billbindc

I'm wondering what it says about Russian logistics that these assets remained in such a vulnerable position for what looks like three separate attacks that knocked out up to 22 aircraft. Were they simply out of fuel?

Best estimates now 7000 Russian dead and 14000 to 21000 wounded (more likely the latter based on Steve's estimate of the situation): https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/16/us/politics/russia-troop-deaths.html

What would be the actual utility of dropping some tactical nukes on Ukraine? Yes, it would be frightful. Yes, it would hurt Ukraine. It would also likely result in a permanent trade embargo on Russia, the evaporation of any support from China and Russia reduced to some sort of juche style economy. It would also turn the war in Ukraine from a strategic blunder into a tragedy on the level of the Holodomor or the Holocaust. What does permanent pariah status and the united hatred of the world accomplish for Putin and/or Russia?

Those "100 UAVs" are Switchblades.

The effect of US intelligence revelations starting last summer should not be underestimated. They didn't just prepare the information battlefield for this war, they also created intense paranoia within the power vertical in the Kremlin. Putin was so worried about US intelligence penetration that he demanded all preparations be kept within a tight circle. That stunted the entire planning process.

USAF FORTE Global Hawk certainly taking a long look:

What do you all think would be the implications if Kherson was retaken?

Early claims of 30 helicopters taken out may turn out to be right if that's most of their aviation fuel going up.

The Occidental Observer is a purveyor of anti-Semitic and far right nationalist trash. No thanks.

g So I guess we have something like proof that Russian forces depend on the cellular network too.

Perhaps the best 'big picture' read I've found on where this is and where it's going: https://samf.substack.com/p/the-bankrupt-colonialist?utm_source=twitter&s=r

All of a piece with the Soviet Era. The ROC hierarchy was riven with informers, collaborators and outright KGB agents up to and including Patriarch Alexy II. Putin simply reactivated old links and turned the Church from a whipped cur into a regime guard dog.

Edward Snowden has posted exactly twice since 2/21. That isn't because Russian plans worked out.

Which Opposition Bloc? Didn't they splinter into two?

Ach...I realized I wasn't clear. How much of those 100,000 that Ukraine is putting together will actually get to the battlefield and when. Thanks.

I've been pondering the question of the newly forming units. It's been my supposition that Belarus "joining the war" is almost entirely notional except as a way to divert forces to the NW border and the airstrikes are designed to actually delay their arrival into the active battle. So...here's my question: how many do you think will be in the fight and when?

You break it down precisely: Putin crosses lines, Putin is deluded and Putin is or soon will be desperate. I would counter: 1. Up until a week ago, there was plenty of evidence and a broad consensus that Putin was quite calculating. I think that there's an over correction happening right now to that thesis. One huge miscalculation is not something to dismiss but it doesn't mean that he's suddenly become incapable of rationally analyzing his options. 2. I think Putin certainly had bad information and much of it self inflicted/systemic. It is very clear that those misconceptions have been dispelled by application of Ukrainians introducing Russkiy Mir to Saint Javelin. Back to 1 above. 3. Putin *will* be desperate but that doesn't mean he can't survive a loss at least in the short run. As noted elsewhere in this thread, Milosevic did so (until he made another serious mistake) in part because he wasn't seriously challenged with the system he controlled. Putin is in a similar place with respect to control and if nothing else, Putin is a survivor. I can't see him immolating himself, his family, his imperial idee fixe by escalating beyond control. Mistakes can be made, accident happen, etc but I am pretty sure we aren't going to be climbing much higher on the escalation ladder (or taking the escalation slide, or whatever else the kids call it these days). Thanks for the engagement. Slava Ukrainyi, etc and so forth.

On your last point, I've been relentlessly arguing that the nuke/wmd issue is overblown in the sense that there's no "Hulk, smash!....wave hands....success!!!" move Russia can make that magically resolves things their way. I can see Putin amping up the frightfulness out of desperation but there's no analytical progression that gets him to a win via irradiating or poisoning a Ukrainian city.

Sorry if that came across as snark. Just commenting on the unfathomably profound suspicion in most quarters of any Russian initiative. I think the assumption is that Putin is still trying to 'win' on some level and negotiations will be not be had in good faith until he has no other choice. It's pretty clear that the Kremlin is still grasping for ways to change the equation: https://www.ft.com/content/30850470-8c8c-4b53-aa39-01497064a7b7 I'd be very curious to hear how impactful Chinese aid could be.

There's an argument out there that no negotiation with the Russian government should be taken seriously until well after the troops actually withdraw. I endorse it.

Gents, I wanted to take a second to thank you guys. This forum has turned out to be extremely informative. I'm an old grognard from the dosomefink days who hadn't been on this site for years and it's turned out to be one of the better places to get unregurgitated info. Elvis, thanks for luring me back and thanks to everyone else for the cornucopia of excellent information. Slava Ukrainyi, etc and so forth.

Kofman has made the argument that you can't really know until you see a military in action. Think that's spot on.

I have a friend whose grandmother was nicknamed "le Pigeon" in the the French resistance. The stories are wild.

Btw folks…if you are impressed by the ‘FSB letters’ you should be asking yourself what information contained therein couldn’t be gleaned from a reasonably informed reading of pretty widely known public facts and how easily could it be written by anyone with a pastiche level of knowledge of the way the Russian security state thinks/talks? Once you have the answer, you know how seriously you shouldn’t be taking them.

As a person closely involved with that imbroglio said to me (in effect): “It doesn’t matter if you think Kotkin engaged in essentialism. He’s right!”.