why cant morters fire without line of sight?

[CMplayer]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

While this is a nice suggestion, it will only be possible to do that with relative spotting - the current Borg model would lead to it being abused, because you could use a routed, fleeing truck-driver 600m away from the mortar who lost one leg and is carrying his buddy to spot for the mortar crew.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I don't see how relative spotting would change this at all. The mortar would only be able to area fire within some number of meters of what it can see itself. So the only relevant borg issue here is that of the Player of the Game himself coordinating his units more than what could be done in real life.

There is no difference here in principle than if I tried to overcome relative spotting by ordering a vehicle to area fire a place where I know my enemy has troops whom the vehicle hasn't seen. Since area fire is by definition at non spotted units, and is always a Player Given order it won't make much of a diff if it is relative or absolute spotting.

[ 09-11-2001: Message edited by: CMplayer ]

[tss]

Tero wrote:

Separating the FO's from specific, dedicated ordinance would be realistic.

That would depend on the army and the time period. In your example case of a certain army fighting in the North, artillery FOs would usually direct the fire of only their own batallion until new firing methods were implemented in 1943. After that, any FO could direct fire from any available artillery batallion (sometimes mortars were also included in the same net, but often they weren't). Sometimes in critical situations the FO didn't even know whose fire he was directing.

If the battle was "planned" it would have involved an artillery fire plan (including targets, positions, timetable if applicable etc) to integrate the artillery into the overall mission plan.

Again, depending on the situation. The pre-attack artillery bombardment was certainly planned, but after that a FO was free to call fire on targets of his choice. And, in 1941 (the relevant period for this particular army), the fire mission would be fired from one or more batteries of his own batallion. (The initial strikes were almost always fired with full-batallion strength, but in the later phases of battles smaller missions would often be fired).

Also, not all "planned" attacks would have a prepared fire-plan, though most certainly had. Those that didn't have one would usually be pursuit battles or advances through unknown terrain where the exact location of enemy forces was not known.

- Tommi

[CMplayer]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Fairbairn-Sykes Trench Knife:

It seems you are even more ruthless than I'd imagined...<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

And it seems you could use a good night's sleep.

Ah, star of evil star of pain/Highhearted youth comes not again. (JJ)

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by CMplayer:

There is no difference here in principle than if I tried to overcome relative spotting by ordering a vehicle to area fire a place where I know my enemy has troops whom the vehicle hasn't seen.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Except that the vehicle can't hit the exact spot if it is out of LOS, while a mortar under your suggestion could, as I understand it.

[CMplayer]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tss:

That would depend on the army and the time period. In your example case of a certain army fighting in the North, artillery FOs would usually direct the fire of only their own batallion until new firing methods were implemented in 1943. After that, any FO could direct fire from any available artillery batallion (sometimes mortars were also included in the same net, but often they weren't). Sometimes in critical situations the FO didn't even know whose fire he was directing.

[/QB]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Either of those two alternatives could be modelled using the system of separating FOs from the purchased batteries. Which battery or batteries FO's get access to would be tweakable parameters.

The present system doesn't allow for the same sort of flexibility, so it is doomed to go the way of the dinosaurs eventually (I believe)

[ 09-11-2001: Message edited by: CMplayer ]

[CMplayer]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

Except that the vehicle can't hit the exact spot if it is out of LOS, while a mortar under your suggestion could, as I understand it.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

In that sense, yes. But there would be zero difference in this abuse between the relative spotting system and the absolute spotting system. This kind of abuse would be based on the 'omniscient godlike player view' which is the same in both spotting systems.

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by CMplayer:

In that sense, yes. But there would be zero difference in this abuse between the relative spotting system and the absolute spotting system. This kind of abuse would be based on the 'omniscient godlike player view' which is the same in both spotting systems.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

You must know somefink I don't about how BTS wants to do the relative spotting system But you are right, it could easily turn out that mortars can still not be allowed this in a relative spotting system.

