CM2 INFO......

[Skipper]

> To reiterate - not just a radical

> statement, but one that is plain wrong in

> the light of the generally accepted

> sources. But I somehow get the feeling

> that we will be hit with some pro-

> communist propaganda soon

Hehe... here ya go!

1. The generally accepted sources rely on what? In the absence of access to NKVD archives, they relied on such "authorities" as the author of "Archipelag GULAG". Repeat: no data better than that was available until early 90s.

2. Those few who had access to the archives would not publish anything except soviet propaganda. Those who would write about the issue without access to archives, by definition relied on dubious sources.

3. Now, as I said above, the access is there. Archival research produces funny results. The "purges" campaign took place, but on much smaller scale than it is generally advertised. Refer you to the works of V.Zemskov. Typical library worm, not even on a Soros grant . Afaik, this is the first guy who has something meaningful to say about the whole issue of 1936-37 state terror scale.

Germanboy: the figures you quote are exactly that. Somebody "estimated" these figures. Read, invented them by sucking out of his thumb. And presented as a serious fact. Glantz quoted that "estimation". Similar estimations about, say, total numbers of GULAG clients, turned out to be gross exagerrations.

In the particular case, 40,000 figure (Solzhenitsyn gives another, exact number) is the total number of military personnel who quit military service in 1939. "Estimate", how many of these retired by age, were KIA, wounded, expelled from service for drinking etc, and there is not much room left for "purges".

At the time, it was only possible to know how many of army top brass were "purged".

Next, these "corps commanders" and "brigade commanders" are not positions. They are MILITARY RANKS (they cancelled traditional ranks in 1917 and switched back to them in 1943).

Most of them (abnd I can easily prove that in case of the five marshals) were not combat officers. Most were political officers (Trotsky's main powerbase), others were not NKVD. Some, as I mentioned, were even judges, railroad bosses etc.

How far did the state terror campaign affect military in general, there is no good data yet, but almost surely that when somebody digs into archives, the referred "estimates" will fall flat.

Next, on "trotskyists" point, Trotsky was not just a figurehead, so to say. He (and Kirov) were the only political opponents strong enough to unseat Uncle Joe. The army establishement was the only thing not under his control in 1936. Besides, he was of no great opinion about them.

Now, look at who was in control of RKKA in June 1941. Bah, all familiar faces - the greatest soviet generals of WWII. And believe me, they had all the experience a peacetime general (with WWI/Civil War comnbat experience) could have, keeping in mind that between 1939 and 1941 RKKA saw threefold growth in number of men, machines and combat formations.

> So, can you conclusively prove that purges

> were not harmful militarily?

No, we are not in court, and I am not a pro historian. Can just show you that "common knowledge" on the issue is likely to be a bunch of crap. Have to see when somebody will look into this matter seriously.

> Has someone said that the Finns should be

> conscript, or have poor officers? I do not

> think that is the case

Neither do I. They most certainly pulled off something nobody expected them to.

By the way, the point of Winter War from Soviet perspective was not takeover of Finland, but the access to Baltic Sea in view of the imminent european war, and gaining ground around Leningrad. Which they got (well, speaking of Baltics they only thought so at the time, but it's another story). Imagine if Wehrmacht could start offensive operations against Leningrad from the old border. It would quite certainly fall.

> Tukhachevskii still saw the flaws in the

> Soviet Army and recommended they be

> changed.

I certainly see the flaws of russian army today, and can predict with reasonable accuracy what the modern war will look like. Does it make me a good general? Hmm... Tukhachevsky was not a great general - anyone who would bother to read his theoretical works in the light of modern day knowledge would know that. What he definitely was though, was a "political whore", to quote Uncle Joe Stalin.

[Skipper]

> I think the most interesting question

> about CM2 is how to model early war Soviet

> infantry.

