Historical Vignette: German Infantry in the Attack

[Blackhorse]

I posted this in another thread, but felt it worthwhile for all to read and enjoy.The following is taken from "Small Unit Actions During the German Campaign in Russia".

It is part of the Historical Series from the CMH, USA. It was originally published in 1953. It is the result of interviewing the German officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers who served on the Eastern Front.

"Chapter 1. Section VIII. Company G Recaptures Hill 726 (October 1942)

During the spring and summer of 1942 the Germans strengthened the Rzhev salient and eliminated Russian forces that had gained a foothold west of the Vyazma-Rzhev rail line. The salient gradually became one of the strongest defense lines the Germans had built in Russia. In the early autumn Marshal Zhukov launched an offensive against the Rzhev salient to divert German forces from the Stalingrad front and to eliminate this potential threat to the Russian capital. In this action, which is the last one in the series concerning the fighting west of Moscow, Company G resisted the onslaught of fresh Russian troops who had recently arrived from training centers in Siberia.

In mid-September Russian infantry supported by tanks seized Hill 726, some 10 miles north of Olenino. Once the Russians had wrested it from the Germans, they withdrew their tanks and left an infantry company of about 75 men to defend the newly won position. This hill now constituted a dent in the German MLR and afforded a sweeping view of the German rear area, thus hampering movements. Its rapid recapture was of vital importance to the Germans.

The Russian defense system on the hill was not organized in a continuous line, but rather in the form of strong points. The positions were quite deep, afforded overhead cover, and were so well camouflaged that they could only be detected at very close range. The communication trenches leading to the rear were deep enough only for crawling. All machineguns were emplaced so as to deliver only frontal fire. Mortars were emplace on the reverse slope of the hill, and large quantities of ammunition and handgrenades had been stored in the strongpoints. A belt of wooden mines-to which German detectors did not respond-extended almost completely around the hill. Gaps had been left in the mine belt to permit passage of friendly patrols. Before the attack, German reconnaissance patrols were able to identify these lanes.

Company G made five or six attempts to retake Hill 726, but failed; in each case the attack was halted at the very beginning because of heavy casualties incurred from mines and massed mortar fire. The Russians defended the hill with extreme tenacity. The company commander, CPT Veihmann, observed that the Russians confined their activity to the hours of darkness. During the day, their positions appeared deserted. Russian reconnaissance patrols were very active, but only between midnight and dawn.

Viehmann decided to launch a surprise attack at dusk on 2 October. He selected 30 men who, together with two flame thrower teams, were to make up the assault detachments. Six machinegun teams were to follow directly behind. After seizure of the hill, an intrenching team was to move in with previously prepared barbed wire obstacles, set them up on the reverse side of the hill, and establish defensive positions. All men in the assault detachments were equipped with sub-machineguns and issued an ample supply of handgrenades. They were familiar with the terrain, including Hill 726 itself and the Russian MLR.

Under cover of darkness and unnoticed by the Russian, the assault troops moved from their assembly area into the jumpoff positions. At the scheduled time the two companies along the flanks of the German MLR facing the right and left sides of the hill as well as the machineguns located on the southern slope poured fire into the Russian positions. While the german troops in the MLR diverted the enemy's attention by sudden shouting, the assault elements attacked and penetrated the Russian mine belt through two previously identified gaps.

The defending Russians were taken completely by surprise. The fire and shouting from all sides confused them as to the true direction of the attack. They were further thrown off balance by the German flame throwers, despite the fact that the latter failed to function after only a few bursts.

Nevertheless, the Russians did not give away to panic or abandon their positions, but struggled to the bitter end. After about an hour of hand-tohand- fighting the entire hill was in German hands, as were 20 Russian prisoners. The initial German objective, to cut Russian communicatiosn to the rear, had been achieved early in the attack. The Russian MLR was thereby out of contact with the defenders on the hill, who apparently were not alert enough to summon assistance from the rear before being cut off.

Once the hill was taken, The Germans immediately dispatched two listening sentries to points about 30 yards in front of their lines, set up barbed wire obstacles, and otherwise prepared their defensive positions. Within 2 hours a continuous line of barbed wire entanglemts stretched across the crest of the hill.

About an hour after the completion of these defenses one of the sentries reported the approach of about 40 Russians. All entrenching work was immediately suspended and the defense positions were quickly manned. Soon thereafter the second sentry confirmed the report of the first. The gap in the wire obstacle line which had until then been left open for the men at the listening post was closed.

At a given signal the Germans opened fire just as the screaming Russians began their counterattack. Rushing headlong into the wire entaglements, which they had failed to spot in advance, The Russians were cut down by the German defensive fire concentrated on that zone. Only three of the attackers were able to regain the safety of their jumpoff positions.

The next day the Russians directed heavy harrassing fire against Hill 726, but made no further attempts to conduct a concerted infantry attack."

A very cursory analysis shows:

1. MGs were used in support of the assault, not in the direct assault.

2. Assault teams were equipped exclusively with SMGs

3. FTs were not nearly as effective as hoped (**** happens example)

4. A solid plan and good leadership were key to victory that day.

[This message has been edited by Blackhorse (edited 06-04-2000).]

[This message has been edited by Blackhorse (edited 06-04-2000).]

[Wesreidau]

Great post! Good example of a historic battle suitable for a scenario. Now you gotta create it, shoulda kept quiet

Ermm..I`ll be the Russians ok LOL

[Blackhorse]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Wesreidau:

Great post! Good example of a historic battle suitable for a scenario. Now you gotta create it, shoulda kept quiet

Ermm..I`ll be the Russians ok LOL<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

[Speedy]

That was a great read blackhorse, roll on CM2