pintere
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Posts posted by pintere
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A clip has been making the rounds of a Russian being very visibly hurled into the air after his tank blew up. Based on the video it looks like he was riding on the tank just in front of the turret on the right hand side. Then, after the tank hit a mine (??) he was flung into the air before landing about 100 metres away.
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13 minutes ago, womble said:
This is a problem, aye. And promising though they seem, from what simulations can tell us, the F-16/AMRAAM combo isn't quite up to it.
What sortof puzzles me is that an ATGM (with a massive warhead to punch through MBT armour) can be effectively launched at 10km range, but "mobile" SAMs struggle to manage that sort of engagement envelope. Starstreak has a ceiling, AIUI of 10km, but won't reach out that far (I don't know the dynamics of why) laterally. Or perhaps Startstreak is rare or fills a more important niche in the AD complex than "Keeping the AHs off our spearpoint formations".
But it seems like it should be a fairly important programme to develop a relatively portable missile that at least matches the range of the threats that the tip of the spear is going to face, and mount it on a chassis that can keep up and survive in the general environment the tip of the spear is expected to exist in. And then send them all to Ukraine.
For the Starstreak, I suspect it has to do with air being lighter at higher altitudes. Thus the total amount of resistance is less going straight up than parallel to the ground the whole way.
The problem exists mostly because this problem was not one that had been anticipated by western armies. The idea was that, in a battlefield with air superiority (if not air parity) then MANPADS would only be a last resort weapon against close in attacks.
As this war shows, there’s absolutely a need for a new MANPADS that can engage helicopters at low altitude and long ranges. I sure hope Western developers have recognized this and are at least in the early phases of a project like this by now.
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2 hours ago, Jr Buck Private said:
I'm starting to wonder if they can pull this off without the F16s.
We‘ll know the answer to that soon enough. But without them it’ll definitely be much riskier. Those Ka-52s need a tactical solution, and the most promising one seems to be F-16s coupled with western AA missiles.
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Maybe Ukraine would be better off launching their summer offensive in Luhansk this year, with the aim of capturing Starobilsk. Though it wouldn’t be as decisive as reaching the Sea of Azov, they’d have far fewer minefields to contend with. If it really is the case that Ukraine is at a critical disadvantage without western jets, then it might be worth reconsidering their strategy so that they can still score a major victory with a lower likelihood of failure. This ought to keep the western supply of arms flowing too.
Then, next summer, they can have another crack at the south with higher quality ground and air forces.
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5 hours ago, Bulletpoint said:
How big would that breakthrough need to be in order to say the offensive succeded? Of course we don't know what the Ukrainian command considers their objective for this counteroffensive, but how much would it take to be seen as a success for the Ukrainian public and from the allies?
Reach the Sea of Azov. Simple as that. Alternatively, if they take Starobilsk I’d say that’d also count as a (admittedly less decisive) operational victory, as this city is a key railroad/logistics hub and its capture would mean the Russians could only route railway traffic through Rostov.
Since Bakhmut was in Ukrainian hands last fall, I don’t think its recapture could be considered the success that Ukraine needs right now, as its value is limited and Ukraine presumably allowed it to fall in order to preserve forces for the summer.
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1 hour ago, Bulletpoint said:
While it's still too early to declare the Ukrainian counteroffensive a failure, it's definitely not progressing much so far.
At what point in time will we be able to properly evaluate the Ukrainian counteroffensive? Start of Autumn?
I’d say that if the Ukrainians still haven’t achieved a breakthrough by September, then we can say the counteroffensive probably fell short of its main objective.
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6 minutes ago, Twisk said:
I don't really know anything about this but out of interest why couldn't a simplified bridge layer like the M104 Wolverine be used to create a literal bridge through a minefield? If you want a path just lay a big hunk of metal along that path (a stronger marston mat reinforced with kevlar?).
Mines make the ground unsafe so just make a new layer of ground above thatIt would potentially be vulnerable to artillery, but if it was made out of the right material…
The only issue I could see would be that this approach would be VERY slow and (more than clearing mines by hand for sure) would be really hard to hide from the enemy.
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Unconfirmed, but it seems like Surovikin may have been arrested.
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/18817
"A Report has appeared on the “Ukraine” Telegram channel, quoting the Russian rosZMI media channel that Surovikin was arrested on the evening of June 27 and is detained in the Lefortovo pre-trial detention center along with his deputy, Colonel-General Andriy Yudin.
