Range of Panzerfaust

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

Veterans were used as cadres, not as sturmbattalions, in the late war.

I did count 5 PF per platoon, and said so. Not per squad.

Find me any WW II study on tanks KOed by fausts that shows 60 fausts being fired at each one simultaneously and I'll eat a wool ski cap.

Stop making tendentious arguments and answer the bleeding question - what change are you advocating?

Do you think you'd have a prayer with Allied armor against my German infantry after the change?

Would you be willing to have your recommendation depend on being able to beat my German infantry with your Allied armor, and your rules for German infantry AT effectiveness?

In finance, there is something called "making a market". You know that someone is giving you his honest assessment of the just price of something, if he will take either side of the trade. In this case, a benefit to the German infantry's AT ability is proposed. Will you take either side of the changed situation you propose?

[PeterNZer]

Next to Germanboy's attempt at a joke

Well i thought it was funny..

I conclude that the probably accuracy of the average fired faust was somewhere in the range of 8% to 33%. Or 20% plus or minus 10%

Wow. Now that is insightfull. So somewhere between 1 out of 10 PFs hit and 4 out of 10 PFs hit. I see the numbers you've been working over really have provided you with some high level of accuracy. Oddly enough, I'd be -more- than happy with a 40% accuracy if the PF was -used-. Heck, one platoon would almost be guaranteed to knock out a tank (which they're not now). So thanks for 'prooving' that PFs should be more accurate.

Your propositions:

Your QM, rejects, leftovers in depots in March '45, etc suffices to drop the 7.7m rounds constructed to 4.4m

good stuff. Some factual info there, nice.

Followed up by a drop to 4m due to training etc. Fine by me.

Partisan ambushes between German and the German border were rather rare, but I will be absurdly generous and assume they got 10% of the things

Facts would be nice here.. but ok.

Spoilage I will left be a factor of 2 since one fellow seemed to think a lot of that one, even though the 5/plt in CM only have to last them 1 week, leaving 1.8m

That's a guess, isn't it?

Then I will allow another whopping factor of 2 for battle damage to a simply tube, leaving 900,000. Then I will let 9 out of 10 faust be fired at non-AFVs, leaving 90,000. fired at AFVs

all guesses

Then I will take the highest figure ever offered for tanks KO'ed by the things and round it upward, and that is 30,000, which is only 1/3rd your required number, meaning an average final accuracy of 33%

So in the end we have a result which could vary wildly depending on the previous numbers. And yet it still makes no sense. All it does it show, somewhat vaguely, the number of PFs fired that hit and destroyed stuff. Gives no indication of accuracy at various ranges or conditions. You could apply this magic 33% across the board to all PF usage, but clearly that wouldn't work. In the end you'd have to start guessing some more to add in factors for range and conditions and experience of the forces.

The end result is no better than guesswork.

Alternately, someone could do some real historical research an attempt to come up with some better thoughts.

Throwing numbers at the problem doesn't provide any more clarity since the logic chaing is quite long and much of it guesswork.

Why do you persist with this silly line of argument? Essentially your point is "don't change the PF" and you'll use whatever numbers you want to show it.

I could of course do exactly the same and provide 'conclusive' proof that PFs hit their armored targets 80% of the time. I would then look just as silly, however.

You logic is something that I don't think can accurately be used to give any reasonably indication of tactical PF accuracy. Lets get Rexford in here with some real numbers and real history please.

PeterNZ

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- Official owner of the sig files of Dalem, Croda and JeffShandorf -

Der Kessel scenario design group

Combat Vision movies

[This message has been edited by PeterNZer (edited 03-21-2001).]

[Philistine]

Sorry for the long post, but:

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

No, I am not assuming that every faust made was used.

Actually, as seen below, you are.

No I am not assuming that every faust used was fired at an AFV. Put your own numbers on the likelihood for a faust to pause either hurdle. Personally, I'd put the first factor around 1/2 and the second factor between 1/5 and 1/10. Choose your own.

Actually, the 1/2 number of PF's not fired seems very low to me. I'd probably at least double it, but will accept your number.

{snipped #'s}

Then I will allow another whopping factor of 2 for battle damage to a simply tube, leaving 900,000. Then I will let 9 out of 10 faust be fired at non-AFVs, leaving 90,000. fired at AFVs. Then I will take the highest figure ever offered for tanks KO'ed by the things and round it upward, and that is 30,000, which is only 1/3rd your required number, meaning an average final accuracy of 33%. Maximum.

Here, you forgot to take out the # of PF's not fired. Your factor of 2 brings the accuracy up to 66% as a maximum. Isn't this consistent with what Paul was saying a a theoretical maximum by elite troops (keeping in mind that the vast majority of late-war troops armed with PF's would be regular at best and most-likely green as an average?

