Film of Stuka 87G in action

[JonS]

And, of course, the paras could have been used in Russia. The Crimean bottleneck, closing encirclements, seizing bridges and crossings, etc etc. You know, para stuff.

[stoat]

Originally posted by A.E.B:

Out of curiosity, how many of us here have seen photos or gun camera footage of FBs/CAS of any nation taking down armour.

I found no gun camera footage but I've only searched a quarter of my books. I did find in Nick Cornish's Images of Kursk two pictures of a quartet of PzIVs that have been smashed, supposedly by Shturmoviks. Three are completely annihilated (turrets off sides caved in, where present, and strwen about), and the fourth has taken a massive hit to the port side.

These may or may not have been airial kills, and I will try to get the pictures on this site.

I do believe that they were airial kills, because the tanks are spaced very closely together, and the hatches on the remotely intact panzer have been openned. Though this could have been from an internal explosion, I believe that it shows that the crews abandoned their vehicles and they were then destroyed. (pictures taken after Germans lost airial superiority)

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by JonS:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

No, sorry - I was reading it as "what if they had never landed on Crete at all" - and were not dissuaded from further airborne operations.

Ah, ok. I read it as "drop takes place as it did, except they lose at Malame, causing the entire invasion to fail, and meaning para cas are even higher than actual"

Taking your line: if they decide not to do Crete, why owuld they then do any of the others? The only major difference would probably be that the stock of Ju-52s and tpt pilots would remain larger for longer. </font>

[stoat]

This from another book:Charles Winchester's "Ostfront". When speaking about the airial battle for kursk it states: "The IL-2's main contribution seems to have been to blind Luftwaffe reconnaissance. It could overtake and shoot down the Fw189s of the German recce flights, confident its frontal armor would protect it from the German rear gunner."

Better anitaircraft than anittank?

As for the German paratroopers; taking Malta would have been a smart decision. It would have given the Axis and air and sea base to fight British convoys, or make them take the long way round Africa, which would have added to the supply problem in Britain. Also it would give the Axis a point from which to protect their Africa-bound convoys, perhaps giving Rommel the supplies he needed to win.

[Guest Mike]

Malta is a good possibility - however the Axis (ie Germany) had already decided not to bother before Crete hadn't they?

They (mistakenly) figured it wasn't worth the diversion of resources, and by the time their mistake was evident it was too late - Malta was well fortified and garrisoned.

There are several wargames on hte subject of course - I like the SSI "Battlefront" series scenario myself - the Axis invariably do well, it's jsut a matter of whether they do well ENOUGH......

[JasonC]

As usual, someone trying as hard as possible not to understand a chain of reasoning makes a hash of that chain of reasoning. Then we are entertained with Lancester's musings because there is an equation, any equation, even though we know its premises do not hold here and unsurprisingly neither do its conclusions apply, empirically. Nor am I the one pretending tanks fought only tanks etc. (Including all the other causes of loss reduces the kills available to be awarded to them, naturally).

But let's apply the missing principle of charity in argument the other side mislaid, and assume as naively as possible that low kills per Russian tank were simply a byproduct of their overwhelming numerical superiority in Lancesterian fashion. Its just math, let's do it.

20,000 tanks to start plus 8,000 lend lease plus 102,000 produced equals 130,000 Russian tanks. Germans around 50,000. Let's take 10000 tanks are our unit and call it 13 to 5. The squares are to remain equal under Lancestrian attrition. Russian power 169, German power 25, net outcome Russians left with 144, Germans with zero. Square root again to get back to numbers, we have 12. In our units, that is 120,000 tanks, that Russia was supposed to end the war with. The actual figure is 30,000 or less, their losses were 100,000 not 10,000. So our fine Lancestrian estimate gets Russian losses wrong by a factor of ten.

Let's still pursue it anyway, to see what it predicts about average achievements, relative performance of the winning and losing sides, etc. Total kills are 10,000 + 50,000 = 60,000, total shooters are 130,000 + 50,000 = 180,000. Average kills per shooter are 0.33. Necessarily less than unity by the already mentioned identity. Here, vastly less, because the Lancester equations predict run-away wins ("snowballing") for the more numerous side.

