CAS and its effectiveness revisited

[Jeff Heidman]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by CavScout:

I think it is tough to compare CAS of today versus that of WWII.

You fly a bit slower in a P47 over a modern jet fighter.

Then there is the lack of SAMs and such.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

CAS is today is MUCH more effective, simply because of the addition of guided munitions.

The biggest problem with CAS in WW2 (battlefield air support) is hitting anything. Tanks are extremely difficult to hit with a bomb or a rocket.

Sure, they might not be too hard to hit when they are lined up on a road, and this forces them to travel at night or dispersed. But on an actual battlefield in WW2, the odds of a fighter bomber actually taking out a tank were slim at best.

Today, an AH-64 or A-10 launches a Hellfire or a Maverick and the tank is dead. Yeah, there are SAMS, but in WW2 there was flack. Take your pick.

Jeff Heidman

[Jeff Heidman]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tailz:

General comparisons of what? Fighter bombers (ie Typhoons) slowed the movement of German armoured forces to a crawl during the Normandy campaign. (and not just by railway/bridge destruction... they were getting shot apart on the 'drive to the beach'... had to travel at night, because day travel was suicide.) If it was German and moved by day, it could be guaranteed of becoming a target for FB's. Even staff cars got chased down!! (Rommel) The modern version of the fighter-bomber... AH-64 or the A-10, so without Air Superiority (to keep the FB's away), air assets can and will dominate armour.

The joys of combined arms warfare.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Your example is not an example of CAS, but of interdiction. There is little doubt that FBs can and did wreak havoc on columns of vehicles, including tank. When they are all lined up and driving in a straight line it is easy to hit them with rockets and bombs.

Once they dispersed, even during the day, it become very difficult to spot or engage them.

Jeff Heidman

[DanSpillard]

As this is a thread about arty and air support, I'd like to mention it seems the piper cub arty spotters are an omission in the thread and game. Not all arty spotters where on the ground. Of course the idea of an Air Force spotter on the ground for air support was born during this time and they are not listed either.

Gamewise I have no problem with the airstrike rules or the effectiveness. I have played the Viller-Bocage battle a couple of times and the air worked out well.

[scoop88]

In all the debate here about the accuracy of fighter-bombers hitting ground targets, I don't think enough mention has been made of the fact that the THREAT of Allied air power was enough to seriously handicap the Germans' mobility. During daylight periods of good weather in Normandy the Germans avoided movement in the open for fear of being hit by fighter-bombers, which limited their ability to move their armor to where it was needed most. (Sure, they could move at night, but anybody who has been involved in a military night march with running lights dimmed or out knows how difficult and dangerous it is.)

Also remember that the Germans deliberately planned the Ardennes offensive for a period of bad weather to avoid Allied air power ... and when the skies finally did clear over the Ardennes, the Germans lost any chance of success.

So the point is that you have to consider the strategic value of close air support/interdiction (that it made the Germans put severe limits on their own mobiiity), in addition to the tactical value (the actual number of targets hit). In strategic terms, close air support/interdiction was an important factor in the Germans' defeat, although the strategic element is beyond the level of Combat Mission.

[Bimmer]

This has been covered before, as you might expect. The fundamental points have been hit here - interdiction vs. CAS, strike accuracy, ordnance effectiveness, etc. I am of the mind that air support is now entirely too effective and does not mimic the historical capabilities of CAS very well. Interdiction is beyond the scope of the game. Unfortunately, there are some who do not understand the differences between the two.

If you want to see some other thoughts on this and supporting evidence for my position, check: http://www.battlefront.com/discuss/Forum1/HTML/013472.html

[Guest tero]

>This has been covered before, as you might expect.

A nice way to put it. Far from the more ordinary "do a "insert your favourite profanity here" search.

I sure feel there is a demand for a real life FAQ on a lot of issues.

>The fundamental points have been hit here - interdiction vs. CAS, strike accuracy, ordnance effectiveness, etc.

It is just that Anglo-American history writing has not been all that objective when it comes to dispelling old Western Allied propaganda. When you see an old English or American news reel you automatically deem it to be a relevant, historically accurate source, original voice over and all. When you seen an old German news reel with the original voice over you deem it automatically as propaganda.