Also, note that your analysis leaves out at least two other significant factsors: (1) hits that do not destroy a tank & (2) multi-hits (more than 1 PF fired at the same target either of which would kill it). Assign this a combined 1/2 further reduction.

You now have a 122% chance of a kill.

In fact, in the above chain, it is entirely possible the number of dead AFVs is overestimated by a factor of 2 (e.g., the Germans only claim 16000), and likewise entirely possible that the portion fired at AFVs is underestimated by a similar factor (which still leaves, not an assumption that all fausts were fired at AFVs, but that *1 out of 5* was). And if those are regarded as more believable, then you will get not 100%, nor 33%, but 8% hits when one was fired.

The reductions seem reasonable (though I would question the 1/5 fired at non-AFV's and put it between 1/5 and 1/10]. Applying the 1/4 further reduction from PF's not fired and non-kills/multi's brings it back to 33% (again, not out of line with Paul's suggestion)--for a range of 33% to 122% (obviously too high).

My point is, your analysis is too succeptible to argument over #'s and factors to give a legitimate picture of the effectiveness of fired PF's. Using #'s you concede as reasonable (although on the high side) would appear to give nonesensical results with a huge range of "possible" effective percents.

Let us look at Paul's proposed accuracy percentages and others' proposed "short run" models and see which of these two effects they would have {snip}

These are comparable to the accuracies screcks currently get at those ranges.

Is this necessarily inaccurate? Going to the excellent link provided by

alla_keefek http://www.geocities.com/Augusta/8172/panzerfaust4.htm#destr , the author provides some actual numbers (which could probably be used by you much more effectively in showing limited PF effectiveness):

On the East Front in January-March of 1944, 262 AFV kills were reported (out of 8130 AFV kills whose cause was known--12,500 total) as being caused by PF 30 & 60. In the same time period, there were 656,300 PF's deployed with troops. (4 per 10,000 deployed)

Using the same time-period and sources, there were 88 AFV kills by Panzershrecks with 278,100 deployed. (3.16 per 10,000 deployed)

As you can see, the effectiveness of PF's is about 25% greater than that of Panzershrecks based strictly on number killed versus number deployed. (BTW, the author gives an interesting explanation of why the absolute rate of kills was so low for PF's, being mainly their use against non-AFV targes, and the newness of the weapon).

Thus it doesn't necessarily seem out of line for PF's to be approximately equal to Panzershrecks at the appropriate ranges.

BUT, I think you hit the nail on the head when you say:

What both of you are assuming rather than arguing, is that CM faust effectiveness is too low, so that some upward adjustment in that effectiveness is in order.

This is the issue. I don't know what the answer is. Most people's concerns with the PF seems to be that they do not fire enough at what should be within effective range. This may or may not be true. My main point is that your painstaking numerical analysis has nothing to do with this question.

Further, I feel pretty safe in saying that the way most people use their armored assets (including me) and especially the structure of battles in CM (approxmiately equal forces without any real prepatory bombardment, etc.)will expose the Allied tanks to much greater fire by PF's than was historically true.

Anyway, that's just my $.02 (which should be multiplied by a factor of 2 for length, but reduced by a factor of 6 for clarity...)

--Philistine

EDIT: I suppose it would be asking to much to think I could format this right the first time....

[This message has been edited by Philistine (edited 03-21-2001).]

[PeterNZer]

Nice post Philistine. Pretty clearly demonstrated what I am sure many people think, and that is the numbers don't add anything much to the debate.

If you go to that provided link and then the PzSh link you'll see more info on the PF and PS indicating at 30m the PF 30 was 100% effective under ideal conditions. Fun

Anyway, if I have a beef with PF use, it is that for me they only seem to be used when a squad comes from being totally unobserved to attack. ie. a Tank might be coming close, has no idea of the squad, squad appears and fires. Even then you'll be lucky if both PFs (assuming there is two) is used.

If a squad is already spotted by inf or the tank PF use, I find, is -extremely- rare. Even targetting the tank won't cause the PF to be used. With a squad of 9 or 10 guys you think one would be able to be passed a PF and pop up to snap off a shot.

I'm not arguing troops that are being shelled and are heavily engaged should fire off all their PFs, rather that if a squad is under fire from say one other squad and a tank comes into range that the be very inclined to fire. At the moment this doesn't seem to be the case..

Again, these are just my impressions. I currently haven't read enough German memoires to get a feel for PF use in the field (let alone accuracy).