Russian kills are 50,000, spread over 130,000 shooters, average kills 0.385, above the 0.33 average. Despite their larger numbers, Lancestrian odds effects raise their average effectiveness, compared to the overall average of both sides. The Germans on the other hand have 10,000 kills spread over 50,000 shooters, average kills 0.2, far below the average for both sides and barely better than half the Russian figure. The relatively performance and the initial odds multiply out to the predicted 5 to 1 loss ratio, favor the more numerous side.

Now we know the war was not such a lopsided win, and the kill ratio was 2 to 1 favor the Germans, not 5 to 1 favor the Russians. Suppose we decide to fit a Lancestrian analysis anyway. We can do so by introducing a quality factor for the German tanks, counting each as some multiple of a Russian tank. We know the actual losses, and can solve the resulting equation for this quality factor, that would predict the real losses if Lancestrian relationships held.

The answer is 2.53 times - each German tank counts as 2.53 Russian ones. That means the actual odds are not lopsided, not in real combat power numbers (as we could have guessed from it being a long war with high losses, most of the winning side knocked out themselves, etc). We have 13 vs. 12.65 instead of 13 vs. 5. Squared, the powers are 169 and 160. The lesser, the Germans goes to zero, check. The remainder is 9. Square root to get back to numbers from power, gives 3. In our units, that is 30,000 tanks remaining for the Russians, check.

Now, what are the real "tanks" destroyed on this quality adjusted basis? 100,000 Russians and 126,500 Germans (Russian tank equivalents). The losing side lost more, check (Lancester can't predict anything else). Total KOed, 226,500 Russian tank equivalents. Total shooters, that plus 30,000 surviving Russians, equals 256,500. Average kills per tank, 0.88. Less than unity by the aforementioned identity, check. But now much closer to it, since we are correctly looking at a close fight with high losses to both sides. Russian kills 126,500, from 130,000 shooters, 0.97 average. Above the overall average, because the winning side gains relative quality through the Lancestrian odds edge. German kills 100,000, from shooters 126,500, 0.79 average. Less than the overall average because the losing side loses relative quality to odds effects. But notice, they are both fairly close to the overall average, only differing by about 10%.

Then one can divide the Russian tank equivalents by the quality factor found before, to get German tank equivalents for the Russian KOs. 0.97/2.53 = 0.38, just as before naturally.

Notice, in a close war the actual impact of the odds based squaring effect on average efficiencies is small, here about 10% of the average. Conceptually, in any war that features high losses on both sides and lasts a long time, Lancester analysis will only fit the real losses if that war is reconceptualized or remeasured as a closely matched contest. And Lancester analysis predicts largely linear results for closely matched contests, since an escalating impact to odds differentials is all it was ever meant to track.

Does this mean a typical German tank really was 2.53 times as effective as a Russian one? No. The conditions for Lancester do not obtain in this instance. Those equations are derived from the hypotheses that (1) all weapons bear on all other weapons (2) lethality is a direct linear function of firepower and not otherwise related to odds. Which is true even approximately only of aimed fire by firepower integrated forces. The reality with tanks is instead that few are in LOS of each other at any one time. Meaning they effectively approach each other as independently as gladiators - for which Lancester correctly predicts linear not squared odds effects.

There is another way the Lancester equations break down, on the aimed side rather than the firepower integration side. When fire is by area, particularly with soft targets it is true, the impact of a given amount of firepower is not independent of the density of targets. Instead it scales linearly with density. And this leads to the area fire version of attritional linearity, distinct from the "gladiatorial" one.

Suppose we imagine two forces, each with 10 riflemen emitting the same firepower. They are clearly evenly matched. Now, replace one of side with a single MG manned by 2 men, and stipulate that the firepower emitted by either set is equal. On the Lancestrian aimed fire squaring analysis, the riflemen are stronger. The keep the same firepower, but also spread the enemy fire over 5 times as many targets. Odds are supposed to be a "two-fer", helping defensively as well as offensively - thus the square law.

But now suppose the fire is area, unaimed. The 10 riflemen as 5 times as large a target. For the same bullets fired (which we stipulated above), they lose not the same amount from their deeper total, but five times as much. They run out therefore just as fast. Extra numbers do not help them defensively, because higher target density multiplies losses taken. In combat power, the two are equal. But in efficiency in generating that power, the MG is vastly superior. If they exchange off, its side will lose only a fifth as many men. And it is obviously easier to field and replace etc.

