Macksey on Guderian - book review

[Private Bluebottle]

This recently landed in my email box from a list I subscribe to. I thought it might be of interest to readers here:

From: H-DIPLO [Labrosse]

Date: 9/6/03

Subject: Koch on Macksey, _Guderian: Panzer General_

H-NET BOOK REVIEW Published by H-German@h-net.msu.edu (August, 2003)

Kenneth Macksey. _Guderian: Panzer General_. Revised edition. London:

Greenhill Books, 2003. xii + 228 pp. Maps, illustrations, notes,

bibliography, index. $34.95 (cloth), ISBN 1-85367-538-5.

Reviewed for H-German by James V. Koch <jkoch@odu.edu>, Old Dominion

University

If Germany had defeated the U.S.S.R. militarily in 1941-42, it is

likely that the tightly knit Guderian clan would still today occupy

the estate at Deipenhof in the Warthegau in West Prussia (now part of

Poland) that was given to Generaloberst Heinz Guderian in October 1942

by Adolf Hitler. What should we make of this gift from the _Fuehrer_

to Guderian, the acknowledged genius behind German armored forces in

World War II? Was it simply one among many such secretive gifts that

Hitler lavished upon the paladins and favorites of the Reich on the

occasions of their anniversaries and birthdays, or when they recorded

an especially notable achievement? (Guderian had been awarded the rare

Oak Leaves to the Iron Cross in July 1941.) Alternatively, was it a

subtle bribe to muffle an occasionally insubordinate general who,

despite demonstrated affinity for National Socialism and Adolf Hitler,

might have been viewed by Hitler as potentially disruptive and

contentious? He was, after all, "always a rebel in his profession,"

according to Downing, and known for speaking his mind to nearly

everyone, even to his _Fuehrer_.[1] Does the gift further suggest that

Hitler regarded Guderian, who had been sacked for ordering a retreat

south of Moscow contrary to the _Fuehrer's_ orders in December 1941,

as, nonetheless, an ideological comrade?

These are among the interpretative dilemmas Kenneth Macksey, veteran

military historian, tackles in his revision of his original 1975

biography of Heinz Guderian. Guderian is justly celebrated as a

military leader of "brilliant gifts," who was bold, inventive,

charismatic and supremely determined.[2] His inspired, "lead from the

front" generalship hastened the fall of Poland in September 1939,

keyed the spectacular German armored dash across France to the English

Channel in May 1940, led Panzer Group Two to unprecedented victories

in the U.S.S.R. in Fall 1941, and delayed the collapse of Germany in

the face of the Soviet onslaught, 1943-45. He was, during these years,

one of the most effective generals in the world and certainly the

apotheosis of leadership in armored, mobile warfare. More so than any

other general, his leadership satisfied Saint-Exupery's memorable

criterion. "An armoured division should move against the enemy like

water. It should bear lightly against the enemy's wall of defense and

advance only at the point where it meets no resistance."[3] Yet, as

Earl Ziemke, a well-regarded historian of the battles on the Eastern

Front has concluded, on occasion Guderian's "judgment was less than

impeccable."[4] He sometimes tended toward recklessness, could be

insulting in approach, and played footsy with the Nazi inner circle.

General Walter Warlimont of the General Staff noted after the war that

Guderian "politically sought a closer association with the Party than

was customary among the officers" (p. 176) and shrank from becoming

involved in any resistance activities against Hitler. The salient

question, then, is how well does Macksey handle the ambiguity of such

situations in his revised edition?

Macksey's original biography of Guderian was solid, conventional work

that relied primarily upon Guderian's own writings, but also utilized

the post-war evaluations of Guderian by many individuals, including

Sir Basil Liddell Hart. Macksey, a onetime British tank officer who

saw action in Western Europe in 1944-45, is at his best when he

details Guderian's astonishing, driving development and use of

Germany's Panzer forces. He also dispenses at least passing coverage

to nearly all the major events and issues of Guderian's life. However,

unless an author simply wants to sell a few additional books, the

production of a revised edition of a well-accepted biography should

presume the author has acquired new material that either buttresses

previously weak assertions or changes some conclusions. Macksey says

three developments caused him to revise the biography. First, new

information mined from Ultra intelligence intercepts is now available

and has changed how we view leadership decisions in the war. Second,

Macksey feels the need to assess the impact of what he labels the

Liddell Hart "saga" (p. xi). Macksey alleges Liddell Hart brought ruin

to his own scholarly reputation by overzealous self-promotion of the

notion that he had a tremendous impact upon Guderian's thinking about

armored warfare. Third, Macksey has been able to talk with surviving

members of Guderian's family and associates of General Erich

Fellgiebel, who was in charge of the Wehrmacht's communications at the

time of the Hitler assassination attempt on 20 July 1944.[5] The

family had information that clarified Guderian's previously cloudy

role on that day. Thus, Macksey concluded another edition was merited.

