Trommelfeuer Posted November 28, 2003 Share Posted November 28, 2003 Ian Gooderson's 'Air Power at the Battlefront', London 1998, contains a couple of cases studies. It's very interesting, please have a look. Greetings, Sven [ November 28, 2003, 05:42 AM: Message edited by: Trommelfeuer ] 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Andreas Posted November 28, 2003 Share Posted November 28, 2003 Sven You may want to check that link again... 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Trommelfeuer Posted November 28, 2003 Author Share Posted November 28, 2003 Sorry, my fault, now it's the correct link. Greetings, Sven [ November 28, 2003, 05:51 AM: Message edited by: Trommelfeuer ] 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Eddy Posted November 28, 2003 Share Posted November 28, 2003 Interesting read. Clearly the perceived threat from Allied air power by the German troops was far greater than the actual, physical threat. The number of abandoned vehicles or the number of vehicles destroyed by their own crew was suprisingly high. I wonder if a survey exists for prior to the breakout, and if so whether the number of abandoned vehicles would be so high. It could be that crews destroyed/abandoned their vehicles more easily after COBRA because there may have been a feeling amongst the German Army that they had lost the battle once the breakout has occurred. Or maybe not. Anyway good read for a Friday afternoon. Beats the crap out of working. Cheers Ed 0 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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