Jimmy Carter

Hey Guys!!
 
I've got a quick question about Artillery ammunition counts. I have searched and gone through the advance copy of the manual but couldn't find the answer to this - so my apoologies if this has already been covered elsewhere.
 
In all previous Combat Mission titles - indirect fire assets such as an off board mortar or howitzer would be depicted as having a set ammunition count showing the different types of ammunition available. However, using one type of ammunition was always to the detrmient of the other.
 
So for instance, if I had a mortar that had 160 HE rounds and 24 Smoke Rounds and if I fired all of my HE rounds in an opening salvo at the start of the scenario - that Gun would then show as "empty" for the remainder of the scenario despite the fact it should still have 24 smoke rounds which hadn't been used yet.
 
Now, being an old Gunner myself, I know full well High Explosive and Smoke projectiles are not interchangeable so it's always sort of mystified me as to how using all of my HE rounds somehow meant all of my smoke rounds were inherently used up too, even though they were never fired. Likewise, I could never figure out what this might be abstracting if it wasn't just a game limitation.  
 
In any event - what I'm wondering is with the introduction of precision munitions in Black Sea, which are going to be inaddition to the HE and smoke rounds they may be stocked with, is whether artillery ammunition is counted/used the same way as seen in previous CM Titles ~or~ whether all rounds are now individually tracked?
 
Meaning - I have 50 HE Rounds, 10 Smoke Rounds and 5 Precision Rounds - If I use all 50 of my HE rounds, will my guns still show as empty ~or~ will they now correctly show that I have only used up my 50 HE rounds and that I still have my 10 Smoke Rounds and 5 Precision Rounds left to use?
 
Thanks!!

Donetsk Airport (as you may have noted) has been attacked mainly by non numbered brigades/corps, thus making the use of that example rather dubious, and comparable to (for example) the inability of Counter Terrorism Operation Forces to take the Saur Mogila heights. 
 
Considering that there would be token forces in the area at best, meaning lack of continued defence and lack of substantial mechanised reserves for counter strokes, Russian air and fire, troop command, intelligence and control superiority, enfixing attacks of separatists against the bulk of Counter Terrorism Operation Forces, I do not see anything that would preclude rapid advance, on the post breakthrough WW2 rates (if you are interested I would gladly provide those, as well as the depths of such operations). Morever 250km is not all that deep (by Russian/Soviet terms) - this is completely within a single operational bound.
 
Weeks would be spent consolidating ground, reducing pockets of resistance, installing the pro Russian authorities and so on. The initial advance itself would be rapid (days). Thus while the entire operation could (and most likely would) take time, due to the small depth of the objectives and afore mentioned conditions, the initial advance would be conducted in one leap (with relevant airborne and amphib assaults), which would (most likely) go at a high rate of advance (100+ km/day).
 
p.s. I assume that the war begins in Spring, after the likely offensive by Ukrainian loyalists.

This view (that I am about to express) is hypo-theoretical only. It comes from my personal point of view, and open source information I could gather. I would try to keep this scenario going, if it is of interest to the local community.
 
First of all, what are the Russian (political) objectives in this conflict? To sum up - precluding Ukraine from joining NATO military-political block, precluding Ukraine from being a valid threat to Russia in the future, negating any claim Ukraine has on Crimea, to defend the interests of pro-Russian people of Ukraine.

(p.s. - I seriously doubt NATO intervention should Russia openly intervene in the conflict, not in the time scale I think it would happen in).
 
To accomplish this Russia requires a substantial buffer zone with friendly (or at least neutral) population, with sufficient economic power to sustain that region, at least partially, to destroy Ukrainian means of fighting war (ie it's armed forces and defence related industry). Such buffer zone would probably be in the form of the Pro-Yanukovich regions (could be seen from voting patterns here)


Hence from military perspective we have the objectives of:
- rapidly defeating the Counter Terrorist Operation Forces east of Dnepr.
- securing the designated territory, installing pro Russian regime there.