Let's try to give it a shot. They are very different in June-August 1941 and September-November.

summer: Regulars, large command delays (not many radios), limited and wildly inaccurate arty support (lack of ammo and good maps, poor comms again). Infantry platoon HQs must sit on the wire to the main HQ, and the wire can be cut by, say, a nearby explosion. Have to have commander tanks with different reaction time, for one tank in platoon had a radio. No air support. Very often understrength, undersupplied, and in bad mood (heavily harassed by Luftwaffe enroute to deploment areas, as well as just prior to attacks). Surrender easily (no knowledge of what german occupation or captivity really means).

Germans: veterans, excellent arty, cheap TRPs, knowledge of original Soviet positions (non-interdicted air recon).

fall: conscripts or greens, no arty, no armor, no bloody nothing except 14.5 mm AT rifles and Molotov cocktails. Lots of fanatic troops. Exagerration of sorts, there were much more combat capable formations (Elnya, anyone?), but that's how the bulk of the army looked.

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by Skipper:

1. The generally accepted sources rely on what? In the absence of access to NKVD archives, they relied on such "authorities" as the author of "Archipelag GULAG". Repeat: no data better than that was available until early 90s.

Okay - so first I misinterpret Glantz, now that I have shown that there is little to misinterpret, he is making up his figures. I am afraid you can not have it both ways. Please make your mind up. Before you do I have to tell you that unfortunately for you Glantz' work is from 1995 and relies heavily on archival material released in the 1990s. So somehow you are in possession of superior wisdom? Excuse me while I go with Glantz and his sources.

------------------

Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Guest Germanboy]

Originally posted by Skipper:

Most of them (abnd I can easily prove that in case of the five marshals) were not combat officers. Most were political officers (Trotsky's main powerbase), others were not NKVD.

Hmm... Tukhachevsky was not a great general - anyone who would bother to read his theoretical works in the light of modern day knowledge would know that.

Bit of a contradiction, BTW - so was Marshal Tukhachevsky a political officer (as you claim to be able to prove) or a bad general who wrote bad theoretical works? It still appears you don't know what you are talking about.

------------------

Andreas

Der Kessel

Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[Skipper]

Apa:

As a generalisation, I am easily annoyed by people labeling Stalin, Hitler, Zhukov, other soviet and german leaders and generals as "dumb", "morons", etc.

Put it this way, neither of the above were either dumb or morons. Or, from a more personal perspective, I am most certain that you and me are much dumber than the above mentioned individuals were in 1941.

Same story about RKKA. Nobody in the world at the time was prepared better than the Red Army to face the nazies. Nobody but RKKA was prepared for them at all.

[Skipper]

Heh... Sorry for not being clear. I can prove that most of the 5 marshals "purged" were not combat officers at the time they were "purged". And in every case of the five, I can understand Stalin's reasons (although not his methods - but I have no idea if he had an alternative; surely enough, he did not look for alternatives too hard). Heck, the surviving four were no more useful during war, either - sinecures for granddads.

Getting rid of Tukhachevsky (ie, firing him from the army brass, not the act of killing him) IMHO was a positive factor for the RKKA combat-readiness.

During 20-s Trotsky was in charge of the army. Most of the top brass were his creatures. That's the context in which the purges should be seen, mainly.

[Jeff Heidman]

Originally posted by Skipper:

Heh... Sorry for not being clear. I can prove that most of the 5 marshals "purged" were not combat officers at the time they were "purged".

What is a "combat officer"? And why would it be the case that their removal would not effect combat readiness anyway?

Jeff Heidman

[Gregory Deych]

Originally posted by Skipper:

Hehe... here ya go!

1. The generally accepted sources rely on what? In the absence of access to NKVD archives, they relied on such "authorities" as the author of "Archipelag GULAG". Repeat: no data better than that was available until early 90s.

Except that the current date largely confirms what was published back then.

2. Those few who had access to the archives would not publish anything except soviet propaganda. Those who would write about the issue without access to archives, by definition relied on dubious sources.

Again, this is no longer the case so - irrelevant.

3. Now, as I said above, the access is there. Archival research produces funny results. The "purges" campaign took place, but on much smaller scale than it is generally advertised. Refer you to the works of V.Zemskov. Typical library worm, not even on a Soros grant . Afaik, this is the first guy who has something meaningful to say about the whole issue of 1936-37 state terror scale.