Macksey's revised biography of Guderian continues to be solid work

because it adds context and critical analysis to Guderian's own

autobiography, _Panzer Leader_, which appeared in English in 1952.[6]

Although Macksey, on the whole, is rather gentle in his treatment of

Guderian, this biography is not hagiographic to the same degree as his

study of Albert Kesselring.[7] Nevertheless, several unresolved issues

and caveats are worthy of mention.

First, there is the matter of the gift from Hitler to Guderian.

Macksey opts not to delve into the possible elements of corruption and

avarice that surrounded the huge gift of money that Guderian received

from Hitler in 1942 to enable him to purchase the Deipenhof estate.[8]

Not all of the military elite received such gifts; Rommel, for

example, neither received nor accepted anything, despite his status as

one of the _Prominenten_. With gift commitment in hand, Guderian

toured the Warthegau area with the Gauleiter's staff and found the

estate he wanted, at which time the Polish owners were evicted.

Probably out of embarrassment, Guderian says very little about the

gift in _Panzer Leader_. Nor does Guderian mention that originally he

had selected a much larger estate, but this request was denied as

excessive and a bad precedent, given that individuals more prominent

than Guderian also were to receive estates. Similarly, Guderian does

not mention specifically that in September 1939 his family had

repossessed the family's ancestral estate at Gross-Klonia in the

Warthegau. Nor does he disclose that he successfully petitioned to

avoid paying the usual German tax on the Deipenhof gift, or that he

was one of more than one hundred notables in the Reich receiving

sizeable _Sonderzahlungen_ (special payments) each month from the

_Fuehrer_. In Guderian's case, he received 2,000 _Reichsmark_ per

month in addition to his regular salary. Macksey skates over or

chooses not to write about nearly all of these uncomfortable details

even though Gerd Uebershaer and Winfried Vogel's valuable study of

Hitler's largely confidential gifts (including Guderian's) was

published in 1999.

Second, Macksey tends to underplay Guderian's impulsive, sometimes

reckless nature, which on several occasions almost resulted in his

being captured by the enemy. John Erickson, for example, notes that

Guderian narrowly avoided capture by the Soviets on the third day of

Barbarossa.[9] Guderian was wont to make quick, instinctive decisions

on limited data. To his credit, he usually was correct, and Macksey

underscores these instances. However, these lightning choices

sometimes blew up in his face and when they did, Guderian could not

resist attempts to place the blame on others. On occasion, he would

gild the factual lily in order to convince his superiors of the

necessity of his precipitate course of action. Multiple superior

officers repetitively heard from Guderian that it was already too late

to reverse an action that Guderian had taken. This occasional

recklessness extended to the political realm, where Guderian

carelessly became enmeshed in _Freikorps_ machinations in Latvia in

1919, nearly ending his promising career. Macksey notes that this

activity put him "under a distinct cloud" (p. 33), but does not

connect this cloud to a more general pattern of behavior. Indeed, he

argues the opposite, that this episode drove Guderian away from

politics. This is a judgment difficult to support. Guderian continued

to dabble in politics, but became more astute in how he did so.