[CMplayer]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Fairbairn-Sykes Trench Knife:

I thought a forward observer with a functional radio (who has excellent LOS to critical points in a battle) would not just become useless after his "ammo allocation" dries up <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Back to the game as it stands today, one reasonable way to use spotters who've shot their wads might be to just use them as observers. They've got binocs, which I believe makes them quite useful pairs of eyes to have surveying the battlefield (to see guns quickly after they unhide and the like).

[CMplayer]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

You must know somefink I don't about how BTS wants to do the relative spotting system <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well I'm assuming that the area fire command will remain as it is today. If they restrict it, then everything could change.

[CMplayer]

Andreas,

I started imaging concrete cases of how letting mortars 'lean' their targetting could be abused and your POV became much more compelling.

For example an open topped vehicle is hiding behind a building, out of view of a mortar. It is spotted by joe shmo crew who's lost on the other side of the board, and next turn the mortar can target it by 'leaning' it's area fire to the other side of the building.

This would be bad, so I have to admit I'm coming around to your side on this one.

Though if everyone promised not to use it gamily maybe????

[ 09-11-2001: Message edited by: CMplayer ]

[Tero]

That would depend on the army and the time period.

More specifically it would depend to the organization of the artillery arm and how FO's were integrated (or not as the case may be) into the infantry force structure.

In your example case of a certain army fighting in the North, artillery FOs would usually direct the fire of only their own batallion until new firing methods were implemented in 1943.

The instances were are talking about pertain mostly to the attack phase in 1941 and the widrawal and defence during the summer of 1944. Apart from Gora (even that during that bit the artillery was in static positions for the most part) the artillery fired from prepared positions between early 1942 and the summer of 1944.

What artillery the batallion had available depended on what the division had at hand in the KTR (field artillery regiment with 48 artillery pieces if at full text book strenght) assigned to it. The mortars (a total of 24 81-82mm and 12 120mm in the entire division !) mortars were formed as KrhK (mortar company) at the regimental level. If we talk about brigades they had 6 120mm mortars and 24 artillery pieces in 2 batteries (patteristo). The average range of the guns was 10 km's.

Given these facts any HQ (or FO for that matter), IF the lines of communications were intact, could call in strikes in known targets. As I said earlier if the battle was in any degree planned (ie there had been time to do even some preliminary preparations) the artillery was given a fire plan and any and all FO's were privy to them.

Also, lets not forget the method of firing at the sound of the fighting using the map and target resolutions and calculations made at the battery in case the FO went off the air. As the artillery was horse drawn for the most part and it had only a range of 10 km's they were moving most of the time if the situation was volatile. In case they were in positions and the **** hit the fan they habitually fired at their own discretion by the sound of the battle if they did not have any FO's to direct them and they knew they would have to abandon the guns and all remaining unused ordnance if the lines broke.

After that, any FO could direct fire from any available artillery batallion (sometimes mortars were also included in the same net, but often they weren't). Sometimes in critical situations the FO didn't even know whose fire he was directing.

Concur. But in the case of mortars being in the same net the communications hub was at the infantry HQ (regimental or lower) anyway so the fire request could and often would have been given or relegated to the team that could execute it rapidly.

Again, depending on the situation. The pre-attack artillery bombardment was certainly planned, but after that a FO was free to call fire on targets of his choice.

If you have Koskimaas Veitsen Terällä you can see that in the case of Ihantala the map overlay (p149) for the fireplan had more than 50 target references and target zones (sulku) on an area of 3km by 5km area.

And, in 1941 (the relevant period for this particular army), the fire mission would be fired from one or more batteries of his own batallion. (The initial strikes were almost always fired with full-batallion strength, but in the later phases of battles smaller missions would often be fired).

Concur.

Also, not all "planned" attacks would have a prepared fire-plan, though most certainly had. Those that didn't have one would usually be pursuit battles or advances through unknown terrain where the exact location of enemy forces was not known.

Check out

http://foto.hut.fi/seura/historia/toiminta.html

Note the speed with which maps with grid references and place names were made available to the troops.

[ 09-14-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[hansfritz]

As this was my first Forum question,I've been delighted to read all the reply's and arguments its caused.I now understand that the morters sighting restrictions are the best way to represent them in the current game(set over a short time period).Also as you can see the whole of the playing area but the morter could not,at times firing at enemy that the morter couldent possibly know about seems unfear and unrealistic. It still anoys me about the morters changing leaders and loosing there spotters.this does need to be adressed.