And JC, if these changes were made I would still remain happy to play as either side. As it is I try not to get to close to German soldiers, others are less cautious and should be punished more in my view

PeterNZ

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- Official owner of the sig files of Dalem, Croda and JeffShandorf -

Der Kessel scenario design group

Combat Vision movies

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

Partisan ambushes between German and the German border were rather rare, but I will be absurdly generous and assume they got 10% of the things, leaving 3.6m.

Sorry Jason, but the link Philistine provides quite clearly suggests that production of the PF-30 started in 1943. I know for certain (my grandfather almost got killed in one) that partisan ambushes in Russia (where the Germans were only thrown out in Summer 1944) were not rare. Also, huge amounts of stocks of all kinds were lost in the destruction of Army Groups Centre, and South Ukraine during the summer of 1944 (source: Adair 'Hitler's greatest defeat' and others). How many PFs got lost there?

0

1,000

1,000,000

2,000,000

Your guess is as good as mine, and nobody will ever know. So please do not obscure the issue (that is that you randomly pick numbers you find believable and then call people names if they don't go along with them) by talking about partisan ambushes in Germany, because it makes you look ridiculous.

Just some friendly advice.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Michael Dorosh]

Partisan hunts were commonly used as a method of field training, IIRC. After basic training, Germany soldiers went to a field training and replacement unit, usually located in the occupied territories, not at home in Germany. Here he was given advanced instruction, and also sent to the field on "partisan hunts." I don't imagine much has been written about the history of training and replacement units in English, so this may be one of the overlooked aspects of their history, as viewed by us in North America.

This says nothing as to how rare ambushes were, but if the Germans were actively looking for contact, perhaps its not hard to believe that they found it on occasion.

EDIT = On further reflection, what this has to do with PF usage is beyond me! So I will stop now. I would be intererested, however, in knowing more about partisan warfare, especially when used as a training aid! And especially the experiences of the grandfather in question.

[This message has been edited by Michael Dorosh (edited 03-21-2001).]

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

EDIT = On further reflection, what this has to do with PF usage is beyond me! So I will stop now. I would be intererested, however, in knowing more about partisan warfare, especially when used as a training aid! And especially the experiences of the grandfather in question.

This really was in response to Jason's question about partisan ambushes in Germany in 1944, which was a bit pointless.

My grandfather received his Heimatschuss (Million-dollar wound) that almost but not quite killed him in March 1944, when his bunker (behind the German lines, he was a counter-battery observer) was attacked by partisans.

He was detailed to anti-partisan operations I believe, but he prefers not to talk about it. I am not sure about your statement about replacement units - I believe the actual replacement units were all in Germany, where they provided training for new recruits, and that the ad-hoc creation of anti-partisan units was left to the transit units closer to the front. But I know very little about this aspect of the war.

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Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Paul Lakowski]

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

Veterans were used as cadres, not as sturmbattalions, in the late war.

Well Alex Buchner and others don't agree, veterans were concentrated at the Battalion Regimental in the 'assault company' and the 'Fusilier battalion' at the Divisional level.

I did count 5 PF per platoon, and said so. Not per squad.

Good

Find me any WW II study on tanks KOed by fausts that shows 60 fausts being fired at each one simultaneously and I'll eat a wool ski cap.

No one is saying 60 on one target ,but unlike you I'm atleast looking . All I was suggesting was over kill is normal in battle.

Stop making tendentious arguments and answer the bleeding question - what change are you advocating?

You miss the point I'm not advocating any thing I'm examining the data that I can lay my hands on, I have hunch the PF should be more effective but I'm more interested in the data ....and BTW my points are atleast no more 'tendentious' than yours.

Jason you have a definate goal and are craming what ever data you can find to prove the point ....even if it means, making the 'facts fit the theory' ....rather than adjusting the theory to accomadate any new facts.

I actually have given several bits of data from sources that report

Accuracy strongly dependant on training ,which by that point in the war was poor for Front line German infantry.

Often more shooters Vs fewer targets [ overkill]....dilutes the above kill rates.

Ratio of hit to penetration low [ 1 in 8 for RPG in vietnam].... could crucify the above kill rates.

Less Pf at units than assumed....most cases units were well bellow TOE strenghts.

Heres some more oblique but none the less relavant data

In Iran IRaq war ATGMs were used by both sides these were mostly Sagger Milan and TOW.

The stated kill % of these weapons were

TOW & Milan 80%

Sagger 60-70%

The battle field accuracy turned out to be

TOW & Milan 30-40%

Sagger 10%

The reason was inadequate training that reduced the kill prob by any where from half to 1/6 in real battle.

We don't know .....

The Real Shelf life figures this stuff is more like ammo , rather than weapons.

How many users became casualties before they even got to fire.

How many were destroyed by arty and being over run by enemy.

