Centaur tanks supporting Canadians

[Kingfish]

Looking for unit info on the Centaur tanks used on Juno and the advance inland.

So far I have found out that the 5th independent Marine armored support battery landed on Sword Beach, and the 1st Marine armored support regiment landed on Gold Beach, but haven't found any specific info on those that landed on Juno.

[Kingfish]

Bump

[JonS]

(7th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group) MIKE RED/NAN GREEN Beach

105th LCT (A) Flotilla (3rd Btty, 2nd RM Armour Support Rgt):

. LCT (A) 2010, 2120, 2263, and 2428 (broke down and sank on passage)

. LCT (HE) 2051, 2078, 2240, and 2313

. LCT (CB) 2041

(8th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group) NAN WHITE/NAN RED Beach:

103rd LCT (A) Flotilla (4th Btty, 2nd RM Armour Support Rgt):

. LCT (A) 2009, 2014, 2283 (abn), and 2455 (RM Centaurs and Shermans)

. LCT (HE) 2150, 2234, 2240, and 2306 (RM Centaurs and Shermans, OCU and bulldozers)

. LCT (CB) 2338 (10th CAR Fireflies)

*******************

ORS Report No.2

Employment of Royal Marine Artillery During Operation NEPTUNE

The R.M. Artillery were allocated as follows:

. One regiment of 8 tps to 3 Cdn Div.

. One regiment of 8 tps to 50 Div.

. One independent bty of 4 tps to 3 Br Div.

In general, the role assigned was to provide:

1. Direct fire on the beaches during the run in.

2. Close support fire for the infantry while the SP artillery were being disembarked.

3. Indirect fire from the beaches as called for by F00s.

4. Thickening up of artillery fire under command of field regiments to which Marine regiments were allocated.

The following is the role actually performed in the operations as obtained from the sources indicated, together with certain opinions deemed of value.

RM Artillery Regt. in support of 3 Cdn Inf Div.

* CO RMA Regt. - Lt. Col. JOHNSTON.

* 26 Centaur and 7 Sherman tanks were landed on D day, one troop at H+10 mins and the remainder at H+120 mins.

* 4 Centaur and 1 Sherman tanks were landed during D+ 1 day.

* 2 Centaurs returned to UK.

Direct Fire on the Beaches During the Run in:

* No direct fire was employed during the run in on orders of GOC 3 Cdn Inf Div, owing to obscurity of targets and to lateness of arrival.

* Close Support Fire for Infantry while SP Artillery were being Disembarked

* Very useful close support was given and the guns were used extensively in eliminating snipers and strong points.

Indirect fire from beaches:

* No indirect fire was provided from the beaches owing to:

. a) the lateness of arrival.

. casualties to FOOs.

. c) one troop being beached in very deep water when SPs were arriving, requiring the rapid clearance of the beach.

Initial Period Under Command:

On the evening of D day, three troops were placed under command 4 SS Bde, 47 RM Cdo, and performed very valuable services for the Commandos in street fighting, destroying enemy strong points at point blank range and leading commandos down uncleared streets using Besas.

Remaining troops moved forward under the command of RCA regiments, two troops per regiment. Owing to the fluidity of the Canadian front and the fact that FOOs were preoccupied with SP guns, the Marine artillery was not employed until D+3, when they assumed their normal role in close support of the infantry.

On D+4 three troops in support of 46 RM Commando performed an independent operation providing concentrations on ROSEL and ROTS for 7 minutes. Subsequently, three troops were again used on ROTS when a heavy and very useful concentration was laid down.

BM RCA, 3 Cdn Div:

Marine artillery performed according to plan but, owing to lateness of arrival of the bulk of the guns, were unable to provide maximum effect. A very useful role was performed at ST AUBIN SUR MER in clearing out the garrison.

RM Artillery Regt in support 50 Inf Div

* CO RMA Regt. - Lt. Col. BESSETT.

* Of sixteen LCTA, three beached on time, one on 69 Bde sector and two on 231 Bde sector. Between D and D+2 four LTA arrived which had been delayed by heavy weather. Four LCTA returned to UK and the fate of five other LCTAs is as yet unknown. In addition to the severe weather the convoy speed was apparently excessive from the departure.