>I am of the mind that air support is now entirely too effective and does not mimic the historical capabilities of CAS very well.

While I share your view on the representation of the historical capabilites of CAS in CM no I would not say it is overly effective as such.

>Interdiction is beyond the scope of the game.

Not necessarily. One way to represent it would be to inflict some random casualties (by depleting the squads or disabling or taking out some vehicles or AFV's) on the German players forces after purchase IF the Allied player purchased CAS. If the German bought AAA these casualties would be neutralized or greatly diminished.

>Unfortunately, there are some who do not understand the differences between the two.

I think there is much controversy as to where CAS becomes interdiction.

[This message has been edited by tero (edited 01-18-2001).]

[Guest tero]

>I think you're flogging a dead horse there mate.

And that makes me a ...... necroequestrian ?

>Sorry, couldn't resist...

I did start it myself.

[Sirocco]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Bimmer:

I am of the mind that air support is now entirely too effective and does not mimic the historical capabilities of CAS very well. Interdiction is beyond the scope of the game. Unfortunately, there are some who do not understand the differences between the two.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I couldn't agree more.

I don't know how BTS intend to implement aircraft in CM2, or whether they intend to include them at all, but it's an area that needs some fundemental research if they are to be included.

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"He belongs to a race which has coloured the map red, and all he wants are the green fields of England..."

- Joe Illingworth, Yorkshire Post War Correspondent

[Jasper]

"Interdiction is beyond the scope of the game. "

Not is operations it isn't. BTS is tippy toeing towards the edge by their 'Operations' feature. In that case you could / would / should be able to intedict the enemy supplies (reinforments) scheduled to show up in future days.

[Bimmer]

Here's the point on interdiction: Who is going to make the decisions based on the results of enemy interdiction? That is to say, at what levels of command are the effects of interdiction likely to be evaluated and countered? When moving forces around within a theatre, or even down to a corps or division sector, the decisions are being made at several levels above the highest represented in CM. We are not handling division command-level movements here - CM is purely tactical. I cannot think of a situation where even the largest possible CM operation would (or could) represent battalion-level movements of any distance longer than what would be considered tactical adjustment, and thus not subject to interdiction. If a designer wants to incorporate the effects of interdiction in an operation, fine, but there is absolutely no reason that this needs to be modelled in detail or represented graphically in the game - it is beyond the scope of CM's tactical environment.

I consider the CAS question to be completely separate from the interdiction argument with the sole commonality being the use of tactical air forces in both activities.

P.S. - The Luftwaffe general whose name I couldn't remember in the old post is Paul Deichmann. His book is _Spearhead for Blitzkrieg_.

[Guest Big Time Software]

I think Sirocco posed the best question:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>And the chances of getting a direct hit would be good..? War isn't a videogame. Put yourself in the seat of a WW2 fighter-bomber, dropping down at speed from altitude, aiming at a tiny target on the ground, in cover, possibly moving, with ground fire coming up at you. Now what do you think your chances are of hitting that..?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Not very good when looked at from the broad spectrum of possibilities. From my experience, CM's CAS models this. So much in fact that I would never think of purchasing CAS for a QB. It simply is too ineffective in my experience.

If someone is really sure that we overmodled the effectiveness of CAS, try doing a bunch of tests. And I mean a BUNCH So far nobody has really tried this. Just one group of people saying "it is overmodled" and another saying "it is fine".

Tero brought up some historical refferences, but nobody has compared these to what happens in the game. BTW Tero, your ratios of missions to success are incorrect. You can not mistake strategic results with tactical ones. For example...

If a plane has a 10% chance of finding a target, and a 20% chance of hitting it, you will find that 1 out of 10 missions will result in not one vehicle being ENGAGED. But in that one battle, there is a 20% chance that one vehicle will be killed. So in the big picture it is only, what, one in 50 missions that results in a kill. However that does not mean that if an airplane shows up you that there is only a one in 50 chance that a vehicle will see a vehicle killed. Instead, it is one in 20.

Also... people forget that a 500lb bomb does not need to score a direct hit to cause a vehicle significant damage. This is a HUGE bomb folk, it only needs to get close. Still a tough thing for a WWII pilot to do, but far more likely than a direct hit. And hitting a slowly moving vehicle with 50cal MGs isn't nearly as hard, and yet is just as effective in most cases.