How many service warheads actually detonated on impact.

Whats the real chance of a penetrating PF actually killing a tank.

If we could find answers to these questions we'd have a better understanding...why don't you start digging through archives and get some of this data for us?

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Germanboy:

This really was in response to Jason's question about partisan ambushes in Germany in 1944, which was a bit pointless.

Agreed, I am guilty of moving this in another direction entirely. But I hope I can be forgiven - actual combat experiences are always of interest to me.

My grandfather received his Heimatschuss (Million-dollar wound) that almost but not quite killed him in March 1944, when his bunker (behind the German lines, he was a counter-battery observer) was attacked by partisans.

He was detailed to anti-partisan operations I believe, but he prefers not to talk about it.

Can't blame him. Sounds like a brave man your family can be proud of, who was asked to do not-very nice things. Would you be averse to sharing his photo with us?

I am not sure about your statement about replacement units - I believe the actual replacement units were all in Germany, where they provided training for new recruits, and that the ad-hoc creation of anti-partisan units was left to the transit units closer to the front. But I know very little about this aspect of the war.

My knowledge is quite limited as well, but I am led to believe that the ersatz battaillonen and the ausbildings units (if I am using the terms correctly) were seperate, until conjoined later in the war. For example, I know Grossdeutschland had an advanced training centre at Aktyhrka, deep in Russia. Recruit training was conducted in the local regimental recruiting areas in Germany, after which, as the war progressed, the advanced training centres were moved into captured territory (and back again late in the war as ground was lost).

Transit units (in english, commonly referred to as March Battalions, also I think Transfer Companies - I need to look at my references again) are an interesting phenomenon. Like many aspects of the German Army, very different from western practices. My understanding is that the various Wehrkreise would gather newly trained recruits, form these March Companies, and they would travel to their divisions as formed units.

I will see if I can dig out my source - I am going by some re-enactment unit newsletter articles written by a West Point scholar; the only solid source I've been able to locate in English that touches on this subject in some detail.

Any other input is welcome.

[Guest wwb_99]

Michael Dorosh has an interesting point on partisan training. A good example in english would be the early parts of Guy Sajer's 'Forgotten Soldier.' His first taste of combat was a partisan hunt.

On the subject of panzerfausts, I will say that while the 30s were not very useful, other than psychologically, the 100m models were deadly, at least in terms of CM. Last night I took out three AFVs that got too close to my faust toting pioneers, all at ranges of 40-60m. And I had a 50% hit rate to boot.

WWB

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Before battle, my digital soldiers turn to me and say,

Ave, Caesar! Morituri te salutamus.

[Michael Dorosh]

Find me any WW II study on tanks KOed by fausts that shows 60 fausts being fired at each one simultaneously and I'll eat a wool ski cap.

An historical aside here - the Canadian word for "wool ski cap" is toque, pronounced "toooooooook" - "t" as in "tea", "oo" as in "kooky" and "k" as in "kangaroo".

This may seem odd to any other Canadians reading this, but "toque" is really not a word that many Americans actually recognize. Staggering!

UFI added FYI.

[:USERNAME:]

I hope that BTS gets it right in CM2. Until then , I try to avoid scenarios where the german infantry have to rely on PF30.

[Michael Dorosh]

Here's the info on training from my source.

Basic training - at the outset of war, 16 weeks basic (recruit) training in the Wehrkreise where the soldier was recruited. I presume in a special company of his battalion or regiment. General and specialized training was conducted (ie machinegunners as machinegunners, signallers as such, etc.)

Advanced training - conducted as formation training. Recruits graduated into their battalions and were trained as a battalion.

Wartime Changes

Ersatz Battalione were added with the onset of war (Replacement Battalions) that were to assume the responsiblity for recruit training. Every regiment in the field, in theory, had an Ersatz Battalion in Germany. These units belonged to the Ersatz Heer (Replacement Army) and were divided into Corps along Wehrkreis lines. Therefore, Infanterie Regiment 119 shared its number with Infanterie Erstaz Battaillon 119.

Ersatz units took over the functions of the former recruit training companies, now that the infantry units were in the field indefinitely.

Whenever the German soldier came home on leave, for courses, etc., he was attached back to his Ersatz Battaillon.

After a while, Ersatz Battaillone were changed to accommodate more than one field unit. Numerical alignment between field and ersatz regiments thus ceased, though the Army still recruited for particular regiments in the same Wehrkreise.

In October 1942, Ersatz Battaillone were modified, and used to control only the administrative functions partially described above (ie returning soldiers) and new organizations - Ausbildungsbataillons - were created to handle the training aspect.

This is all very simplified, and there was a complex structure to these training units, and many changes in how they did business.