Kyiv Post was unable to verify this at this time and is investigating."
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I wonder, where are all those tanks/artillery gonna come from? They’re already struggling to supply enough to the army in Ukraine, and even all the ones Wagner had won’t be nearly enough.
On the other hand, this does increase the probability we‘ll finally see a T-34 operational once again
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Going back to the war in Ukraine for a moment, we do have a piece of good news.
According to the newspaper, Germany has already handed over 34 Gepard systems to Ukraine, and another 15 will be delivered in the coming weeks.
“In addition, we want to deliver up to 30 more Gepard systems by the end of the year in cooperation with the United States,” Freuding said.
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14 minutes ago, Sojourner said:
So, what if this so called insurrection is a bit of theater to accomplish exactly that, and open a new front in the north, without unduly raising eyebrows? I think a tip-off might be Prigozhin's frequent use of the phrase, "all according to plan." Putin has been trying to get Lukashenko to join the party, and Luka's been reluctant probably due to fear of retaliation. But now Luka has nukes, so that's no longer an excuse. Putin looking weak for backing down to Prig will be quickly forgotten if he can roll into Kiev in a matter of days.
There’s a million other ways he could’ve done that which wouldn’t make the world hold their breath for another revolution in Russia.
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34 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:
Two counters to this:
1. I think he could have. Easily. Defending it against VDV and Spetsnaz? Yes, for a while anyway. But the coup would likely have been over, one way or another, before those forces could be brought in so not really relevant.
2. He didn't need Moscow to get major concessions. He could have sat in Rostov and gotten way, way, way more than what he wound up with.
Even if he got cold feat about accidentally taking over Russia, he could have withdrawn his forces to Rostov and likely held out indefinitely against security forces. The only way the Kremlin could have got Prig out of Rostov would be to abandon the entire south of Ukraine (due to lack of supplies) and used the withdrawn forces to oust him. No matter how low you think the chances of this happening might be, they would likely be higher than Putin would want to risk. Prig had all the cards.
Which gets me back to something critical behind the scenes changed in favor of Putin and against Prig. Prig got spooked and he decided to accept a crappier deal, but a certain one, rather than try for a better deal that would end with him hanging by piano wire if he failed.
Steve
What I wonder about is what Prig‘s endgame was this whole time. I can’t imagine he could’ve negotiated for any sort of concessions as soon as he began taking over sovereign Russian territory with his troops. Say he bottled up in Rostov. What then? He might be a thorn in Russia‘s side for a while, but if no one came to his aid then he’d just be waiting to get bombed out ala Grozny style.
I’m pretty sure he and his co-conspirators were all in, but not enough important people defected to him for the plan to work, and so he chose the off ramp. Could he have taken Moscow if he chose to reject Luka‘s offer? Maybe, but without defections from other local forces I wouldn’t be so sure.
The force sent to Moscow apparently had ~5000 men, and though there wasn’t exactly a lot in the way aside from special forces, Rosgvardia and police, I doubt that even the skilled Wagner detachment could’ve captured the city in the face of substantial resistance. If Kyiv 2022 taught us anything it’s that even a somewhat ragtag defense can prevail if it’s defending a major urban centre and if all it needs to do is delay for a crucial period of hours.
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6 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
That is a helluva theory. “A force capable of dislodging him from Rostov”. That is an urban area of 1.1 million. If he decided to dig in even with a few thousand he could have Fallujah-ed it likely for weeks. He had enough troops to insurgency things for months while controlling the freakin RA logistical backfield. Wagner not only had the means, they had the position…they were dominating the RAs interior lines largely unopposed.
I do not think it was threat of military force that backed him down, he already crossed that threshold when they started shooting down RUAF assets. The guy had the southern theatre HQ and likely the critical node in the RA C4ISR backbone - even threatening to blow that all to hell would get people thinking twice.
Whelp, I guess in ten years we can have a Hot Thread reunion and all go “remember that weekend in Jun 23?”
My best bet is that Prig concluded that either:
1) He wouldn’t be able to take control of Moscow with the limited forces he had.
2) Even if he DID, he wouldn’t last long without other Russian players taking his side.
We have to keep in mind what each party had in mind for an endgame. Prig was probably planning to overthrow the current military (if not political) leadership, and had been planning this for some time. He knew full well that his plans would go nowhere unless others joined him in his rebellion, but that support never materialized for whatever miscalculation. Now he’s in a bind, and even if he consolidates in Rostov his days are numbered.