Steve

[Guest tero]

I did some recalculations as I realized my errors while I was driving home.

>From my experience, CM's CAS models this.

Except for it being 100% on target in CM I agree.

>If someone is really sure that we overmodled the effectiveness of CAS, try doing a bunch of tests. And I mean a BUNCH. So far nobody has really tried this. Just one group of people saying "it is overmodled" and another saying "it is fine".

I take it you admit that when CAS makes a bombrun it has picked a target that is real

every time. Apart from that I count myself to the "it is fine" cathegory.

>Tero brought up some historical refferences, but nobody has compared these to what happens in the game.

I would be content if people even compared them to the various memoires thrown around as authoritative sources.

>BTW Tero, your ratios of missions to success are incorrect. You can not mistake strategic results with tactical ones.

If you read carefully I made the calculations to compare the data to the other source I mentioned. Just to discredit the awesome (or was it impressive ?) ratio attributed to the USAAF in that one source.

And I deliberately included the strategic targets to bring the ratio up so as to show what the "true" kill ratio for ALL stafing and bombing missions was according to official USAAF figures. I was fishing for responces and you are the first one who actually took notice.

>If a plane has a 10% chance of finding a target, and a 20% chance of hitting it, you will find that 1 out of 10 missions will result in not one vehicle being ENGAGED. But in that one battle, there is a 20% chance that one vehicle will be killed. So in the big picture it is only, what, one in 50 missions that results in a kill.

You must mean in 9 out of 10 missions not one vehicle being engaged. Only 1 out of 10

missions find/engage a target. At 20% hit rate that figures out as 0.2 mission in 10 (ie. 1 in 50 or 2 in 100) kills a target. And even that is generous, given the uncertainty of the kill claims.

>However that does not mean that if an airplane shows up you that there is only a one in 50 chance that a vehicle will see a vehicle killed. Instead, it is one in 20.

See one killed or kill one self ? Chance to kill one self is 2 in 100 (according to the

calculations above). See = witness one killed, that is anybodys quess.

According to this thesis 90% of the time the plane does not find a target, even if they

are in the correct target area. If we assume the designated target area was found OK in

100% of the cases (which most certainly did not happen) there are a few options:

1) the planes returned home fully loaded

2) the planes jetisoned their payload and returned home.

3) the pilot followed somebodys lead and bombed whatever the other guy engaged, for effect

4) the pilot looked and looked, anxious to score some kills. He sees what he thinks

qualifies as target and attacks that (drawing others to follow his lead) = attacks a bogus target

I think options 3 and 4 are more likely than the first two.

>Also... people forget that a 500lb bomb does not need to score a direct hit to cause a vehicle significant damage. This is a HUGE bomb folk, it only needs to get close.

That depends on the terrain and the fuse settings. In the open you do NOT want to be near one when it explodes but if the terrain is soft/wet/marshy/snowy/covered with trees the attack must be fairly spot on to make any damage. If the bomb has a daisy cutter attached then the splinter effect is more pronounced. Also, in air/tree bursts (just like with any artillery shell) the cone of the explosion leaves blind zones that escape damage while the area next to it is devastated.

>Still a tough thing for a WWII pilot to do, but far more likely than a direct hit.

Yes. But a kill claimed due to a near MISS was more often not a kill at all.

>And hitting a slowly moving vehicle with 50cal MGs isn't nearly as hard, and yet is just as effective in most cases.

The same spotting restrictions apply though.

[This message has been edited by tero (edited 01-19-2001).]

[Bimmer]

Steve, you are correct that no one here has, to my knowledge, conducted extensive tests on CAS. If I can get some time and a reasonable setup I may try to do this. My comments are based on anecdotal evidence within the game as compared to historical evidence.

In the earlier thread I pointed out a USAAF ordnance study cited in Deichmann's book that suggested that TacAir was substantially less effective than claimed, particularly against tanks and heavy AFVs.