It is a striking historical fact that this consideration did not occur to Lancester as he developed and published his equations, which he did in the year of Verdun and the Somme. He was counseling concentration of force to generate higher squares to trade off the local enemy more efficiently, at the very moment it was being proved to a demonstration, at the cost of a million causalties, that packing in more riflemen in the same space detracts from combat efficiency and multiplies losses, without helping reach any decision.

The reason why has been outlined above. If the scale of the fight being considered, its most effective weapons, its average ranges, etc, all mean virtually all fire effect is area fire, then sure it is important to multiply firepower, but instead of numbers being a "twofer" in that respect, the side that generates that firepower with the smallest target signature is the one that will win. Thus dug in machineguns and 8 inch howitzers were the important thing, not numbers. (Because both generate enourmous firepower from conditions of relative safety for the firepower emitter).

Which is an aside about the shallowness of what passes for military analysis and thought, even among those developing it, let alone those citing it without understanding its history, limitations, and pre-conditions. Obviously plenty of practical officers noticed that 8 inch howitzers and dug in machineguns were useful, even if British motorcar manufactures did not.

All of which was addressed at dismissing the notion, sledgehammer on a gnat fashion, that Russian average KOs per tank were only low because they won so easily with the squared power of their superior numbers.

Then we have the idea that perhaps the specific lethality of tanks were high whenever they actually encountered each other, and the low averages (forced to be less than one by mathematical law) are just a result of that being infrequent. It is a testable proposition. It predicts or entails that tanks expend very little AP ammo, since they almost never encounter each other. Rounds expended should be on the order, 1/specific lethality, and specific lethality per hypothesis is high, perhaps 0.5, perhaps 0.25. Ergo, rounds expended should be low. Some can be allowed for training, others lost when tanks are. Perhaps 50 rounds per tank should be what we see for the whole war.

The prediction is wrong and the hypothesis is falsified. Tanks expend very large amounts of AP ammo. They evidently have many occasions on which they see enemy tanks and fire at them. Without killing more than one over the whole war. Ergo, most of their shots miss or bounce. Ergo, most of their shots are in poor shooting conditions, and especially at long range. Most *kills* may be medium range or under, that is a different story. The average tank does encounter other tanks, does engage them, but does not usually (per occasion) destroy them. Specific lethality is low.

Once again, we face the romanticism problem. The most exciting clashes are clearly those in which kills are most likely, at short range or at most medium, with many targets and brave and ready shooters ready to engage them. Those occasions certainly happened and mattered, resulting in a large portion of all AFV kills.

But for every such occasion, there were others - lots of them - where a tank was shot at, the crew said WTF?, did not notice the shooter let alone duel them to the death, and got out of dodge. Sometimes a few lead tanks were hit and the rest halted - for hours, not 30 seconds before a banzai charge up the left edge of a pit. There were occasions when it was clear to both sides who had the upper hand, and the other side wisely denied battle. Lots of them, with shooting, but without much dying.

Common sense tells us this, the veterans tell us this if we listen to them systematically rather than selectively, statistics tell us this, the length of the war tells us this, the longevity of tanks tells us this. But romanticism does not tell us this, because it reveals the tenative nature of real combat, the tendency of sides to avoid each other, an unwillingness to press home to victory or death - because if pressed far enough it is usually death.

I hope all this is still at least marginally interesting to those who remain.

[Michael Emrys]

To continue my musings on Dorosh's list (and possibly some others)...

He mentioned England and quickly wrote it off. Well, yes and no. If Germany had had the naval power to safely move and supply an army-sized force across the Channel in the autumn of 1940, there probably would have been plenty of objectives that paratroops could have taken that would have eased their way ashore. But that also assumes that paratroops and the transport planes to carry them had been available in the required numbers. Since none of those conditions obtained, Dorosh is in my view correct.

Next, Leningrad? At the moment, I can't think of what paratroops would do at Leningrad, but they might have been useful at grabbing some of the river crossings on the way there. Somebody want to make a suggestion?

