aargh - every time I post this question (2 or 3) the thread gets closed...

[Mike T]

I've heard the same actions described in many ways - fanatic, courageous, stupid - My next question is what causes men to react in such a manner?

One of the reasons I brought up the Somme is the fate of the Newfoundlanders - Out of 810 men only 69 met the muster the next day. The curious thing about their fate is not the high casualty figure (many other battalions suffered just as badly) but the fact that they were not in the first wave or for that matter the second wave. They were attacking after watching eight other battalions from the first two waves get decimated and they had to advance over open ground from the assembly trenches just to reach their own front lines (since casualties from the first two waves clogged the front line trenches) subjected to machinegun fire from the full force of Germans (as there were no other targets left for them to fire at). Still, faced with all that they managed to reach the first German trenches - further than any other battalion in their division.

I'm reminded of a scene from the movie 'Gallipoli' where the ANZAC's are about to attack the Turkish trenches - due to a miscalculation in the timing of the artillery, the fire was lifted and the Turks remanned the trenches. Even though they knew the Turks would be waiting, the ANZAC's continued with the planned assault.

How would you describe that?

Why did they continue?

What can possibly motivate you enough to do what they did?

More importantly - How do you incorporate such reactions into a game like CM?

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'Bitter Mike'

[Fionn]

Mike,

It is simple to model that in CM. It doesn't need fanaticism. You simply need a CO stupid enough to order the advance and the troops will advance... They might break quickly given the excessive number of casualties they will undoubtedly suffer but they will, generally, obey your orders.

As for the point re: the Somme and casualty rates...

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> considering that the average battalion contained 730 men and if you assume that it suffered 600 casualties (approximately 80% of its fighting strength) that means that 100 battalions suffered 80% casualties on that day - mostly before noon. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I think that this reasoning is a little fallacious since we CAN'T assume they suffered 600 casualties each. I know of some Bns which suffered 95% casualties and others which suffered less than a dozen (2%) casualties during that day.

Also you have to figure out casualties as a ratio of the entire force.. Losing 60,000 casualties on the first day ( the real figure) spread throughout 20 divisions, each with 12 battalions results in the following.

Total front line infantry strength ( 750 x 12(no. of battalions) x 20 (number of divisions)) = 180,000

60,000 casualties out of a front-line infantry strength of 180,000 = Roughly 33% casualties amongst the front-line infantry.

See, this is why I say that the reality of the Somme is sometimes "lost" in the hype. Certainly some units were almost wiped out but over the entire front you can see that casualties, while extremely high, were NOT sufficient to render further advances impossible the next day.

In those days it was quite common to keep a unit which suffered 33% casualties one day in the line for further attacks. Also you must remember that some of the 60,000 probably reported back for duty during the first night due to only having minor wounds.

Sure I think 60,000 casualties in 1 day is madness but if you have 120,000 front-line infantry left it certainly is possible to continue the attack.

[This message has been edited by Fionn (edited 03-07-2000).]

[Mike T]

180,000 men spread over a front 18 miles long gives us 10,000 men per mile of front. A mile is 1760 yards long - 10,000 men over 1 mile gives approximately 5 men per yard. A little crowded don't you think . I'm being a little facetious here but if you let me explain I think it will clear up.

Consider that the standard military procedure was to keep 1/3 of your forces in reserve. Extending this to the Corps, one division in three would be kept in reserve. We are now left with 2/3 of your 20 divisions for the front lines (let's be generous and say 14 divisions for the front lines with 6 divisions held in Army reserve - probably the Cavalry ). We now have 168 Battalions on the front lines or 126,000 men. Add to this the fact that the Division itself would hold one brigade in Divisional reserve (1/3 of their forces), we are left with 112 battalions conducting the initial assault or 84,000 men. Now consider 60,000 casualties spread among 84,000 men we have a casualty rate approaching 75% among the frontline troops in the initial assault. Even if we assume that the divisions were able to commit their own reserve brigades we are still left with a casualty rate approaching 50%. All of this in the first three hours of the day. So now you've effectively removed nearly 100 battalions from doing anything more than defending their own trenches (or about 8 Divisions).

My whole point in this discussion of July 1, 1916 is that the battalions in the assault suffered such tremendous casualties and continued to press on - they didn't break, even after watching the battalions in front of them get mowed down. How do you explain it and how do you model it? If I follow the explanations of morale in CM, this would never happen even if you (as the CO) were stupid enough to order your men to do exactly as they did on that day.

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'Bitter Mike'

[Fionn]

Mike,

Good points but one thing you forget is that Bns in WW1 really DID achieve insane densities which we'd never do now.