After basic training in the Ausbildungsbataillon, the soldier went back to the Ersatz battalion, given home leave (if possible), then formed into Marschkompanien (March or Transfer Companies) and sent forward. Some of the transfer units were converted into Feldersatzbattaillone (Field Replacement Battalions) once they arrived in the field.

These field replacement units were incredibly complex as well, and some units were formed into regiments and divisions to provide extra training, partisan hunts, etc.

As the tide of the war turned, Feldersatz and Ausbildungs battalions dropped out of their training role, and into actual combat roles. This happened at Market Garden, for example, with the training and replacement units of the SS divisions there.

This is very general and many not make sense; if anyone desires a better explanation (as far as I am able with my scarce sources) feel free to email me.

[:USERNAME:]

Another aspect is that theres a tendancy for overkill. Unless a tank was a flaming hellhole, shooting PF might not stop at these close quarters. A tank that recieved a hit that did not find ammo/fuel might be abandoned and the german infantry (always pulling back) might keep shooting till it went Ronson.

The other point is that they really are more in line with ammo. Left in the rain/mud/sleet/etc might make it a good candidate to be shot off at anything promising as soon as possible. This is a fact. Old ammo is discarded/burned up if you can. I think I read that only 10 percent of a nations ammo output gets expended in front line battle. This is higher for ammo that is used in the rear like howitzers/guns but front line ammo is like food. No one likes a jam or a hang fire.

You wouldnt eat old chow would you? Well. maybe some of you..

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by :USERNAME::

The other point is that they really are more in line with ammo. Left in the rain/mud/sleet/etc might make it a good candidate to be shot off at anything promising as soon as possible. This is a fact. Old ammo is discarded/burned up if you can.

Old grenades, on the other hand, are also candidates for booby trapping. I have no source for this, but perhaps someone else can touch on whether or not a PF was easily rigged or boobytrapped - or whether or not German and Allied soldiers both would have suspected them of being so and simply destroyed them?

On the other hand, Stan Sisclowski, a Canadian infantryman in Italy, tells in his book of finding a cache of Allied grenades - he and a buddy went to an abandoned house that was being used as a latrine by German soldiers until quite recently to this incident, and used up the grenades "for fun."

Soldiers are little boys at heart...

[:USERNAME:]

Ive seen drawings for PF booby traps. The PF is tied up into a tree pointing at a point in the road. A string or wire runs across the road along the spot that is targeted and is secured to the trigger mechanism.

It would certainly be a nice use of old PF30 and the klein version.

The germans had a 9mm cheap smg version of this. It is on display at Aberdeen. This gun is nailed to a log and pointed at a trail/path/road. Same deal with a string running to the trigger. It probably as effective at night scaring patrols into thinking they found the enemy main line of resistance.

[Gunny Bunny]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

An historical aside here - the Canadian word for "wool ski cap" is toque, pronounced "toooooooook" - "t" as in "tea", "oo" as in "kooky" and "k" as in "kangaroo".

This may seem odd to any other Canadians reading this, but "toque" is really not a word that many Americans actually recognize. Staggering!

UFI added FYI.

Speaking as a Canadian I was aware of this. The reason the Americano's don't spell it like this is that the word is by assimilation from Canadian French "TUQUE".

Regards,

Gunny Bunny

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by :USERNAME::

Ive seen drawings for PF booby traps. The PF is tied up into a tree pointing at a point in the road.

It would certainly be a nice use of old PF30 and the klein version.

Interesting, but not what I am talking about. I meant the act of sabotaging PFs and leaving them in positions so that enemy troops "capturing" them and trying to employ them will be injured or killed. This was done with hand grenades, I am wondering if it was ever done with PFs. I really have no idea one way or the other.

[:USERNAME:]

It would be easy enough to do. Just plug something in the tube behind the charge. It more than likely would kill someone.

[jasoncawley@ameritech.net]

Well, I am gald to see a few people at least wrestling with the numbers, but still disappointed that everyone doing so is only trying to show they are pointless. You sorta have to try to get the intervening terms believable.

And no, there is no pretence involved that each intervening term will be anything like exact, but errors in one estimate may offset errors the other way in another later factor. The whole thing will simple serve as a check, eliminating hypotheses of excessive effectiveness, by forcing them to imply more results than can be seen historically.

When anyone settles on a chain they think leaves the faust effective enough, I can then make them look again by applying the same sort of reasoning and scale of figures to other small arms. The resulting implication of huge intermediary loss figures would be, that the late war German infantry, instead of all having SMGs, had to fight with pocket knives because so few rifles had actually reached them, through the roving bands of uber-partisans and what not. But we haven't gotten that far.