Meanwhile Putin and Russia want to stop Prig, and Luka basically offers Prig an off ramp that Prig at least gives him a plausible chance of surviving this ordeal with his power somewhat intact. So he decides to stand down.
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Best theory of what happened that I’ve heard (though I disagree about the Chechens):
"Verdict from some official news sources as to the about-face is apparently that Prigozhin had been counting on public and some high-level support for his coup, but not enough materialised even with the defections, while a force capable of dislodging him in Rostov in the form of the Chechens was appearing to his south.
Perhaps Prigozhin realised he might not take Moscow even if he got there, and even if he took Moscow he can't hope to hold it. So when Lukashenko called to cut a deal where he and his forces could get out alive without charges, he took it. The coup was well-planned, but circumstances beyond his control prevent him from succeeding."
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9 minutes ago, FancyCat said:
Let's dial it back some. Prig was about to lose his power and life?, he called MoD's bluff? Neither want to do full scale gang war, so having shown he can escalate, he gets to live, gets to do something in Belarus, keeps a small army, and gets actual power recognition by everyone including Putin. If it ain't some Turkish coup power play, maybe reality is taking over the Russian state isnt easy, nor exactly desired...plus a cook ain't becoming head of state. He probably would have been quietly rid of had he gotten to Moscow and trapped by bureaucracy.
That’s the only way this whole thing would make sense then. Somehow, Prig came to the conclusion that his grip on Wagner was slipping and he himself was in danger. So, in order to prevent the MOD from achieving their plans, he decided to make his move like this.
But, either before or during the process of his thunder run to Moscow, he decided that he had no realistic chance to topple Putin and so forced what he thought were good concessions when he had Moscow by the throat.
Maybe he’s just trying to buy time while maintaining a decent contingent of troops he can rely on. What his (and Putin‘s) long game is remains to be seen.
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We may soon see Chally 2s joining the fight
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1 minute ago, akd said:
Another one:
2x Mi-8 EW
1x Mi-35
1x Ka-52
1x Il-22M
Good. Let all those damned Ka-52s fall out of the sky, it’ll make the work for the UAF way easier.
Speaking of which…
The Armed Forces of Ukraine successfully crossed the Dnieper in the area of the Antonovsky Bridge, there is a battle going on, - Z-channels.
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1 minute ago, Haiduk said:
Kadyrov troops, for example. Here they approaching to Rostov. Grigb posted this already in own thread, but let it be separately
Good luck to both sides. Alas, I don't like popcorn %)
ok ok so here we have it, a military coup against Moscow, and Putin plans to put it down with Chechens?
Assuming they don’t just defect, if it came to a showdown between Wagner and Kadyrov‘s TikTok warriors I know who I’m putting my money on.
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9 minutes ago, Haiduk said:
Wagners don't interfere to Army execute own tasks in Ukriane
And who will Putin be using to oust Wagner from Rostov? As soon as fighting starts to go down there Wagner will take a stand against any unpatriotic Russians, war in Ukraine be damned
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If the rumours about Wagner approaching Krasnodar are true, then soon Russia will only have one railway line to supply all their forces in Ukraine…
I’d say it’s time for the AFU to start HIMARSing the s*** out of Starobilsk. Then the whole Russian frontline in the south will be cut off.
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7 minutes ago, womble said:
Maintaining artillery superiority is another reason for a broad advance. If you generate a salient, you have to put your CB assets into the salient to be able to reach the enemy's batteries that are "in front" of the projection in your lines, which brings your long-ranged CB assets into range of shorter-ranged enemy fires to the sides of the pocket. Which is obviously suboptimal. So you need a broad, uniform front of advance, so that the enemy is always "in front" of you, not to the sides. Patton would have a fit.
I think that ties into one of the assumptions by the authors. Ukraine doesn’t have the manpower or material superiority to push the Russians back on a broad front. Therefore they’ll need to pick a spot they’re confident they can breach, smash the lines there and surge towards the south. But from the time they create a salient until the actual breakthrough, they will be more vulnerable.
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1 hour ago, Haiduk said:
Russian TG says according to their source in General Staff, in result of today's strikes on ammo dumps in Kherson oblast was lost 15-20 % of ammunition, stored for defense of southern direction. As if also were lost about of 30 servicemen and dozens of vehciles, including tanks.