Germanboy: the figures you quote are exactly that. Somebody "estimated" these figures. Read, invented them by sucking out of his thumb. And presented as a serious fact. Glantz quoted that "estimation". Similar estimations about, say, total numbers of GULAG clients, turned out to be gross exagerrations.

In the particular case, 40,000 figure (Solzhenitsyn gives another, exact number) is the total number of military personnel who quit military service in 1939. "Estimate", how many of these retired by age, were KIA, wounded, expelled from service for drinking etc, and there is not much room left for "purges".

Actually, it's your estimate that's widely off base. Here are the numbers, according to Professor Komal.

Year Dismissed Percent of all officers Arrested

1937 18658 13,1 4474

1938 16362 9,2 5032

1939 1878 0,7 73

Out of those in the "dismissed" category, approximately 85% were dismissed due to "political" factors. Also, the arrests were

heavily biased towards upper ranks of the Army - which was especially damaging. It's a lot easier to replace 30% of all Leutentants

then 90 percent of Colonels and aove. The "missing" item in this table is the effect of purges on those who were left - in many cases very junior officers who were promoted several rungs on the ladder above their ability. Many were extremely hesitant to exercise any sort of initiative, fearing they would be branded as Troskite saboteurs

if anything at all went wrong. As they say, no men ever went very wrong by following orders from his superiors.

At the time, it was only possible to know how many of army top brass were "purged".

Next, these "corps commanders" and "brigade commanders" are not positions. They are MILITARY RANKS (they cancelled traditional ranks in 1917 and switched back to them in 1943).

Most of them (abnd I can easily prove that in case of the five marshals) were not combat officers. Most were political officers (Trotsky's main powerbase), others were not NKVD. Some, as I mentioned, were even judges, railroad bosses etc.

Actually, in vast majority of cases they are both "positions" and "military ranks". It would not be out ordinary for somebody with "Brigade Commander" to lead a regiment, or a division but that's about it.

How far did the state terror campaign affect military in general, there is no good data yet, but almost surely that when somebody digs into archives, the referred "estimates" will fall flat.

That, on the other hand, is complete bull****. People have been digging into archives for the last ten years, and numbers have been generally consistent.

Next, on "trotskyists" point, Trotsky was not just a figurehead, so to say. He (and Kirov) were the only political opponents strong enough to unseat Uncle Joe. The army establishement was the only thing not under his control in 1936. Besides, he was of no great opinion about them.

Now, look at who was in control of RKKA in June 1941. Bah, all familiar faces - the greatest soviet generals of WWII. And believe me, they had all the experience a peacetime general (with WWI/Civil War comnbat experience) could have, keeping in mind that between 1939 and 1941 RKKA saw threefold growth in number of men, machines and combat formations.

Errr…no. Can you say "Voroshilov, Kulik, Budenny"? These were the top men in the RKKA in June, and it took a lot of bad missteps on their part until they were pushed

Somewhere where they could do less harm. Others, like Pavlov were summarily shot for errors which were hardly their own. On the "Trotskies" point you're blowing up

simple association into a conspiracy. Come to think of it, Stalin and Trostky were fairly close in those early days of the revolution. Certainly a lot closer then many men and women sentenced under Stalin for "Trotskism".

> Tukhachevskii still saw the flaws in the

> Soviet Army and recommended they be

> changed.

I certainly see the flaws of russian army today, and can predict with reasonable accuracy what the modern war will look like. Does it make me a good general? Hmm... Tukhachevsky was not a great general - anyone who would bother to read his theoretical works in the light of modern day knowledge would know that. What he definitely was though, was a "political whore", to quote Uncle Joe

Stalin.

His works were as revolutionary in his day as anything by Guderian, Fuller and Lidell-Hart. Unfortunately, we cannot know what he could've done with the army given another

4 years of stewardship. It's reasonable to assume that he would've done better. And do you really expect any sort of objectivity on the part of "Uncle Joe" to the men he had executed on his orders? Puh-leese.

[This message has been edited by Gregory Deych (edited 02-06-2001).]

