great discussions together. We are about to start a Battalion level Attack game in fact.

For those interested, what you do is:

1) Define orders as the Battalion HQ.

2) Then role play Company HQ's, and determine how you would carry out that mission from Battalion.

3) Finally, role play the Platoons HQ's and decide how your platoon will carry out the mission the Company HQ set out.

It may SEEM like a lot of work, but I play Battalion level engagements in CM now quicker than most people play company level ones. It becomes second nature.

So I think the comments about CM being limited to Company level fighting are innaccurate. It's not limited, it's just detailed. And I don't consider the modeling of each platoon (Hell, it's only 9 platoons!) to be that big a deal. Some people may find that too much to deal with, others like me really enjoy it.

It's not right of anyone to tell another person off for not enjoying the game at the same level of command as they do.

Finally, the reason I have been giving ScoutPL the cold shoulder is because I have no desire in adding fire to his already burning temper. It was becoming clear to me that no matter what I posted it would only make things worse. Under the advise of other members of the forum and of my own decision I have decided to refrain from discussion with him. I know now that no matter what kind of evidence or argument I pour on him he is not going to accept that any form of broad based recon has a place in CM, and will continue to believe I am simply playing a video game.

My choice has nothing to do with me not accepting differences of opinion.

Now putting him aside and forgetting about these unproductive arguments, let's get down to business.

You accept that I have a valid point about the value of "beyond the briefing" reconaissance. You also proposed some interesting *methods* of accomplishing that task. Would you be interested in discussing and comparing our methodology? I certainly am, it's one area I think is worth some open minded attention. I must be doing something differently than your tests, as I haven't had my leading half-squads (yes I do often split a squad and put it on "point") slaughtered at all yet.

You should talk to some of the people I haved played and ask them to describe what I did and how it turned out. Maybe we could do a little critique for one another?

I look forward to this thread becoming productive again.

Please, NO ONE, bring this stupid bickering up again. Scout you have had your "closing" statements, I've had mine, others have given their comments, it ends here. I have made it clear I no longer wish to have any discussion with ScoutPL, and I have explained why.

And Jason:

"I read that comment as an honest question by someone who was trying to understand two points of view, both of which he respected as more informed than his own, which puzzled him by their contrast. "

Thank you.

[This message has been edited by Pillar (edited 01-27-2001).]

[Guest Pillar]

One other point I want to expand upon before signing off for tonight:

While I am eager to learn the tactical views of existing armies, I am also trying to come up with my own distinct tactics based on extrapolation from what I read.

I don't agree with ScoutPL's assertion that I am applying Operational Art to CM, BUT here is my point: SO WHAT IF I WAS?

CM is a damn fine tactical wargame and it WILL show you what works and what doesn't (apart from a few minor game-issues). If I come up with a new TACTICAL theory based on extrapolation of operational or even philosophic (Sun Tzu, Clausewitz) knowledge, GOOD FOR ME!

There have been many times throughout history where a *new* way of doing things; *new* tactics emerge, based on great study and creative thinking. If I achieve great success in CM by handling my infantry a certain way, or doing recon a certain way, that tells me something: I've improved.

If the rest of the US Army doesn't use those tactics, or only views them as operational art, *I don't care*. The Germans showed the French new ways of fighting on the outbreak of World War Two. Guerilla forces around the world continue to show modern armies that they don't have to "play by the rules".

Likewise, *I* have been shown new ways of fighting which perhaps are not contained in modern US Army doctrine. Personally, I'm open to them.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

Well, I am glad you appreciated my last round of comments, Pillar. But you aren't helping very much - LOL. I doubt it is what you intend, and Lordie knows I am guilty of the same, but your last two notes came across pretty darn pompous. There was also a noticable lack of content in them, nor any real acknowledgement of the fact I urged, that Scout certainly has a point.

As for the suggestion that I ask others how you conduct recon, that strikes me as pretty absurd. Surely you can tell me what you did more easily than they can, from the other side of the fog. I gave you a number of examples of CM incidents, some in pretty clear detail. To my blinkered perspective, what I got back was "yes, I scout with half-squads and use an OP line, but mine goes to 11!", as a sort of dismissal of everything I said. But you declined the opportunity to provide any examples or clearly explained tactics that address the issues I raised.