My comment about how rare partisan attacks were inside Germany, which several people seem to have missed the point of, was based on the time when most of these things were fielded. The faust 30 was out longer, yes, but the production rate was not as high in the earlier period. Most of the fausts come out in the last year of the war, and the last 7 months they are more abundant still. For partisans to have gotten 25% of the things, they'd have to have gotten nearly all of those made before the retreat to the German borders. Which they obviously didn't.

wwb-99's experience tallies with my own, and is part of what is behind my concern here. Contrary to one fellow's assumption that I am after one fixed goal and bending data at will, I am after a realistic level of faust effectiveness. When the man with no name suggested an improvement to the -30 alone, and explained why he thought it was needed, I readily assented.

But you see, I use the German infantry a lot. And I know the later fausts are quite effective, just as wwb-99 states. And if you gave me big accuracy increases or doubled ranges or both, then I'd run the board with the things. I know that is too big a change, independent of any of the production number stuff.

Notice the cross check of the small arms. Say, in order to justify high hit rates for the things, you need only minute fractions of them to reach the front (A). And suppose, to make the late war squad types at all believable, you need almost all the better weapons to reach the front (. Then you are left arguing that the intermediary processes squashed all the fausts and spared all the MPs. What do A and B have in common? Both inflate German infantry effectiveness in CM.

I am more sympathetic to other explanations or added terms offered here. Shooting dead tanks, for instance, not because of all-at-once 60-1 overkill, but because the platoon isn't sure it is dead unless it is burning. That is quite believable - much more believable than the partisan and all overrun and quartermaster tall tales.

As for the (alleged) 1-8 penetrations by RPGs in 'Nam, I seriously doubt fausts were that ineffective when they connected. Why? Because if so, I'd expect many run-o-the-mill tankers to have tales of the 25 faust hits they survived. Just from the size of the populations and that hit-kill ratio. While occasional tales of the 1 close call are common enough, such "run" stories aren't.

Now, not trying to be generous on any factor to show something, here is the sort of real picture I find plausible.

Tanks killed. Some say 16k, some say 30k. I'll call it 25k. Portion of these killed in the early war by rifle grenades, or mid-war by the ~1 million hand mines, I think is small. Call the remainder 23k.

Partitioning there between schrecks and fausts, I think the fausts were more effective merely because they were in more places tactically, making a faust round better than a schreck round. A Schreck lanucher, though, is a less common item and with better range I think it would be more effective.

If I take the mean between "as good as a schreck round" and "as good as a schreck launcher", that'd be a factor of 2.45 on either side. Then there are 2.3 times as many fausts as schreck rounds, net of non-delivered ones and leftovers in March etc. This all leads me to believe that the schrecks got about 1/6, or 4k.

That leaves 19k kills for the fausts themselves. 4.4m delivered and not returned. Training, 4m left. Since they are delivered, and most of them are later war, I don't think the "intercepted by partisans" story is worth much. 3.9m.

But destroyed in depots, bombed, overrun, I think probably happened. Most of the weapons were pushed out to the troops - e.g. in March 45, only 10% of those left were in armories rather than unit hands - but units get overrun too. Higher figures I don't consider credible, because of such items as the small arms cross-check. So I will call this - 1/3rd, leaving 2.6m. Please note that I've already got 1.4m not fired, and other factors later will add to it, so don't go telling me I am claiming all were fired.

Lets do an intermediary cross-check. Say ~200 divisions, ~1200 battalions, ~3600 companies, ~10800 platoons, are operational. I think that is a conservative estimate, since there were more divisions later on, though quite a few of them understrength. Understand I mean the organization slot, not the individual men within it, who are turning over regularly.

Say 4-5 are present in the average platoon, as in CM. Then what frequency is implied by my 2.6m figure, or in other words, how often can that many platoons be refitted with new fausts? 48 to 60 times per platoon-slot. That is pretty close to "once a week", allowing for some tapering off of number and frequency in the early part of the series. The figure is believable to me.

How often are they being used against non armor? I got one fellow more or less agreeing that the 5-10 range is probably right, and I think it is. And I am including rarer uses like bobby-traps, attempts to use them against infantry that fail because the guy gets shot, etc. The point is to seperate off a fraction actually being attempted for the doctrinal purpose, engaging enemy armor. I will say 1 out of 7.4 which leaves a round 350,000. 5 and 10 give 260k and 520k respectively, so alternative guesses here will not be grossly off.

How many of those who made the attempt, got KOed before they got their shot off? I'll say half. Remembering that if anyone else picks the thing up to try again, in the same battle or afterward, then it wouldn't count in this category, I think that is an amply allowance. Notice, I've got quite a bit of unfired ones by now. So I've got 175,000 living shooters at tanks, and I've got 19,000 dead tanks at the other end.