What is the balance of forces (I would expand this if requested)?
- Russia has a complete control of air and complete superiority in terms of reckon-strike complexes, intelligence gathering, superiority in quality of equipment and of troop control and command (above battalion).
- Russia currently arms and trains the separatist forces, organising their brigades into corps type structures, restructuring brigades up to mechanised standards.
- both parties (Ukrainian loyalists and Separatists) suffer from major corruption issues, both sides are primarily limited by the supplies of weapons in equipment when rising their military units, as well from manpower deficiency (currently separatists did not enact mobilisation, previous waves of mobilisation has proven to be inefficient for the loyalist forces). Thus any estimates of their forces must be made with utmost caution.

Due to the military-political situation, ie the ongoing Counter Terrorism Operation, poor intelligence (even with NATO support from means such as imint, humint, elint and so on), poor leadership, presence of real and present threat from separatist forces, I doubt that Ukrainian Counter Terrorism Operation Forces would be capable of sending any substantial force out of their area of operation before Russian Armed Forces strike or blow the bridges prior to such an attack.

What is the military geography of the region? The depth of operation is approx. 250km (from Russian jump of points next to the border to the Dnepr river line, objectives in Odessa would be achieved by forces out of Crimea - with amphib, airborne and land borne advances). This constitutes 1, maybe 2 days of advance. There are no valid obstacles before Dnepr, Dnepr itself would be crossed using pantoon bridges and amphib vehicles at points of convenience, providing the encirclement of any actually defended bridgeheads (which were not yet taken by the VDV forces). Pripyat marshes may appear to be a formidable obstacle (to a strike from the north), however they were crossed by Soviet forces in 1944. The road network is sufficient to allow bypassing all of major cities (which would be controlled by special forces, local separatists), the terrain is fairly open, allowing movement away from roads.

What is the required force, to enact the plan? 4 combined arms armies (southern MD, western MD, partially - central MD), VDV forces, Black Sea Fleet.

If so requested I could draw a more complete plan, with OOB for all sides, map of operations and so on. I hope you find this post of interest to you.
p.s. What I don't understand - where does NATO intervention come from? In the scenarios that I for see there is no time for NATO to respond to the developments (unless NATO forces attempt to mount an offensive after Russia has secured it's objectives, but this would be stupid in my opinion).
I would also suggest reading on:
- Bagartion, Vistula-Oder, Manchurian offensives (1944-1945), especially from the point of logistics.
- Reading the articles by the Office of Soviet Studies such as "The high roads of war" (or atleast I think that is what it was called).
- Reading "Red Army" by Ralph Peters if all else fails.

Greetings. I have just registered here on the forums, but have been playing CMSF for several years and am awaiting CMBS very eagerly. I have several questions / suggestions pertaining to some tactical capabilities that can be potentially game-changing on the modern battlefield and the possibility of their implementation in CMBS and its (hopefully) future modules or unofficial modifications. I apologise if this have already been discussed (in that case, can you please direct me to the relevant topics / posts, if possible), but I was not able to find anything relevant through the search (only "Nakidka" has been mentioned a couple of times in passing, it seems, and without official BF comments on it). Also, pardon me if my English is not perfectly clear, since I am a non-native speaker. So, without further ado, how about putting in the game:
 
1.) Vehicles equipped with infrared-blocking and radar-absorbing camouflage covers.
 
The obvious example is the Russian "Nakidka" kit (my apologies for the Wiki link - could not find anything more useful in the English language). Since thermal imaging plays an enourmous role in how most modern combat vehicles and some weapon systems (especially the deadly "Javelin") acquire and engage targets, reducing the vehicle's IR signature should be one of the top priorities for any nation faced with a modern technological opponent (such camouflage should probably become as common as optical camouflage eventually). The radar signature reduction would probably be more significant on the operational level (I do not know if and how the functioning of BRM-1/3 recon vehicles radars is simulated in CMBS), reducing the visibility of the formations to the enemy radioelectronic reconnaissance, but would still perhaps help against certain radar imaging / targeting systems, such as the AH-64's "Longbow".
 