[Gregory Deych]

Originally posted by Skipper:

Heh... Sorry for not being clear. I can prove that most of the 5 marshals "purged" were not combat officers at the time they were "purged". And in every case of the five, I can understand Stalin's reasons (although not his methods - but I have no idea if he had an alternative; surely enough, he did not look for alternatives too hard). Heck, the surviving four were no more useful during war, either - sinecures for granddads.

Getting rid of Tukhachevsky (ie, firing him from the army brass, not the act of killing him) IMHO was a positive factor for the RKKA combat-readiness.

During 20-s Trotsky was in charge of the army. Most of the top brass were his creatures. That's the context in which the purges should be seen, mainly.

I can understand Stalin's reasons too, which in no way says anything about how correct they were. If I think you're a German spy and sentence you to death, my actions are perfectly consistent with my reasoning...but it says absolutely nothing about wether you are or are not a spy! To put it another way, Stalin's actions were designed to preserve his position from any POSSIBLE contender, regardless of wether any such contention existed. If that's the point of the Soviet state was to guard Stalin's ass, then that's a great strategy. Otherwise it's a recipe for disaster.

[Skipper]

> Except that the current date largely

> confirms what was published back then.

Except that the figures you later quoted are 4 times less than previously mentioned 40,000, to start with.

> Actually, it's your estimate that's widely

> off base.

Fair enough, an estimate is an estimate.

> Here are the numbers, according to

> Professor Komal.

Aha. Looks like somebody already dug in the archives. Can you give me an URL or ISBN?

Taking the figures you posted as a fact, we are now talking almost 40,000 dismissed, and about 9,000 arrested. It remains to figure out, how many of the dismissed were "purges for political reasons". I very much doubt that it was 85%.

With 80,000 strong officer corps one would expect about 6 to 8,000 dismissed annually just in a normal way of life, what do you think?

The large drop in "dismissed" figure in 1939 is when soviet mobilisation started.

> Actually, in vast majority of cases they

> are both "positions" and "military ranks".

Very far from vast majority. While certainly vast majority of divisional and regimental COs would be "kombrigs", the other way around is not true. Ie, lots of "kombrigs" were not combat officers at all. Ie, police, NKVD, judges etc. The normally cited figures "X out of Y kombrigs", afaik, do not separate this category.

> Can you say "Voroshilov, Kulik, Budenny"?

Surely can. Can you say "Head of partisan movement"? Sinecures for heroic granddads. iirc, none of these guys you mention took part in strategic decision making except Kulik, maybe.

> His works were as revolutionary in his day

> as anything by Guderian, Fuller and Lidell-

> Hart. Unfortunately, we cannot know what

> he could've done with the army given

> another 4 years of stewardship.

Poland 1920. Have you read his works, by the way, or just quoting somebody else's opinion? Cause I did, and well, I can write such fantasies, too - as long as you don;t ask me to stick to realities of available technology, economics, logistics etc too much.

> And do you really expect any sort of

> objectivity on the part of "Uncle Joe" to

> the men he had executed on his orders?

No. Why do you ask? I do not expect any degree of democratic inclinations or political corectness from him, either. Not that kind of person, you know It's just the he did not do anything out of bloodlust - his actions always had a good political or strategic reasoning behind. He made his fair share of blunders, but it is not quite so clear that "purging" the army in 1937 was one of them.

Army, as far as I can say, was not an imagined but very real and direct political threat to the Uncle Joe.

Besides, you have no idea what RKKA was like before the purges. Somehow, you assume that it was better, or more efficient, or capable of holding Vistory Parade in 1942. My undertanding is completely different.

[The Commissar]

Originally posted by Barleyman:

Are you willing to test that hypothesis over a game, assuming CM2 comes out with winter war support?

I would love a chance for this sort of test.

However, before commensing such a battle, we must establish what results give either player "better then history" statistics. IE: Capturing a vilage isnt enough if you lost 5 times the number of men as the enemy did. The other way around, now THAT's a feat!

Finnish were not much more then conscripts themselves, AFAIK. The moview Winter War, if it is to be relied upon to even a light degree, shows this. The Finns were modivated - just like the Russians were when Germans invaded them. Any people would have the same reaction.

