Great article on WW2 Artillery Doctrine

[Chicago Boy]

I posted this in another thread, but I think everyone might enjoy reading this great piece of research on WW2 doctrine in the ETO.

Its on the War times Journal Website-other great stuff there as well. http://tigertank.com/aslcrossroads/tactical/arty.htm

Cheers from the Windy City

[This message has been edited by Chicago Boy (edited 10-14-2000).]

[jlsimpson]

Hmm nice site kinda fits in with some of my preconceived ideas on artillery effects . I have also noticed looking at what little statistical evidence there is covering tank losses by indirect fire the us claim a far higher known kill rate than the british .

[brucer]

Sorry, but you're better off reading the later version of the same article (on combathq.thegamers.net, among other places) where the author admits at the end that all his main suppositions about the differences between American and British artillery were WRONG, the result of something he misheard at a gaming conference by some speaker whose name he can't remember. Please...

Actually, given that the article has exactly zero historical backup to it, the amount of play that has been given the author's unique and unverified assumptions on the web is quite remarkable. I have little more faith, for instance, in his conclusion that since the Germans used a TIR coordinate system instead of gridded maps (source? who knows?) that they were therefore less efficient gunners.

There's a big difference between claiming that the Germans relied less on artillery in their doctrine (which no one disputes) and claiming that their gunners therefore must have been relatively incompetent (which seems largely unfounded).

Keep looking: there are better sources out there, most of which don't happen to share the author's deeply pro-American bias, either.

Regards,

Brucer

[Claus B]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by brucer:

Keep looking: there are better sources out there, most of which don't happen to share the author's deeply pro-American bias, either.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Can you name some of those sources?

Claus B

[ibucephalus]

The claims the author of the article makes seem very different from everything i've read and experienced of the british artillery system.It doesn't seem based on much research. A good book that gives a first-hand account of canadian artillery in the war is "The guns of Normandy" by George Blackburn. I'm shure you could find a copy even in the states.

[Wilhammer]

]http://combathq.thegamers.net/articles/Arty/arty.asp

Let's all read this "corrected" version of the article mentioned in the first post, and then deny or affirm the information presented.

Brucer, you are a bit to harsh in condemning it as WRONG. Also, no one is claiming that German FOs and gunners are incompetent, just that the German system was not as rapid in delivery compared to the British or American system. Knowing, as we all do, the propensity for German engineering "overkill" (for lack of a better word), it does not come to too much of surprise they depended on detailed surveys and "as needed" calculations.

American management style (which leads the world and shows it the way) no doubt helped to create the the well organized idea of a book of pre-calculations for use by non-engineers, better known as technicians, and helped reduce time to target as the gunners had to do far less work to calculate the delivery of the shelling.

The radio-net was a huge idea to and was readily adopted by the US as we were making far more radios and citizen ownership was far ahead of anyone else, a situation borne of necessity due to the vastness of the US.

What is discussed in the aforementioned article sounds right to me.

What I really want is a book or books that confirm, support or contradict any or all parts of the above article.

[This message has been edited by Wilhammer (edited 10-14-2000).]

[PzKpfw 1]

Concerning Soviet artillery it was in an developing state from 41 - 44 initialy it was largely inferior in practice as in C&C to the US & UK as their was a lack of cordination as well as the lack of trained specialist's & the lack of radios, Ie, in June 1941 the only establishment in the artillery that had the communication, & survey personell required for inderect fire was the howitzer Regt, within a Rifle Division, and this was changed in the July Shtat as the Soviets shifted the trained personell to Front HQ's.

So in 1941 the Soviet artillery was for the most part only able to provide direct fire support and the effectiveness of their artillery was directly related to the competance or lack of, of the Artillery HQ staff. Rifle Divisions well into 1944 never had the inherent ability to provide inderect fire support and were dependant on higher level formations to provide IDFS.

A classic example of early Soviet problems cordinating Artillery was during the 1942 Kharkov offensive where the Southwestren Front tried to cordinate & control 35 Seprate Artillery Regt's and failed miserably as it was simply beyond the abilities of the single augumented HQ staff to control that large a grouping.

