Jump to content
Battlefront is now Slitherine ×

Siberian Reinforcements


EB.

Recommended Posts

By "Siberian reinforcements" we generally are referring to the many division brought from the Soviet Far East to the Moscow area in late 1941. These units engaged in a stunningly powerful counteroffensive against exhausted, frozen, undersupplied German units in Dec. 1941. In the game, my understanding is that these units appear when a German unit gets within a certain range of Moscow--please correct me if I am wrong on this.

What I want to discuss is the underlying premise of this reinforcement. What seems to be the fashionable theory in the West is that Stalin brought these units to Moscow area (leaving only weak units to defend the Soviet Far East) because he knew through espionage that the Japanese were "going South instead of North"--that is, the Japanese were going to strike the Allies / US rather than the Soviets. The understanding here, I think, is that if the Japanese had somehow chosen to attack the Soviet Far East instead of the US and Allies, then the Soviets would not have been able to produce the "Siberian reinforcements". Basically, I think that this is wrong.

If you consider the situation logically, it seems clear that if Moscow were threatened, Stalin would bring in the Siberian reinforcements REGARDLESS of what was occurring in the Far East. That is, whether the Japanese are at full peace or full hostility, the defense of Moscow will of course come absolutely first. No doubt about that. Even if the Soviet Far East were to collapse completely to the Japanese, that would have been the end of it--the Japanese would not have had the logistical capability to mount land operations deep into Siberia--no way at all. They could have at best seized the areas immediately around Manchuria, including Vladivostok. The Soviets could have easily ignored this, setting it aside in the accounts for future re-conquest. But the idea that Stalin would have kept those units in the East even at the cost of losing Moscow seems silly.

So, to sum up: Siberian reinforcements should NOT depend upon the situation in the Far East. I would say that the Soviet player should be allowed to choose if and when to bring in these units. And when the choice is made, there should maybe be some level of victory point penalty to the Soviet player. That would better reflect the reality in my opinion.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

By "Siberian reinforcements" we generally are referring to the many division brought from the Soviet Far East to the Moscow area in late 1941. These units engaged in a stunningly powerful counteroffensive against exhausted, frozen, undersupplied German units in Dec. 1941. In the game, my understanding is that these units appear when a German unit gets within a certain range of Moscow--please correct me if I am wrong on this.
Actually you're full assessment is not far off from the idea of how the Siberian Transfer is triggered in Strategic Command. Yes Moscow the Urals, Stalingrad and other cities are key to triggering the transfer, but it also depends on relative strengths, troop positions and so on, basically it is triggered when the in game assessment mechanisms decide that the USSR is threatened and the transfer must be made. I do call this option 'War in Siberia' but it could just as easily be looked upon as 'Allow the transfer of Siberian Troops' as well since I don't think it would have been too far off to assume this transfer would have happened regardless of the situation with Japan.

Debatable yes, but just in case let's keep it civil everyone ;)

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Thank you for your very informative response. I see now very clearly that you have a workable method in place which allows the computer to decide the Siberian reinforcements. I am fully satisfied on this point now.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Interesting -- good point about Japanese logistics. I've always thought most of what Japan wanted from the Soviet Pacific region, primarily oil, was fairly close to the Home Islands; no doubt their were greater treasures in the hinterland.

But, as we are all agreed that Moscow and a link to the Caucasus are the greatest priorities, does that mean "War in Manchuria" will automatically be set to off? If not it's only a handicap for the Axis.

After the two Outter Mongolia battles Japan seems to have been genuinely afraid of open warfare against the Soviets. An odd stance for the samuarii mentality to take. Yet it's undeniable that Soviet Troops had little trouble brushing the Japanese aside in both "the undeclared war" and a few years later, during the invasions of Manchuria and Korea.

The Russians regarded Japanese infantrymen highly but had little respect for their officers, especially the most junior. Aside from being led by Zhukov, the Russian Siberian troops also had a big edge in heavy equipment, artillery and air support over the Japanese.

My impression is, by the late thirties Japanese officers in Manchuria were too accustomed to fighting poorly equiped Chinese. The run-ins with the Soviets served as an awakening; their armies achilles tendon was it's lack of effective tanks and heavy field artillery, but strong items with the Soviets. Also, the Japanese Air Force, despite it's elite zero pilots, doesn't appear to have been prepared to face hard opposition nor to either provide ground support or attack enemy ground support.

But apparently nothing was done to correct those weaknesses; probably, Japan's industrial base being what it was, nothing could have been done -- till the war was won against the West and it was expanded.

I'm hoping there will be a Pacific version of this game. For one thing I'd like to see how these two armies are treated in there original positions and what the options are for Russia moving the bulk of her Siberian units west in 1941. I'd like to see if there really was a serious option for attacking Russia instead of the United States.