I am not sure if there are currently stocks of the "Nakidka" or similar kits for the regular line service vehicles of the Russian units (this was probably a rather low priority since Russian Ground Forces were not likely to face a major high-tech opponent in the past two decades; however at least the new M2 modification of the 2S19 "Msta-S" SPH seems to come factory-equipped with such countermeasures). However, it should be relatively easy to rush produce them during the mobilization efforts when faced with the real possibility of conflict with NATO (certainly easier than producing new APS units or ERA modules; for example this article (in Russian) claims that the price of one such kit for Armenia was just $2675 in 2005). US/NATO seems to have done some research (.pdf link) too, though I am curious as to how far it has progressed (obviously, encountering major high-tech opponents has not recently been a priority for NATO either).
 
Implementing it: Since I do not know how the CMBS engine deals with IR/radar spectrum (if simulating them at all), I can not offer concrete advice on how to simulate it in the game. If the IR/radar signature is an independent value of the unit, then the camouflage kit should, obviously, directly reduce it in the given proportions. If there is just a single "observation" parameter (combining optical, IR and anything else), then perhaps the camouflage can reduce it by a proportion relative to FLIR/radar system "boosts" factored into the values. For weapons with IR/radar guidance, the camouflage can perhaps increase times needed for acquiring the target and/or increasing the probability of losing target lock in-flight (not sure how air support is implemented - if even ATGM launches are handled as very precise area strikes then perhaps their CEP can be increased when targeting the camouflage-equipped vehicles). Not sure if it is better to handle the process from the targeting ("how much it is seeing") or the targeted ("how much it is seen") vehicle's side, and how to do it without affecting either the observation capabilities of regular optical systems, or the visibility parameters of vehicles without camouflage (it would be really great to have independent IR and radar signature variables if there are not ones now ).
 
As for the vehicle models, while it would be really great to have ones with visible camouflage covers, from gameplay perspective just standard models with changed values and short description modifier (like "T-72B3 'Nakidka'" or "T-72B3 (IR camo)") would suffice.
 
2.) Dedicated smokescreen laying systems for area concealment.
 
As opposed to the already implemented individual smoke screens or artillery smoke rounds with temporary localised effect, how about being able to cover entire areas of the battlefield in the long-term across-the-spectrum (visible/IR/radar) shroud? As an example, here is a recent exercise (in Russian) of the Russian CBRN protection unit - an entire railroad station was concealed for 3 hours with a 2 km long and 200 m high optical/IR/radar impervious smokescreen. The exact designation of the equipment used is not given, but it was probably something like the TMS-65 turbojet spraying vehicle (here is a rather illustrative video of its operation). And Russian chemical units practice such actions rather routinely, training to conceal entire military bases and airfields. Combined with a heavy ECM jamming of GPS signal transmission frequences to block or disrupt satellite positioning, such smokescreens would render just about any piece of precision-guided weaponry ineffective in the protected area (the only thing I can think of that would remain unaffected is inertial guidance, but this method is not very precise to begin with), and any kind of target acquisition beyond the simple notion that "the enemy is somewhere in there" would be completely impossible (the same would also be true for the defenders though - "somebody might be coming at us from somewhere").
 
While this would probably be more common practice at an operational level (protecting sensitive installations in the rear from airstrikes), it is not impossible to imagine it being used in a tactical frontline defensive action (if you have to defend a fixed position against a technologically superior enemy, it is much better if he were not able to use his sophisticated engagement capabilities effectively). Aside from being outright useful, I think it adds the possibility of some very interesting tactical situations (think of having to assault or defend a completely shrouded city, with your and enemy soldiers fighting through an apocalyptic gloom while wearing gas masks, further reducing visibility to almost point-blank engagement ranges, as if city fighting was not already hard and brutal enough as it is ), and therefore would be a welcome addition to the game.
 