E.g. By your very OWN admission (God I love it when I can use uncontested statements )the Newfoundlanders attacked over the same ground that a full 8 Battalions had just died on.

As you well know I could point out instances in which an entire DIVISIONAL frontage for an advance was less than 1000 metres (less than 1 kilometre). Thus we'd have a concentration of 10 front-line infantry per metre.

The simple fact is that during WW1 you did often have divisional frontages which, today, would be, at best, considered Battalion frontages. During WW1 the "battering ram" approach was common in which, instead of advancing 2 up, 1 back the entire regiment would simply advance in what amounted to column formation. As the first Bn died the 2nd Bn would rush forward and try to gain a bit more ground. When the 2nd was stopped the 3rd would advance and try to gain more ground until it also was stopped.

If all 3 Bns of the regiment were stopped it wasn't uncommon to find an entirely new regiment brought in to attack in exactly the same place only a few hours later.

So, basic points are that:

1) WW1 attacks were likely to be LESS wide but have more forces in "reserve" than modern attacks and

2) your figures ignore the factor of time.

8 Battalions attacking along the SAME stretch of ground 1000 metres wide (I'm just using 1km here for ease of calculation) but, at widely separated times still only results in a troop density of 1 per metre of front DURING each attack.

Lastly, I don't agree with your 1/3rding of the units. The Somme was pretty much an all-out affair and any units in or near the front lines DID make the attack. Divisions etc didn't keep a reserve as far as I remember but pretty much chucked in the reserves etc also.

WW1 was fought quite differently to WW2 and modern wars and to assume 2 up, 1 back etc etc is to ignore some of the idiocies which went on during the war.

Also I think that 20 divisions were committed to the fight ( so 20 divisions PLUS reserves.. This is only a guesstimate on my part though since I don't have an OOB here. We need to find out EXACTLY how many divisions were committed as it greatly will impact casualty rates." . I do know that 7 Corps were committed and thus estimate 20 divisions were committed to the actual assault. Does anyone have an OOB for the 1st day of the Somme?

As for CM... In CM I COULD replicate exactly the same.. In fact, yesterday I chewed up a US company with a massive 6 HMG ambush which pinned almost the entire company in some woods 200 metres from my positions ( a village). The AI constantly tried to get men to advance and they DID obey but were pinned by fire as soon as they got up. (It managed to get 1 squad into a church holding 2 HMGs but I killed them quickly with an SMG platoon I had hidden there just in case ).

[Mike T]

Fionn - Middlebrook's book gives the best account of the battle that I've read but its been years since I've read it so my recollections about OOB are pretty vague.

Regardless of that, one question remains - What motivates people to continue to advance in the face of such casualties?

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'Bitter Mike'

[Guest Big Time Software]

Why the follow up formations didn't tell their officers to "get stuffed" is beyond my (hehe.. I can say this now!) 21st century thinking, as it is yours. We really can't get inside those guys' heads, or at least I have never come onto a study that described it in late 20th century terms.

One thing that I do know is that there was a cultural difference between WWI and after, and that must have been the single largest aspect of the answer. What I mean by this is that people were much more willing to submit themselves to authority figures without taking independent action. This started to change by the end of the war. The start of the revolution in Russia was in no part started because of this. The Germans had similar problems, and IIRC even the Allies had some difficulties by the end. Propaganda and barking out orders started to lose their appeal

After WWII things started to change. While military discipline remained pretty much the same as it was before, the Germans and Soviets (later on) started to change the focus of accountabiity. Officers and men were encouraged to take responsibility for themselves and the lives underneath them in a way unheard of during WWI. The Allies started to pick up on this shift, but as we have discussed here the British didn't totally "get it" although they improved each year in battle after the defeats of 1940.

All in all, IMHO the reason why WWI was not repeated in WWII on a mass scale is because the former broke certain traditional mindsets. This lead to innovations in tactics and strategies, which then reinforced the change in mindset so that it could work in battle. It is all tied up together, but the end result is that the average solider in WWII was not willing to walk over his dead comrades when it was obvious all was lost already. The Soviets did a bunch of this in the first year of the war, but there were other reasons for this in addition to leftovers from WWI.

Steve

[Fionn]

Most of the armies in WW1 can best be understood along FEUDAL lines.

Lords ( commanders of divisions, regiments, Bns etc) and minor nobles ( Captains, Lieutenans etc) ordered their serfs about.

The lowly privates were conditioned by social status at the time to obey. Before the war they obeyed the factory owners and lords of their regions and looked up to them. During the war these same factory owner's sons and minor lords were their platoon and company leaders.

I think that we can't understand WHY they obeyed because we don't owe allegiance to anyone in the same way they did and so can't understand it.

