US Tankers & the opinions they had for US armor

[Guest kking199]

Several points I would like to make here.

I am new to CM, but not to WWII history or sims.

1. Is CM Historically accurate?? Can "we" answer this question? I fully agree with the statement that understanding "how" the Germans practiced defense on a normal basis would help clarify their performance perceptions. Please remember that in most of the Western theater the Germans were in well prepared defensive positions. Safe to assume with Guns pre-sighted at several kill zones. Tactics, numeric superiority, and combined arms had a definite effect on the "performance" of the M4. Some how we must "simulate" all these factors. Is this difficult... yes, can you make everyone happy.. no. It seems to me that CM does a pretty good job of balancing all the factors.

2. Eisenhower's "opinion" of the M4's performance. Remember he was not on the battlefield, he was also an American who believed, or wanted to believe, that America had the "best" equipment, like most Americans did at that time. It was important for the highers ranking officers not to degrade the M4, that would certainly would have had major negative moral consequences. What did you want to happen, Eisenhower send a Memo stating... "M4 piece of sh*t, please use accordingly?!?!" come on. I would love to know what Patton thought about the M4 vs the German V & VI. Remember that Eisenhower was playing politician, spokesperson, and chief moral officer while head of SHAEF.

My $.02. BTW this is a great forum!

[Jeff Duquette]

First and foremost, excellent post Grisha. You have obviously done some homework.

The Sherman weighed in at approximately 32 tons, and had an approximately 60in

diameter turret ring. The Sherman could easily have been upgraded with a larger turret and gun (up to and including a 90mm main gun...remember that the Israelis Army eventually upgraded the Super Sherman to a 105mm main gun).

The Armoured branch of the U.S. Army did apparently want an upguned version of the Sherman as early 1942 (chief talk was focused around installation of the 3in AT gun). The eventual plan would evolve toward a 90mm upgunned Sherman, as well as new larger Tanks with 90mm guns (presumably the something along the lines of the M26).

However, Army Ground Forces (AGF) wanted the Sherman to function as part of maneuver elements only (breakthrough and exploitation…not tank fighting). Under this doctrine/philosophy tank vs. tank fighting would be left solely to Tank Destroyers and Anti Tank Artillery. AGF had the ultimate authority over the structure, weapons and doctrine of the US Army during WWII. The lack of a heavy tank in the US ARMY arsenal in 1943 and 1944 was a deliberate implementation of Doctrine.

Weather the doctrine was flawed or not is not really worth debating. It does however go along way toward explaining the lack of a heavy tank in American arsenal in 43-44.

Regarding the obstinacy of high-ranking folks such as Eisenhower digging in their heels on this issue, other than never having seen this implication associated with Eisenhower's name before, he would simply have been implementing official doctrine.

Gen. Leslie J. McNair commanded the AGF at that time when inclusion of a heavy tank would still have been realistically possible. McNair was the man behind the Tank Destroyer concept. In order to understand the design and use of American Armour during WWII, you have to understand McNair, his philosophies, and the politics of the US Army General Staff both before and during the early days of WWII. There is an excellent work available at CMHI on the Tank Destroyer: its evolution, doctrine, and proposed employment. Goes along in explaining this whole issue. Just a side note: Ironically McNair was killed at the very onset of Cobra, when some of the Allied Carpet bombing fell short of its intended mark.

Regarding someone's suggestion of putting side-by-side accounts with German tankers, great idea...real easy to suggest. A tad bit more difficult to do the legwork associated with such a suggestion. If you are going to cast out arbitrary criticism of someone else's "sweat", how about backing it up with some research of your own.

[Guest Michael emrys]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Jeff Heidman:

That being said, I do think that the actions of people like General McNair and (to a lesser extent) Eisenhower where almost criminally flawed. The Sherman was grossly inferior. It was a serious error on the part of the US to assume that there was no need for a heavy tank. The things is, errors are excusable, but the Army brass went to very great lengths to deny that there was a problem long after it was obvious. This resulted in the solution taking that much longer to be implemented.