As for your last, allow me to note that #1 it is unlikely you have in fact found anything truly new, simply because most moderately sensible things have been tried. #2 if you have found anything new it is unlikely to be sound (and it working against people you regularly play means nothing in that regard, for obvious reasons - particular commanders have particular habits and thus particular weaknesses). #3 if you have found anything new and sound it is unlikely to be any distinct improvement, as opposed to a rival but equivalent method of achieving similar results.

#4 if you have found new and improved methods, it is likely they exploit unrealistic aspects of the CM engine and would work in real life (e.g. instantly-transmitted sighting reports, god-like move coordination from the top down, etc).

Notice, that "monstering" up a level, means straining realism simply by putting complete info and cross-coordination in the hands of people who would not actually have it. A platoon leader having tight control over his squads is realistic, and the tac-AI and morale rules will take some of it "back". Going up a command level to company will produce more tightly integrated platoon manuevers than could probably really happen, but it is pretty close. If you command every squad in a division every minute, not a scrap of realism would remain, because the truth is no one in a division ever has that kind of information or control ability every minute. I trust you see the point.

And #5, in all of the above you are hardly the most objective witness because no man is a just judge in his own cause.

All of that said, it remains possible you have good ways of conducting pre-battle tactical recon. Duh. And I am certainly interested in discussing them with you.

But I would like a few things clear at the outset if we are going to. I am not going to be the least bit interested or impressed with any past game of CM. I don't care a jot about your W-L record. Keep your ego to yourself, and talk tactical turkey, methods, why they work, not "I did this and everything fell before me" crowing. OK? I just am too old for that sort of horsefeathers.

I start out by noticing one unmentioned issue in this whole discussion - the difference between tactical recon (or less flamboyantly, finding out where the enemy is in CM games) - on the offense and on the defense. Some things may remain the same, but many things change, in my opinion. I am one who believes that the largest edge the defender has is the sighting differential that a properly planned defensive scheme can help bring about, and I also have forcefully expressed my belief that the defender must manuever, indeed can't afford to remain stationary.

The defender has fewer forces to play with. Losses matter relatively more. An OP line set up along the lines of historical doctrine can use up a quarter of a defender's force in a small engagement. The danger of the attacker coming on warm-place for leather is greater, and if the defense is scattered (including front-to-back) and that occurs, the result can be defeat in detail even with fine information on enemy routes of advance, etc. These constraints do not operate on attackers, in the same way anyway.

The attacker has, in principle, a greater appetite for information and can spare men to go get it. He cannot always spare time to get it and to react to it in other than minor ways. But e.g. a probing wave and a reserve, then backing success, is a standard tactic. The weight of the two things can be varied, and that may by one of the "control knob" variables involved in your scouting ideas.

An example - everything is better with examples instead of abstractions. In Valley of Trouble, which I presume everyone has played because it is one of the demo fights, the U.S. has a sum total of five infantry platoons. 3 starting rifle, 1 starting engineer, and 1 reinforcement. The reinforcement must act as a reserve, that is obvious. The deployment boxes prevent grouping the entire force, and time it not unlimited. The realistic options for "up" vs. "back", therefore, are 2 up 3 back, 3 up 2 back, or 4 up 1 back. Otherwise put, the U.S. can hold one, or two, of his starting platoons in reserve, or he can send all four in the "first wave".

The benefit of additional platoons held back is, of course, that the lay of the defense can be mapped out somewhat before the axis of advance of these platoons is decided upon.

The natural balance to me seems to be 3 up and 2 back, and that is what I used the first time I played it. It worked OK, but I sent the engineer platoon as one of the "ups" (the center one), and it might have been better as the additional reserve platoon. The reason I sent it is that I wanted them not only to scout, but to eliminate obstacles if possible, along the line of advance I expected to use as my main avenue, if it was clear enough.