Third, Macksey does not give sufficient weight to Guderian's long-term

sympathies for Adolf Hitler as a person and the National Socialists as

a movement. Guderian's endorsement of the cause of the _Freikorps_ in

1919 was followed by his occasional attendance at Nazi Party meetings

after Hitler took power; numerous personal meetings and dinners with

Hitler; and, his insertion of flattering prose about Hitler in his

_Achtung! Panzer_ in 1937.[10] He ignored or repressed the reality of

the _Kristallnacht_, the development of the concentration camp system

and the Holocaust, as well as the sordid behavior of some elements of

the _Wehrmacht_ in the East, beginning in Poland. He showed little

interest in protecting Polish and Soviet prisoners of war and

citizens, or protesting their treatment; and was inattentive to the

depredations of the _Einsatzgruppen_ on the Eastern Front. Guderian

consistently refused to do more than listen to the anti-Hitler

resistance, which fit with his servile radio broadcast and issuance of

written orders after becoming Chief of Staff of the OKH in July 1944,

in which he demanded a National Socialist officer corps and told

General Staff officers they should "exhibit the thoughts of the

_Fuehrer_" (p. 190); his "half hearted" encouragement of attempts to

begin peace negotiations; and, his early 1950s leadership of a group

of former German military leaders and Nazis who sought to rearm and

reunify Germany.[11] Taken together, these actions paint a less

flattering picture. However, Macksey views this portrait rather

benignly, or ignores its flaws, despite many new developments such as

the _Historikerstreit_, and works such as Heer and Naumann's seminal

exploration of _Wehrmacht_ atrocities on the Eastern Front, published

as early as 1995. Macksey does touch at least indirectly on most of

these topics. Nevertheless, he seems reluctant to follow their trail

inductively to reach a general summary conclusion. The judgment of

others has been more piercing. R. T. Paget's searing comment about the

German officer corps that, "like the Pharisees, they passed upon the

other side of the road," applies, with certainty, to Guderian's

behavior.[12] Yet, except when he observes that _Schneller Heinz_ had

"fissures" in his character (p. 217), Macksey finds circumstantial

reasons to grant Guderian a moral pass. One can agree with Macksey

that many others, including some Allied leaders, failed similar

character tests, without absolving Guderian.

Fourth, Macksey does not exhibit any skepticism over Guderian's

assertion that he advocated a Mediterranean Strategy after the fall of

France (p. 136). A viable strategic option for Germany in the summer

of 1940 was to move south and drive Britain out of the Mediterranean

region (and perhaps away from the Middle East oilfields as well) by

capturing Gibraltar, Malta, most of the North African coastline and

Suez. Arguably, such a strategy might have driven Britain from the war

or resulted in the fall of the Churchill government, in which case a

government conducive to peace negotiations might have resulted. In

summer 1940, it seems unlikely that the United States would have

intervened in such a struggle. Further, this strategy would have

deferred a conflict with the Soviet Union and enabled Germany to fight

a one front war, if this likely battle of autocracies were to occur.

Regardless, it was, at the very least, a course of action that would

have changed the war dramatically. Even so, when Guderian mentions his

advocacy of this approach, Macksey does not pursue the notion. Perhaps

he agrees implicitly with Downing, who noted, "whether Guderian really

did see things so clearly in 1940 is, of course, open to doubt."[13]

Fifth, Macksey does not really ask whether the renewed German drive on

Moscow in October 1941 was wise, or if it actually would have ended

the war, if successful. Instead, he stresses Guderian's insistence

that Moscow be the primary strategic objective and the Generaloberst's

disappointment that his armored group was diverted south to the

massive encirclement battle around Kiev in August and September 1941.

However, there is room to question Guderian's narrative here.[14]

Guderian's receipt of the coveted Oak Leaves to the Iron Cross on July

17, 1941 and the subsequent placement of more divisions under his

command may have assuaged his objections to Hitler's plan. This was

the view of Halder and others, who believed Guderian sold out. In any

case, once the Kiev encirclement was completed (and it may have netted

an astonishing 660,000 Soviet prisoners), the question devolved to one

of whether or not it was still productive for Germany to resume its

drive on Moscow. Militating against such a move was the rapidly

approaching Russian winter, and the need to refit and replace worn and

destroyed tanks and equipment. By September 15, 1941, more than one

half of the tanks available to Army Group Center in June 1941 were

either destroyed or out of commission. Only 25 percent of the tanks in

Guderian's renamed Second Panzer Army were available for battle after

Kiev. Shortages of materiel were rampant. Exacerbating factors

included the inability of the _Wehrmacht_ to replace the almost

500,000 casualties it had suffered thus far and the reality that

Guderian was twice as far from Moscow as he had been at the end of

July 1941. Finally, the respite before Moscow had provided the Soviet

Army with the opportunity to prepare its Moscow defenses and to begin

moving more than twenty-five quality divisions from the Far East. The

Germans still enjoyed an approximate eight to five manpower advantage

in terms of front line troops in the area of Army Group Center, but

time was of the essence.[15] The better part of valor might have been

to defer the Moscow drive until spring 1942 and instead occupy the

remainder of Ukraine and seize the oil-rich Caucasus.