[ October 25, 2002, 02:11 PM: Message edited by: JerseyJohn ]

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Jersey John: thanks for the response. You are very correct that the Japanese were very afraid of having to fight the Soviets on the Manchurian border. In fighting there in 1938-39, the Japanese forces were heavily crushed by the Soviet units. They were so bloodied that within the Japanese military there was a firm determination to avoid fighting the Soviets at all costs. This was the dramatic shift from the "Strike North" to the "Strike South" school of thought. I read a great biography of Yamamoto which explained this perfectly. Anyway, from that point on, the US and Allies looked like far easier targets for japanese forces than the USSR. Also, have you ever played Operational Art of War? I played a scenario by some very smart guy in that game which depicted a japanese attack on Soviet borders in summer of 1941--the actual units that would have been involved and so forth. Basically, from playing the scenario, you can see very clearly that it would have been overwhelmingly difficult for the poor Japanese to advance very far into Soviet territory. I was only playing against the computer, but I played first one side and then the other just to be sure. Anyway, good comments overall.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Thanks for the good word, pleased we agree on so many of these points.

Your assessment of Japanese logistical inadequacies being unable to support a major land campaign, such as the invasion of Asiatic Russia is probably correct. Also, her generals don't seem to have had any real strategical plan outside of China. Even there, they didn't seem to know if they wanted the whole country or only the most productive eastern provinces.

The admirals appear to have been the strategists.

***

I've had a copy of Operational Art of War for years but have never gotten into it. I read the manuals and the scenario notes, the game looks extremely interesting, but I've never played it. Part of the reason is I'm wary of getting into older programs as it takes a while to learn them and so many are being replaced overnight by newer versions, but I think I'll finally give Operational Art a try pretty soon.

***

You had an earlier site called "World War One or --" regarding possible scenarios -- it's buried a few pages of forums back by now, but I added a project I think might interest you -- it's a subject I've been interested in for a long time, a hypothetical situation based on the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

The idea of the scenario is World War One ending differently; a compromise in the West (Germany withdraws from Belgium and Northern France) and the establishment of the Eukrainian puppet state in the East. Germany keeps Poland and the Austrian and Ottoman Empires met their historical fate.

The situation in Sept 1939 is an alliance of Russia-France and England against Germany, as in 1914, except this time Germany is much more powerful. Also as in 1914 the three allied states are fighting her from the start.

The Allies have the initiative. The Soviets are beginning an invasion from the Smolensk region to divide Eukrania down the middle via Kiev.

In the West England and France are still mobilizing while Germany has completed her mobilization buy hasn't committed her main forces yet.

There are numerous specifics in the entry on your site. I think it's a very interesting situation and one that came very close to happening -- in 1918 the British and French tried to get Germany to accept that very offer, but the Kaiser's government thought they would win it all with the Hindenburg-Ludendorff offensive -- which is another 1939 scenario.

Would be very interested in your opinion -- if you think the idea is drek that's fine; alternate history isn't for everyone and I find myself not overly obsessed by the subject.

***

Don't believe I've read the bio on Yammatto. Read one in the seventies -- is this book that old? But I'm interested in anything on the events leading up to the Pacific War. There's a good, though rather dry book by H.P. Willmott, "Empires in the Balance, Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942" that is filled with useful information but at times the writing becomes absolutely lifeless.

It baffles me that, having decided not to attack Russia, Japan, in her southern strategy, didn't just take the Dutch East Indies without attacking either Britain or the U. S..

Sure, Britain would have gone to war with her, but the gesture would have been meaningless as the UK was very weak in Asia.

Roosevelt would not have been able to get America to declare war, and if he did it would have been known as "Roosevelt's War" and lacked all popular support.

Simply taking the Dutch colonies would have made the U.S. embargo next to meaningless. With Indonesian resources, principally rubber and especially oil for her ships, a one sided war with Britain by herself would have been entirely to Japan's advantage; for all intents and purposes the europeans would have been ousted from the "Far East."

India would have taken her own independance and in all probability the newly independant states would have alligned with Japan. With a little patience her empire could have been peacefully consolodated and the only rival would have been America.

Only a direct attack on an American possession would have gotten the U. S. stirred up enough to fight. All this is another situation I'd like to explore, but it's unlikely any Pacific game would have a starting point other than Pearl Harbor and the historical opening campaigns.

Then, having attacked Pearl Harbor, it baffles me that they didn't follow it up with a landing in force to actually seize the place. The Phillopines would have sat by unable to affect the situation and, without it's Central Pacific Naval Base, America would have been stuck building up on the West Coast for a least a year -- that, and possibly a few distant operations with the Australians and New Zealanders, none of which would have come to much without the additional operations coming out of the Hawaiian Islands.

That's the thing with the Japanese, for all their ruthless tendancies they tended to avoid decisive planning. True, the U. S. would eventually have launched a campaign to retake Hawaii, but it would have been difficult and bloody but by then the Phillipines would have fallen and Japan would have had a secure flow of raw materials from her conquests to her Home Island factories. It would have been an entirely different situation.

The only way I see a Japanese attack on the USSR was if it had been planned in conjunction with the German invasion. That would have been impossible since Hitler chose not to let the Japanese in on his Barbarossa plans and Japan also chose not to inform Germany of their South Plan. What an alliance!

Looking forward to your views on these things.

[ October 27, 2002, 03:19 AM: Message edited by: JerseyJohn ]

Link to comment
Share on other sites

×
×
  • Create New...