[Michael Emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by hansfritz:

It still anoys me about the morters changing leaders and loosing there spotters.this does need to be adressed.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Let's consider this for a moment. I wonder how hard it would be for BTS to program a new option into the game for mortar teams. During each orders phase, there would be a new command available, something like "Designate Spotter". You would click on this command (or press a hotkey equivalent) and then click on your choice of HQ unit. From that point forward until you selected another HQ, or your selected HQ got killed, it and it only would perform spotting duties for that team. More than one team could select the same spotter. The team(s) mated to an HQ would still have to be within command range of it in order to enjoy the benefits of spotting.

I don't know what kind of problems this system might have, such as: Would the AI be able to employ this rule effectively?

[added] It occurs to me that something similar could also be applied to other teams. Even though they do not require spotters, it might be nice to have them locked to an HQ that has especially desireable leadership bonuses, rather then just being the nearest.

Comments?

Michael

[ 09-16-2001: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Comments?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Well yes

I am currently reading a book called 'Zeitzeugen: Der Harz im April 1945'. There is an interesting account there of a SS training unit thrown into combat in the chaotic last days of the cauldron. They had dug in someplace or other, and ordered their HTs and some support weapons to remain behind as reserve. When they decided to bug out, all of these were gone. As they found out later, some other officer (presumably high-ranking) had passed through, and ordered the reserve to join his Kampfgruppe, the protestations of the soldiers notwithstanding.

I think it is a nice simulation of chaotic battlefields, and I like that it takes a bit of control away. These things happened - remember von Luck and the 8,8cm AA battery during Goodwood? In a more generic circumstance, say there is an AT team. You intend it to be assigned to Lt. Luck, for his high leadership values. But Lt. Luck moves out of his command range, and you for some reason decide the unit should remain where it is. How is he going to give orders to it then? Because that is what command range simulates - considering that platoon level wireless sets were either scarce, or crap, or both.

[Michael Emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

You intend it to be assigned to Lt. Luck, for his high leadership values. But Lt. Luck moves out of his command range, and you for some reason decide the unit should remain where it is. How is he going to give orders to it then? Because that is what command range simulates - considering that platoon level wireless sets were either scarce, or crap, or both.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Ahem. Had you read my post carefully, you might have noticed this sentence: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The team(s) mated to an HQ would still have to be within command range of it in order to enjoy the benefits of spotting.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Thanks for the comment.

Michael

[Tero]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

[added] It occurs to me that something similar could also be applied to other teams. Even though they do not require spotters, it might be nice to have them locked to an HQ that has especially desireable leadership bonuses, rather then just being the nearest.

This kind of a feature would also make it possible for other than parent company command units to take under their care units which have lost their command units.

[ 09-17-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Michael Emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

This kind of a feature would also make it possible for other than parent company command units to take under their care units which have lost their command units.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

If you mean leaders of one platoon taking over orphaned squads from a different platoon, not necessarily. And for good reason, as has been discussed previously in other threads.

Michael

[ 09-17-2001: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]

[Ben Galanti]

How would any potential issues with onboard arty 'leaning' be any different then with the off-board stuff? If my crew spots that vehicle behind a building, I can call in offboard 81mm mortar fire on it, with the penalties for shooting out of LOS. Why should that be much different then for an onboard 81mm? There would have to be a wider dispersion pattern for firing blind, and it could g et tricky with the fact that onboard fire starts immediatly... Hmm...

Ben

[Fairbairn-Sykes]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by hansfritz:

the morter <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

wasn't this addressed?

[Tero]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael emrys:

If you mean leaders of one platoon taking over orphaned squads from a different platoon, not necessarily. And for good reason, as has been discussed previously in other threads.

Michael

[ 09-17-2001: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I wonder what the veterans of the 82nd and 101st Airborne for example would say about the premise that leading or being led by HQ's other than from your parent formation under combat conditions is ahistorical and unrealistic.

