Advancing Backwards - Demodernization of the German Army in WW II

[The DesertFox]

FYI,

Interesting reading....enjoy!

http://www.ospreypublishing.com/features/6

cheers

Helge

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Sbelling chequed wyth MICROSOFT SPELLCHECKER - vorgs grate!

- The DesertFox -

Email: desertfox1891@hotmail.com

WWW: http://www.geocities.com/desertfox1891

[Lindan]

Thanks Helge, an interesting read!

[Schugger]

That was a good read.

Thanks for sharing the link, DesertFox.

[M Hofbauer]

interesting read. however...

Three exceptionally well equipped German infantrymen from the last weeks of the war. The Panzerfaust anti-tank rockets and the MP44/StG44 assault rifle are good examples of the high quality equipment produced by German industry. However, over-engineering and constant modifications reduced numbers to a relative trickle when compared to the flood of material produced by the Allied war effort.

well it is all true etc. about the economic tohuwabohu that wartime germany was, nothing new here, however IMO they chose a poor example to illustrate their point: Both Panzerfaust production, which was 6-8 million, and eventually and to a lesser degree the StGw-44 (half a million produced under adverse conditions), too, were examples of effective mass-production in the closing stages of the war.

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"Say i think u all need to chill out." (GAZ_NZ)

[This message has been edited by M Hofbauer (edited 09-26-2000).]

[aka_tom_w]

I thought this was so well written I would post some of it here to inspire others to go read the rest of it:

"

FOCUS ON The German Army of World War 2

This article is taken from Osprey Military Journal Volume 2issue 1 . If you have enjoyed this article, why not visit

www.ospreymilitaryjournal.com to sample more free articles

from OMJ, to order individual issues or for information on how

to subscribe!

Advancing Backwards The Demodernization of the German Army in World War II

Charles Winchester

The British found out in the desert. The Russians learned it in 1941. Most Americans

didn't discover the truth until D-Day, but their tank crews never forgot. German

equipment was superior: better design, manufactured to higher standards, and

operated by consummate professionals, who would fight with diabolic efficiency

right up to the spring of 1945 when all hope was lost. British soldiers nicknamed their

Sherman tanks 'Ronsons' after the cigarette lighter advertized to 'light every time'.

Russians christened the lend-lease M3 'the coffin for seven comrades'.

It looked very different from the other side of the front-line. The ferocious reputation

of the German army was maintained until the end, but as successive TOEs (Tables

of Organization and Equipment) reveal, a high proportion of the German army relied

on horse-drawn vehicles throughout the war. German tanks were of excellent

quality, but their numbers dwindled. In September 1939 the authorized strength of a

panzer division included 328 tanks, reduced to 165 by 1943 and to just 54 in 1945.

The war ended before this could be effected, some formations fighting on at about

1944 establishment, many others reduced to fighting on foot. Many elite panzer and

panzer-grenadier formations spent considerable periods as infantry formations: a

process of 'demodernization' that had profound consequences. The turnover in

personnel was equally fearsome, many of the better German formations suffering

annual losses equal to their entire strength in enlisted men and 150% of their

officers."

and it goes on.....

[Rocket Fodder]

The cold war had similar orders of battle:

Russia: Huge numbers of cheaply built war machines.

US: Small number of high-tech items

[Lawyer]

The author is Charles Wincester. Wasn't he the uptight major on M*A*S*H? I wondered what he got into after Korea.

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Just call me Lucifer 'cause I'm in need of some respect....

[Spook]

Further from the noted link & article:

Yet the efficiency of the German army, on a unit-for-unit basis, remained higher than that of the Allies. Since 1945 this has drawn the attention of NATO planners, seeking to identify the source of the Wehrmacht's strength in the hope it could be replicated. The Dupuys have sought to quantify it mathematically. Martin van Creveld has compared US and German battlefield performance, explaining German success in terms of small unit cohesion. The German army fostered a strong sense of comradeship: 'buddy groups' trained and fought together and returning wounded came back to their own unit rather than being drafted into a new one, via an anonymous replacement battalion. However, this has been challenged by Omer Bartov on the grounds that casualty rates were so high for so long that the turnover precluded much sense of unit identity. Soldiers joined a battalion in Russia and were wounded or dead within weeks. Battalions, let alone rifle companies, could have a new commander every week. In Hitler's Army (OUP 1991) Bartov goes on to link this with the barbarization of warfare on the Eastern Front: soldiers doomed to die don't take prisoners.

I wasn't priorhand aware of Omer Bartov, but it's of interest to me as to how extensively he challenges Creveld's views.

[Guest Michael emrys]

Yeah, I don't know what's going on with this. I have heard murmurrings against van Creveld a couple times in recent months. I've read only one book by him, Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941: The Balkan Clue, which seemed pretty good to me. Though written in 1973 it seems carefully researched using primary documents. It presents an almost day-by-day account of Germany's strategic planning and execution from the cancellation of Sea Lion until the opening of Barbarossa. I liked it immensely.

Michael