As Tero points out, success with 500lb GP bombs is highly dependent on fusing and ground conditions. Aerial gunnery is not terribly easy, particularly against targets moving on a different axis to the firing aircraft (incidentally, this is one of the reasons why interdiction along roads and railbeds is substantially easier than attacking deployed forces). The one type of ordnance not mentioned, rockets, are actually what prompted me to comment in the first place. Historically they were terribly inaccurate (check the study mentioned above) and highly unlikely to kill any sort of heavy AFV. Blast effects by any sort of ordnance are a different question entirely - softskins and infantry are highly vulnerable to these, as are open-topped AFVs.

Your point about quantifying these impressions within the game is well-taken. I'll see what I can do.

[Guest tero]

Work related inactivity bump

[Simon Fox]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>WO 291/2357 Rocket Typhoons. This report is dated 12 June 1945. The expected probability of hits on different targets using RPs is given as: Target/Dimensions/% hits

Small gun position/5' diameter/0.2

Panther tank/22'6" × 10'9" × 9'10"/0.5

Large gun position/10' diameter/0.8

Army hut/60' × 30' × 20'/2.8

Large building/120' × 54' × 50'/10.0

Among the hundreds of abandoned and knocked out tanks that have been examined, no instance has been recorded of a tank that has been hit by R.P. and escaped major damage.

RP are very effective on guns (20mm guns are blown to pieces), tanks, barns and huts. Brick houses have a large hole knocked in them and "considerable havoc wrought inside". Anti-personnel effects are limited, as the rocket tends to bury itself, and on concrete structures and thick masonry such as churches the damage inflicted in superficial.

The morale effects of rocket attack appear considerable. Enemy PWs report that all personnel except flak gunners hide from aircraft from 1 to 10 minutes after the completion of an attack, expecting the attackers to return for a second strafing pass.

"It appears quite definite that it is the nature of the attack that upsets the Germans and not the physical damage which it causes."

RP Typhoons are also reported to have a considerable heartening effect on friendly troops.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>So I guess that means irrespective of the other effects the globale morale of the side with CAS should rise and that of the opponent fall. hehe

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Muddying the waters as usual.

[Brian Rock]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero:

I found some new evidence to put the alledged effectiveness of CAS in doubt. These figures are for USAAF only as I have not located any compatible comparative data on RAF yet.

At

http://www.au.af.mil/au/afhra/wwwroot/aafsd/aafsd_list_of_tables_operations.html

I found the official figures on sorties, expended ammunition and bombs and the numbers of lost USAAF aircraft. I really find it odd the real historians claim these figures are indeterminable.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Are you saying the Air Force historians aren't *real* historians?

[Sirocco]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>So I guess that means irrespective of the other effects the globale morale of the side with CAS should rise and that of the opponent fall.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

"We had hardly started when they were overhead...Dirt, stones, and disintegrated trees, wrapped in clouds of black smoke, went flying past our vision slits...As if chased by the devil we raced across trenches and over craters, 60 tons of tank bobbing about like a rowing boat in a storm."

- Caen, Anvil of Victory, p.244

When looked at from that perspective, I think "shocked" status for the crew would most often be the appropriate result of CAS.

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"He belongs to a race which has coloured the map red, and all he wants are the green fields of England..."

- Joe Illingworth, Yorkshire Post War Correspondent

[Guest Big Time Software]

Tero, thanks for corecting my 1 in 10 mistake. The point is, with your correction, valid. Total number of kills divided by number of missions does not give you the chance of a vehicle being killed in a particular circumstance. Number of targets available, weather conditions, terrain, pilot skill, etc. all factor in.

So what is a reasonable kill rate for CAS in a CM battle? I don't have a number because I do not know of one that exists to give We made it about as effective as we felt was warrented. And in support of those who think that battlefield CAS was not all that effective, I say I totally agree. That is why I never waste my points on a CAS unit

Getting back to the 100% on target thing. Tero, we covered this in a previous thread. There are other factors included that reduce this from being effectively 100%. If the plane doesn't aquire a target it doesn't show up. CAS missions can even target friendly units. And even if it attacks a particular target, you can't be sure what it went after. So in game terms, it is irrelevant since it has no bearing on the realism of the simulation at all. Therefore, it is not worth discussing yet again.

Steve

[Guest Broken!]