Thought, it can be also disinformation
Surely no sane person would give away the exact percentage of ammunition lost…
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From RUSI, by the same guy who wrote the recent report about Russian tactics:
"Ukrainian forces are making gains, but the offensive is some way from its decisive phase; we must refrain from premature pronouncements of success or failure.
Ukrainian forces have launched their long-anticipated offensive in an attempt to break through Russian defence lines to liberate the occupied territories. Ukrainian troops have broken through initial fighting positions along a broad part of the front, but remain some distance from Russia’s main defence line. Kyiv has yet to commit the bulk of its forces as its lead elements try to set the conditions for a breakthrough.
The fighting so far has been tough. Russia’s initial fighting positions constituted fox holes and hand-dug trenches, but behind these were complex minefields of anti-tank and antipersonnel mines, covered by Russian UAVs and artillery. The main defence line, still 15–20 km from Ukrainian positions, has properly dug trenches and concrete-reinforced firing posts, tank obstacles, ground-laid cable to coordinate artillery strikes, and even more mines. Behind that are the reserve fighting positions of the third defence line.
The fighting will likely get tougher. As Ukrainian forces penetrate deeper into the defences, they will come into range of more Russian artillery firing posts. Moreover, their own artillery will be able to deliver fewer counterbattery missions, and the Ukrainian lines of advance will become more predictable, as they must follow the breaches identified in the minefields. As Ukrainian troops push forwards, they will also be covered by fewer air defences, and will likely come under greater attack by the Russian Aerospace Forces and aviation.
Given these threats, the Ukrainian military is currently trying to achieve three things. Firstly, there is an intense counterbattery duel being fought, with both sides trying to strike each other’s logistics, command and control, reconnaissance, and artillery systems. The Russians are hunting for Ukraine’s artillery with Lancet UAVs. The Ukrainians are utilising Storm Shadow and GMLRS to try to destroy Russian command and control and munitions stockpiles.
Secondly, the Ukrainians are trying to get the Russians to commit their reserves, moving troops from the third defence line to bolster sectors under pressure. Once these troops are pulled forwards, it will become easier to identify the weak points in the Russian lines, where a breakthrough will not be met by a new screen of repositioned forces.
Thirdly, the Ukrainian military is trying to put pressure across the front to advance through the first line of defences in as much breadth as possible. The reason for this is to increase the options for attacking the main defence line and to keep Russian forces uncertain as to where the main effort will be launched. Furthermore, with such a long front, stretching out Russian troops limits their ability to stack units in depth, pulling more forward.
At some point, the Ukrainians will have to decide where to commit their main assault units, and the offensive will enter its decisive phase. This decision must be conditions-based. It isn’t about adhering to some fixed timeline. When these units are committed, the offensive will either achieve a breakthrough or fail. Success is binary, not linear. The line is either broken or it is not, and Kyiv must shape the battlefield to maximise the probability of a breach.
The extent of a success will be determined by how much progress is made on the other side of the breach. If a breach can be achieved, then the critical question will be how many units Ukraine has in reserve to surge forward and exploit the success. If operations are currently methodical, once a breach in the line occurs, speed will be of the essence.
The uncertain variable in the current offensive is Russian morale. Russian units are currently fighting from prepared positions and their command-and-control infrastructure is mostly intact, though some key command posts have been struck. If Russian units can be forced to reposition, however, the poor training and discipline of Moscow’s forces could see the defence become uncoordinated and susceptible to collapse. Bringing about such conditions would require some significant actions by the Ukrainians to get the Russians moving, but it is possible under such conditions for the strength of the defence to crumble rapidly. Ukraine can endeavour to bring such a situation about, but it cannot be counted on.
For Ukraine’s international partners, the summer is likely to be deeply uncomfortable. Losses will mount and success will take time. It is vital, however, that there is no diminution in the strengthening of the training programmes allowing Ukraine to continue to generate combat units, or the mobilisation of defence industry to put supply to the Ukrainian military on a sustainable basis. However much territory is liberated in this offensive, the critical variable is convincing the Kremlin that even if its defeat comes in stages, it is coming."
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1 hour ago, Grigb said:
From me. I am making them based on content inside of the boxes. Basically I read post, I make map, mark settlements, mark actions (directions of attacks) then put text boxes with descriptions at close to location as possible.
Well that’s some top notch work!
How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
Seems like Erdogan‘s actions back up his most recent words as well. The commanders of the Azov Regiment that went into captivity at Mariupol last year have been allowed to return to Ukraine from their Turkish exile.