[Disco Diva]

Hello Hanz and Fritz

I think your point on mortars firing without line of sight is quite a valid one considering you just blew the crap out of me with your artillery in the last game we played . Personally I think the more restrictions on it the better being the double crossers you two are I don't think you should command an army at all

[Maastrictian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

I wonder what the veterans of the 82nd and 101st Airborne for example would say about the premise that leading or being led by HQ's other than from your parent formation under combat conditions is ahistorical and unrealistic. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I assume you are referring to the various ad hoc units that got put together during the rather confused night preceding D-day. I can't think of any examples when this happened under and in less than 30 minutes, except where the officer taking command was of higher rank than Lieutenant (which CM already allows). Correct me if I'm wrong of course.

--Chris

[Tero]

Originally posted by Maastrictian:

I assume you are referring to the various ad hoc units that got put together during the rather confused night preceding D-day.

The confusion and organizational disorder lasted way beyond that first night.

I can't think of any examples when this happened under and in less than 30 minutes, except where the officer taking command was of higher rank than Lieutenant (which CM already allows).

I can not quote exact examples but I have read reports of hodge podge units being assembeled and moved towards the sound of the guns and key objectives. For all I know these hodge podge units fought in the composition they moved in until order was restored many days later.

I have a notion in CM a Coy commander can assume command of orphaned infantry units only if the units are from the same company the HQ is from. Support assets like HMG's are of course a different story.

Even if any Coy HQ can take command of any infantry unit out of CC there are times when there either is no Company HQ or it is too far away to be of any use in the tactical situation.

The time limit (of 30 mins) is irrelevant. I would not say it would be unrealistic to have a veteran master sargeant head a counter attack with remnants from several different units within the time limits in CM in a CM scope battle.

[ 09-21-2001: Message edited by: tero ]

[Andreas]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

I have a notion in CM a Coy commander can assume command of orphaned infantry units only if the units are from the same company the HQ is from. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

That notion is wrong.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

Even if any Coy HQ can take command of any infantry unit out of CC there are times when there either is no Company HQ or it is too far away to be of any use in the tactical situation.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

In which case it is right that the unit should suffer the penalty for being out of command.

[Maastrictian]

I supose we are rather off the topic of morters specifically, but its fun right?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

I can not quote exact examples but I have read reports of hodge podge units being assembeled and moved towards the sound of the guns and key objectives. For all I know these hodge podge units fought in the composition they moved in until order was restored many days later.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Fair enough, I've read the same reports. This has nothing to do with units having their commanders killed by enemy fire and, in less than 30 minutes and while still on the front lines, comming under the command of another platoon leader. The reports you cite are of soldiers being reorganized while not in battle.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

The time limit (of 30 mins) is irrelevant. I would not say it would be unrealistic to have a veteran master sargeant head a counter attack with remnants from several different units within the time limits in CM in a CM scope battle.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Don't forget that the veteran master sargeant is likely in the CM platoon HQ unit too. There are four guys in there, the 2nd in command is likely one of them. I'm certain you can find some examples of the third or fourth in command leading his troops on that victorious counter attack as well. Fair enough. I've seen leaderless CM squads lead victorious counter attacks. Obviously platoon should not throw down their weapons and run after their command unit has been killed, and they don't.

But I think its unreasonable to expect a platoon to be fighting at full efficiency even a half hour after their leader was killed if they have been moving around and taking fire. Perhaps in some very large CM battles (battalion level?) a leaderless platoon will get half an hour to sit in the rear and sort itself out. But how often does that happen in a CM game?

The reason I am harping on this "30 minutes" value is because that is a very long time in a CM game. Most battles last 30 or 40 minutes, I've almost never seen one that lasts for more than an hour. So by the time a platoon leader is killed (10 minutes after start time) and his platoon is pulled back (2 or 3 minutes) and regroups (30 minutes mimimum) and gets back to the front (another 2 or 3 minutes) fourty five minutes have passed and the battle is almost over.

Did it happen? Yes. Did it happen at CM's scale and time frame? Not often enough to spend the time coding.

--Chris

Edited for quote syntax

[ 09-21-2001: Message edited by: Maastrictian ]