Errors are excusable. Being pig-headed about being wrong is not. Being pig-headed to the point of getting your own men killed rather than admit you made a mistake is damn near criminal, and what the US Army did borders somewhere between the second and third. Eisenhowers "instructions" reflected that. He was more interested in being told what he wanted to hear than he was interested in the truth.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

I have to say that my natural sympathies are to agree more than disagree with you. But to be fair (to the truth even more than to the personalities involved) a couple of things need, I think, to be fine-tuned here.

First if all, I know next to nothing of Gen. McNair and the deliberations that eventuated in the equiping of the tank corps, so I will not undertake a defense of him here. In any event, he had been dead for over half a year by the time the survey in question had been taken.

As for Eisenhower's role, I doubt very much that he had anything to do with what tanks the Army decided to build. He was busy from autumn 1942 on with running a theater of operations, meaning that he had to make the best he could with what he was given. He could send requests for more and better equipment up the pipeland and hope that somebody was listening and would respond. But the ultimate production decisions were out of his hands.

Additionally, I think he could look at the statistics of kills/losses and draw his own conclusions. This may have fallen well within the range of what was considered tolerable. Everyone would like to improve the statistics. Further, everyone would prefer that none of our guys got hurt at all. But war is a bloody, costly exercise and thus far nobody had been able to make it otherwise. In order to conduct a war, one had to accept losses.

So what was General Eisenhower supposed to do? Call a press conference and announce that our tanks really suck and America's sons are being needlessly slaughtered by the basketload, and until American industry provides the US Army with the perfect equivalent of the Panther, I am cancelling all further operations? Well, we can all imagine where that would go.

The war wasn't going to stop. It was going to be fought and it was going to have to be fought with what was at hand. So what I think was going on with the report that Grisha has shared with us was an attempt to build confidence among the ranks. I think that like most such efforts, it comes off looking dishonest and half-assed because it doesn't really address the very real concerns of the guys on the pointy end, but as you noted simply glosses over them. And that kind of thing succeeds only in discrediting its authors and higher command in general.

But to call it criminal is going just a bit too far. I call it a regrettable but sincere error of judgement.

Michael

[Jeff Duquette]

A German opinion on the Sherman

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The preferences of the crews for lighter, more maneuverable Panzers was recorded in a report written on November 1944 by Albert Speer on his trip to Italy during 19 to 25 October 1944:

On the Southwest Front, opinions are in favor of the Sherman tank and its cross-country ability. The Sherman tank climbs mountains that our Panzer crews consider impassable. This is accomplished by the especially powerful engine in the Sherman in comparison to its weight. Also, according to reports from the 26.Panzer-Division, the terrain-crossing ability on level ground (in the Po valley) is completely superior to our Panzers. The Sherman tanks drive freely cross-country, while our Panzers must remain on trails and narrow roads and therefore are very restricted in their ability to fight.

All Panzer crews want to receive lighter Panzers, which are more maneuverable, possess increased ability to cross terrain, and guarantee the necessary combat power just with

a superior gun. This desire by the troops corresponds with conditions that will develop in the future as a result of the drop in production capacity and of the fact that, because of a shortage of chrome, sufficient armor plate can't be produced to meet the increased production plans. Therefore, either the number of Panzers produced must be reduced or it will be necessary to reduce the thickness of the armor plate. In that case, the troops will unequivocally ask for a reduction of the armor thickness in order to increase the total number of Panzers produced.

(Jentz’s Panzer Truppen Vol 2 pg 150-151) <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Another…Shermans on the Eastern Front:

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The combat power of the Sherman tanks with Russian crews doesn't appear to be especially high, because the Russian tank crews have very little faith in this tank. Many times, crews abandoned Sherman tanks that were still serviceable after receiving the first hit. This Sherman tank, just like the T34 tank has not evolved to withstand the superior effectiveness of the Pz.Kpfw.lV and Sturmgeschuetz weapons. In general, firefights are conducted at ranges between 1200 and 2200 meters.

(Jentz’s Panzer Truppen Vol 2 pg 219) <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

[Maastrictian]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>

[the greyhound is] Not as effective as the so-called "Staghound" manufactured in the United States for the British

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Great post! Of topic question: what is a Staghound?

--Chris