The lessons learned were applied and to solve the earlier problems the Soviets developed the Artillery Division which was largest, & most powerful regular artillery organization formed in WW2 even the presence of 1 Artillery Division was often eneough to ensure Soviet success.

During Stalingrad the Soviets formed the first of this new type of Division, which essentialy was an HQ with 8 attached Seprate Artillery Regts, that supported the 62nd Army, and proved the worth of the new organization, as well as in 1943 during the Kharkov offensive ,when Rifle Divions, attacking a German Division near Kharkov with the supt of 2 Artillery Divison's ahnialated the defending German Division then sent a Tank Army through the breach toward Kharkov. .

After Stalingrad the Soviets continued to evolve their Artillery with the forming of Artillery Brigades, these consisted initialy of 7 - 8 Seprate Artillery Regts attached to an HQ wherever needed, then scaled down to 3 Regt's later in 1943 for better C&C.

This was followed in 1943 by the formation of Artillery Breakthrough Divisions which were basicly an upgraded Artillery Divisions with the addition of 152mm & 203mm howitzer Brigades formed for as the name implies to facilitate breakthroughs.

They also formed the first Artillery Corps HQ's in 1943 which were designed to take over artilley cordination responsibilies from the Army & Front HQ's

So by mid 1944 The Soviets feilded 26 Artillery Divisions, with 11 Breakthrough Divisions, and 6 Artillery Corpse HQ's, and 7 Guards Mortar Divisions, with another 11 Artillery Divs added by Sept 1944 and 2 more Polish Artilery Divisions formed in 1945.

By 1944 the state of C&C as well as communication had increased to the point, that IDFS ability was now aproaching Westren standards in that, begining in 1944 an Artillery Reconnaissance Battalion (spotter Bn) was added to each Artillery Division, and one more was added to each Front HQ & Artillery Corpse HQ, by late 1944 over 90 Artillery Reconnaissance Battalion's had been formed, along with the formation of Artillery Aviation Regt's so that by the end of 1944 each Front & Artillery Corpse HQ had one Regt of spotting aircraft as well.

It is arguable that Soviet Artillery efectiveness ever reached Westren standards, but one thing is evident by late 1943 Soviet Artilley capability had surpassed German abilities, even at the height of Blitzkrieg in effectivness & responsivness. The success of any Soviet offensive could be directly gauged by the artillery commitment. It will be interesting to see how this evolution is modeled in CM2

Regards, John Waters

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"We've got the finest tanks in the world. We just love to see the

German Royal Tiger come up on the field".

Lt.Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. Febuary 1945.

[This message has been edited by PzKpfw 1 (edited 10-15-2000).]

[Jeff Duquette]

PzKpfw 1:

Excellent post. Great summary of the challenges faced by Soviet Artillery during WWII. I suspect this topic will rear its head considerably following the release of CM2...assuming BTS takes a realistic approach to Soviet limitations on tactical employment of indirect Artillery fire. People will want to know why the Russians never (or rarely have FO’s).

Just to add to the reading list for the somewhat more serious...take a look at US ARMY Field Manual FM 6-40 TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR FIELD ARTILLERY MANUAL CANNON GUNNERY, 23 APR 1996 , CHANGE 1, 1 OCTOBER 1999. Yah sure it’s a modern FM, but it will give you an excellent overview of field artillery and indirect fire.

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/6-40/toc.htm

[jlsimpson]

Heres another site site . check out Reflections of a gun crew member on the process of laying and firing the gun.

http://members.tripod.com/~msg_fisher/irv-1.html

[brucer]

Agreed, Germans relied less on artillery to do the job. But I found the author's comments on German artillery survey to be out of line with my own experience as a gunner, and any history I've read.