How many fausts per tank? If only 1/8 penetrated, then sure they could be wonder-hitters. CM would have it all backwards, and they'd be flying all over the place but not killing anything, despite hitting everything. I don't think this can be right, for reasons I already gave. The lucky tankers are nowhere in evidence.

Jumping ahead slightly to deal with what I think is a minor issue, I will allow ~15% of the portion that hit (whatever that is, we'll get to it below), to not kill, because they are duds or because they glanced. That will cover a lot of "survived the faust hit" stories (singular), incidentally. 150k left.

Now I've got overkill and chance to hit left. I think single fausts from ambush were pretty common, because I've read of a number of such. But there might be instances of firing off a platoon's worth into the same tank, to "light" it. The range of overkill, it seems to me, should be 2-2.5 per kill, or roughly half what a platoon is expected to have, and twice what was really needed. I've got 60-75k "engagements" left. That leaves the to hit calculation at 25%-32%, or 1/4 to 1/3.

That is a little better than my previous estimate but in the same general range. The fellow who wanted higher accuracies might consider it acceptable or might not. I would. Can we from this conclude that the hit prob at stated effective range is those figures? No. It would be lower at those ranges, and higher in closer.

Suppose it is 15% at stated "effective", and 50% at half that. Fire a couple times at effective range and once at close range, and you are in the right ballpark.

Then we still have to remember the man with no name's stricture, that we should add a bit to the range to reflect running, compensate for omni-spotting, and give the -30 a chance. Ok, sir, fine by me - for the 30 though.

What model of the engagement and accuracy envelopes are we left with?

% to hit

Weapon 20 - 40 - 60 - 80 - 100

F-30 35 10

F-60 50 35 15

F-100 65 50 35 25 15

When the range is at the distance for the 35% numbers in the table, the chance of the squad firing the weapon should be high (~3/4 say). If you want to fire still closer, you'd use hide and a platoon ambush marker.

Engagements at 40, 60, and 80-100 yards with the respective weapons, would be possible, especially unsuppressed and with a clear LOS. I'd suggest an engagement chance at such distances of around 1/4th, so that if a target lingers at such distances it would be shot at, but momentary "snapshots" would have to be closer.

For what it is worth.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by :USERNAME::

It would be easy enough to do. Just plug something in the tube behind the charge. It more than likely would kill someone.

And only a complete moron would simply pick the thing up without checking for an obstruction such as you describe.

One of the drills I am called on to do with the 84mm Carl Gustav is check the barrel and venturi before firing; in fact, a safety precaution is the first thing a soldier does when he picks up any kind of weapon - even one that has been issued to him for years. Once it is out of your sight, you simply presume that when you come back to it, it has been rendered unsafe - and you automatically check the breach to ensure no ammunition is in it.

Anyone picking up an enemy weapon and not doing a safety precaution would deserve to have his head blown off. Knowing this, I can't believe the Germans (who were VERY skilled at booby trapping) would be dumb enough to believe that something so simple could work.

Taking this out of the realm of fantasy, I do know that German eihandgranates came with two types of fuzed, colour coded - one a very short fuze made with one purpose - to kill the thrower. I am still wondering if the PF had any built in methods of sabotage such as this. It seems silly on the face of it, but the Germans spent a lot of time and resources on things that no one else bothered with - anti-magnetic paste for their tanks, short fuzes for their own grenades, etc.

[Philistine]

Jason,

I'm not trying to be obtuse here, but I still don't understand how your analysis translates to CM depictions of rate to hit.

I don't get what your ultimate point is, and whatever it is doesn't seem to follow from your analysis. Is your point: the percentage to-hit of PF's should not be increased in CM? Is it: the likelihood of firing of PF's should not be increased?

Your reasoning seems to be PF's had a (somewhat) low to-kill rate against tanks & thus....something. Are you arguing that PF to-hit rates should be decreazsed? If not, why not?

I don't see that you can make the type of fine distinctions that you seem to be attempting to make with so many assumptions. A few small changes in your assumptions (which changes seem to be within the realm of reasonableness) will make your calculated effectiveness swing wildly from 8% to 66% or more. Given this, what's the point?

Even using the historical information, it seems that PF's were more effective then panzershreck on a PF round vs. PS launcher basis and much more effective comparing PF rounds versus PS rounds. (BTW, this was actually pretty suprising to me).