I did have an overall initial plan. Rather than commit nowhere until after a recon, I decided on the basis of terrain analysis to make the initial main effort of wide left hook. This advance was made by two platoons, infantry on the outer part of the hook and the engineers on the inner part; one of the Sherman 105s supported the outer, infantry platoon.

The other platoon designated "up" was conducting a sort of recon, pretty much exclusively. It was not expected to charge and seize some objective, but only to probe - but to do so as a platoon. Its job was to either serve as a diversion and cause confusion about my main effort, or if the enemy reacted to my main effort correctly, to find a weak spot for a secondary effort.

Since I had 2 other infantry platoons and a flock of tanks present or on the way, that seemed like an eminently flexible plan. Yes I had chosen an axis of advance. If things proceeded well along it, I could commit to it all of my armor and 80% of my infantry by half-way through the battle. If enemy reactions made that a poor choice, I would have probed for weak spots elsewhere, and could throw at such a weak spot almost all of my armor and more than half of my infantry.

Now, just exactly what am I going to get in the way of greater flexibility, by *not* choosing that first axis of advance? If I send only 2 up, then I am probing everywhere, broad-front recon. I commit to nothing, and presumably do not reveal anything about axes of advance. But in return, at the pointy end I've got 90 guys, and the Germans have an entire company defending the valley. I can ID positions and arty them, sure. But I am not going to secure anything more, really.

Whereas, with the choice I made, I had a Sherman 105 and two infantry platoons more or less on line (the engineers not entirely free to manuever because of pillbox observation zones, it is true), when I ran into the German's right flank platoon in a patch of woods. I easily shot the heck out of them. Then the Sherman 105 easily blasted a log MG bunker. The German right flank was then gone, and I could turn the line of pill boxes, and as planned threaten to attack south rather than east - or both.

The Germans committed their reserve of course, and the opening stages did not decide the whole battle. The point is simply that the natural seeming 3-2 preserved great flexibility while also allowing enough up front to overwhelm a single-platoon German position. Whereas, a 2-3 long recon beforehand, would not have appreciably increased total flexibility in my opinion, while it would have reduced my ability to blast my way through the German right flank position rapidly and cheaply.

Do you agree? Is 3-2 the obvious way to go in "Valley of Trouble", from the standpoint of your recon ideas? It might help if you explain exactly how you play "Valley of Trouble" as the U.S., and especially how you to the recon.

I hope this is interesting.

[Vanir]

Apples and oranges, apples and oranges.

Originally posted by ScoutPL:

If you want to have a realistic playing experience with CM, stay the hell away from QB's. Talk over with you're opponent what you want to do and take a few minutes to set up a scenario. Make sure the one setting it up is on the defense and provide a good intel dump based on what you guys predecided the level of intel would be. Then fight a damn battle! And quit p-footing around! Your attack plan should be based on the intel paragraph you received from "higher", not on the first ten turns of you stumbling around toward the enemy positions like Elmer Fudd!

It is very obvious to me that the reason Pillar and Scout can't agree on anything is because they are arguing past each other. And they are doing this because they are not playing the same game.

Scout doesn't need to recon in his games because he receives an intel dump in his scenarios. Pillar needs to recon because you don't get intel prior to a QB. Scout uses CM as a simulator and tailors his games to avoid elements that don't mesh with his real world experience. Pillar views CM as a game based upon reality and uses real world doctrine as inspiration but does not feel bound by it.

Apple and oranges. There is no way they were ever going to agree when approaching the subject from such different perspectives.

Both of their positions make perfect sense when viewed within the context in which they were written.

I think it is true that CM was mainly intended as a company level game. It is certainly true that the larger the scale is set the less realistic CM's Borg-like CnC model becomes. Having said that I have personally found 3000 pt QBs to be the most enjoyable games in CM. I guess I'm just not a grog.

BTW Pillar, I found your article very well written and informative. I will surely refer back to it as well as to comments made earlier in this thread by you, Bill, Jason and others. Of course, I play QBs almost exclusively.

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You've never heard music until you've heard the bleating of a gut-shot cesspooler. -Mark IV

[Guest Pillar]

Thanks Vanir, and good insight.