If the author is arguing that the German artillery was slow because they got orientation and fixation from known points, well, all pre-GPS artillery survey did that. If he's arguing it's because Germans used fewer gridded maps than the Allies, well, he could be right... on the Eastern Front, where good topographical survey would have been harder to find. (France, which was gridded down to the millimeter even before the war, should have been a different story...)

If the author had chosen to argue that the Germans' need to fight all over Europe forced them to specialize in a form of artillery survey that turned out to be less efficient in Northwest Europe, or that early German reliance on tac air had led to a de-emphasis on good artillery coordination, those are valid arguments I've heard elsewhere... but it's a lot more than just "one side used TIR, and the other side used topo."

As for the American vs. British practice, I have not seen any reliable evidence that British indirect fire plotting (which they all but invented in WW1, after all) were somehow more complex than the American versions of the same documents. All evidence indicates that the Brits didn't use a FOO system instead of a FO system 'cause they thought the average soldier wouldn't understand the math... they did it because they thought it more efficient to leave the authority to fire in the hands of a person who could actually see the target. Many historians have concluded they were right. And I think you'll find the Brits relied just as much on radios as the Americans in artillery units, by the way...

In fact, the only criticism I've found in the history books of late-war British artillery doctrine was that it was sometimes superbly wasteful, taking out whole grid squares when the Americans or Germans watching them thought a fewer number of shells was all that was really needed.

Historians say that was a product of three things... the higher ratio of British fieldpieces to soldiers on the ground (often twice the Americans'); the general British aversion to infantry casualties by this point in the war, if shells would do the job; and the fact that the British COULD. It takes a lot of efficiency to engage targets on the fly with dozens or hundreds of tubes, with a minimum of delay... the fact that the British did so regularly speaks to the superiority of their artillery practice, not the other way around.

A much better source for artillery doctrine on the web is at http://www.jmkemp.demon.co.uk/artillery/.

BruceR

[Guest machineman]

Didn't the Soviets call artillery the 'Queen of the Battlefield'?

I remember reading about the Russian defeat in World War I and how one of the major reasons was getting pounded all the time by German artillery that they could not reply to.

As most of the high command of the Soviet Union in WWII had spent their youth retreating under those same artillery blasts it made a lasting impression and they vowed they would never be outdone that way again!

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"Environment is everything - The Lion may be king of the jungle, but you airlift him to Antartica, and he's just some Penguins bitch" - Dennis Miller

[Wilhammer]

Bruce,

A paste from the link you provided, which is my point, exactly;

"[Wesely] Due to differences in how the fire calculations were performed, there were vast differences in the response time to a call for artillery. US and British artillery could respond in 2-3 minutes, while other nations averaged about 12 minutes."

BTW, I always have assumed, excepting for TOT, American and British doctrine, British methods forming the basis of the American, are very much similar. The only other significant difference is that US would get requests and often prioritize them to get maximum effect on one target, then go to the next, which is one way the tables in the article you point us to would be used for.

I am with you in calling Bitish doctrine of a superior quality no doubt enhanced in application due to the desire to minimize casualties.

[This message has been edited by Wilhammer (edited 10-15-2000).]

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Wilhammer:

Bruce,

A paste from the link you provided, which is my point, exactly;

"[Wesely] Due to differences in how the fire calculations were performed, there were vast differences in the response time to a call for artillery. US and British artillery could respond in 2-3 minutes, while other nations averaged about 12 minutes."

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Is that only tube arty, or mortars too? At least until 1944, the Germans had an additional level through which to transmit fire requests, the Bemessbatterien. I have no very little understanding how it worked exactly, but my grandfather was in one of these, as an Unteroffizier, so he did not know a lot about it either. Obviously, having another level to communicate through will take time. The question is what the system for mortars was though, since the Germans seemed to rely a lot on them. Anybody got an idea?

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Andreas

[Jeff Duquette]

Regarding Artillery in WWII, I have always liked the following quotes from William Depuy.

From: “Changing an Army, An Oral History of General William E. Depuy”, United States Military History Institute. Depuy served in ETO 1944-45 from Normandy to the German Surrender as an infantry officer in the 90th ID. He commanded an infantry battalion in the 90th I.D during WWII, and later in his career commanded the 1st ID during the Vietnam War (1966-67).