Nonetheless, Guderian continued to be a strong advocate of renewing

the Moscow thrust, which resulted in what has been termed the

"sharpest setback the German Army had suffered since 1918 and a defeat

of such magnitude that it crippled Germany's chances for victory over

the Soviet Union."[16] It does appear that Guderian was persuasive in

convincing Hitler to undertake this risky venture, which hardly would

have constituted such a gamble forty-five days earlier.[17] Indeed,

already on August 4, 1941, Guderian had met with the _Fuehrer_ and

told him he believed the Soviet Army was scraping the bottom of its

manpower barrel, a judgment far off the mark. Macksey, however, does

not choose to investigate Guderian's culpability for this critical

decision and notes only that the renewed drive on Moscow had

"theoretical feasibility" (p. 153), though it constituted a very

difficult assignment. Fugate, however, lambastes Guderian, asserting

that he was an "influence monger," who "uncorked this bottle of heady

wine and served it to his superiors," but then pointed the finger of

blame at others when the operation predictably failed.[18] Robert

Kershaw is on target when he describes the final assault on Moscow as

"more a gamble than a considered operational plan."[19].

Sixth, Macksey uses the revised edition as a means to land body blows

to the scholarly reputation of Sir Basil Liddell Hart. He strongly

endorses John Mearsheimer's highly critical evaluation of the

importance of Liddell Hart's contribution to armored, mobile

war-making and highlights Mearsheimer's finding that Liddell Hart

supplied Guderian with a passage to insert in the English language

version of _Panzer Leader_; the passage flatters Liddell Hart and

proclaims Guderian's intellectual debt to him.[20] Doubtless, the

self-promoting Liddell Hart was overly insistent that he be described

as a seminal military thinker. Further, in later years, he obfuscated

or ignored many of his 1930s predictions that were rendered foolish by

events. Yet, at the end of the day, it also is true that Liddell Hart

influenced Guderian substantially and on many other occasions Guderian

acknowledged this. For example, in March 1943, when Guderian assumed

the role of Inspector General of Armored Troops, he met with a large

group of senior officers and read to them from an article authored by

Liddell Hart. Azar Gat provides a useful counterpoint to the tendency

of Macksey and others to degrade Liddell Hart.[21] True, Liddell

Hart's assertions of his influence on Guderian and the course of World

War II in general are substantially overdone. Even so, the great body

of Liddell Hart's work remains perceptive and valuable.

Macksey leaves us, then, with a somewhat sanitized version of Heinz

Guderian. Are the omissions and distortions in this version fatal?

Hardly. This is not a wine that has become sour. Nevertheless, these

oversights constitute items that should be addressed when and if

Macksey entertains yet another edition of this useful book.

Interestingly, the _Bundeswehr_ was forced to confront many of the

same ambiguities in Guderian's military career when it considered

naming an army barracks after him in the mid-1960s. Subsequent media

attention and public discussion focused considerable attention on

unresolved and embarrassing aspects of Guderian's career, and the

_Bundeswehr_ ultimately abandoned the naming notion despite his

amazing military achievements. The episode did underline, however, the

extent to which Generaloberst Heinz Guderian was a complex, nuanced

individual who is not so easily described.

Notes:

[1]. David Downing, _The Devil's Virtuosos: German Generals at War,

1940-1945_ (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), p. 17.

[2]. F. W. von Mellenthin, _Panzer Battles_, trans. H. Betzler, ed. L.

C. F. Turner (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), p. 258.

[3]. Antoine de Saint Exupery, _Flight to Arras_, trans. Lewis

Galantiere (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1942), pp. 64-65.

[4]. Earl F. Ziemke, _Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the

East_ (New York: Military Heritage Press, 1968), p. 446.

[5]. Much new information Macksey regarded as definitive was generated

by Karl Heinz von Wildhagen, _Erich Fellgiebel_ (Wennigsen/Hanover:

Selbstverlegen, 1970).

[6]. Heinz Guderian, _Panzer Leader_ (New York: Dutton, 1952).

[7]. Kenneth Macksey, _Kesselring: German Master Strategist of the

Second World War_ (London: Greenhill Press, 1996).

[8]. Gerd R. Ueberschaer and Winfried Vogel, _Dienen und Verdienen:

Hitler's Geschenke und Seine Eliten_ (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer Verlag,

1999). Note that Guderian's Deipenhof was 2,500_ Morgen_ in size.

Since a _Morgen_ usually was less than one American acre, it seems

likely that Deipenhof was less than 2,500 acres, however, the variable

definition of a _Morgen_ makes it difficult to know.

[9]. John Erickson, _The Road to Stalingrad_ (New York: Harper and

Row, 1975).

[10]. Heinz Guderian, _Achtung! Panzer: The Development of Armoured

Forces, Their Tactics and Operational Potential_, trans. Chrisopher

Duffy (London: Arms and Armour, 1995).

[11]. John Wheeler Bennett, _The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in

Politics, 1918-1945_ (New York and London: Penguin, 1967), p. 203.

[12]. R. T. Paget, _Manstein: His Campaigns and His Trial_ (London:

Collins, 1957), p. 2.