Mortain? What would they have done there? If they had grabbed the important hilltops before the Americans occupied them, that might have been useful. But how were they going to get there with the Allies so totally in control of the airspace? And how big a force could have been transported with the existing fleet at that time?

Cairo? Ah, well, this might get interesting. Would it have been possible for paratroops to occupy the Alamein defenses, or at least some key portion of them before 8th. Army fell back to do so? I doubt it. Once again, we come up on the number of available transports. There were probably enough in the Luftwaffe, but could they be deployed in time to perform the mission? I don't know, but I have my doubts.

[possibly to be continued]

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by stoat:

As for the German paratroopers; taking Malta would have been a smart decision. It would have given the Axis and air and sea base to fight British convoys, or make them take the long way round Africa, which would have added to the supply problem in Britain. Also it would give the Axis a point from which to protect their Africa-bound convoys, perhaps giving Rommel the supplies he needed to win.

The Axis didn't need Malta to be able to cut off the British sealane through the Med. They had enough bases already in Sardinia, Sicily, Panteleria, and Libya to accomplish that. Protecting their own convoys though would have been a boon.

Michael

[stoat]

There are now three conversations taking place at one time.

"Impact:The Army Air Forces' Confidential Picture History of World War Two" has multiple photos of lightly armored (halftracks, whirbelwinds) and many of shattered trucks and prime movers, but also a few of deystroyed tanks. Two of Panthers hit by rockets in Normandy and one of a JgdpzIV destroyed by, you guessed it, 50cal fire. What is interesting to note is that these are confirmed kills. The pilots attacked, reported, and later ground forces secured the wrecks and varified the kills. Will try to post some shots from here as well.

[stoat]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

The Axis didn't need Malta to be able to cut off the British sealane through the Med. They had enough bases already in Sardinia, Sicily, Panteleria, and Libya to accomplish that. Protecting their own convoys though would have been a boon.

Italian cooperation in the form of a decisive fleet engagement would have helped too. Especially when the Brits were hunting down Bismarck and the Med fleet had fewer ships.

If the Italian navy had fully engaged the RN early in the war, the war in the Mediterranean Basin very well could have ended differently.

[JasonC]

The Italian navy never had a prayer of hurting the Brits. It was a basket case. Romantics searching for wilder and wilder fantasies...

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by stoat:

Italian cooperation in the form of a decisive fleet engagement would have helped too. Especially when the Brits were hunting down Bismarck and the Med fleet had fewer ships.

I don't understand that statement. Do you mean to say that you think ships were taken away from the Med Fleet in order to chase the Bismark? That's not precisely the case. The force in Gibraltar was, but that was a seperate force from the Med Fleet. It could of course be employed within the Med, but was primarily intended for the protection if needed of convoys headed for the Cape and points east. It was not under the command of Cunningham, so far as I know.

If the Italian navy had fully engaged the RN early in the war, the war in the Mediterranean Basin very well could have ended differently.

Possibly, but it needs to be kept in mind that one of the reasons it didn't was that it was suffering a fuel shortage. They requested Hitler to release fuel oil from Ploesti to them, but he refused. Not surprising in light of his own shortages.

Michael

[JonS]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

Next, Leningrad? At the moment, I can't think of what paratroops would do at Leningrad, but they might have been useful at grabbing some of the river crossings on the way there. Somebody want to make a suggestion?

Close the land (ice?) bridge into the nearly-beseiged city?

[JonS]

Stoat, you seem to be missing a very important piece of information:

The Med was closed to British convoys for a very long time. Without Malta being Axis controlled (obviously).

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by JonS:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

Next, Leningrad? At the moment, I can't think of what paratroops would do at Leningrad, but they might have been useful at grabbing some of the river crossings on the way there. Somebody want to make a suggestion?

Close the land (ice?) bridge into the nearly-beseiged city? </font>

[Guest Mike]

Leningrad was surrounded - cut off already - where are you going to land those para's? In the middle of it??!! On Lake Lagoda?

I can see them doing REAL well on a plain of flat featureless ice - or would you have them dig in??!! lol

Jason I would like to follow your reasoning, but can you distill it into english please?

[stoat]

What I meant by fewer ships was that there were no ships that could be sent to reinforce the Med fleet. The Italians would have faced what the British already had in theater and would not have to worry about a sizable force of CAs, BBs, BC, and CVs being sent from the North Atlantic to stage with the already present ships at Gibraltar.