Direct fire on Beaches during Run in:

* No targets were engaged on run in, on either brigade sector.

Close support fire for infantry while SP artillery were being disembarked:

* At H+6, three LCTAs were ashore carrying six Centaurs and one Sherman, but two mechanical breakdowns occurred due to clutch and track failure. The Sherman was hit and burnt out on the beach. Besa and 95 min fire was directed against targets of opportunity but, owing to the small number of the Centaurs available, the effect was small.

Indirect Fire from the Beaches:

* No indirect fire was provided from the beaches as no Sherman command tanks were available for communications.

Initial period under command:

At H+7 three Centaurs under command 147 Fd Regt fired 33 rpg supporting the attack of 47 RM Commando on the LONGUES battery, providing useful neutralising fire. They then proceeded to LA ROSIERE in the evening but were forced to return to DUBOT owing to enemy action. On D+1 they returned to LA ROSIERE and took up anti tank positions, but did not see action in this capacity Approximately 10 rpg were fired against a gun on the cliff in the area of square 7887 providing adequate neutralisation for the infantry

Five Centaurs on the left flank went under command of 86 Fd Regt instead of 147 Fd Regt and were able, with the subsequent arrival of LCTAs, to form two complete troops by the evening of D+1. The first shoot for these tanks, apart from using Besas against MGs and snipers in the area of 86 Fd RHQ on D day, was on D+4 as part of the regimental fire plan on AUDRIEU.

Following this, they were employed to thicken up artillery in front of field regiments.

It was felt that, had 32 tanks been landed with the FOOs available, a vital role could have been performed in assisting the infantry at LE HAMEL, which held out for the whole of D day, and in coping with the numerous infantry and MG nests as well as two 88 mm guns on the NIEUVAINE RIDGE, which were available targets. Great assistance could have been provided 47 RM Cdo in operations against PORT-EN BESSIN, had the necessary force been available. Very close artillery support was required and this could have been most effectively supplied by the Marine artillery

Marine Artillery Ind. Bty in support of 3 Br Inf Div

Tp Offr Ind Bty.

* At H hour, eight Centaurs and two Shermans were landed on RED beach, but four of them were drowned, and four Centaurs landed on WHITE beach half an hour late without difficulty. One LCTA returned to the UK and one LCTA arrived at D+ 1.

Direct Fire on Beaches during Run in:

All craft fired on the run in. Visibility was very bad on WHITE beach, but the beach was sprayed with Besas and a house occupied by snipers was set on fire.

Close support fire for infantry while SP artillery were being disembarked:

On RED beach the infantry were hard pressed and suffering heavy casualties and Centaur fire was considered of great value. On WHITE beach there was very little to do as there were no emplacements to cope with. Some shelling was done against buildings occupied by enemy snipers.

Indirect fire from the Beaches:

No indirect fire was provided from the beaches because of casualties to F00s and Centaurs.

Initial period under command:

BM RA, 3 Br Div.

Five Centaurs and two Shermans were placed under command 33 Fd Regt in a counter mortar role but were withdrawn to 4 SS Bde before employment.

2 I/C 33 Fd Regt.

Marine artillery came under command at H+4 and went into action NE of HERMANVILLE. They were moved into the regimental area at H+12 and placed on regimental grid and frequency and fired two or three shoots on D day. The only role performed was in thickening fire on LEON SUR MER, where they were extremely useful. They remained in reserve until D+3 when they were withdrawn. More use could have been made of the Marine artillery by allocating some strong point or village as their responsibility instead of leaving them in reserve.

CRA, RMA

Brig. SAUNDERS.

The role of the Marine artillery was seriously affected by the Navy's failure to land the LCTAs at the right time and place.

The bad weather caused disproportionate casualties, forcing a large number of craft to turn back to the UK, causing others to founder and seriously interfering with the timing so that a large percentage arrived late and were unable to fulfil their role as defined.

If there had been a high degree of resistance on the beaches, their use in the original role planned would have been extremely valuable. As there was not the resistance on the beaches that had been anticipated, they were used against targets of opportunity where 25 pdrs and SPs would have been adequate.