So at best, Finns and Soviets would both be Conscript/Green/Regular with the Finns having a higher fanatacism rating and better morale.

If I am not mistaken, the Finns also used mostly Soviet equipment, so it should not be very difficult to model.

Now, radios - did the Finns have better communication? Quite probably. So reaction times would be shorter.

Other then that, I see no major difference. Coordinate your assault and plan well - that is what the Soviets skipped all together in their approach to battle against the Finns (and early on, the Germans).

Cheers!

------------------

"...Every position, every meter of Soviet soil must be defended to the last drop of blood..."

- Segment from Order 227 "Not a step back"

[Skipper]

> If that's the point of the Soviet state

> was to guard Stalin's ass, then that's a

> great strategy.

That's warmer already. His strategy, in simple terms, was something like that:

- collectivisation (early 30s)

- industrialisation (mid 30s)

- building up military (late 30s)

- big european war

- worldwide communist revolution

- he conquers the world

Do you want a description of what USSR was like in late 20s, when Stalin acquired the real power? It was a wasteland.

Since Stalin wanted to manage it within his own lifetime, he had to press very hard. Guarding his ass in the circumstances was justified, to put it mildly.

Finally, it is one thing to accuse something of "trotskyism" under the same breath as for "spying for germany", like they liked to do, and quite another - to say that Trotsky was Stalin's political opponent number 1, even when he was already abroad.

[Gregory Deych]

Originally posted by Skipper:

Except that the figures you later quoted are 4 times less than previously mentioned 40,000, to start with.

This may be a semantical problem. Some authors count only those who were imprisoned, others those who were dismissed from the army as well.

> Here are the numbers, according to

> Professor Komal.

Aha. Looks like somebody already dug in the archives. Can you give me an URL or ISBN?

The source is: "Military Cadres before the War", Military History Journal ¹2, 1990.

The article is available at http://rkka.vif2.ru/analys/kadri/main.htm (in Russian).

Taking the figures you posted as a fact, we are now talking almost 40,000 dismissed, and about 9,000 arrested. It remains to figure out, how many of the dismissed were "purges for political reasons". I very much doubt that it was 85%.

With 80,000 strong officer corps one would expect about 6 to 8,000 dismissed annually just in a normal way of life, what do you think?

The large drop in "dismissed" figure in 1939 is when soviet mobilisation started.

Indeed. However, one would also expect that in a period when a large majority of officers were dismissed, the marginal (but politically safe) candidates would be preferentially retained. If your brigade XO is a drunk, but the only one who could replace him is a a captain you just promoted to command a regiment you damn well keep what you have.

> Actually, in vast majority of cases they

> are both "positions" and "military ranks".

Very far from vast majority. While certainly vast majority of divisional and regimental COs would be "kombrigs", the other way around is not true. Ie, lots of "kombrigs" were not combat officers at all. Ie, police, NKVD, judges etc. The normally cited figures "X out of Y kombrigs", afaik, do not separate this category.

I have not been able to find any references to non-military being given military ranks. It's possible that some retired military men could have been referred by their army rank, but that does not create a large class of men. Also, NKVD have their own ranking, being referred to as "Senior Leutenant GB" (who was actually equivalent to a major), "Kommisar GB" etc, but never "kombrig GB".

> Can you say "Voroshilov, Kulik, Budenny"?

Surely can. Can you say "Head of partisan movement"? Sinecures for heroic granddads. iirc, none of these guys you mention took part in strategic decision making except Kulik, maybe.

Hardly. Voroshilov managed to wind his way around General Staff and Stavka until the end of the war, being Stalin's crony he was nearly invulnerable (to anybody but Stalin, of course). Budenny made a total hash of Southern front untill being shuffled off for total incompetence.

> His works were as revolutionary in his day

> as anything by Guderian, Fuller and Lidell-

> Hart. Unfortunately, we cannot know what

> he could've done with the army given

> another 4 years of stewardship.

Poland 1920. Have you read his works, by the way, or just quoting somebody else's opinion? Cause I did, and well, I can write such fantasies, too - as long as you don;t ask me to stick to realities of available technology, economics, logistics etc too much.