[JonS]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />If the Italian navy had fully engaged the RN early in the war, the war in the Mediterranean Basin very well could have ended differently.

Possibly, but it needs to be kept in mind that one of the reasons it didn't was that it was suffering a fuel shortage. They requested Hitler to release fuel oil from Ploesti to them, but he refused. Not surprising in light of his own shortages.</font>

[JonS]

Leningrad-on-ice: I didn't say it was a good idea ...

[stoat]

I'll get to Malta convoys a little later, but now I will talk about Operation Herkules. It was drawn up by Comando Supremo and involved the invasion of Malta and the island of Gozo as well. It would have utilised:

1506 combat planes(666 Luftwaffe)

Admiral Iachino's naval forces(presumably sizable and containing BBs)

Admiral Tur's 12th Naval Division(for the landing)

14 groups of submarines

Here's where it gets interesting:

Luftwaffe XI Fleigerkorps

a German paratroop division

the Italian Folgore parachute division

the Italian Spezia parachute division

Land Forces:

Italian XVI Corps-Assieta and Napoli Divs

Italian XXX Corps-Superga, Livorno,and Friuli Divs.

8 Axis Divisions against 30-35 thousand Allied troops on the two islands.

What is interesting is that even after the campaign on Crete, which was bloody to say the least, the Axis was willing to assault an island using airborne troops, in this case two thirds of them Italian.

[stoat]

Malta Convoys: a misunderstanding. There were a good number of convoys from Gibraltar and Alexandria that reached Malta. (some intact, some torn up) However, none went completly from Alexandria to Gibraltar. It was not completly closed to convoys, just to through convoys.

[Guest Mike]

Originally posted by JonS:

Would it have made much difference, really? Mata certainly caused some losses to the Axis convoys, but not nearly as much as is popularly imagined (and certainly not as much as Rommel fanbois like to claim). The critical limiting factor was port capacity in Africa, and most especially transport within Africa.

And yet when the Axis virtually ahnihilated Force K at Malta the resulting increase in supplies to Rommel enabled him to surprise the British at Gazala in 1942.

It was really Force K (surface ships) and submarines based at Malta that did the damage - Rommel's transport capabilities in Africa might have been limited, but that just meant that any shortfall in tonnage reaching Africa was that much more of a shortfall for the troops at the front.

For example 9 November 1941: Force K Sinks 7 italian transports and 1 destroyer. Force K also participated in the 1st and 2nd battles of Sirte, and in escorting inward bound convoys to Malta. 60% of supplies shipped to Africa by the Axis this month are lost to ships, submarines and aircraft.

In April 1942 Force K is pretty much wrecked - 4 destroyers and 3 submarines are bombed in harbour and sunk or permanently wrecked, and another 2 submarines lost on ops (including Upholder) - the Cruiser Penelope escapes to Malta - 10th Submarine Flotilla is ordered to leave Malta - Force K ceases to exist.

Ultra also enabled the allies to massively lever their forces in Malta by only using them to attack known targets rather than having to spend resources looking for them in the first place.

For example the Italians lost 1/3rd of their supplies shipped in October 1942, and 50% of their supplies shipped in December 1942 - you can't tell me that's not significant!!

And I dont' know why you think it's only Rommel appologists that think it was important!!

[stoat]

Total Italian merchant ships that at one point had been in service up to March 1943: 901 ships, 3,855,652 tons

Losses as of March 1943: 568 ships, 2,134,786 tons

Remaining: 333 ships, 1,720,866 tons

63% of ships and 55% of tonnage lost.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by JonS:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />If the Italian navy had fully engaged the RN early in the war, the war in the Mediterranean Basin very well could have ended differently.

Possibly, but it needs to be kept in mind that one of the reasons it didn't was that it was suffering a fuel shortage. They requested Hitler to release fuel oil from Ploesti to them, but he refused. Not surprising in light of his own shortages.</font>

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by stoat:

...Operation Herkules.

This was the plan for summer, 1942. What I had reference to was an operation a year or more earlier. It would have involved smaller forces on both sides. Do you have any OOB information for that one? If so, could you post it?

Michael