If you have been, unquestionibgly, taking orders from one class for 15 years and a representative of that class told you to advance I bet you'd advance. Conditioning sets in.

I really think that a major part of the reason for the behaviour in WW1 comes down to the class structure at that time.

[Guest hunt52]

Hmmm.... a rephrasing of my question that I thought up right now:

There seem to be two "factors" about each unit in CM. One is who controls it, and the other is what it is doing. (Note - I am sure this is a wild and gross oversimplification)

1. Who controls it:

Binary - Either the player or the TacAI

If the morale status is Shaken or better

the player runs the unit. If it is Panic

or worse the TacAI does.

2. What is is doing:

Graded - From (Rested, Shooting at

things) to (Routed, Not Shooting at

things) This can be treated as a binary

state for the sake of simplicity. I do

realise that there are levels of shooting

back.

It seems to me that 3 of the possible 4 conditions are modeled very well:

1. Player Control, Shooting

The unit is following orders and shooting

at things.

2. Player Control, Not Shooting

The unit is ordered to run like hell, and

is not shooting at stuff.

3. TacAI Control, Not Shooting

The unit is not able to be ordered and is

not shooting.

4. ?

It seems to me that situations would arise where a unit would be worked up enough to not be in the player's control (for a variety of possible reasons) and would still be shooting. For example, you could order a unit to fall back out of a kill zone and it ignores that order and keeps firing.

I think there should be situations where the status is:

4. TacAI control, Shooting.

Now, if either

a) anyone has seen a panicked unit fire or

this didn't happen

then I withdraw my comment.

- Bill

[Stoffel]

This is very hard to achieve I think.

Read the book about the 3rd SS division(soldiers of destruction)

In 1942 they defended an area that existed largely of swamps.

They held out for 6 months and when they were finally rescued 60% of the division was killed.

All the original combat teams were almost destroyed and their ranks were filled up with

clerks,doctors,mechanics,cooks and so on.

Most of the remaining men were hungry,sick and starving but they refused to surrender I don't think that a division made up largely out of conscripts could do that.

So incorporating such a feature in this game looks impossible to me.

[Guest Germanboy]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Stoffel:

Most of the remaining men were hungry,sick and starving but they refused to surrender.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Yes, but wasn't there an issue about no prisoners being taken out of SS units by the Russians? If that was the case they did not have much of a motivation to surrender if it meant a bullet in the head.

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Andreas

[Guest Big Time Software]

Soviet captivity was dreaded by anybody fighting for the Axis cause, especially if they were German or ex-Soviet. Both sides expected no quarter, and all too often that expecation was very true. This started on day one, much to the shock of the average German soldier. And it just got worse from there on...

Steve

[Simon Fox]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Those who survived, emerged as different men. They and their friends had offered their all, trustingly,

and they felt, right or wrong, that this trust had been squandered. The belief that their leaders knew best

and knew all, this Victorian belief which had enabled them to entrust their very lives to the will and care of

others, was as dead as the 5,415 men who lay out in the No-Man's Land of this Northern Sector. From

now on, men would begin to think of themselves first, a little more often, and would want to have more of

a say in the control of their own future.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

[tss]

Germanboy wrote:

Yes, but wasn't there an issue about no prisoners being taken out of SS units by the Russians?

It's quite persistent legend that Soviets didn't take SS men as prisoners, but they did. Certainly SS men believed that they would be shot and probably many were shot, but in the end the majority of surrenders were accepted.

Steve wrote:

Soviet captivity was dreaded by anybody fighting for the Axis cause, especially if they were German or ex-Soviet.

True. However, the death rates of Axis POWs in Russia are often overestimated by a wide margin. It's a quite common belief that only few prisoners ever returned and the fate of the 6th Army in Stalingrad is used to "prove" this: out of 95000 POWs only 5000 returned. In fact, out of 2.5 million prisoners that Soviets took, about 2 million returned after the war so the death rate was somewhere along 20%.

One dead in five is still a terrible death toll, but it's quite light compared with the fate of Soviet prisoners in German hands: out of four million prisoners only one million returned.

- Tommi

[Hakko Ichiu]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tss:

In fact, out of 2.5 million prisoners that Soviets took, about 2 million returned after the war so the death rate was somewhere along 20%.

One dead in five is still a terrible death toll, but it's quite light compared with the fate of Soviet prisoners in German hands: out of four million prisoners only one million returned.

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

It should be noted, however, that many German POWs remained in Soviet hands years after the end of the war. There were Spätheimkehrers ("late returnees") showing up well into the 1950s.

Ethan

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Das also war des Pudels Kern! -- Goethe