Implementing it: Since basic smokescreen mechanics have been present in the game for a long time, it seems that implementing a bigger version of it should not be that hard (yes, very presumptious of me, I know ). There may perhaps be some processing power concerns, but even CMSF already has a capability to produce quite large smokescreen fields (like when a couple of "Stryker" platoons get spooked by a mean-looking T-72 ) without a noticeable effect on performance. In any case, it is probably possible to reduce the smoke field's detalization for the sake of gameplay.
 
3.) Realistic decoy vehicle dummies.
 
Here are some photos of the Russian 45-th independent engineering-concealment regiment training to set up various inflatable high-fidelity (well, relatively speaking ) decoy vehicle dummies. They not only look realistic enough, but also have appropriate moving parts (like turrets) and equipment that reproduces thermal and radioelectronic signatures of the real vehicles. All to confuse the enemy, of course, and to make him waste time and effort destroying these false targets, sparing your real forces some trouble. Since the dummies are easy to transport and deploy (the tank decoy weighs less than 100 kg and takes about 10 minutes to set up) they might prove to be an advantageous asset in a defensive operation. Perhaps the player can be allowed to place them in the deployment stage within the designated zones, where they would stay for the duration of the battle.
 
Implementing it: The real trouble would perhaps be in allowing the player to identify the vehicles as dummies while denying his enemy the same untill his forces make a positive identification (for which they presumably would have to get rather close to them - within less than a kilometer, probably (obviously bound to differentiate depending on the observing unit's capabilities)). The actual models can probably be borrowed from the vehicles that are being simulated (and this course will probably have to be followed if there is no way to present different models of the same unit to the player (dummy) and his opponent (real vehicle model untill identified as dummy)), while adding '(dummy)' classification to their description (though, if the enemy player would be able to see it too, that would obviously defeat the whole purpose ). The on-hit animations and after-effects would probably have to be changed too (it would certainly be nice to have a deflating and a burning/melting animation (or being torn to shreds in case of large explosions), but from gameplay viewpoint simple disappearing into a pile of rubber debris would suffice, perhaps).
 
So, dear Battlefront, can you please-please-please-pretty-please-with-a-cherry-on-top try and implement at least some of these capabilities in one of the further patches or modules? Or, if not, maybe some modification makers are feeling up for the task?
 
In any case, thank You for Your attention.
 
P.S.: As long as we are on topic of softkill countermeasures, I also had a question about the "Shtora" optical-electronic suppression system in the CMBS. Have its emitters been implemented as an upgraded system, now covering the relevant tracking signal spectrum of the TOW-2, or would they only be effective against Ukrainian "Konkurses" and other older SACLOS ATGMs?

and being weird is a good thing, everyone is weird, I'm weird, I love being weird. But being wrong is another thing. Being "offended" over nonsense it's just, pathetic. Pathetically wrong. You have to have a sense of humor in life and not take something seriously, or you'll kill yourself one day. You got to laugh at the things in this life. How black people are continually being segregated against, or how the Americans killed all the native Americans, and called it freedom. It's funny because you're laughing at the Americans at how stupid they are. That's why its funny.

ok, the abstraction principle for things that can't be simulated in the game is too vague, it could be argued both ways. I just don't see a reason, (in some situations) why the unit has to lose his ability to see clearly while trying to hide. It doesn't work for all situations, like if you are hiding in a building and hide in a bathtub, that makes perfect sense, but I feel that you are trying to come up with reasons why the hide command removes situational awareness in each scenario, it could be that way, but it doesn't have to be that way. It's just really subjective of what a person would do to "hide." For example imagine the parking lot example, there is no cover, or maybe some imaginary cover, (trash or trash cans, or a lots of used condoms lying on the floor, which can be used bunched up together to make a improvised guille suit), I don't see a reason why he has to cover his eyes, or block his sight in anyway. But the whole hiding principle is a good principle, and is a good tool, but I think it could be better. Because it could be argued both ways for why it would and would not work, and be reasonable.
Ps, the condom example was a stupid joke.