s bakker Posted February 15, 2000 Share Posted February 15, 2000 Here is the second part of the article on mechanized assault. This part focuses on the role of the infantry during the tank attack and how the two branches can support each other. Read and enjoy. ---------------_____________________________________________ ATTACK BY MECHANIZED AND MOTORIZED FORCES. (2) Infantry-tank cooperation. When the enemy has well prepared positions with natural or constructed tank obstacles, the German infantry attacks before the tanks and clears the way. The objective of the infantry is to penetrate into the enemy position and destroy enemy antitank weapons to the limit of its strength and the fire power of its own support weapons, augmented by additional support and covering fire from the tanks and self-propelled weapons sited in their rear. Only after the destruction of the enemy antitank defense can the tanks be employed on the battle line to the fullest advantage.When the tank obstacles in front of the enemy position are already destroyed, and no additional tank obstacles are expected in the depth of the enemy's main defensice position, the infantry breaks through simultaneously with the tank unit. The infantry attack is conducted in the same manner as it would be without the cooperation of tanks. Heavy infantry weapons are kept in readiness to fire at possible newly discovered antitank positions. Of particular importance is protection of the open flanks by echeloning the flank units and employing heavy weapons at the flanks. In most cases, the infantry follows the tanks closely, taking advantage of the fire power and paralyzing effect of the tanks upon the enemy's defense. The Germans normally transport the infantry to the line of departure on tanks or troop-carrying vehicles in order to protext the infantry and to increase its speed. The infantry leaves the vehicles at the last possible moment, and goes into action mainly with light automatic weapons. The tanks advance by bounds from cover to cover, reconnoitering the terrain ahead and providing protective fire for the dismounted Panzer Grenadiers. The tanks do not slow their advance to enable the infantry to keep continuous pace with them, but advance alone and wait under cover until the infantry catches up with the advance. Terrain that does not offer sufficient cover is crossed with the greatest possible speed. The infantry attacks in small formations also by bounds under the fire cover of its own heavy weapons and of the tanks, staying away from individual tanks because they draw the strongest enemy fire. When a tank company attacks with infantry, there are normally two platoons on the line, one platoon back, and the fourth platoon in reserve. The interval between tanks is usually 100 to 120 yards. The tank's machine guns usually engage infantry targets at about 1,000 yards range and under, while the tank guns engage targets at 2,000 to 2,500 yards. The coordination between tanks and Panzer Grenadiers moving into combat on armored half-tracks is similar to the technique employed in a purely armored formation, since the armored half-tracks are not only troop-carrying vehicles but also combat vehicles. When the terrain is favorable for tank warfare, the Panzer Grenadiers in their armored half-tracks follow immediately with the second wave, after the first tank wave has overrun the opponent's position. A deep and narrow formation is employed. After the penetration, the main mission of the Panzer Grenadiers is to overcome the enemy positions which survived the first wave. In attacking enemy pillboxes the Germans use combat groups consisting of tanks, infantry, and engineers, assisted by artillery. The normal composition of a combat group attacking one bunker is one platoon of tanks and one platoon of infantry reinforced by one squad of engineers. Before the combat group is committed against the enemy pillbox, artillery fires high explosives and smoke shells at the neighboring pillboxes to isolate them, shells the terrain between pillboxes, and conducts counterbattery fire. Under the protection of this fire, the combat group advances close to the pillbox while other infantry units attack the enemy in the terrain between the pillboxes. One tank squad covers the advances of the other tank squads and the infantry platoon by direct fire against the pillbox, particularly against the observation and weapons' openings. The first tank squad halts under cover whenever possible and covers the advance of the second tank squad. When the combat group reaches a barbed wire obstacle surrounding the pillox, the two tank squads have different missions. One tank squad remains in front of the pillbox, and its tanks are driven into a position from which they can overlook the terrain, and watch out for antitank guns and machine gun emplacements, while the other tank squad (the pillbox tank squad) rolls across the obstacle to enable the infantry and engineers to get close to the pillbox. The pillbox tank squad then fires on the pillbox at close range. The infantry squad meanwhile takes the surrounding terrain and covers the engineeers who blast the entrance of the pillbox with TNT. _____________________________________________ Watch out using all these tactics blindly in CM though, particullary the part about ‘The tanks do not slow their advance to enable the infantry to keep continuous pace with them, but advance alone and wait under cover until the infantry catches up with the advance. Terrain that does not offer sufficient cover is crossed with the greatest possible speed.’ Changes are you gonna make a bazooka team very happy with this tactic ! Grtz S Bakker Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Germanboy Posted February 15, 2000 Share Posted February 15, 2000 Excellent post. Keep them coming. Anybody interested in how the US did these things (street-fighting, pill-box assault, river-crossings and bocage) in the ETO, you must read 'Closing with the Enemy'. ------------------ Andreas Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CoolColJ Posted February 15, 2000 Share Posted February 15, 2000 Are you typing this stuff out by hand?! ccj Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Fionn Posted February 15, 2000 Share Posted February 15, 2000 Actually Bakker, You misunderstand the scale of operations envisioned here and what the intent of the piece is given the FULL context of German tactical doctrine. When this piece discusses movement across open terrain to "cover" it is actually assuming that the reader will know that what is being referred to as "cover" is what we commonly now call a "bound". A bound is a piece of tactically significant terrain providing some level of concealment and protection against enemy fire whilst also being easily found but not unique in the context of the environment it is in. (i.e. It would be stupid to pick the only clump of trees within 2 km as your bound for obvious reasons ). Anyways the point is that what they are actually saying here is that when a tank is moving from one "bound" ( generally a hull-down position if at all possible) to another bound it should do so as quickly as possible ( FAST ) and NOT constrained to the speed of the infantry (MOVE). In this microcosm of tactical movement the tank's PRIME objective is to minimise its vulnerability to AT weaponry and thus ability to support the infantry is sacrificed during the move so as to ensure weapons platform survivability. WHEN the tank gets to the next bound and is in cover it will then remain there for some time providing fire for its accompanying infantry. Thus whilst the tank may not move with the infantry when it is moving from one bound to the next it MUST stay in their general vicinity. At most what you're seeing here is the German commanders telling their tankers they shouldn't be afraid to be 100 metres in advance of their infantry for a few minutes. We're NOT talking about British Tank Regiment obstinacy. It is very important to provide interpretation of documents such as this since so many people don't understand and appreciate the full context and gestalt awareness of tactical doctrine which was being assumed to be known by all readers of this piece. It's similar to why officers in foreign armies often read the same military manuals as the enemy but come away with a VERY different appraisal of how the enemy will fight than a junior officer who has been indoctrinated in enemy BASIC doctrine who THEN reads the same manual. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Also S Bakker Posted February 15, 2000 Share Posted February 15, 2000 Well it seems i managed to misinterpete the text i myself posted _____________________ At most what you're seeing here is the German commanders telling their tankers they shouldn't be afraid to be 100 metres in advance of their infantry for a few minutes. _____________________ Fionn, thanks for putting everything in perspective. Indeed when i read the article i had visions of Panzers speeding through the country side with no infantry supportlike in the early blitzes. ____________________ It is very important to provide interpretation of documents such as this since so many people don't understand and appreciate the full context and gestalt awareness of tactical doctrine which was being assumed to be known by all readers of this piece. ________________ Well you made that obvious now didn't you? Glad you shed yor light on this one. CoolColJ: nope, i'm a secret worshipper of the great god CopyPaste Grtz S Bakker PS: ______________ i.e. It would be stupid to pick the only clump of trees within 2 km as your bound for obvious reasons _________________________ Hey, wait a minute, are you calling me stupid ? Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Major Tom Posted February 16, 2000 Share Posted February 16, 2000 What Fionn is taling about is the tactic of... NOT BEING SEEN merely hiding in the only cover apparently availible does nothing for your camoflage. Positioning your troops in places that the enemy doesn't expect is another mode of hiding. Some hiding spots are so obvious that you deserve blowing up. Oh, and when the enemy asks you to stand up, don't. Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Fionn Posted February 16, 2000 Share Posted February 16, 2000 LOL. If you're standing behind the only cover in 2 clicks I call you dead Major Tom is right.. There's a HUGE difference between being IN concealment and BEING CONCEALED and an even bigger difference between being concealed and being in GOOD concealment Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Guest Germanboy Posted February 16, 2000 Share Posted February 16, 2000 <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Major Tom: What Fionn is taling about is the tactic of... NOT BEING SEEN merely hiding in the only cover apparently availible does nothing for your camoflage. Positioning your troops in places that the enemy doesn't expect is another mode of hiding. Some hiding spots are so obvious that you deserve blowing up. Oh, and when the enemy asks you to stand up, don't.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> As I just learned the hard way - damn you Major Tom, I will make you pay for this. Breaks down and cries -my platoon, Cpt. Turner give me back my platoon... ------------------ Andreas [This message has been edited by Germanboy (edited 02-15-2000).] Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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