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>INTERVIEWER: I'd like to ask one last question. When you finished up in Germany at the end of World War It and reflected back on your experiences, what do you recall were your first thoughts as to what your battalion had accomplished and how?

GEN DEPUY: One of the comments that I've made has infuriated tie Infantry School. Now. I don't blame them for being infuriated, but I honestly concluded at the end of World War II, when I soberly considered what I had accomplished, that I had moved the forward observers of the artillery across France and Germany. In other words, my battalion was the means by which field Artillery forward observers were moved to the next piece of high ground. Once you had a forward observer on a piece of ground, he could call up five to ten battalions of artillery and that meant you had moved combat power to the next observation point — more combat power than the light infantry could dispose of. Now, you needed the infantry to do that. You needed the infantry to protect them, but the combat power came from this other source, and I think that trend has accelerated ever since. I think the infantry has the dirtiest job of them all. But, if you want to be rigorously analytical about what you're really trying to do, it’s trying to move combat power forward to destroy the enemy, and the combat power that you are moving forward has been, in the past, mostly artillery, and that is even more true today. The infantry has a lot of ears and a lot of eyeballs. Now, it can call forward even more artillery fire and different kinds of munitions — Cannon Launched Guided Projectiles (CLGPs), the Family of scatterable Mines (FASCAMs), Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICMs). high explosive (HE), smoke, and illumination, and soon they will also have terminally guided anti-armor munitions. The infantry is a sensor. It's a sensory organization that works into the fabric of the terrain and the enemy, and can

Call in all of this firepower — including artillery and TAC air that can really do the killing.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Another Quote from Depuy I found in: Danny Parker’s “Battle of the Bulge, Hitler’s Last Offensive, 1944-1945”.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>I really believe, based upon my experience [in. WWII], that the combat power provided by the artillery, I'm sorry to say, probably represented 90% or more of the combat power actually applied against the enemy. That's why I say that getting a forward observer to a high piece of ground was the most important function that infantry performed in that war. That is not to degrade the infantry; it's just an objective analysis.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

From: Bill Mauldin’s “Up Front”

[ibucephalus]

To Brucer:

Sir,

I love you. You say the things I want to say but am to illiterate communicate. I think people are too quick to accept opinion for fact in the absence of experience. There seem to be great misconceptions about the workings of artillery on this board. I think we need more gunners around here. Your comments are always appreciated.

[brucer]

Steady up, gunner. And drop us a line at 9 Bty next time you're in Toronto. On Mondays the round's on me.

Ubique.

B. Rolston

BK 9, RCA

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[Olle Petersson]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Wilhammer:

Let's all read this "corrected" version of the article mentioned in the first post,<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

In what way is it corrected?

Except for the added author's note I can't find any difference at a quick glance.

And what is the difference between a FO (Forward Observer) and a FOO (?)?

I'm not too convinced about the supremacy of US artillery. Having something like one spotter per gun instead of one FO per battery or battalion lays the ground for confusion and faulty target priority. US spotters "request" fire, whereas the others "call" fire.

i.e. the US spotter request a battalion of 155mm and get a battery of 105mm, the British spotter call a regiment of 25pdrs and get it.

Cheers

Olle

[Hun Hunter]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Olle Petersson:

In what way is it corrected?

Except for the added author's note I can't find any difference at a quick glance.

And what is the difference between a FO (Forward Observer) and a FOO (?)?

I'm not too convinced about the supremacy of US artillery. Having something like one spotter per gun instead of one FO per battery or battalion lays the ground for confusion and faulty target priority. US spotters "request" fire, whereas the others "call" fire.

i.e. the US spotter request a battalion of 155mm and get a battery of 105mm, the British spotter call a regiment of 25pdrs and get it.