[13]. Downing, p. 54. The "doability" of the Mediterranean option is

subject to question in light of the attitudes displayed by Franco and

Mussolini.

[14]. Bryan I. Fugate, _Operation Barbarossa: Strategy and Tactics on

the Eastern Front, 1941_ (Novato: Presidio Press, 1984).

[15]. These and other valuable data may be found in Freiburg

Militaergeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes. _Der Angriff auf die

Sowjetunion_ (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer Verlag, 1983, 1991), pp. 657-58.

[16]. Fugate, pp. 277-78.

[17]. R. H. S. Stolfi, _Hitler's Panzers East: World War II

Reinterpreted_ (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). Stolfi

asserts that the probability of Germany defeating the Soviet Union

already in fall 1941 was well above 90 percent if it had continued

toward Moscow and not been sidetracked south. There are, of course,

other views on this.

[18]. Fugate, pp. 311, 289.

[19]. Robert J. Kershaw, _War without Garlands: Operation Barbarossa,

1941/42_ (New York: Sarpedon, 2000). Kershaw points out OKW's

"inability to recognize the extent to which German fighting power has

actually eroded by September" (p. 241).

[20]. John J. Mearsheimer, _Liddell Hart and the Weight of History_

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); and Guderian, _Panzer

Leader_, p. 20.

[21]. Azar Gat, _British Armour Theory and the Rise of the Panzer Arm:

Revising the Revisionists_ (New York and Hampshire: Palgrave

MacMillan, 2000).

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[Michael Dorosh]

Did Ladislas Farago go into detail about which political parties Patton voted for, or how he felt about Japanese-American incarcerations in his own home state of California?

Are a general's personal political views really relevant to a biography detailing his military career?

I would suspect so, but is this reviewer really suggesting that Macksey or anyone else could possibly arrive at a conclusion about what Guderian really felt about the Holocaust or what he really knew about the einsatzgruppen? If Guderian didn't suppress any such knowledge after the war (both in his writing and in his own mind) I would be surprised.

Perhaps a biographer is really best to mention but "skate over" such subjects - as this reviewer accuses Macksey of doing - especially when presented with a dearth of solid evidence?

[ September 12, 2003, 09:41 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[JasonC]

That strikes me as a crazy objection. Of course Guderian's politics were relevant. Guderian climbed based on party connections, and used political pull from the top to get his new ideas heard and implemented. He was after all fighting a hierarchy of senior superiors who were quite skeptical of his views and of his rashness. He bypassed that hierarchy to plug directly into the power source, Hitler. It was characteristic of the way the Nazis operated that they overrode formal bureaucracy in favor of ideological "commitment". Guderian saw this and traded on it.

The military upside of that is that innovative officers (by no means junior, but not at the very top initially) got their innovations implemented when everything was going well. But it had military and human downsides as well. On the military side, the leadership style was entirely "empirical" and even the most promising were sacked for any failure. In addition, the professional competence of the staff and hierarchy were systematically wrecked, which proved disastrous when the string of cheap victories against doctrinally unprepared opponents ended.

And obviously it also had a human downside. Guderian was no disinterested technocrat. He was ideologically aligned with the Nazis and supported them unreservedly. You may view that as his payment in a bargain that got him the power to implement his views, but the evidence is that much of it was simple conviction. Anything was justified if it seemed to increase German power. The rule-ignoring recklessness in that attitude is at the core of the man's personality. Anyone who has read him can see his military intellect, but also his scheming and his self-excusing mendacity.

[ September 12, 2003, 12:46 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Edward McEneely]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Are a general's personal political views really relevant to a biography detailing his military career?...

Perhaps a biographer is really best to mention but "skate over" such subjects - as this reviewer accuses Macksey of doing - especially when presented with a dearth of solid evidence?

I would suggest that a biography that fails to cover the personal beliefs of its subject in-depth, and merely limits itself to commenting on his military career is really a military history, and not a biography.

Also, and this is my personal opinion only, any biography of a WWII-era German that I would care to read ought to first detail "what they knew, and when they knew it", and also their connections to the Nazi party. But I understand that a lot of history buffs don't feel the same way, and I shan't disparage them for that.

[Michael Dorosh]

I too would love to know who knew what, when.

We've seen the difficult cases like Speer and Reifenstahl (not military commanders, I realize, but the examples that spring to mind). Goering, too seemed to convince himself he had plausible denial.

Certain political matters such as JasonC points out (ie how beholden an officer may have been to civvie politicians) are one thing, but that whole "it never happened" thing is quite another.

Unless you're writing about Ernst Remer, of course.