For an excellent discussion of CAS, Interdiction, BAI (battle area interdiction), etc., see the book "Firepower in Limited War" by Robert Scales. Briefly covers Normandy, extensively covers Vietnam, Gulf War, Afghanistan, and Falklands. This is the best coverage of this topic I have read to date. Lots of nuts and bolts about how good (and bad) CAS is conducted, as well as a broad discussion of its effectiveness. Covers artillery and helicopter support as well.

There seems to be a lot of "all or nothing" to this discussion of CAS and interdiction,(CAS camp vs the Interdiction camp). Really, both had and have their place. When the terrain is open, Interdiction and BAI are very effective. The pilots can find plenty of targets by themselves. This is the ideal interdiction environment. But when there is a lot of close terrain (forest or jungle)the ground forces will often be the better "target locator" for the airforces. In this environment, there should be a greater percentage of CAS in the mix.

In the WWII ETO, post Normandy, true CAS missions (ie, target spotted from the ground) were highly concentrated about the locations of the Air Liason Officers (ALO)(as the FAOs were called). After all, they were the only ground personnel who could call an fighter-bomber strike against a specific target. In CM terms, you would get no CAS at all unless you had an ALO attached, in which case your chances of getting CAS were very good indeed. ALO requested CAS missions were 1/3 of 9th Airforces total missions during the time of the Normandy breakout. The ground forces benefiting from these missions rated them as more effective than heavy artillery at digging out tough close-in targets. At the same time, fighter bombers would perform interdiction missions to the immediate front of the advancing columns (the modern term is "battle area interdiction"). This combination destroyed over 2,000 German vehicles during the week of the breakout.

"Our best tank destroyer is the P-47" - (Fall, Street Without Joy).

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"You can't reason a man out of an opinion he did't reason himself into in the first place." - Mark Twain

[Jasper]

Ya know, you just can't rush good help.

Well I've got a source document on this subject, I uploaded the file blah blah. Did everything but provide a link to it. Duh. Anyway it's called "Air Action Against Combat Formations". There's some other stuff but I think that's the best that I've got. I didn't really look for airforce type stuff, the next time I think about I'll look around and see if I can find some other source documents on air support.

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Check out http://www.geocities.com/funfacts2001/ for military documents written during WWII

[Guest tero]

>Are you saying the Air Force historians aren't *real* historians?

They say the biggest lie is the statistic and since it was these Air Force analysts who draw up the statistics they could damn well analyze what ever they wanted, coming up with aswers that were predetermined and/or selfserving.

Hence to call Air Force historians (payed employees with invested interests) historians is dubious at best.

[This message has been edited by tero (edited 01-25-2001).]

[Guest tero]

>Total number of kills divided by number of missions does not give you the chance of a vehicle being killed in a particular circumstance. Number of targets available, weather conditions, terrain, pilot skill, etc. all factor in.

Yes. But if the numbers are drawn from historically reliable source they are indicative of the true (or rather actual) effect of the CAS in terms of sorties per kill.

>So what is a reasonable kill rate for CAS in a CM battle? I don't have a number because I do not know of one that exists to give

We could start with the actual kill rate in CM. But that is a bust as I think there have not been any extensive tests made.

How is the kill propability calculated ? Is CAS rated as a vehicle or as an off board asset arty in terms of algorithms ?

Incidenatly, could CAS be made an off board arty asset with FO assigning targets ?

>We made it about as effective as we felt was warrented.

What were the criteria ?

>That is why I never waste my points on a CAS unit

So you included it to meet the demand ?

>There are other factors included that reduce this from being effectively 100%.

Such as ? In my experience CAS is 100% on target when it decides to show up. The fact that it misses is beside the point.

>If the plane doesn't aquire a target it doesn't show up.

Perhaps it should ? Off board arty fires even if the target area is devoid of human life.

>CAS missions can even target friendly units.

That is true to life.

>And even if it attacks a particular target, you can't be sure what it went after.

Unless you have some sort of LOS on the target area. And since CAS prefers armoured targets certain assumptions can be made as to the nature of the target.

>So in game terms, it is irrelevant since it has no bearing on the realism of the simulation at all.

Still, it would be nice to have them pick random targets, like houses and patches of forest, from time to time. Just to muddy the water up some.