Cheers

Olle<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

As a Redleg (in my youth anyway), a whole lot of this article just didn't jive. I have no idea about how German or British fire control (esp. in WWII)worked but what little I do know about US Fire Control in WWII (and later) made me wish the author had used some references and research instead of recalling a lecture at a gaming convention.

The only book I have that goes into WWII Artillery Fire Control in any way is "Standard Guide to U.S. World War II Tanks & Artillery". It does have a nice chapter on US Fire Direction but it is vague on some points (like response time). The GFT (graphical firing table), which is basically a slide rule with firing data on it, is credited with being "20 times" faster than old-style calculations. I can attest that it does allow rapid calculations by math-weak artillery men (like me). In the mid 1980's I easily beat our (slow) fire control computers. It was fairly easy to have firing data for the guns in less than 30 seconds with this method, which was not very different than that apparently used by the US in WWII.

As far as comparing the US & British FO methods (i.e. requests for fire vs. orders), well they both seem to work. The confusion you imagine might exist in the US system doesn't seem to have been a major problem. I can't speak first hand from this as I'm not a combat vet and was in Corps Artillery anyhow (general support, counter battery only, grunt boy don't call us we have bigger things to shoot at ). However, the US FDC is trained to do alot besides math, like prioritizing targets, determining proper ammo-target combinations, etc. I'm not sure about the WWII FO to Gun ratio but don't get the idea that each gun shot for one observer.

I would think the library at the US Field Artillery School (Ft. Sill) would have reams of information on this subject (WWII fire control).

Greg

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"The Germans found out who the 'master race' was when they met us" - Henry Havlet 45th Infantry Division "Thunderbirds"

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Hun Hunter:

I have no idea about how German or British fire control (esp. in WWII)worked but what little I do know about US Fire Control in WWII (and later) made me wish the author had used some references and research instead of recalling a lecture at a gaming convention. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

HH - that was a refreshing post. If I get around to it I will post a bit about what my grandfather did as counterbattery observer in Russia later in this thread. I would still like to see some evidence about German arty (adn especially mortar) delays, instead of unsubstantiated claims it took 15min and odes to superior US management practices.

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Andreas

Der Kessel Home of „Die Sturmgruppe“; Scenario Design Group for Combat Mission.

[This message has been edited by Germanboy (edited 10-24-2000).]

[Hun Hunter]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Germanboy:

HH - that was a refreshing post. If I get around to it I will post a bit about what my grandfather did as counterbattery observer in Russia later in this thread. I would still like to see some evidence about German arty (adn especially mortar) delays, instead of unsubstantiated claims it took 15min and odes to superior US management practices.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I, for one, would love to see some info about your grandfather's experiences.

As far as alledged US (& British) superiority, from the anecdotal accounts by German soldiers I've read they did fear US (and British) artillery, however you get the same fear in US soldiers under German artillery fire. Not having any kind of information at hand on German practices and only a vague idea about U.S./British ones I hesitate to jump to a conclusion but so many senior Germans commented on the "excellence" of American artillery in books I have read there has to be something there. Maybe I'll do a little more looking on this topic.

I do think there are a few areas were CM could simulate the fire support process a little better. They did manage to leave out the most lethal weapon in the entire US & British arsenal, the artillery spotting planes (death by Piper), heck even Panzer Leader had that (board game, published in 1974 for you youngsters). I have a pretty hard time swallowing the fact the killing the FO will cause your artillery to write you off. If you have a radio (or telephone) and a target the FDC will talk to you (at least in the US Field Artillery). I think perhaps any HQ should be able to act as a FO (with a reduced ability). Perhaps any FO could call for fire from any available unit (especially in the US system) but with a reduced effectiveness (i.e. longer delay).

Oh yea, and as others have said, the adjustment distance allowed is WAY too small. Once you have the FDC's attention almost any size adjustment can be made quickly, personally I have corrected over 1000 meters (hey I was a 2LT in training, I got better I swear).

Greg

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"The Germans found out who the 'master race' was when they met us" - Henry Havlet 45th Infantry Division "Thunderbirds"