The cite that I linked to before (it was earlier pointed out in the Thread by alla_keefek) has some further interesting information http://www.geocities.com/Augusta/8172/panzerfaust3.htm

The Panzerschrecks were initially less successful than Panzerfausts because Panzerschreck gunners - trusting in the impressive size of the Panzerschreck - tended to open fire at larger ranges of around 100m (330 ft.), which was also necessified by the relative cumbersomeness of the large Panzerschreck which was a hindrance when retreating into cover after the shot. Panzerfausts were easier to handle and usually shot from a distance of 30m (100 ft.) after which the soldier quite easily could get under cover again.

At early trials, out of 12 Panzerschreck rounds fired at a static T-34 at a range of 100m only 3 hit the target.

In the same trial all of the five Panzerfausts fired at a range of 30m hit the tank - however one should keep in mind that this was a static target that did not shoot back!

This type of information seems more appropriate for determining the correct modeling of effectiveness. (Note that it doesn't say what kind of PF it was, but given that they were "early" trials, I would assume they were PF-60's at best).

Also, looking back at the thread, I haven't seen a great cry for increasing the hit percentage for PF's. Instead, the request seems to be for PF's to be fired more when they are ostensibly in range. (Not sure myself whether this should happen or not, under the "who wants to bell the cat" theory).

With regard to the percentages to hit, do we even know what they are? Are they substantially different than a PS? Should they be? For instance, is there a difference (in CM and/or real life) for the percent to-hit of a PF-100 and a PS when they are both fired at, say, 50 meters? Should there be?

The problem I have with your analysis is that it proves too much. Taking the widely quoted "statistic" that it took 10,000 rounds of small arms ammunition fired to kill 1 person, you can extrapolate from this that no one would be killed by small arms fire in CM, as the battle almost surely has less than 10,000 bullets being fired.

(BTW, when I said that you were counting all PF's as being fired, what I meant was you were not considering those PF's which were in the possession of units, supply depots, in transit, etc. at the end of the war or when a unit surrendered).

The problem I have with your analysis is that using numbers that I consider reasonable I can come up with diametrically opposite conclusions of the efficacy of fired PF's. In addition, I fundamentally think that PF's are different then most other AT weapons, being more akin to ammo, rather than weapon.

Just continuing the debate

--Philistine

[:USERNAME:]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

And only a complete moron would simply pick the thing up without checking for an obstruction such as you describe.

Are you saying that he has to inspect it without picking it up? He is going to get down on all fours and shine a flashlight up its tube? Do you think he can open the breech to look in? I am pretty sure there isnt a breech to see into like your gustuv weapon. Its alot more plausible than you are dismissing.

But enough of this. Its just a bad thread. Jason is like obsessed with his 4 function calculator applied to WWII.

[Paul Lakowski]

Originally posted by jasoncawley@ameritech.net:

I am more sympathetic to other explanations or added terms offered here. Shooting dead tanks, for instance, not because of all-at-once 60-1 overkill, but because the platoon isn't sure it is dead unless it is burning. That is quite believable - much more believable than the partisan and all overrun and quartermaster tall tales.

As for the (alleged) 1-8 penetrations by RPGs in 'Nam, I seriously doubt fausts were that ineffective when they connected. Why? Because if so, I'd expect many run-o-the-mill tankers to have tales of the 25 faust hits they survived. Just from the size of the populations and that hit-kill ratio. While occasional tales of the 1 close call are common enough, such "run" stories aren't.

.

I get real worried when I hear crap like that. A serious study on the true effectiveness of a weapon in combat is dismissed because it doesn't fit with your version of histroy.honesty

A similar problem was encountered with HEAT rounds fired from the 75L24 , the answer may be very simple.

HEAT rounds in order to penetrate properly have to hit the target straight on and who knows how many fail to detonate due to a realistic impact....do you know that the ricochet chance of a RPG type warhead is 50% @ 30-40° impact angle?If nothing else these HEAT jets are probably cutting a swath across the armor unless they hit dead on with out YAW.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by :USERNAME::

Are you saying that he has to inspect it without picking it up? He is going to get down on all fours and shine a flashlight up its tube?

We've wandered from the point. I am wondering about built-in methods of booby trapping said weapons. You've suggested some kind of field expedient akin to sticking a potato in an exhaust pipe. I think I'll hold out for an answer from someone who knows rather than debate this silly point. In general, soldiers are trained to have great respect for weapons - especially enemy weapons, and especially to be wary of German weapons conveniently "left laying around." I have no idea if this extends to PFs - the point was brought up about wastage rates of these weapons, and I was curious as to one minor aspect of these rates. I really wasn't in for a round of speculation on something so insignificant.

You threw out a wild guess as to how to sabotage this weapon. I as equally wildly speculated as to how an Allied soldier would react. Seems kind of dumb to go on about it since we're both talking out of our butts. Hopefully someone can set us both straight.

Yes?