A new concept of the Soviet Assault and New Scenario material

[THH149]

In the critique of the Active Defense doctrine, the US are meant to maneveur its forces to reduce the force ratios of expected soviet attacks, eg from 6:1 down to 3:1 or better so the US defender could apply more of the advantages of the defenders edge in firepower, terrain etc. The idea was the some parts of US battle front was left thinly held and forces transferred to the likely venues of a Soviet massed assault. Could such gaps be safely managed?

Now one of the critiques of the Active Defense doctrine was that it relied on seemingly outdated Soviet concepts of a mass assault, ignoring intelligence on how the Soviets were training and expected the Soviets to ignore experience of the 1973 Arab Isreali War that the US themselves were updating their doctrine to incorporate.

"If the revised doctrine of 1976 was to prove vulnerable on any point, it was one based on a scenario that mayalready have ceased to be realistic by1976: the classic massed armor break-through as the assumed Soviet opera-tional maneuver. Since the manual's tactical descriptions proceeded in reac-tion to this type of penetration, the issue was of no small importance. The doctrinal manual depicted an attack by the enemy on very narrow fronts ingreat depth, with massed firepower in the breakthrough sector. Warsaw Pact forces might throw as many as 600 tanks against a U.S. division in the leading echelon, followed shortly by 600 more. "This doctrine . . . is deeply ingrained in the Soviet Army and if weshould go to war in Europe, those are exactly the tactics we would face."17

By 1976,, "a major shift in tactical operational concepts" had occurred.l8

The Soviets' concern since 1973 about antitank guided missiles had pro-duced a strong awareness of the vulner-ability of their BMP infantry fighting vehicle-the indispensable support ele-ment to the tactics of the rapid and deep classic armor breakthrough. The consequent revival in recent Soviet exercises of another operational maneuver-the concept of multi-pronged attacks by BMP regi-ments reinforced with armor across the entire battlefront seeking holes and weakspots. In training, the Soviets were spending quadruple the time practicing the multi-prong attacks and meeting engagements as they were rehearsing conventional frontal break-throughs. Though many combat sup-port, logistical and leadership problems were evident in the new maneuver,there was no doubt,  about a "tactical revolution" in Soviet militarydoctrine.l9

"Severe ramifications fall from FM 100-5 having built its edifice on but oneof the possible Soviet operational maneuvers."22

So what I'm suggesting is not so much whether its right or wrong, but as an avenue for scenario designers to consider the possibilities of BMP or BTR battalions reinforced with tank companies to attempt breakthrough against thinly held US lines or positions, say with US receiving late game reinforcements (or not as the US intended to operated without tactical reserves) attempting to close the gap before more soviet follow on forces appear. This approach would stand in contrast to the Soviet training scenarios and similar scenarios.

What thoughts could there be from scenario designers on these concepts and could BFC pick them up and issue them as a Battlepack?

[domfluff]

(It's worth noting that the above is talking about the regimental and divisional level - CMCW focuses on battalion level stuff, so is the tactical sharp end, rather than the operational fluidity.)

So, I think it's important to learn the right lesson from those training scenarios. The basic "attack" scenario represents the most basic form, and it's really intended to teach two lessons - the importance of co-ordinating with your artillery, and the value of mass (i.e., the first tank to spot usually wins an engagement, but if you have enough tanks then one of them will get the first spot).

These principles are still true for the Russian army today, but this structure of attack was not the expected default, even then.

The default assumption, as above, was that the usual tactical fight would be the meeting engagement - rapid attacks from the march. The core principles of mass and fires are as true there are they are in the basic attack, but their implementation was much more fluid, complex and subtle.
 

Quote

The consequent revival in recent Soviet exercises of another operational maneuver-the concept of multi-pronged attacks by BMP regiments reinforced with armor across the entire battlefront seeking holes and weakspots. In training, the Soviets were spending quadruple the time practicing the multi-prong attacks and meeting engagements as they were rehearsing conventional frontal break-throughs. 

So, to give you an idea of what that should look like, based on a currently-running game of this I'm playing as the Soviets: http://www.wargaming.co/professional/details/britisharmy1956.htm

In that game, I have a division, and I'm approaching a German town bisected by a major river running north-south.

I chose to advance on two axis, with one regiment on each, preceded by recon. The regiments had orders to attack anything they find directly from the march.

The north regiment made visual contact, so the remaining parts of the division (engineers, two more infantry regiments and the tank regiment, all headed south.

What this means from an operation/ooda loop standpoint is that the north regiment will make contact, and might well bounce off (attacking from the march isn't great, and a regiment attacking a defensive battalion from the march doesn't have great odds in that ruleset). This regiment will then recombine and reform, and make a more formal attack, which is likely to succeed. This gives the NATO player a real decision to make - they have no contact with the south forces at all, so they will have to decide whether they reinforce the north, and how much of their reserves are committed in that direction.

The whole point of this north attack is to buy time in the south, to screen and engineer a way across the river, and to bypass and surround the town. This fluid, multi-axis approach is exactly what the above is discussing, and is represented in CMCW very well.

A good discussion on this kind of thing (same chap who publishes the above ruleset): https://20thcenturywargaming.wordpress.com/2013/06/16/why-cold-war-warsaw-pact-tactics-work-in-wargaming/

[THH149]

1 hour ago, domfluff said:

The whole point of this north attack is to buy time in the south, to screen and engineer a way across the river, and to bypass and surround the town. This fluid, multi-axis approach is exactly what the above is discussing, and is represented in CMCW very well.

I agree totally is ripe for CMCW scenario designers to exploit, so they neednt stick entirely with the Training Scenario mass assault format. I reckon that gives a nice wide spread of possible situations for CMCW to explore, which I think endorses the power of the module.

So, perhaps if I squint a bit to ignore a lot of the detail, it might be the the UH ME is not so unfathomable, that is the idea the the US reacts quickly and somehow finds some reserves to feel out the 'south' axis.

Anyway, thanks Dom for responding so eloquently.

Best

THH

 

[domfluff]

I think you're actually missing the point here - the above reference to FM 100-5 refers to a pre-1973 version (possibly the 1968 version), which indeed doesn't take into account the Soviet lessons learned from the 1973 war.

The later material absolutely does, and CMCW is fully using that material. There's no change needed here, because CMCW is up to date.

The first training scenario is the most basic of building blocks, and in any case is not reflected in anything of the above quote, which is vastly different in scope, scale and intent. A battalion is not a division, and doesn't have the same concerns or areas of responsibility.

[THH149]

I understand it all, the above references I was using refer to 1984 docs arising from the debate and critique about the Active Defense doctrine, and why it moved to AirLand Battle. I'm not suggesting any changes per se in CMCW, just encouraging scenario designers to consider a broader Cold War experience if they so desire.

I'm not saying the training scenarios are wrong, or unrealistic.