In subsequent operations they proved of great value in eliminating snipers and defended posts and as close support artillery.

Deputy CRA, RMA

Col. HARVEY

It is felt that the RMA should have landed their own FOOs at H hour as FOOs of SP regiments were fully occupied with their own units and were consequently unable fully to utilise Marine artillery resources. In addition, in later phases, tanks could have been allocated independently of SP regiments and greater value obtained from available weapons. This policy has subsequently been followed in 6 Airborne Division where three troops are being made up using Marine artillery equipment and available personnel and organised to provide two FOOs and the necessary battery staff. This will permit employment in an independent role under the direction of the CRA.

The present troop composition of one Sherman to four Centaurs appears satisfactory. It is possible that an M 10 chassis with 17 pdr mounted is warranted to obtain improved performance against armour and fixed defences.

In view of the susceptibility of the Centaur in forward areas to anti tank attack with the need for close infantry support, it would be desirable to have increased range up to the limit of the 95 min.

A carrier should be provided for each FOO, as at present he must go forward in a Sherman which may not be desirable.

One 15 cwt per troop is required for ammunition, water, and food to avoid administrative difficulties which are unavoidable when dependent on extraneous sources.

If employed in a limited role, provision for first line repairs should be made by the inclusion of a small REME detachment in a 15 cwt for each four troops to diagnose troubles and arrange for their treatment. Fourteen tanks have been abandoned owing to inadequate facilities for their repair and recovery.

Addendum: Employment of Marine Artillery During "NEPTUNE" Operations

General

In the preparation of this report the following considerations governed the method of treatment and limited the amount of detail contained in it.

1. The Royal Marine Artillery was returning to the UK within two days from the time that the study was initiated.

2. Until the time of departure for the UK the RMA were engaged in operations in close support of infantry formations and, owing to casualties sustained in the assault, it was impossible to detach an officer from each Regiment to return to the assault area to reconstruct the action which took place.

Even had this been feasible, it is doubtful if a complete picture could have been obtained without questioning each officer who had participated, a process requiring a period of time much exceeding that available.

3. It was understood that the information was required as quickly as possible by the BGS (SD), 21 Army Group.

**********

The beaches were visited with the intention of reconstructing as far as possible the effect which the Marine Artillery had achieved. The analysis was extremely difficult and no exact conclusions could be drawn for the following reasons:

1. Fourteen days had elapsed since the assault and much of the evidence had been removed or obliterated. Knocked out Centaur tanks, which would have disclosed targets on which their effect could have been studied, had been removed.

2. Many of the fortifications were in the process of being occupied by our own troops as bivouacs and in the course of this many changes had been made. Damaged enemy weapons had been removed, shelters had been repaired and the scene had changed very considerably. Extensive beach clearing operations had been performed, thus further complicating the task of assessment.

3. The involved nature of the fire plan, in which many different weapons had been employed and which in the target area had produced a similar effect, had created an area of destruction on an extensive scale which made it impossible to differentiate exactly between elements of the fire plan or to isolate the relatively small effect of the Marine Artillery.

In view of the above considerations the report is dependent on the information available from the participants and it is felt that it contains all the conclusions which are warranted.

[ May 17, 2005, 02:24 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Kingfish]

Good Lord, Man, where do you find this stuff?!?

[JonS]

Oh, you know. Here and there. One source leads to another.

Incidentally, what would you reccomend as a stand in for the Centaur in a CMAK D-Day scen?

[Kingfish]

My pick would be the Sherman IB. The Churchills are either too slow or too heavily armored, and there are no 95mm equipped Valentines. The Bishop is also too slow, and that honking big turret is paper thin.

[JonS]

Mmm. Ok, hadn't thought of that. What about a Crusader MkI or Mk II (CS)? The gun is 75mm instead of 95mm, but visually it's 'British'. The difference in calibre is possibly moot given the way CM models fortifications. The armour 'feels' like it'd be a better fit than a Sherman too.

[Kingfish]

Good pick as well, although I've noticed that Crusaders in CMAK are rather 'skittish', and would back away from a threat even if they had numbers on their side. I'm not sure how they would act against a gun-armed PB.