He was overrash in 1920, but note that Russians were within striking distance of Warsaw before they were thrown back.

> And do you really expect any sort of

> objectivity on the part of "Uncle Joe" to

> the men he had executed on his orders?

No. Why do you ask? I do not expect any degree of democratic inclinations or political corectness from him, either. Not that kind of person, you know

[Skipper]

> Please be so kind as to show a shred of

> evidence of a conspiracy to replace Stalin.

In case of Trotsky, I guess, everything is obvious (if you have an understanding of what was the story between the two wars).

In case of the army, well I have no good evidence of that. Multiple "voluntary confessions", but we know what they are worth, right?

However the link Trotsky-army brass is not too difficult to make, and that's, I am afraid, the way it works in reallife - a dictator who waits for evidence, usually gets it in the form of his own funeral.

> Also, NKVD have their own ranking,

> being referred to as "Senior Leutenant GB"

As well as equal to "major" in some of those "studies". That really applies to kombrig/brigadnyy komissar etc.

Thanks for a good URL. Now, look at these figures in view of the facts that:

1. that over 10,000 officers were rehabilitated in 1938-39.

2. That at the same time, about 100,000 new officers were enlisted.

3. That there were about three times more officer positions in RKKA in summer 1941 than there was in 1937.

4. That VVS pilot was NCO rank.

To quote from the URL,

+++

ôàêòè÷åñêàÿ óáûëü èç àðìèè îôèöåðîâ ñîñòàâèëà â 1936—1937 ãã. 19674 ÷åëîâåêà (6,9% ñïèñî÷íîé ÷èñëåííîñòè), à çà 1938—1939 ãã. — 11 723 ÷åëîâåêà (2,3% ñïèñî÷íîé ÷èñëåííîñòè).

+++

Actually dismissed from RKKA in 1936-37 were 19674 men (6.9%), for 1938-39 - 11723 (2.3%).

[Gregory Deych]

Originally posted by Skipper:

> Please be so kind as to show a shred of

> evidence of a conspiracy to replace Stalin.

In case of Trotsky, I guess, everything is obvious (if you have an understanding of what was the story between the two wars).

In case of the army, well I have no good evidence of that. Multiple "voluntary confessions", but we know what they are worth, right?

However the link Trotsky-army brass is not too difficult to make, and that's, I am afraid, the way it works in reallife - a dictator who waits for evidence, usually gets it in the form of his own funeral.

So, there is no rational evidence.

> Also, NKVD have their own ranking,

> being referred to as "Senior Leutenant GB"

As well as equal to "major" in some of those "studies". That really applies to kombrig/brigadnyy komissar etc.

Perhaps, but I'd need to see good, solid reference to that before I accept it. Brigadny Kommisar are usually listed separately in the tables.

Thanks for a good URL. Now, look at these figures in view of the facts that:

1. that over 10,000 officers were rehabilitated in 1938-39.

2. That at the same time, about 100,000 new officers were enlisted.

3. That there were about three times more officer positions in RKKA in summer 1941 than there was in 1937.

4. That VVS pilot was NCO rank.

Yes, RKKA was undergoing an enourmous expansion, which would hamstring even a force well supplied with officer cadres - not to mention one which was literally decapitated. You cannot make a regiment commander from a company commander by simply giving him the new shoulder-boards. Look at this figures - in 1939 - 74% of all positions of regiment commander and up were filled. I'm presuming that most positions were filled because of vertical moves.

To quote from the URL,

+++

ôàêòè÷åñêàÿ óáûëü èç àðìèè îôèöåðîâ ñîñòàâèëà â 1936—1937 ãã. 19674 ÷åëîâåêà (6,9% ñïèñî÷íîé ÷èñëåííîñòè), à çà 1938—1939 ãã. — 11 723 ÷åëîâåêà (2,3% ñïèñî÷íîé ÷èñëåííîñòè).

+++

Actually dismissed from RKKA in 1936-37 were 19674 men (6.9%), for 1938-39 - 11723 (2.3%).